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THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THEODORET OF CYRUS

ANTIOCHENE CHRISTOLOGY FROM THE COUNCIL OF EPHESUS (431) TO THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON (451)



Paul B. Clayton, Jr.

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PAUL B. CLAYTON, JUN.

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Preface

Theodoret of Cyrus (*c.*393–*c.*466) was the most prominent and able Antiochene theologian in the defence of Nestorius at the Council of Ephesus in 431 and in the two decades following, leading up to the Council of Chalcedon in 451. After the banishment of Nestorius, Theodoret quickly became the leading apologist for Antiochene Christology in the struggle with Cyril and Dioscorus of Alexandria. Although the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius himself largely perished due to their condemnation at Constantinople in 553 or at Ephesus in 431 and presently are extant only in fragmentary form or translations in Syriac or Latin, the voluminous works of Theodoret are largely available to us in Greek and provide an invaluable source for the study of the evolution of Antiochene Christology.

Because it developed in reaction to the Nestorian and Eutychian crises, it is necessary to study Theodoret's Christology in chronological sequence. The significance of his theological terminology in the later and rather more widely known works becomes clear only after a thorough examination of the theology of his earlier works. Though it is a laborious and lengthy process, a careful analysis of his works in chronological sequence is, therefore, the only way to avoid serious misunderstanding of the theology of such later material as the commentaries on Isaiah and Paul's letters or the *Eranistes*, written against the Eutychians. Since he was such a prominent participant in the Christological debate from Ephesus to Chalcedon, such a study throws considerable light on the theology of those councils and the final evolution and content of Antiochene Christology.

The following study demonstrates that Antiochene Christology was rooted in the concern to maintain the impassibility of God the Word, and is consequently a two-subject Christology. The Word is immutable and impassible, incapable of experiencing the human passions of growth, learning, temptation, hunger, thirst, fear, and death on the cross. It is the human subject, the assumed man or humanity, of full rational soul and mortal body, who is the subject of these experiences, who is tempted in the wilderness, who overcomes temptation by his free will and so restores human freedom to be obedient to God's will, who suffers the passion of the cross. There is no evidence anywhere in this considerable body of works of a genuine *communicatio idiomatum.* To the end Theodoret insisted that to admit that one of the Trinity died on the cross would be to confess Arianism, since that

would necessarily involve the *physis*, or nature, of the Word in mortality, making the Word mutable in his divine being and thus less than God.

The conclusion is inevitable. By its fundamental philosophical assumptions about the natures of God and humanity, Antiochene Christology was compelled to assert that there are two subjects in the Incarnation: the Word himself and a distinct human person. It would appear doubtful that this is the hypostatic union of Cyril, Ephesus, and Chalcedon. The differences between the Antiochene and Alexandrine schools were not merely of words, but of substance.

Some expressions of gratitude are in order. The first is to the late Reverend Professor Powel Mills Dawley and the Right Reverend Kenneth J. Woollcombe, who during my days as their student at the General Theological Seminary in New York aroused my interest in Patristic Christology, and then to the late Reverend Professor Cyril Richardson, who fanned that interest into fascination and supervised the first chapters of this work as a doctoral dissertation at the Union Theological Seminary in New York. Additional thanks go to the late Reverend Dean John Meyendorff, St Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, Scarsdale, New York, for continuing the supervision of that work after Professor Richardson's death; then to the Reverend Professor Richard Norris for completing that supervision in his usually thorough and rigorous fashion, and to the Reverend Professor Thomas Hopko, retired dean of St Vladimir's Orthodox Seminary, for translating a lengthy Russian work on Theodoret of Cyrus for me and for many hours of discussion on the topic. Lastly, I must thank my daughters Margaret Joy and Elizabeth Anne, and my wife and curate, the Reverend Sharon H. C. Clayton, for never begrudging me the endless hours and days secluded at typewriter and word processor apart from them.

PAUL B. CLAYTON, JUN.

St Andrew's Episcopal Church, Poughkeepsie, New York,
St Patrick's Day, 17 March 2005

Contents

Abbreviations

ACO	*Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ed. Eduardus Schwartz, 14 vols. in 4 tomes. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1914–71.
NPNF	*A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 2nd series, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. Reprinted Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1952–69.
PG	J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus … Series Graeca*. Paris, 1857–66.
PL	J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus … Series Latina*. Paris, 1844–55.
SC	*Sources Chrétiennes*, ed. H. de Lubac and J. Daniélou. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1941–.

Due to the number of volumes in *PG* and *PL* and the frequency of citations, references to volume and column numbers are given in arabic numerals separated by a colon for both *PG* and *PL*. For example, *PL*, 72: 432–4 refers to vol. lxxii, cols. 432–4.

Since several of the authors to whom I refer wrote numerous articles, often in the same periodical and often in quick succession in debate with other authors also referred to, the normal custom of referring to these authors and their articles after the initial full footnote reference by giving their name and the name of the *periodical*, with volume, date, and page reference, would have been impossibly confusing. I have therefore made references to these articles after the initial full reference by citing the surname of the author and the name of the *article*, sometimes abbreviated, with page number. Full references are given in the bibliography as well as the first footnote reference.

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1

Prolegomena

Canon XIII of the Second Council of Constantinople, the Fifth Ecumenical Council, AD 553, reads:

If anyone shall defend the impious writings of Theodoret directed against the true faith and against the first holy Synod of Ephesus and against St. Cyril and his Twelve Anathemas, and defends that which he has written in defence of the impious Theodore and Nestorius, and of others having the same opinions as the aforesaid Theodore and Nestorius, if any admits them or their impiety, or shall give the name of impious to the doctors of the Church who profess the hypostatic union of God the Word; and if anyone does not anathematize these impious writings and those who have held or who hold these sentiments, and all those who have written contrary to the true faith or against St. Cyril and his Twelve Chapters, and who die in their impiety: let him be anathema.[1]

The works composed by Theodoret against Cyril of Alexandria during and shortly after the Third Ecumenical Council at Ephesus thus lie under the ban of the Fifth Council. The chief result for us is that many of those works are no longer extant or are so only in fragmentary form. But enough remains, particularly in Theodoret's correspondence during and after the Council of Ephesus, for us to reconstruct his Christological convictions and concerns at that stage of the evolution of his doctrine. Even his recent admirers admit that the charges of Nestorianism brought against him as a result of what he was writing in his polemics of 431 are understandable and not without some weight. As we shall see later in this chapter, one of Theodoret's strongest defenders in recent times, Adolfus Bertram, bluntly describes our author's *Refutation of the Twelve Anathemas of Cyril against Nestorius*, composed in that year of 431, as 'the words by which he teaches the unity in Christ do not suffice to prove Theodoret's orthodoxy. . . . The *Refutation of the Anathemas* contains Nestorian doctrine.'[2]

[1] *ACO*, Tom. IV, vol. i, p. 219. The English translation here is from *NPNF*, xiv. 315. English translations of quotations from Theodoret in the *Reprehensio in Duodecim Capitum sey Anathematismorum Cyrilli*, *Historia Ecclesiasticȧ*, the *Eranistes*, and Epistles 1–181 will normally be taken from *NPNF*, iii. 25–348. Otherwise the translations are mine, except as noted.

[2] Adolfus Bertram, *Theodoreti, Episcopi Cyrensis, Doctrina Christologica* (Hildesiae, 1883), p. v: 'verba, quibus in Christo unitatem docet, ad Theodoreti orthodoxiam probandam non sufficiunt. . . . Reprehensio anathematismorum doctrinam Nestorianam continet.'

In the way he was treated at this Second Council of Constantinople, Theodoret did fare better than his Antiochene forerunner Theodore of Mopsuestia, who suffered the anathematizing of his person as well as his works in Canon XII. As we shall see later, upon hearing his denunciation of Nestorius, whom he had long and stubbornly defended, and any suggestion of 'two Sons' in the Incarnation, together with his affirmation of the Virgin as 'Mother of God', the Fathers at Chalcedon in 451 had accepted Theodoret as orthodox in terms of the famous formula of the Fourth Ecumenical Council. Thus the most the bishops could do in 553 was condemn the earlier works directed against Cyril.

This naturally suggests an evolution in the Christology of Theodoret, or of the wider Church, or both. It is my purpose here to examine this problem, for my reading of Theodoret, in the light of the pivotal position he played as the chief theological apologist for the Eastern or Antiochene party in the Christological controversy in the fifth century, convinces me that the evolution of his thought and terminology can provide us with very significant clues to understand that controversy and perhaps better to ascertain its meaning for our own contemporary attempt to grow into that same mystery of Christ.

As far as I can tell from reading the works and correspondence of the two major parties, Antioch and Alexandria (and then of Rome, of course, in the person of Leo later on), as they were actually involved in the debate that led to Chalcedon at mid-century, Nestorius himself does not seem to have played any significant role in the development of thought and terminology between Ephesus and Chalcedon. The modern effort to re-examine his position *is* important in the continuing evaluation of the great controversy, but historically the debate that produced Chalcedon's definition was between Antioch's theologians, led above all by Theodoret, and Alexandria's Cyril and Dioscorus. I hope to make clear why I believe that Theodoret expresses and works out in a kind of ultimate way the fullest possible development of Antiochene Christological principles. He is the final Antiochene in this regard.

It was a debate infamously filled with anger and intemperance, to which even this saintly man on occasion fell victim, for as he himself so aptly once put it, 'It is not a little thing that is at stake, but the supreme question of all.'[3]

[3] *ACO*, Tom. I, iv. 2. 134.

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THEODORET

It is imperative in the first place, if we are to have any chance at getting to the heart of Theodoret's convictions about what he liked to call 'the mystery of the economy', to know something about his life and literary works. For Theodoret was no academician given to single-minded research and the production of many books; he was a bishop and pastor whose chief concern was the welfare of his diocese. No ecclesiastical ambitions could centre on the position of Cyrus; he entered the lists of controversy only because he was convinced that the fundamental integrity of the Nicene faith was once again being challenged. His concern was with the living faith of the believers for whom he was responsible as bishop, not with abstract theology as such. His day-to-day efforts centred on pastoral concerns, such as winning back, as he would put it, to orthodox Nicene Christianity what he describes in his epistles as vast numbers of Arians, Marcionites, and other heretics whom he found in his diocese when he arrived there, as he points out in a famous letter to Leo.[4]

It is in this context that his literary works are to be considered. His large correspondence is a virtual mine of information for the life and struggles of the fifth-century Church, Theodoret's own life and administration of his diocese, and the history of dogmatic development in the period. Johannes Quasten characterizes it as 'distinguished for its unpretentious learning, felicitous diction and perfect grace of style',[5] a remark applicable to all his work. Quasten also points out that scattered throughout the correspondence are examples of a new type of letter which Theodoret himself calls 'festal letters', sent out to clerical and lay friends at the great liturgical feasts. Whether Theodoret was just late (as I frequently find myself) or whether it was the general custom, most of his festal letters went out after the great feasts, not before, for he often speaks of them as past.[6]

Then there were the almost inevitable commentaries on Scripture, the finest produced by the Antiochene party. Of all the Fathers of the period, he seems most congenial to the contemporary mind, for though he highly values the historico-literal exegesis characteristic of the Antiochene tradition, he avoids the excesses to which Theodore of Mopsuestia was wont to take the method and is perfectly willing to allow an allegorical or typological

[4] See Epistles 81, 113, and 116. The situation concerning the enumeration of Theodoret's letters and published sources for them is somewhat complicated. See Appendix I, which also includes a brief description of major sources for Theodoret's collected works as a whole.

[5] Johannes Quasten, *Patrology*, iii: *The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon.* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1963), 553.

[6] Ibid. Cf. Epistles 4–6, 25, 26, 38–41, 54–6, 63, 64, and 74.

explanation. He wrote commentaries on Genesis through Chronicles, the Psalms, Song of Songs, the four major and twelve minor prophets, and one on the fourteen epistles of Paul. Several of these are quite important for his Christology, particularly those on Paul and Isaiah. Indeed, it is the belief of Bertram, one of the more important defenders of Theodoret's Christological orthodoxy (from a Chalcedonian point of view), that it was exactly in the study and preparation that went into the exegetical works in the decade or so between his own acceptance in 435 of the reconciliation between the Antiochenes and Cyril back in 432 and the outbreak of the renewed controversy in the latter half of the next decade that Theodoret saw the 'error' of his position at Ephesus:

> At this time, Theodoret, in the study of the sacred Scriptures and the holy Fathers, brought forth books with great diligence and corrected the errors of his teaching. For it is for some certain and for others very likely that during those years most of the commentaries on Holy Scripture, the historical books, the *Graecarum Affectionum Curatio*, the book on Providence, and the *Eranistes* (in which he refuted Monophysitism) were written.[7]

As he makes clear in his correspondence, one of his chief episcopal concerns was the reconciliation to the Church of the varied heretics he discovered in his diocese: pagans, Jews, Arians, Eunomians, Manichees, Marcionites, and even Valentinians.[8] Consequently, his production of apologetic works was high in number and quality, and grew directly out of his pastoral concerns. Johannes Quasten and Berthold Altaner both agree that the most important of these, *The Cure of the Pagan Maladies or the Truth of the Gospels Proved from Greek Philosophy*, is not only chronologically the last of the great line of Christian apologiae against classical paganism in the Roman world, but is 'perhaps the best refutation of paganism which has come down to us'.[9] *Ten Discourses on Providence*, delivered before an educated audience in Antioch, moved from the natural, moral, and social orders, to the Incarnation as the ultimate proof of the love of God for humanity. In *Ad Quaesita Magorum*, unfortunately no longer extant, Theodoret turns on their own heads the objections to

[7] Bertram, pp. 105–6. The English translation from the Latin is my own. Translations later in this chapter from German and French authors will be my own unless otherwise noted.

[8] All are mentioned, e.g., just in Epistle 81.

[9] Quasten, iii. 543; Berthold Altaner, *Patrology*, trans. Hilda C. Graef from the 5th German edn. of 1958 (London: Nelson, 1960), p. 398. Altaner had not changed his mind by the 7th German edn. (Freiberg: Herder, 1966), p. 341: 'Theodoret wrote the last and perhaps the best of the apologetics written against paganism under the title *The Cure of the Pagan Maladies (Graecarum Affectionum Curatio)*. In twelve books he sets out over against each other the pagan and Christian answers to the fundamental issues of philosophy and theology, citing over a hundred pagan authors' (my translation from the German original).

Christianity raised by the Persian magi, blaming them for the long persecutions against Christians under the Persian kings.[10] Nor is *Against the Jews* now extant, save for one fragment whose authenticity is hotly debated.[11]

Just as his exegetical and apologetical works stemmed from the pastoral needs of a busy bishop in heterodox Syria, so too his dogmatic and controversial works: they are directed against the Arians and then against those whom he considered to be raising anew the spectre of Apollinarianism: Cyril, Eutyches, Dioscorus, and their confederates. We shall come to all of these in due course.

The last category, more in the vein of works written simply because the author was interested in their subject, consists of three large works. The earliest is another mine of information about fifth-century spirituality as it was actually lived and the attitudes of the Syrian Church toward asceticism: *The History of the Monks or the Ascetical Way of Life* (*Historia Religiosa seu Ascetica Vivendi Ratio*). It describes the lives of twenty-eight men and three women, most of whom lived near Antioch and were personally known to the author, among them Simeon Stylites, who, still living, is described in chapter 26.[12] Included are many of the hermits of his own diocese. The Church history *Historia Ecclesiastica* takes up where Eusebius left off, at AD 323. Unfortunately for our concerns here, though Theodoret finished it during his exile at Apamea between his deposition by the Latrocinium in 449 and his rehabilitation in the eyes of the Cyrillian majority at Chalcedon in 451, he concluded his *Historia* with the death of Theodore of Mopsuestia in 428, totally excluding any reference to the Nestorian controversy.[13] Perhaps it is the mark of a good historian to exclude events in which his own activities were so central and controversial. None the less, the apologist in Theodoret is not absent, for the thrust of the entire work is to delineate the victory of the Nicene faith over the Arians.

Third and last of his historical works, the *Compendium of the Heretics' Fables* (*Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium*), is especially important for my purpose inasmuch as it was finished about 453, *after* the Council of Chalcedon. The first four books give us Theodoret's estimation of all the

[10] Epistles 82 and 113; also the *Historia Ecclesiastica*, 5:39, in *PG*, 82.

[11] Cf. Quasten, iii. 545–6.

[12] *PG*, 82: 1283–1496. For a new critical edition of ch. 26, cf. Hans Lietzmann, *Das Leben des hl. Symeon Stylites*, Texte und Untersuchungen, 32 (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 1–18. A Syriac version is available in A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der Syrischen Literatur* (Bonn, 1922), pp. 106 ff.

[13] The studies on this work are more in number than is often the case in Theodoret studies. Cf. Quasten, iii. 551, for the fullest listing amongst patrologies. The text is in *PG*, 82: 882–1280; English translation in *NPNF*, iii. 33–159. An earlier English translation is found in Theodoret of Cyrus, *A History of the Church in Five Books, From A.D. 322 to the Death of Theodore of Mopsuestia A. D. 427*, anonymous translation (London: Samuel Bagster and Sons, 1843).

heresies from Simon Magus to Nestorius and Eutyches, although Bardenhewer rather cryptically remarks, 'The section on Nestorius at the end of the fourth book is characterized by some scholars as spurious,' though he gives no reference to other authorities, nor do other patrologies seem to follow suit with his doubts.[14] The fifth book counters these heresies with what Quasten describes as 'a systematic presentation of the Church's teaching in 29 chapters which is unique in Greek patristic literature and very valuable for the history of dogma'.[15] Among his sources, Theodoret names Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius of Caesarea, Eusebius of Emesa, relying heavily, as Quasten points out, on Eusebius' *Church History* and *Adversus Haereses*, though he attributes the tenth book of the *Philosophumena* not to Hippolytus, but to Origen.[16]

Having read almost all the extant Theodoret corpus, I can only express an appreciative sympathy with Johannes Quasten's estimate that the breadth of Theodoret's reading and the skill with which he uses his sources to his own ends with great honesty make him not only one of the most learned men of his generation, but also one of the most productive. I would emphasize that nearly all of his work is the result of burning concerns generated in a hectically active and pastoral ministry:

> Theodoret is one of the most successful writers of the Eastern Church and his literary bequest has greater variety than that of the other theologians of Antioch. He composed works in almost all the different fields of sacred science. In 450 he himself estimates the number of his books at 35 (Ep. 145; cf. Ep. 116). Only a comparatively small number of these has survived, but enough to give evidence of his learning. Conversant with classical literature, he seems to have read Homer and Plato, Isocrates and Demosthenes, Herodotus and Thucydides, Hesiod, Aristotle, Apollodorus and Plotinus, Plutarch and Porphyry. He was acquainted with several languages besides his own, which was the Syriac. The Greek, in which he wrote, is perfect, and his style clear and simple, so that Photius (Bibl. cod. 203) praises the purity of his Attic.[17]

[14] Otto Bardenhewer, 'Theodoret von Cyrus', *Patrologie*, 2nd edn. (Freiburg: Heidersche Verlagshandlung, 1901), p. 329.

[15] Quasten, iii. 551. Quasten's treatment of Theodoret and his works is by far the fullest in the patrologies available to me; yet, though he normally includes every study known to him on a given work at the end of his description of it, he has none at all for the *Compendium*. The mystery of Bardenhewer's 'einigen Forschern' is not resolved by this later patrologist, even if in his text Quasten gives us notice that the chapter on Nestorius at the end of Book IV 'has been questioned, but without sufficient reason. Spurious, on the other hand, is the so-called *Libellus contra Nestorius ad Sporacium* (*PG*, 83: 1153–64) which repeats this chapter word by word and adds a new polemic against Nestorius.'

[16] Quasten, iii. 551–2.

[17] Ibid. 538.

What is known of his life is basically drawn from his own works, particularly his correspondence and the *Historia Religiosa* (*History of the Monks*).[18] He was born at Antioch near the end of the reign of Theodosius I. Garnier gives the date as 386,[19] Ceillier the next year,[20] but most modern historians, Azéma points out, follow the *Historia Religiosa* and Tillemont in assigning his birth to 393.[21]

In the *Historia Religiosa*, Theodoret tells us that his mother was about 30 years of age at his birth,[22] but nowhere gives the names of either his father or his mother. His maternal grandmother was a person of landed wealth,[23] and her daughter, having married at the age of 17, and being young and

[18] The sources of a biography of Theodoret are quite limited. There was no contemporary historian of his life. Gennadius of Marseilles, who died *c.* 494, wrote a short note on Theodoret in ch. 89 of his *De Viris Illustribus.* Sirmond's was the first truly biographical work on Theodoret, done largely from his own extensive knowledge of Theodoret's works (*PG*, 80: 35–56). Garnier in turn expanded this with a rather severely critical Dissertatio 'De Vita Theodoreti' in his *Auctarium*: *PG*, 84: 89–198. This was continued in its turn by Tillemont in *Mémoires pour servir a l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1693–1712), xv, and also by N. N. Glubokovsky, *The Blessed Theodoret: His Life and His Works*, 2 vols. in Russian (Moscow: University Typography, 1890). In English J. H. Newman wrote a brief biography in *Historical Sketches* (London, 1876), ii. 303–62. The most extensive and still the best account of his life, except perhaps for Glubokovsky's, is E. Venables, 'Theodoretus', in *Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines*, ed. W. Smith and H. Wace, iv (1887), 904 ff. Founded basically on Tillemont, Venables's work is characterized by a sympathy for Theodoret that is in pleasing contrast to Garnier. Cf. also the description of Theodoret's career, works, and sources in chs. 1–5 of Pierre Canivet's *Le Monachisme Syrien selon Théodoret de Cyr* (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1977).

[19] Garnier's Dissertatio I in *PG*, 84: 90. The entire Dissertatio 'De Vita Theodoreti' covers cols. 89–197. Agreeing with him is Louis E. Dupin, *Nouvelle Bibliothèque des Auteurs Ecclésiastiques*, 60 vols. (Paris, 1686–1719), iv. 81 n. 1.

[20] Remi Ceillier, *Histoire générale des auteurs sacrés et ecclésiastiques*, 2nd edn., 17 vols. (Paris: Chez Louis Vives, 1861; 1st edn. was in 23 vols., 1729–63), x. 19.

[21] *PG*, 82: 1384; Theodoret of Cynus, *Correspondence*, ed. Yuan Azéma, SC 98, p. 13; Tillemont, xv. 212, 869. See also for the year of his birth F. Cayre, *Manual of Patrology and History of Theology*, trans. from the 1930 French edn. by H. Howitt (Paris, Tournai, and Rome: Desclée & Co., 1940), p. 41; G. Bardy, 'Theodoret', in A Vacant, E. Mangenot, and E. Amann (eds.), *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, xv (1946), col. 299; Venables, p. 905; H. G. Opitz, 'Theodoretos', in G. W. Wissowa, W. Kroll, and K. Mittelhause, *Realencyklopadie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, II Reihe, v (1934), col. 1791; P. Canivet, 'Theodoretos', in Josef Hofer and Karl Rahner, (eds.), *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 2nd edn. x (1965), col. 32; Bardenhewer, p. 326, prefers 386 for Theodoret's birth year, but gives no reason for doing so; Altaner simply gives 393; p. 396 of the English trans., p. 339 of the 7th German edn.

[22] *Historia Religiosa*, chs. 9 and 13; *PG*, 82: 1384, 1399–1411. See also Theodoret of Cynus, *B. Theodoreti Episcopi Cyri Opera ex Recensione Iacobi Sirmondi denuo edidit . . . Ioann. Ludov. Schulze*, 5 vols. (a reprint of J. Garner's 1684 edn.; Halae, 1769–74), iii. 1190. The Schulze pagination is also repeated in large type in the margins of *PG*, 80–4, which reprint the Schulze edn. of Garnier's work, and where the *Historia Religiosa* is found in *PG*, 82:1283–1496. On Theodoret's birth, cf. also Tillemont, xv. 208 ff.

[23] Schulze, iii. 1191; *PG*, 82: 1383–4.

considered quite beautiful, lived a typically secular life of fashion, there being no children to interfere. In contrast, her husband was a man of some piety who seems deeply to have desired children. His wife's barrenness and his piety, in the manner of the times, led him to seek the intercessions of the hermits abounding in the vicinity of Antioch.[24] Theodoret's story of his mother's conversion reveals his own ascetical spirituality. When she was 23, one of her eyes was stricken by a disease which resisted regular medical treatment. As is not uncommon to this day in such situations, an acquaintance suggested a certain cure. In this case it was in the power of a renowned hermit, one Peter of Galatia, at the time inhabiting an otherwise empty tomb in the city. Upon hearing from her friend that Peter had healed a similar affliction, with prayer and the sign of the cross, none other than the wife of Pergamius, governor of the East, Theodoret's mother immediately betook herself to the hermit's tomb.

Theodoret obviously delights in telling his readers how without putting aside her ear-rings or necklaces, her face painted and her person attired in equally fashionable transparent silk, his mother mounted the ladder into the tomb and asked the hermit's help. Apparently the holy man was in no way nonplussed, for he immediately both upbraided her for the impiety of trying to improve on the handiwork of the Creator and then reluctantly applied prayer and the sign of the cross to her diseased eye. It was, of course, restored, and that lent due authority to his exhortation. She put away her jewels and fashionably transparent gowns to embrace the ascetic life, which she made more and more severe, her son tells us with obvious approval, until her death.[25]

Unhappily, she still remained barren. Some years later, one of the hermits, Macedonius, promised them their prayers would be heard by God.[26] Six or seven years had already passed since she had embraced the ascetical life appropriate to a serious Christian wife, but three more were yet again to pass with her still without child. Finally, Theodoret's father returned to Macedonius' cell (this holy man seems to have been distinguished by his simple diet, for his second name was 'the barley eater'[27]) to reproach him. This time the hermit said that she would soon conceive on the condition that the boy be dedicated to the service of God. The condition met, four months later his mother did conceive, Macedonius having spent whole nights in prayer to this end, and visiting her in the fifth month to prevent a threatened miscarriage.

[24] Schulze, iii. 1213; *PG*, 82: 1407 ff.
[25] Schulze, iii. 1188–90; *PG*, 82: 1379.
[26] Schulze, iii. 1214 ff.; *PG*, 82: 1409 ff.
[27] *NPNF*, iii. 1.

Upon his birth, his parents strictly kept their covenant, a fact which must have impressed itself deeply upon Theodoret, for one of the first defences that spring to his mind when writing various civil and ecclesiastical authorities to defend his piety and orthodoxy is this almost pre-natal loyalty to the Nicene faith.[28] Before his birth he had been devoted to God's service, and, as he writes to one Taurus the patrician in his difficulties over the winter of 448–9,

> From my mother's breast I have been nurtured on apostolic teaching, and the creed laid down at Nicaea by the holy and blessed fathers I have both learnt and teach. All who hold any other opinion I charge with impiety, and if anyone persists in asserting that I teach the contrary, let him not bring a charge which I cannot defend, but convict me to my face.[29]

Thus he was named by grateful parents *Θεοδώρητος*, Theodoret, 'gift of God'. When writing of Macedonius' life in *Historica Religiosa*, Theodoret betrays the awe in which the small boy held the holy man, for he tells us that from the time he was an infant, he received not only the weekly blessings of Peter of Galatia but the frequent exhortations of Macedonius to order his life in a manner suitable for one given to God:

> Well do I remember his words; well was I taught the divine gift given to me, but little have my words answered to his lessons. May God, through his intercession, help me by his grace to live the rest of my life according to his admonitions.[30]

He was taken weekly to Peter's tomb, where the old man sat the boy on his knee to feed him raisins, bread, and the Word. The holy man presented him with half his linen girdle, which naturally Theodoret's family kept on hand to lend to borrowers as a remedy against any and all diseases until someone neglected to return it and it was forever lost.[31]

At an early age, he was admitted as a lector in the Church,[32] but we know nothing for certain of his formal education, save for its results. Theologically, as can be gathered from the praise he lavished on them in chapter 39 of the *Ecclesiastical History* and in Epistle 16, he was indebted to Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, but inasmuch as Theodore was made bishop of Mopsuestia in 392, the year before his birth, and Diodore had died two years before that, in 390, Theodoret in the main must have been their reader rather than hearer. Perhaps Theodoret may have heard the bishop of Mopsuestia preach in Antioch at one time or another, for no less an authority than Cyril of Alexandria reports one occasion when Theodore of Mopsuestia caused

[28] Cf. Epistle 81; *Historia Religiosa*, ch. 9, *PG*, 82: 1381–84.
[29] Epistle 88.
[30] Schulze, iii. 1215; *PG*, 82: 1409.
[31] Schulze, iii. 1188, 1195; *PG*, 82: 1379, 1387.
[32] Schulze, iii. 1203; *PG*, 82: 1395.

offence in a sermon preached in Antioch by refusing the title *Theotokos* to the Virgin, a refusal he later retracted for the sake of peace.[33] It is sometimes suggested that Theodoret made the acquaintance and friendship of both Nestorius and John, later to be his patron as Patriarch of Antioch, when the two were monks in the monastery of St Euprepius at the gates of Antioch,[34] or perhaps was the fellow student of both under John Chrysostom.[35] That Theodoret was only 14 at Chrysostom's death makes that unlikely, but nothing of this can be proved one way or the other.[36]

In the spring of 448, Theodoret wrote a series of letters to defend himself against the charges brought against him by Dioscorus of Alexandria, Cyril's nephew and successor. In Epistle 80, he remarks that he has been a bishop for twenty-five years, 'after passing his previous life in a monastery'. In his letter to Leo of Rome the next year, Epistle 113 of 449, he says that he has been a bishop for twenty-six years. In a letter to Anatolius the Patrician written at the same time (Epistle 119), he identifies his monastery as that at Nicerte, 'a hundred and twenty miles away from Cyrus, seventy-five from Antioch, lying three miles away from Apamea', and expresses the desire to be allowed to spend there the imperial banishment from his diocese to which his deposition at the Second Council of Ephesus, or the 'Latrocinium', of 449 would lead.

Thus, perhaps the happiest years of his life had been spent in the monastic life at Apamea up to his consecration to the see of Cyrus in 423. The young man, well grounded in classical learning, influenced by the memory in his parental city of Diodore, Theodore, and Chrysostom and by the learning and culture of Antioch, a city described by R. Devreesse as at the apogee of its glory, and an influence on both the world and the Church precisely in these decades between 380 and 430,[37] at the death of his parents when he was about 23, sold all his inheritance, as he informed Leo in Epistle 113, distributed his wealth to the poor, and retired from Antioch's urbanity for the distant ascetical life of prayer and study of the Scriptures.[38] The seven years until he

[33] Epistle 69, among the collection in *PG*, 77: 401–981.

[34] Bertram, p. 2; *NPNF*, iii. 3; Bardy, col. 299.

[35] Azéma, i (*SC*, 40), 14.

[36] 'Certain traditions, or at least the conclusions of some historians, would have it that he might have counted St. John Chrysostom and Theodore of Mopsuestia among his teachers, that Nestorius and John of Antioch might have been among the number of his fellow students. The idea is not incredible, but it's far from being proved' (Bardy, col. 299). Of Garnier's assertions that Theodoret was put into the monastery of St Euprepius at age 7, was the fellow student there of Nestorius and John of Antioch, and so on, Tillemont says simply in xv. 868–9: 'He advances all these things without giving any proof, and I do not indeed see that he would be able to give any' (both translations from the original French are mine). Tillemont's chapters on Theodoret's education come to the same conclusion as Bardy: cf. pp. 211–16.

[37] R. Devreesse, *Le Patriarcat d'Antioche depuis la paix de l'église jusqu'à la conquête arabe* (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1945), p. xi.

[38] *NPNF*, iii. 3; Azéma, i. 14; Venables, p. 906.

was made a bishop in his thirtieth year were always remembered in his later writings with the fondest contentment.

Then in 423 he was consecrated bishop of Cyrus against his will.[39] Theodoret does not tell us who his consecrators were. Garnier argued that the chief consecrator would have been either Alexander, Patriarch of Antioch from 413 to 419, or his successor Theodotus (419–29), with whom Theodoret ends his list of Antioch's bishops in the concluding chapter 39 of the *Ecclesiastical History*.[40] On the other hand, Tillemont urged that canonical precedent would have made Theodoret's chief consecrator the metropolitan under whose jurisdiction Cyrus lay, namely the bishop of Hierapolis.[41] On the basis of Epistle XLI, published by Sakkelion in 1885 from among the letters thus come to modern light for the first time in the Latin *Codex Patmensis 706*, Opitz argued in 1934 that it must have been Theodotus.[42]

Cyrus (or Cyrrhus) was the chief city of Cyrrhestica, a province of Euphratensis named after it.[43] The city, described by Theodoret as a wretched and solitary little town whose ugliness he 'managed to conceal' by great expenditures on all kinds of buildings, lay about sixty-five miles north-east of Antioch, up the River Oenoparas (now Nahr Afrin).[44] In the late nineteenth century it was still there, known as Koros.[45] Dom Remi Ceillier characterized the town, whose only claim to historical fame is its connection to its bishop's name, as 'a small deserted village, highly unpleasant, which had only a few

[39] Epistles 80, 81. For a careful documentation of 423 as the year of Theodoret's ordination against Garnier's 420 or 421, cf. Karl Gunther, *Theodoret von Cyrus und die Kämpfe in der orientalischen Kirche vom Tode Cyrills bis zur Einberufung der Sogen. Räuber-Konzils* (Aschaffenburg: Buchdruckerei Dr. Gotz Werbrun, 1913), pp. 5–8.

[40] Cited by Venables, p. 906. [41] Ibid.

[42] Opitz, col. 1791: '... against his will he was well made Bishop of the city of Cyrus in the Metropolitanate of Hierapolis by Theodotus of Antioch (ep. 41; p. 34 Sakkelion)' (my trans. from the original German). Sakkelion's text is most easily available in Azéma's edition of the correspondence, *SC*, 40 (1955). Cf. Appendix I.

[43] F. van der Meer and Christine Mohrmann, *Atlas of the Early Christian World*, trans. and ed. Mary F. Hedlund and H. H. Rowley (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1966), map 15a, p. 18.

[44] Epistle 138. Tillemont recounts interesting remarks about Cyrus in ancient authors in xv. 217–18.

[45] *NPNF*, iii. 3. It does not appear on modern maps of Syria available to me, such as *The Times Atlas of the World*, ed. John Bartholomew, 5 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), ii, plate 34. Perhaps they are simply not detailed enough to show what would now be an even more minor village than it was in the sixth century. My friend the Revd Paul Cochran, recently retired rector of St Peter's Episcopal Church, Hazelton, Pa., was stationed in 1965 as a Peace Corp Volunteer in Kilis, Turkey, near the Syrian border. This town was founded in the sixteenth century as a market town of Aleppo, but the Treaty of Versailles drew the Turkish–Syrian border between the two towns. He visited the site of Cyrus, now in Syria but only a few miles from Kilis, in that year, and found it in ruins, although there are a few small villages in the vicinity.

inhabitants, all poor'.[46] Perhaps it would have been simply that to most men, but to Theodoret it proved the right place for him to exercise a self-denying, energetic, and apologetic pastoral ministry.

Venables describes Cyrrhestica as an extensive plain quite fertile with a rich and loamy soil, and intersected by various mountain ranges.[47] Theodoret's diocese measured roughly forty by forty miles, and contained what seems the rather astonishing number of 800 separate parishes.[48] In addition, there was a large number of monasteries and hermits, all of whom received the new bishop's enthusiastic attention.

As would be expected in a Syrian outpost of the Roman world, it also had more than its share of heretics. In Epistles 81, 113, and 116, he lists the Eunomians, Arians, Marcionites, Encratites, Jews, and pagans whom he spent a youthful episcopal fervour in gaining to the Church Orthodox and Catholic. It was in this struggle that he wrote his apologetical works, including that against the Persian magi and astrological fate. He tells Leo in 449 that he recovered eight villages worth more than 1,000 Marcionites, another of Eunomians, and another of Arians. Indeed, in this Epistle 113, he insists that by 449 no heretics remained in all his diocese, all won to the true Nicene faith by his diligence and persuasion. Here was a fine pastoral mixture of Syriac preaching to the poorest and most ignorant of his charges and apologia written in the finest Greek for the learned.

But he was not content with either monastic asceticism or his mission against heresy, for though Cyrus was the winter quarters of the tenth legion,[49] there was nothing there of architectural substance. Using his own revenues from his diocese, which thus can not have been small,[50] having already dispensed to the poor the inheritance he had had from his parents and priding himself on owning nothing but the 'rags I wore',[51] he 'erected porticoes and baths, built bridges and made further provision for public objects'.[52] In a statement that seems passing strange for a town which was the headquarters, even if only for the winter, of a Roman legion, he tells the consul Nomus in Epistle 81 that upon finding Cyrus without any supply of water from the river running beside it, he built a conduit for such a supply. For flood control he had a canal dug, and eventually built in the city a great church in which he housed relics of the apostles and prophets, as well as of the patriarch Joseph and John the Baptist, which he had sent him from Palestine and Phoenicia, 'and which he had solemnly welcomed with chanted Psalms accompanied by all of the people of the city and the countryside'.[53] All these public works

46 Ceillier, x. 19. 47 Venables, p. 906. 48 Epistle 113.
49 Venables, p. 907. 50 Epistle 79. 51 Epistle 81. 52 Epistle 79.
53 Ceillier, x. 20.

required people of technological skill: in Epistle 115, he tells us that he procured for his city men 'of the necessary arts'—that is to say, architects, masons, carpenters, and engineers. Then he adds men of medicine, 'among whom was the reverend presbyter Peter', who had practised his medical skills in Alexandria.[54]

Theodoret was not content with buildings. In Epistles 42, 43, and 45, he appears in an effort to obtain relief for the farmers of his diocese from what seemed exorbitant taxation, for, as he complains, taxes were so high that people were abandoning the land and the country. Consequently, he writes on their behalf directly to the Empress Pulcheria, his friend the patrician Anatolius, who was magister militum of the East, and the prefect Constantius, his efforts stretching over the middle years of the fifth decade. To add bitterness to this pill of necessary episcopal concern for the temporal welfare of his people, the tax assessor was a renegade bishop, himself 'under serious charges and subject to the ban of excommunication under the most holy and God-beloved Domnus' of Antioch. Jackson, in his article on Theodoret in the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, identifies this bishop tentatively with Athanasius of Perrha, with whose circumstances this kind of thing would accord.[55]

Already a builder, intercessor with the state for his people, a zealous and apparently extremely effective episcopal apologist for the Nicene faith in his own diocese, Theodoret's fame for learning, orthodoxy, and preaching brought him even more responsibility, for he was often summoned to Antioch and beyond to preach and give counsel to the Patriarch for the defence of the Antiochene interpretation of orthodoxy.

It is a great pity that only a very few fragments of his sermons remain: only nine columns in Migne, plus six more containing five panegyrics on Chrysostom from Photius.[56] He must have been a forceful preacher, and Epistles 83 and 147 give us some insight into the reaction he met from his hearers: John of Antioch literally unable to keep to his *cathedra* while Theodoret preached in his cathedral at Antioch on the Incarnation, but in ecstasy of delight clapping his hands and springing up from his throne in the church, and the very presbyters and deacons who later, as he complains in Epistle 147, would accuse him of preaching two Sons in Antioch, flinging their arms around him when he descended from the ambo, kissing him on the head, breast, hands, and knees, exclaiming, 'This is the voice of the apostles'. His sermons likewise produced furious reactions from his theological opponents. Undoubtedly more than a metaphor is meant when in Epistles 81 and 113 he

[54] Epistles 114 and 115. [55] *NPNF*, iii. 264 n. 1.

[56] *PG*, 84: 53–64, with the Chrysostom panegyrics from Photius in cols. 47–53. The Greek text of the fragment in cols. 56–8 is available in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 7, pp. 82–3.

says that the heretics stoned him, wounded him, and brought him nigh to death. In the latter he complains to Pope Leo, 'He from whom no serets are hid knows all the bruises my body has received, aimed at me by ill-named heretics, and what fights I have fought in most of the cities of the East against Jews, heretics, and heathen'.

Thus, as Bertram concludes, he spent himself in building up the Church within and without his own diocese, deriving 'every joy of the soul from prayer and continuous study of holy scripture', convinced that the priest ought to condemn that which pertained solely to this world to give himself totally to his divine office.[57] Typical is his response in a letter of thanks to a friend, one Cyrus, for having sent him some of the famed wines of Lesbos. He admired their whiteness and delicacy in flavour, but as to their imparting long life, he says he has little use for that, for he does not aspire to a long life, having seen the troubles by which it is storm-tossed.[58]

THEODORET'S ROLE IN THE EVOLUTION OF CLASSICAL CHRISTOLOGY

He was in every way, then, the exemplary bishop, much beloved by his people. In Epistle 81, he defends himself against Alexandrine charges by pointing out that in the quarter-century of his episcopate in Cyrus he had never had to appear in court as either defendant or prosecutor, and his clergy followed his own example. He never took an obol or a garment from anyone, and none of his personal household had been allowed by him to accept so much as a loaf of bread or even an egg. If it had not been for his masterful and in every way charitable defence of Nestorius, his name might have been considerably more honoured by history. Indeed, Tillemont thought that his memory would be held in as great respect as that of Basil or Chrysostom if he had not been involved in the defence of Nestorius against Cyril of Alexandria.[59] Bertram concluded that 'neither would we find in him anything to be reproved if he had not been involved in the dispute arising from the heresy of Nestorius'.[60]

In August of 430, Celestine, Bishop of Rome, had gathered many of the bishops of the West to his council in Rome. They condemned Nestorius, demanding his recantation on pain of excommunication. Soon afterwards, the like was done by Cyril's council of Eastern bishops in Alexandria, whose endorsement of Rome's condemnation was speedily dispatched to Constantinople.

[57] Bertram, pp. 2–3. Citing Newman, Venables estimates that during the thirty-plus years of his episcopate, Theodoret was invited to preach in Antioch twenty-six of them (p. 907).

[58] Epistle 13. [59] Tillemont, xv. 207. [60] Bertram, p. 3.

John of Antioch received letters announcing their actions from both Celestine and Cyril just when he was surrounded by Theodoret and other bishops of his patriarchate, assembled possibly, as Jackson suggests,[61] for the consecration of Macarius as bishop of Laodicea.

John and the Antiochene bishops quickly sent a letter in their common name to Nestorius, urging him to accept the name *Theotokos* popularly attributed to the Virgin, interpreting it as the equivalent of his 'Mother of Christ', for, say they, the Only-Begotten was born of her impassibly.[62] The Antiochenes found it difficult to attribute the title *Theotokos* to the Lord's mother in any but a loose sense, because to them, what was born of her was not God, but the temple which God inhabited. The Alexandrines, of course, insisted it was God himself, God the Word, who experienced birth of the Virgin, who is thus *Theotokos*, the God-bearer, and that it was God the Word himself who suffered death on the cross. Their utilizing Apollinarian formulae to express the unity in the one Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of God himself, was waving the proverbial bull fighter's red cape in front of the zealous Theodoret and his Antiochene confederates, while in their turn the Antiochenes' justifications for the use of *Theotokos* as applicable to the Virgin, because of its long use in popular piety, inasmuch as he whom she bore was the temple in whom God the Word 'tabernacled', simply served to convince Cyril and his Alexandrine party that the Antiochene bishops divided Christ into two Sons: one the man Jesus, the other the Word of God, the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity.

While John of Antioch and Theodoret and the other Antiochene bishops were trying to play an irenical role between Cyril and Nestorius in Constantinople, the latter counter-attacked, refusing to term the Virgin *Theotokos* and insisting on his own 'Mother of Christ' (*Christotokos*), while persuading the Emperor Theodosius to summon a general council to Ephesus for Pentecost, 431. Cyril's publication of his Twelve Anathemas, or Twelve Chapters, to which he insisted Nestorius subscribe,[63] made further reconciliatory effort

[61] *NPNF*, iii. 5.

[62] *PG*, 76: 1449–58. See esp. cols. 1453 and 1456. Theodoret's name is third in the list of concurring bishops. Garnier thought that Theodoret was the author of this epistle to Nestorius, but Sister M. Monica Wagner, C.S.C., in 'A Chapter in Byzantine Epistolography—The Letters of Theodoret of Cyrus', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 4 (1948), 176–7, definitively ascribes it to John of Antioch on the basis of style analysis.

[63] Cf. the exchange of correspondence between Nestorius, Celestine, and Cyril. The Letter of Nestorius to Celestine is in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 2, pp. 12–14; the third dogmatic letter of Cyril to Nestorius, with the Twelve Anathemas appended, *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 1, pp. 33–42. Both are conveniently Englished in E. R. Hardy and C. C. Richardson (eds.), *Christology of the Later Fathers*, vol. iii of *The Library of Christian Classics*, ed. John Baillie, John T. McNeill, and Henry P. van Dusen (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), pp. 346–54. My English quotations of passages from these letters are taken from this source.

on the part of the Antiochenes impossible, and they swung over to Nestorius' defence (or perhaps offence), the matter of which survives today in Theodoret's *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum Cyrilli* in the text of Cyril's counter-refutation.[64] We shall examine this carefully in Chapter 5; suffice it to say for the moment that it explained the Antiochene party's point of view, defended the orthodoxy of Nestorius' position, and accused Cyril of an Apollinarian confusion of the divine and human natures in his doctrine of the Incarnation.

Epistle 150, one of the four in the *Auctarium* of Garnier which also appear in the Greek acts of the Ecumenical Councils, and which was prefixed to his *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum Cyrilli*, in its strong language indicates the heat and zeal with which Theodoret now took up the pen of battle. Theodoret wrote to John of Antioch:

> I have been much distressed at reading the anathematisms which you have sent to request me to refute in writing, and to make plain to all their heretical sense. . . . Foes who make war from within are far more dangerous than those who attack from without. I am yet more grieved that it should be in the name of true religion and with the dignity of a shepherd that he should give utterance to his heretical and blasphemous words, and renew that vain and impious teaching of Apollinarius which was long ago stamped out. Besides all this, there is the fact that he [Cyril] not only supports these views but even dares to anathematize those who decline to participate in his blasphemies—if he really is the author of these productions and they have not proceeded from some enemy of the truth who has composed them in his name. . . . I for my part, by the aid of the light of the Holy Spirit, in the investigation of this heretical and corrupt opinion, according to the measure of the power given me, have refuted them as best I could. I have confronted them with the teaching of evangelists and apostles. I have exposed the monstrosity of the doctrine, and proved how vast is its divergence from divine truth. . . . Then let the author of these writings reap from the Apostle Paul's curse [Gal. 6: 16] the due rewards of his labours and the harvest of his seeds of heresy. We will abide in the teaching of the holy Fathers. To this letter I have appended my counter arguments, that on reading them you may judge whether I have effectively destroyed the heretical propositions. Setting down each of the anathematisms by itself, I have annexed the counter statement . . . that the refutation of the dogmas may be clear.

Theodoret justified his position on the grounds of the New Testament and the testimony of the Fathers before him. Cyril's use in his third dogmatic letter to Nestorius and its appended anathemas of 'union in *hypostasis*' (*henosthai . . . sarki kath' hypostasin . . . ton Logon*), and 'a union in *physis* (*kath' henosin physiken*), and the description of Christ as the 'one enfleshed

[64] *PG*, 76: 385–452; *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, pp. 107–48; part 7, pp. 33 ff.; English trans. *NPNF*, iii. 26–31.

hypostasis of the Word' (*mia hypostasis tou Logou sesarkomene*) were the clues which convinced Theodoret that Cyril was doing nothing other than resurrecting Apollinarianism.[65]

The events at the Council of Ephesus have been told too often to require detailed retelling here. The synod had been called for Pentecost, 431. Cyril and fifty of his bishops arrived in early June, almost simultaneously with Theodoret and his metropolitan, Alexander of Hierapolis. Despite their requests, Cyril and his allies refused to delay until John of Antioch and the Oriental bishops could come up. When they did arrive, they set up their own famous rump session, or 'Conciliabulum', and the two groups spent July and August hurling anathemas at each other, the one side for the other's not accepting the deposition of Nestorius passed before it arrived and could take part in the debate, the second for the first's unjust procedures, as they took it, against the Patriarch of Constantinople. Finally, several of the Oriental bishops were sent by the Conciliabulum to appeal directly in person to the emperor at Constantinople. Theodosius met them at Chalcedon, and we possess a vivid view of their tireless efforts in behalf of Nestorius from Theodoret's letters written back to his confederates in Ephesus, a correspondence we shall investigate in more detail later. For the moment, we note no more than their failure to move the emperor: Cyril's party had won the day, and John of Antioch and his bishops, including Theodoret, returned home in open schism from Cyril. Nestorius went into exile near Antioch, and the episcopal *cathedra* of Constantinople was occupied by his successor Maximian in October.[66]

On the way home the Oriental bishops, including Theodoret, held a council at Tarsus renewing their deposition of Cyril and their mutual determination never to abandon Nestorius. John held another synod before the end of the year at Antioch, again reaffirming the Easterners' actions at Ephesus and Tarsus.[67] Either before or after this synod at Antioch, Theodoret and John visited the much venerated, aged Acacius of Beroea, to inform him of what had transpired at Ephesus. Perhaps it was the result of Acacius' distress at the results of these synods, but while Theodoret returned to his

[65] On Apollinaris of Laodicea as the ultimate source of Cyril's key phrase *μία φύσις* or *ὑπόστασις τοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*, which he thought Athanasius had originated, cf. Quasten, iii. 139–40, and M. Richard, 'L'Introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la théologie de l'incarnation', *Mélanges de Science Religieuse*, 2 (1945), 5–32, 243–70. Cyril usually uses the phrase 'one infleshed *physis* of the Word'. However, he occasionally says 'one infleshed *hypostasis* of the Word', as in his third letter to Nestorius, *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 1, pp. 33–42. Hardy and Richardson, *LCC*, iii. 352 n. 17, trace the phrase to Apollinaris in Pseudo-Athanasius, *De Incarnatione*, *PG*, 28: 25–30.

[66] Venables, pp. 908–9. Cf. also Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, vii. 34–5; the text is in *PG*, 67: 29–372, with an English translation in *NPNF*, ii. 1–178.

[67] Venables, p. 909.

diocese to write further Antiochene apologiae against Cyril—namely, the *Pentalogos* or *Adversus beatum Cyrillum sanctumque concilium Ephesenum libri quinque* (obviously the name given the work by later tradition)—John of Antioch joined Acacius in leading a group of bishops now concerned to make peace with Cyril. Thus the Oriental party itself began to suffer schisms, the irreconcilables to the bitter end being led by none other than Theodoret's own metropolitan, Alexander of Hierapolis.

John summoned another synod for 432, perhaps at Beroea[68] or Antioch.[69] Theodoret was there, together with others such as Acacius, Macarius of Laodicea, and Alexander. Six short articles were produced, so written that Cyril's acceptance of any one of them would be considered enough to re-establish communion. The one he did accept, quoted in his letter to John of Antioch in 433,[70] is the only one still extant. There must have been a suggestion, none too subtle, that Cyril withdraw his insistence on the Twelve Anathemas, and the Antiochenes protected themselves, or so they interpreted it, from accepting the denunciation of Nestorius. It is interesting that the one article Cyril quotes with approval concludes with a sentence in direct contradiction to his Fourth Anathema.

Henry Chadwick believes[71] that this formula of union in 433, taken from the articles of the 432 Antiochene synod, was composed by Theodoret, who thus would likely have written all six of the originals. Chadwick finds the basis of the formula in the confession made by the Oriental bishops at Ephesus in 431,[72] and also points out that John of Antioch strongly implies that Theodoret was the author of the 432 articles in a letter to Theodoret preserved in *Collectio Casinensis* 210.[73] Lastly, Chadwick even finds a first draft of the formula in Theodoret's Epistle 151, which was addressed to the monks of the East, a most important confession of his faith which we shall examine in some detail below, which is also the place to examine the theology of the formula of union itself.

Theodoret read Cyril's letter to John of Antioch with great care and found it orthodox, but resisted renewing immediate union with Cyril,[74] which John had accepted joyfully, for fear of having to abandon Nestorius to an unjust condemnation, together with four metropolitans of his party, who included

[68] Venables, 910. [69] Hardy and Richardson, p. 355.

[70] Epistle 39, found in Hardy and Richardson, pp. 356–8; *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. iv, pp. 15–20; *PG*, 77: 173–82.

[71] H. Chadwick, 'Eucharist and Christology in the Nestorian Controversy', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 2 (1951), 147 n. 2.

[72] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 7, pp. 69–70. [73] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. iv, pp. 153 ff.

[74] Ceillier, x. 21.

his own Alexander of Hierapolis, who had been deposed by Cyril's synod at Ephesus. Nor was he willing to anathematize the doctrine of Nestorius.[75]

He wrote letters of support to Nestorius and Nestorius' supporters in Constantinople, but coming under increasing pressures from John, as well as civil pressures, with the emperor insisting on the deposition and expulsion of all the bishops who persisted in refusing union with Cyril, Theodoret invited the leaders of the dissidents, now rapidly declining in numbers, to a conference at Zeugma to take counsel concerning union with Cyril.[76] Indeed, now it was even a question of reunion with John of Antioch, who had ordained bishops for Alexander's metropolitan area, an act which Theodoret and his confederates took as an uncanonical intrusion of the patriarch into another's jurisdiction: now it was John setting up bishop against bishop, the classical definition of schism. Alexander refused to attend Theodoret's conference, which, when it met, approved as orthodox Cyril's letter to John, the formula of union of 433, and interpreted it to be a recantation of his Twelve Chapters—rather a face-saving device. But they would not join John of Antioch's peace with Cyril as long as it meant that they had to join in the renunciation of Nestorius.

John now turned to applying civil pressures, and one by one the dissidents conformed.[77] In 435, Theodoret was the last, leaving Alexander and a handful of recalcitrants in final schism. He had been attacked, as Venables puts it, 'on his tenderest side by harassing his diocese'.[78] Dionysius, the magister militum of the time, for example, levied heavy taxation on the diocese, and some of the rabble even tried to set fire to Theodoret's basilica built in honour of Cyrus, Cosmas and Damian. Finally, Theodoret and the others were simply given the choice: submit or be expelled. Giving in to the pleas of the faithful in his diocese and the urgings of the younger St James of Nisibis, Simeon Stylites, and other solitaries,[79] Theodoret requested a conference with John in Antioch. Upon discovering that John had expressly anathematized not Nestorius but only what in his teaching was opposed to apostolic doctrine, Theodoret was able to accept a reconciliation in good conscience. Theodoret was convinced of John's orthodoxy and simple desire for the peace of the Church, and John on his side did not insist that the bishop of Cyrus assent to the deposition of Nestorius.[80] A friendly correspondence even ensued between Theodoret and Cyril himself concerning Julian the Apostate's opposition to Christianity.

[75] Tillemont, xv. 249; Venables, p. 910.

[76] Venables, p. 911. Cf., for one example, the letter written to Nestorius and cited at the Fifth Ecumenical Council, in *ACO*, Tom. IV, vol. i, p. 134.

[77] Ibid. [78] Ibid. [79] Ceillier, x. 21.

[80] Venables, p. 911. For the date 435, cf. J. Tixeront, 'Theodoret', in *A Handbook of Patrology*, trans. from the 4th French edn. (London: B. Herder Book Co., 1920), p. 206.

But the peace was to be short-lived, if not formally broken. In Rusticus' *Synodicon*, immediately following Cyril's letter to John of Antioch replying to the six articles of September 432—that is to say, Cyril's 433 letter including the formula of union[81]—there appears a furious letter from Alexander of Hierapolis to Acacius of Beroea.[82] Alexander's letter is in response to Cyril's pacific reply to the Antiochene peace offers, so must be dated to the winter or spring of 433. In it he speaks with complete revulsion of attacks made by Cyril in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* on an unnamed Antiochene author, and then expresses one of the fundamental themes of Antiochene Christology which we shall later encounter again and again: namely, utter horror at the idea that God experienced in himself death on the cross. Cyril, he says, 'was not reluctant in his interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews to say that God the Word came to life again, having suffered in the flesh'.[83] Amongst the fragments of Cyril's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* published by Migne and Pusey, there is one inveighing against an anonymous divider of Christ into two natures, two *physeis*.[84] This fragment, partly quoted and partly summarized, is attributed to Theodore of Mopsuestia, in Latin in the *acta* of the Fifth Council and the first few lines of it in Greek in Leontius. Thus, by 432, Cyril was already disparagingly quoting Theodore of Mopsuestia, his attention already turning from Nestorius to attack Mopsuestia's Christology on the grounds 'that Christ Jesus is not to be thought of and spoken of by us as a man by himself in the ordinary way and apart, but rather the Word of God incarnate'.[85] In his Epistle 69, Cyril says that he has been studying the works of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, selecting from them materials for future use, presumably against them.

So opened the next phase of Cyril's campaign against the Christology of Antioch. He returned to the fight with full fury in, most likely, 438, with the publication of *Against Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia*,[86] for from suggestions from Rabbulas he had come to the conclusion that they were the genuine sources of Nestorianism.[87] Cyril even tried to force all bishops to repudiate Nestorianism in express terms, but John of Antioch rejected the imposition of any new tests, writing to Proclus, now in the bishop's chair in

[81] *Collectio Casinensis* 145, in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. iv, pp. 94–8.

[82] *Collectio Casinensis* 146, in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. iv, pp. 98–9.

[83] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. iv, p. 98, lines 36–7.

[84] *PG*, 74: 953–1006; *Sancti Patris Nostri Cyrillis Archepiscopi Alexandrini in S. Joannis Evangelium*, ed. P. E. Pusey, (Oxford 1872), iii, 362–440; the fragment referred to is found on pp. 386.15–387.8.

[85] Pusey, p. 387. I am indebted for this line of information to P. M. Parvis, 'The *Commentary on Hebrews* and the *Contra Theodorum* of Cyril of Alexandria', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 26, (October 1975), 415–19.

[86] Cf. Quasten, iii. 128.

[87] Venables, p. 911.

Constantinople, to intercede with the emperor against these constant Alexandrine harassments.[88]

Cyril then wrote an indignant letter to John reporting that a certain presbyter, one Daniel, had informed him that Theodoret still adhered to his former opinions and was openly boasting that he had never anathematized Nestorius or accepted his deposition.[89] Far from cringing before Cyril, Theodoret rushed back to the fray with his *Defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia*, also in 438, of which only a few fragments remain (due to the condemnation in 553) which were quoted against him at the Latrocinium of 449.

There was to be no personal peace again between Theodoret and Cyril before the latter's death in June of 444. Almost none of the writers on Theodoret, save the ever antagonistic Garnier, are willing to grant the authenticity of Epistle 180, which was cited against him in the *acta* of the fifth session of the Fifth Ecumenical Council as Theodoret's composition on the death of Cyril.[90] However, considering the ferocity of his words against Cyril in the *Defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia* and other undoubted sources, taken together with the general tendency of the age for theological opponents to lack a certain charity in their written bombast against one another, a characteristic of our contemporary oral and private discussions which we consider in bad taste if put in writing, I rather sympathize with Canon Venables' 'painful suspicion' of its genuineness lingering to trouble one's conception of Theodoret.[91] To put it simply, the saintly bishop of Cyrus, 'though truly sorry for the poor fellow', was overjoyed that his troublesomeness had been removed by God from the life of the Church. The letter, cited as written to John of Antioch, though if it is indeed genuine, it would have had to be addressed to Domnus, who had succeeded John as bishop two years previously in 442, was obviously a private one, meant in harsh jest, but which none the less demonstrates clearly that the Syrian defender of Antiochene theology considered its foremost and deadly danger now to have been removed:

> Knowing that the fellow's malice has been daily growing and doing harm to the body of the Church, the Lord has lopped him off like the plague.... His survivors are indeed delighted at his departure. The dead, maybe, are sorry. There is some ground of alarm lest they should be so much annoyed at his company as to send him back to us.... Great care must then be taken... to tell the guild of undertakers to lay a very big and heavy stone upon his grave, for fear he should come back again, and show his

[88] Ibid. [89] Cyril's letter is repeated in the corpus of Theodoret's epistles as no. 179.

[90] Cf. Tillemont, xiv. 784; *NPNF*, iii. 346 n. 2; *ACO*, Tom. IV, vol. i, p. 135.

[91] Venables, p. 912.

changeable mind once more. Let him take his new doctrines to the shades below, and preach to them all day and all night. . . . He will be stoned not only by ghosts learned in divine law, but also by Nimrod, Pharaoh and Sennacherib. . . . I really am sorry for the poor fellow. Truly, the news of his death has not caused me unmixed delight, but it is tempered by sadness. On seeing the Church freed from a plague of this kind, I am glad and rejoice; but I am sorry and do mourn when I think that the wretch knew no rest from his crimes, but went on attempting greater and more grievous ones till he died. His idea was, so it is said, to throw the imperial city into confusion by attacking true doctrines a second time, and to charge your holiness with supporting them. But God saw and did not overlook it.

The scene was rapidly changing. Nestorius in exile had no influence on the life of the Church or, for that matter, on the actual course of the debate on Christology, save as a name for Alexandrine supporters to fire at their opponents. John of Antioch was dead, replaced by, as Azéma says, 'the intelligent but ineffective' Domnus.[92] Proclus, who had in April 434 succeeded Maximian, was soon to die, in July 446, and was succeeded by the peace-loving Flavian in Constantinople. If there had ever been any doubt about it, it was now beyond dispute that Theodoret was the clear theological leader of the Antiochene school of theology. He was not to have any peace, however, from the new bishop in Alexandria. This was Cyril's nephew Dioscorus, whom Venables describes (with a scorn no less than that of Theodoret for Cyril in Epistle 180) as a 'violent, rapacious, unscrupulous, and scandalously immoral man, whose profuse briberies had secured the favour of the imperial court, and especially of Chrysaphius the reigning eunuch, who held sway over the feeble mind of Theodosius'.[93] Dioscorus' persecutions of Theodoret were to be unending, and virtually to the destruction of one or the other.

Renewed outward conflict surfaces in Epistle 86, which Venables took to represent Theodoret's accounting to Flavian of Constantinople of Dioscorus' having taken offence at Theodoret's assenting to synodical letters from Proclus of Constantinople. Dioscorus considered this to be to the detriment of the historic rights of the sees of both Antioch and Alexandria, which antedated Constantinople's claims to primacy.[94] On the other hand, Azéma argues that Epistle 86 in the *Corpus Sirmondiana* is actually only the draft of a longer letter by the patriarch Domnus to Flavian, defending himself against Dioscorus, the redaction of which was here credited to Theodoret. There is a letter attributed to Domnus in the Syriac translation of the conciliar *acta* of the Latrocinium, or Robber Council, of Ephesus of 449, which differs basically only in conclusion from Epistle 86. Domnus' letter in these *acta* seems to have

[92] Azéma, i (*SC*, 40), 20. [93] Venables, p. 912. [94] Ibid.

been sent to Flavian before the November 448 synod in the imperial capital which condemned Eutyches.[95]

In either case of authorship, the hand of Theodoret can be seen, and his concern for Nicene orthodoxy as the basis of his theology once more appears. The Antiochenes seem to have approached Dioscorus with the documents of concord worked out with Cyril in an attempt to preserve the shaky peace of 433. It was useless: those who had seen the 433 accord of union as a capitulation to Nestorianism now sought revenge. Eutyches, archimandrite of one of the larger monasteries in Constantinople, more and more emerged as a leader of this movement. As a godfather of the eunuch Chrysaphius, who in 441 had replaced Pulcheria as the power behind the emperor Theodosius, Eutyches was well placed politically to be Dioscorus' chief ally in the capital. In Epistle 86, Theodoret, or Domnus, as the case may be, reports that once again the buffeting of controversy was stirring the Churches:

> In relation to the attacks which are being plotted against the apostolic faith, I thought that I should find an ally and fellow-worker in the most godly Bishop of Alexandria, the lord Dioscorus,[96] and so sent him one of our pious presbyters, a man of remarkable prudence, with a synodical letter informing his piety that we abide in the agreement made in the time of Cyril of blessed memory, and accept the letter written by him as well as that written by the very blessed and sainted Athanasius to the blessed Epictetus, and, before these, the exposition of the faith laid down at Nicaea in Bithynia by the holy and blessed Fathers.... But one of the opposite party, who keep up these disturbances... has stirred an iniquitous agitation against me. But the very godly Bishop Dioscorus has written us a letter such as never ought to have been written by one who has learnt from the God of all not to listen to vain words. He has believed the charges brought against me as though he had made personal inquiry into every one of them... and has thus condemned me. I, however, have bravely borne the calumnious charge, and have written him back a courteous letter.... Besides all this, he sent certain godly bishops to the imperial city, as we learned, in the hope of increasing the agitation against me.

Having then sided with Constantinople that 'the Bishop of Alexandria should administer the government of Egypt alone', as decreed at the 381 Council of Constantinople, and leave other dioceses alone, the author makes a remark which gives us insights into the way his later statements to Leo in Epistle 113 about the primacy of Rome are to be understood, for here Antioch has the primacy over Alexandria, Antioch being the city possessing the throne of Peter, the teacher of Alexandria's Mark:

[95] Azéma, ii (*SC*, 98), p. 226 n. 1.

[96] To whom Theodoret had written Epistle 60 in a friendly greeting towards the end of 444, shortly after Dioscorus' election as Cyril's successor. The letter was delivered by the presbyter Eusebius.

Dioscorus, however, refused to abide by these decisions; he is turning the see of the blessed Mark upside down; and these things he does though he perfectly well knows that the Antiochene metropolis possesses the throne of the great Peter, who was teacher of the blessed Mark, and the first and coryphaeus of the chorus of the apostles.

Among the easier, and so earlier, targets of Dioscorus and his party was Irenaeus, bishop of Tyre.[97] Count of the Empire, and later made bishop of Tyre by Domnus of Antioch,[98] Irenaeus was a friend and correspondent of Theodoret and one of the more extreme supporters of Nestorius. Though he had defended Irenaeus publicly and to Domnus in Epistle 110 as not to his knowledge ever having objected to the troublesome *Theotokos*, in Epistle 16, written in 449, a year *after* Irenaeus' deposition, Theodoret defends his own use of *Theotokos* to the very man he had claimed the May before as not objecting to its use:

What does it matter whether we style the holy Virgin at the same time Mother of Man (*Anthropotokon*) and Mother of God (*Theotokon*) or call her mother and servant of her offspring, with the addition that she is mother of our Lord Jesus Christ as man, but his servant as God, and so at once avoid the term which is the pretext of calumny, and express the same opinion by another phrase? And besides this, it must also be borne in mind that the former of these titles is of general use, and the latter peculiar to the Virgin, and that it is about this that all the controversy has arisen, which would God had never been. The majority of the old Fathers have applied the more honourable title to the Virgin, as your holiness yourself has done in two or three discourses, several of which your godliness sent me and I have in my possession. In these you have not coupled the title Mother of Man with Mother of God but have explained its meaning by the use of other words.

Interestingly to us, Theodoret takes issue with the charge brought against Irenaeus by Dioscorus, the archimandrite Eutyches, and Chrysaphius that the bishop of Tyre was wrongly consecrated by Domnus because he was twice married. Theodoret suggests to Domnus that though the fact was correct, he should claim the precedence of Alexander of Antioch and Acacius of Beroea, who made Diogenes a bishop though he was digamous, as did Praylius ordain Domninus of Caesarea, also a twice-married individual.

That charge was, of course, a smokescreen. The real issue was Irenaeus' support of Nestorius. Dioscorus' party had the imperial ear, and the bishop of Tyre was deposed on 17 February 448. It was the opening round of the campaign that was to culminate at Chalcedon three years later.

Later in the same year, 448, Eusebius of Dorylaeum counter-attacked, accusing Eutyches of the opposite extreme from Nestorianism, of confounding

[97] The story is told in Epistles 3, 12, 16, 35, and 110. [98] Epistle 110.

the two natures of divinity and humanity in Christ. Summoned by Flavian before the synod of Constantinople in November, Eutyches persistently refused to affirm that Christ's humanity, whatever it was, had any consubstantiality with ours. Flavian and the Antiochenes rightly recognized in the teaching of Eutyches the reality of Monophysitism. The Constantinopolitan synod deposed him.[99]

But Eutyches' court influence then caused the battle to sway heavily in the other direction. Appealing to the emperor Theodosius for a retrial, as well as to Leo of Rome, Eutyches and Dioscorus, having got agreement for a council to be summoned for Ephesus for 449 for that purpose, then turned on Theodoret. In Epistle 70 to the patrician Anatolius, Theodoret complains that he has been unjustly portrayed to the emperor as, in Venables' terms, 'a turbulent busybody, restless, and meddlesome, constantly to be found at Antioch and other cities, taking part in councils and public assemblies when he ought to have been attending to the business of his diocese, a troublesome agitator, stirring up strife wherever he moved'.[100] Dioscorus angrily wrote to Domnus that he had it on undeniable authority that Theodoret was creating a party of Syrian bishops, with himself at the centre, which was teaching Nestorianism's 'two Sons' under a different name and attacking what to Dioscorus was the fundamental phrase of orthodoxy: 'one enfleshed *physis* of the Word'.[101] In the same Epistle 79, and in Epistles 80 and 81, it is clear that the charges were believed in the capital, for the emperor signed an imperial edict confining Theodoret to his own diocese and his own city of Cyrus. It was March 449 when the edict was issued, for Azéma dates the epistles in question to April. Indeed, the entire series of letters now numbered in the *Corpus Sirmondiana* 79–113 covers this disturbed period of controversy with Dioscorus' party, including Epistle 83 to the patriarch of Alexandria himself. Its confession of faith we shall later find helpful in estimating Theodoret's mature Christology.

The imperial edict found Theodoret at Antioch in preparation for a synod relating to problems in Osrhoene. He returned at once to Cyrus without even taking leave of his friends, only to be much chagrined and humiliated when a week later the magister militum Euphronius appeared in Cyrus to demand a written acknowledgement from Theodoret that he had received the edict. The letters we have referred to, he wrote immediately to various ecclesiastical and state authorities in his own defence, perhaps the most interesting being 113 to

[99] Ceillier, x. 23. For a list of modern authors who do not believe that Eutyches actually subscribed to the positions attributed to him, see T. Camelot, 'De Nestorius à Eutyches', in A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, (Wurzburg: Echterverlag, 1951), i. 234–42.

[100] Venables, p. 912.

[101] Ibid.

Leo of Rome. It was written after Dioscorus had obtained his deposition from the Council at Ephesus in August 449, frequently called the Robber Council, or 'Latrocinium'. Theodoret was not allowed to appear to defend himself—his eloquence must have been feared, and one of the basic purposes of the council's being summoned was to secure his deposition. Dioscorus and his party took no chances: Eutyches was confirmed in his monastery and acquitted of the charge of heresy; Flavian was deposed and apparently so maltreated that he died within days; the Roman legates, bearing with them Leo's Tome rejecting Eutyches' position, were insulted; Theodoret, Ibas of Edessa, and Domnus of Antioch were deposed, together with others.

Theodoret's Epistle 113 is also of interest to us because it refers to the literary pieces he had been working on from the concord of 433–5 down to the outbreak of the Eutychian controversy: namely, his biblical commentaries and the *Historia Ecclesiastica*, and then against Dioscorus and in particular Eutyches, *That there is one Son, our Lord Jesus Christ even after the Incarnation*, in the present texts of Theodoret's works now appended to Epistle 151, and the *Eranistes seu Polymorphus*, his most important Christological work, written in 447 or 448, and reissued, perhaps as late as 466, with a few additional patristic citations obtained from Leo's Tome. In any case, the second edition of *Eranistes* was after 451.

Theodoret appeals to Leo to receive from him a 'cure for the wounds of the Churches'. He holds first place, Theodoret says, because his see is adorned with many privileges: its city is the largest and most illustrious of the world and is especially adorned with apostolic and orthodox faith. In her keeping are the tombs of our common Fathers and teachers of the truth, Peter and Paul, who 'have rendered your see most glorious', whose joint throne God has adorned with Leo's orthodoxy, for Theodoret has read and expressed enthusiastic approval for Leo's Tome on the Incarnation. There was, after all, nowhere else for Theodoret to turn. Dioscorus was for the moment master of the Eastern Churches, and only Rome had offered the bishop of Cyrus any support. Indicted at the Latrocinium by one Pelagius, a presbyter of his own city of Antioch, Theodoret was defended, it would seem, only by the West. As Bloomfield Jackson put it, 'One word of manly Latin had broken in on the supple suffrages of the servile orientals, the "contradicitur" of Hilarius, representative of the Church of Rome.'[102]

[102] *NPNF*, iii. 8. For the deposition of Theodoret at the Latrocinium following the reading out of excerpts from his *Defensio pro Diodoro . . . et Theodoro . . .*, cf. Johannes Flemming (ed.), *Akten der ephesinischen Synode vom Jahre 449 Syrisch*, German trans. from the Syriac by Georg Hoffman (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1917), pp. 105–13. The Roman legate at Ephesus representing Pope Leo I whose name Bloomfield Jackson spells as 'Hilarius' succeeded Leo as Pope from 461 to 468. Professor Henry Chadwick has pointed out to me in private correspondence that his name is given as 'Hilarus' in the inscription in the Lateran baptistry recording his deliverance from house arrest at the Latrocinium by the intervention of John the Evangelist.

For the moment there was little of practical value that Leo could do to help. In Epistle 119, Theodoret asks his patrician friend Anatolius to obtain for him permission either to go to the West, there to plead his cause 'before the very godly and holy bishops', or at the very least to be allowed to return to his old monastery, 'which is one hundred twenty-five miles away from Cyrus, seventy-five from Antioch, and lies three miles away from Apamea'. The latter was the obviously safe course for the victors at Ephesus, and there he went into a less rigorous exile, perhaps, than he might have expected.

Providence was to prove even kinder to Theodoret, if not to his opponents. The political winds shifted abruptly, as they often do. In July of the next year, 450, Theodosius was enjoying the royal sport of hunting near Constantinople when he was thrown from his horse, injured his back, and died a few days later.[103] His sister immediately emerged from the background into which Chrysaphius had manœuvred her to ascend the throne as empress, taking as consort an aged general and senator, one Marcian. This remarkable woman, who managed better than many a bishop of her time to steer a careful course between the Scylla and Charybdis of Nestorianism and Eutychianism, and her husband Marcian summoned a council to meet at Chalcedon, the suburb of Constantinople directly across the Bosporus. Chrysaphius would cause no more trouble, for he was promptly executed. Theodosius' edict was lifted by Marcian and Pulcheria, which news Theodoret celebrates in Epistles 139–41, and he was free to defend himself at Chalcedon.

The first session of the council assembled on 8 October, 451, with imperial commissioners presiding. To their right sat Dioscorus, Juvenal of Jerusalem (who had voted with Dioscorus' party against Theodoret at Ephesus two years before), and the Palestinian bishops. On the left of the commissioners were the three legates of Leo: Paschasinus of Lilybaeum (or Marsala), Lucentius of Asculum, and the presbyter Boniface, together with Anatolius of Constantinople, Maximus of Antioch, and the Eastern bishops. The place chosen by Constantinople surely signified the way the imperial winds were blowing.

This first session was predictably stormy. Leo's representatives protested the presence of Dioscorus for having held the Latrocinium in defiance of Leo's wishes. Theodoret had presented to the emperor his account of the wrongs done to him, and perhaps also one to the Roman representatives of the only patriarch who had earlier supported him, a list which Venables suggests may already have contained an anathema of the doctrines of both Nestorius and Eutyches.[104] His claim to a seat and a vote in the council produced a fury of

[103] Ibid., p. 9.

[104] Venables, p. 915, citing Philippe Labbe, *Sacrosancta Concilia ad Regiam Editionem Exacta*, 15 vols. (1671–3), iv. 101, 619, 623. The following account may be found on pp. 102–3. Cf. also Ceillier, x. 24; and *ACO*, Tom. II, vol. i, part 1, pp. 69–70, 97; vol. iii, pp. 9–11.

protests from the Alexandrine party, even if the imperial commissioners seconded it on the ground that Leo had recognized his orthodoxy. His opponents loudly denounced him as the teacher of Nestorius; Dioscorus raised the cry that if Theodoret were seated, inasmuch as he had anathematized Cyril, it would be casting Cyril out. The Eastern and Asian bishops responded with their own outcry to throw out the murderer Dioscorus. Both sides, as would be expected, clamored 'long years' to the empress, whom the one side claimed rightly for having cast out Nestorius, the other for summoning Theodoret to the council.

As the minutes of the Latrocinium were read, when the reader came to the point where Theodosius had forbidden Theodoret to appear at the council, the imperial commissioners stopped the reading and summoned Theodoret to take his place among the bishops, as Marcian had desired. It was at this point that the sound and fury above began. The commissioners ruled that since he was appearing in the role of accuser, he should be seated 'in the midst' (*en meso*)—that is to say, I assume, not among his peers as a bishop with voice and vote, but between the two groups, as accuser. Cries of '*Axios, axios*' ('He is worthy') from the Easterners aroused more bombast from the Alexandrines: 'Theodoret has accused Cyril. We cast out Cyril if we receive Theodoret; the canons cast out Theodoret,' and so on. Finally quieted by the commissioners' assurances that Theodoret's presence 'in the midst' compromised no one, and that all debates concerning him would be reserved to the one side or the other, the council proceeded.

In this way Theodoret sat through the first seven sessions of the council, without voice or vote, taking no part in the deposition of Dioscorus during the third session. His turn came with the eighth session, on 26 October.[105] The extreme Alexandrine view and its supporters had lost—the famed Chalcedonian definition of faith had been approved, and the Tome of Leo received, as expressing Cyril's own faith. Further, Theodoret had signed both. Now the demand was moved in the eighth session to resolve the problem of Theodoret: he was to be seated and restored to his bishopric if he anathematized Nestorius. It was felt that this would remove any doubt about his orthodoxy. The moment was at hand at which Theodoret had to choose either to say what he had to this point adamantly refused to say or stand rejected as a Nestorian by this council which had already demonstrated its willingness to go as far as it could to make room in the Ephesine Christological confession for the

[105] Labbe, iv. 619–24. For the way the Definition of Chalcedon was worked out at the council, and the formula's literary sources, cf. M. Richard, 'L'Introduction du', 265–9.

Antiochene emphasis on 'two natures after the Incarnation' by its definition of faith and its rejection of Dioscorus' Eutychianism.

'The most reverend bishops all stood before the rails of the most holy altar, and shouted, "Theodoret must now anathematize Nestorius".'[106] It must be emphasized that these bishops represented not his old unbending opponents who represented extreme Eutychianism, even if some were men- or emperor-pleasers like Juvenal of Jerusalem, who had voted with the Dioscoran winning side in 449 and now switched to vote with the new imperial pair's wishes against Dioscorus in 451. Theodoret tried various tacks. He said that he had laid confessions of his faith before the commissioners and the representatives of Leo. Let them be read that the bishops may know his faith. The answer was adamant: 'We want nothing to be read; only anathematize Nestorius.' Theodoret tried again: 'I was brought up in orthodoxy; I was taught by the orthodox; I have preached orthodoxy; and not only Nestorius and Eutyches, but any man who thinks not rightly, I avoid and count him an alien.' It did not suffice. The bishops again demanded, 'Speak plainly; anathema to Nestorius and his doctrine; anathema to Nestorius and those who defend him.' Another tack, but the same reply. The bishops' patience was growing thin. Theodoret: 'Unless I set forth at length my faith I cannot speak. I believe . . .', and it takes no effort for anyone who has read the Christological confessions in Theodoret's letters written to defend himself in just such situations to imagine rather completely exactly what he was prepared to confess, but the bishops instantly and finally cut in with 'He is a heretic! He is a Nestorian! Away with the heretic! Anathema to Nestorius and to anyone who does not confess that the Holy Virgin Mary is Mother of God and who divides the Only-Begotten Son into two Sons.' At that cry, Theodoret finally submitted: 'Anathema to Nestorius and to whoever denies that the Holy Virgin Mary is the Mother of God, and who divides the Only-Begotten Son into two Sons. I have subscribed to the definition of faith [that is, that of Chalcedon itself] and the epistle of the most holy Archbishop Leo.'

Thus, a century later, the Fifth Ecumenical Council could not undo what the Fourth had done. Theodoret's person and his anathema of Nestorius, publicly pronounced in solemn assembly, had been accepted. But his careful theological position had not been allowed to be presented. Was this impatience on the bishops' part, or might we not speculate that informally, even subconsciously, they might have preferred to let the sleeping dog lie? Had he actually been a Nestorian at Ephesus in 431, as the bishops at Ephesus had understood Nestorianism, and then changed his mind by 451? Was he

[106] Quoted from *NPNF*, iii. 11.

confessing the same faith, what I find convenient for lack of a better term to call the same Christological model, the entire time? We shall turn shortly to this, the central problem of this study. But in the meantime, two points become clear from this sketch of Theodoret's life and the history of the Nestorian and Eutychian controversies.

The first is that he was universally recognized as the leading theological apologist for Antiochene Christology. For historians to centre exclusively on Nestorius and the question of whether Nestorius was or was not a Nestorian as defined at Ephesus in 431 is to miss the mark, fascinating as that question indeed is to anyone interested in the development of fifth-century Christology. Theodoret's position, role, and Christological confessions are much more central to the history of the way in which conciliar Christology actually evolved. Nestorius put the issue thus: is the Virgin rightly to be called Mother of God? Theodoret and Cyril, and then Eutyches, Proclus, Flavian, and Leo, refined the issue to wring out of it the Chalcedonian Definition of faith. Hence my conviction that a careful analysis of Theodoret's faith in the Incarnation ought to give us significant insights into conciliar Christology.

The second point, or perhaps caveat, is to emphasize that what the bishops at Chalcedon did in the eighth session was to say that Theodoret was orthodox, and was thus to be restored to his bishopric on the basis of his *anathematizing Nestorius* and on the fact that Leo had accepted him as orthodox on the ground of his rather simplistic confession of faith in Epistle 113. The point is precisely that Chalcedon and then Second Constantinople in 553 were *not* divergent here, for clearly both accepted Theodoret only in so far as the bishops present and deliberating considered him in essential agreement with the Christological model of Cyril. In the second session at Chalcedon, when the Tome of Leo was considered, it is clear that the bishops accepted it because they considered it a statement of *Cyril's* Christological model, which puts into proper perspective Theodoret's final remark that he had subscribed, with the other bishops, to the Tome of Leo. Cyril's second dogmatic letter (the third, to which the anathemas were appended, was confirmed at the first, fourth, and fifth sessions) and his 'Union Creed' letter to John of Antioch were read in this second session, Theodoret presumably there 'in the midst'. The bishops replied,

> We all so believe; Pope Leo thus believes; anathema to him who divides and to him who confounds. This is the faith of Archbishop Leo. Leo thus believes. . . . We all thus believe. As Cyril so believe we, all of us. . . . As the epistles of Cyril teach, such is our mind; such has been our faith; such is our faith.

At that point, the commissioners had Leo's Tome read. The *acta* continue:

After the reading of the foregoing epistle, the most reverend bishops cried out, 'This is the faith of the fathers; this is the faith of the Apostles. So we all believe; thus the orthodox believe. Anathema to him who does not thus believe. Peter has spoken through Leo. So taught the Apostles. Piously and truly did Leo teach; so taught Cyril. Everlasting be the memory of Cyril. Leo and Cyril taught the same thing; anathema to him who does not so believe.... Why were not these things read at Ephesus [449]? These are the things Dioscorus hid away.'[107]

Thus the Fifth Ecumenical Council's conclusion that the treatises which Theodoret wrote against Cyril and the 431 Council of Ephesus were Nestorian and heretical is actually in complete harmony with Chalcedon's having recognized him as orthodox by 451. Both were Cyrillian councils: the earlier believed him in agreement with Cyril on the basis of his public confession before it in 451; the later considered his 431 treatises against Cyril and the Council of Ephesus as heretical, precisely because it considered them anti-Cyrillian, without passing judgement on his later works.

There is not enough evidence extant to tell conclusively whether Theodoret ever went back to Cyrus or whether he returned to Nicerte to spend his last days writing in his old monastery. We have fragments of a letter to John of Aegae defending what he had done and said at Chalcedon; there is the extant second edition of the *Eranistes*, dating from after Chalcedon; it is most likely that the *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium* was written in 453. There was also in the same year *Quaestiones in Octateuchum*. Zacharias Rhetor in his *Historia Ecclesiastica* 7: 6–7 reports that Theodoret also wrote *On the Council of Chalcedon*, a book which was used by Macedonius of Constantinople *c.* 510 for a florilegium of Antiochene theologians,[108] but which has most unhappily not been preserved. If we were not already aware of Theodoret's prodigious potential for literary output in the midst of a hectic pastoral episcopate, it would be easy to cite this output as evidence that he retired directly from Chalcedon to Nicerte.

The last certain date in Theodoret's life is 11 June, 453, when Leo wrote him a letter.[109] Tillemont thinks he most likely did not survive that year.[110] Venables, Garnier, Bloomfield Jackson, and more recently P. Peeters, and most other historians, have accepted 457 as the likely year of his death on the grounds that his name was not among those of the bishops to whom the new emperor Leo I wrote an encyclical letter in October 457, or in the synodical letter of Patriarch Gennadius of 459. They usually also cite Gennadius' *De Viris Illustribus*, 89 (90), that work being finished *c.* 480, who

[107] Quoted from *NPNF*, xiv. 253, 259.
[108] Cf. Quasten, iii. 552.
[109] *ACO*, Tom. II, vol. v, part 4, pp. 78–81.
[110] Tillemont, xv. 875.

says that Theodoret died during the reign of Emperor Leo (457–74).[111] Louis Duchesne, discounting the value of Gennadius, considered Theodoret dead and replaced at Cyrus by 458.[112] On the other hand, more recently, E. Honigmann has argued against the usual discounting of the remark in the *Chronicle* of Marcellinus Comes, who died in 534, that in the year 466, 'Theodoret, the holy bishop of the city of Cyrrhus, wrote on the incarnation of the Lord, against Eutyches and Dioscorus, the bishop of the Church of Alexandria, who deny that Christ had human flesh.'[113] The work referred to would be the second edition of the *Eranistes.* He strengthens his argument by discounting the absence of Theodoret's name from the imperial and synodical episcopal lists, since there are many gaps in them, and finally refers to a letter from Theodoret to a Bishop Suras of Germanicia mentioned by the early sixth-century Eutychian historiographer John Diacrinomenus. Honigmann rather convincingly refutes Eduard Schwartz's supposition that Suras was a cognomen for John of Germanicia, for why would Theodoret have written to that worthy about the number of bishops (saying it was 520) who had met at Chalcedon, as John Diacrinomenus remarks he did, when John of Germanicia played a strong and decisive role himself at Chalcedon? Hence Honigmann concludes that Suras must have been at the least John of Germanicia's immediate successor, points out that the latter had signed the synodical letter of Patriarch Gennadius of 459, and surmises that Theodoret must, then, have lived until 460, the first likely year of Suras' consecration. All of which makes Marcellinus Comes' date of 466 for the second edition of the *Eranistes* less unlikely than other authors have thought. Perhaps we might be as content as Ceillier[114] with simply mentioning that the date *post quem* for Theodoret's demise would likely be 11 June 453, when Leo of Rome last wrote to him,[115] and that he might well have still been living, as Marcellinus Comes says, in 466.

[111] Venables, p. 916; Garnier in *PG*, 84: 158; *NPNF,* iii. 12; P. Peeters, 'Le Tréfonds oriental de l'hagiographique byzantine', *Subsidia Hagiographica*, 26 (1950), 102.

[112] L. Duchesne, *L'Histoire ancienne de l'église chrétienne*, 3 vols. (1906–10), iii. 493 n. 2.

[113] E. Honigmann, 'Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Basil of Seleucia (The Time of Their Deaths)', *Patristic Studies* Studi e Testi, 193 (Vatican City, 1953), 174–84.

[114] Ceillier, x. 24–5.

[115] It is interesting that in Sermon 28.6 of 453 Leo I adopted the Antiochene *homo assumptus* formula for the first time to assert the full reality of the humanity assumed by the Word in the Incarnation, against what he called the Eutychianism of the monks of Palestine who had accused his Tome of being Nestorian. Philip L. Barclift has worked this out in 'The Shifting Tones of Pope Leo the Great's Christological Vocabulary', *Church History,* 66 (June 1997), 221–39.

THE PRESENT ESTIMATE OF THEODORET'S CHRISTOLOGY IN HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP

I have set out the life of Theodoret at some length, as it can be ascertained from his own works, in order to show the central role he played in the Nestorian and Eutychian controversies, but also by way of introduction, to demonstrate why the only way to do justice to Theodoret's Christology is the admittedly involved and time-consuming chronological approach, examining the Christology in each of his works in the order in which they originally appeared. What are we to think of Theodoret's 'orthodoxy' in the Christological controversy? Was he a Nestorian whose acceptance at Chalcedon would mean that he was perhaps deliberately misunderstood by some of the bishops there for the sake of peace (which seems from the foregoing highly unlikely) or which would justify later Monophysite accusations that precisely Theodoret's acceptance as orthodox proved that Chalcedon itself was Nestorian (though of course the really huge bugbear for them was Leo's Tome)? His character and the way he refused for twenty years to denounce Nestorius with anathema would make conscious evasion on that question at Chalcedon impossible for him—he must have meant exactly what he said, however reluctantly he uttered the fateful words. This would leave us, then, with three alternatives. He was in fact a Nestorian in 431 and remained so until his death, or underwent a conversion to Cyril's Christological model sometime between the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, or from the beginning he was a Chalcedonian before Chalcedon whose Antiochene terminology underwent some evolution under pressure of the debate.

One of the earliest collections of anti-Nestorian writings has come down to us under the name of Marius Mercator, who attacked Nestorianism and Pelagianism while in Constantinople for the decade 422–32. A century later, a collection of his writings was made that has survived in the manuscript *Vaticanus Palatinus* 234, commonly referred to as the *Collectio Palatina*, and which has been published by Eduard Schwartz in the *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*.[116] Schwartz attributes only that portion of the *Collectio* to Mercator which covers pages 5–70 in his edition. There are excerpts from Theodoret's *Pentalogos* against Cyril, *De Incarnatione Domini*, a work probably written, at least in its first form, before the Nestorian controversy, and from the epistles as items 41–9 in the manuscript, published on pages 165–72.

[116] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. v, part 1, pp. 3–215. It was also published by Étienne Baluze in Paris in 1684. Another version, taken from a now lost Beauvais manuscript, was published by J. Garnier in Paris in 1673 and now appears in Migne, *PL*, 48.

Excerpts from Cyril's refutation of Theodoret's *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum*, which includes part of the latter, make up item 40, pages 142–65. Whoever the redactor was of the *Collectio Palatina*, he simply considered at least the 431 era works of Theodoret to be Nestorian, for they were written against St Cyril and the holy Council of Ephesus under the instigation of the devil. Item 41 is prefaced thus by the redactor:

> Of the same Theodoret, from the preface of the Five Books [the *Pentalogos*] which at the instigation of the devil he wrote against blessed Cyril, bishop of the city of Alexandria, and the holy council of Ephesus by which Nestorius was damned.[117]

On the other hand, Facundus, bishop of Hermiane in the African province of Byzacena, was a chief supporter of Theodoret in the Three Chapters controversy that led to the 553 condemnation of his anti-Cyrillian and anti-Ephesine works. This contemporary of the redactor of the *Collectio Palatina* argued forcefully in his *Pro Defensione Trium Capitulorum*, completed in Constantinople in 547–8,[118] that to condemn Theodoret, Theodore of Mopsuestia, or the letter of Ibas of Edessa to Maris the Persian (like Theodoret, Ibas was accepted in person at Chalcedon, but his letter was condemned as anti-Cyrillian in Canon XV of the Fifth Ecumenical Council) would mean rejecting the Christology of Chalcedon. After his return to Africa and the condemnation of the Three Chapters in 553, Facundus and his confederates were for a time out of communion with Pope Vigilius, who vacillated from one side to the other throughout that sixth-century controversy. In so many words, it seems fair to say that most of the pro-Chalcedonian writers of the fifth and sixth centuries, though Theodoret had his strong defenders, thought he had erred in opposing Cyril: his 431 theology was generally considered Nestorian; most thought he had undergone a more or less genuine change of mind by 451; nonetheless, his major defence was his anathematizing Nestorius at Chalcedon. He had, to the general mind, submitted. On the other hand, the various Monophysite writers held him in as much contempt as Dioscorus had: they were never to be convinced that his two natures in Christ did not by metaphysical necessity divide the Lord into two Sons.

The writers who have examined the problem in more recent times have been more generous in the main. Most have come to the conclusion, when they have studied Theodoret at all, that he is to be acquitted of having shared in the heresy of Nestorianism.

[117] My translation from the Latin, as with quotations from Garnier and other authors writing in Latin cited in this chapter, unless otherwise noted.

[118] Edited by J. Sirmond in Paris in 1689 and reprinted by Migne in *PL*, 67: 527–878.

Philip Schaff was not untypical in his treatment of Theodoret. In the chapters on the Nestorian, Eutychian, and Monophysite controversies in his *History of the Christian Church*, he contents himself with simply mentioning Theodoret as one of the defenders of Nestorius in 431, attributes to him the Union Creed of 433, and refers to the condemnation of the 431 works against Cyril at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553.[119] He does not discuss Theodoret's theology, let alone the more involved question of his orthodoxy.

Similarly, Adolf von Harnack, in the chapter of his *History of Dogma* on the development of Christological thought from the Nestorian controversy to John of Damascus, mentions Theodoret in passing, in one place even terming him 'the pillar of the East', but does not consider his theology, simply presenting him as the leading exponent of Antiochene Christology.[120] Getting a little ahead of ourselves, Harnack does take exception to Bertram's positive conclusion on Theodoret's orthodoxy, noting that Bertram's work on Theodoret 'is painstaking but biassed.... The question of Theodoret's orthodoxy is certainly a very troublesome one for a Catholic.'[121] Supporting my remarks above that the Christology of both Chalcedon and the Second Council of Constantinople was Cyrillian, the theme that Harnack persistently pursues through this entire chapter is that Cyrillianism was the actual Christological model of the spirit of the Eastern Church. He accuses Leo's Tome to Flavian of 'hypostasizing' the two natures in Christ by the way it retains to each nature its peculiar modes of action. Two *hypostaseis*, he says, are therefore innately part of Chalcedon. The Monophysites were right: in spite of its formulary disclaimer, Chalcedon was an unholy mixture. Without any doubt its bishops were actually Cyrillians, but in the Chalcedonian definition and in Leo's Tome they allowed a statement that logically must produce a Nestorian two-*hypostaseis* division of the Christ into two Sons. He speaks with contempt of Antiochene bishops having already long before 'succumbed to the power of the Alexandrian Confession', and considers it disgraceful that the great majority of bishops, who held the same views as Cyril and Dioscorus, allowed the emperor and the bishop of Rome to impose on them a formula which did not correspond with their belief.[122] In a lengthy footnote at the end of the chapter, dealing with John of Damascus, Harnack concludes that the official formulae of the Church had been heavily influenced by Antiochene expressions, but that in doctrine itself, all that survived of the Antiochene theology was the statement that Christ had a real and perfect human nature, a point that

[119] Philip Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, 2nd edn., 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886), iii. 705–83. He attributes the union creed to Theodoret on p. 727.

[120] Adolf von Harnack, *History of Dogma*, trans. from the 3rd German edn. of 1900 by Neil Buchanan (repr. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1961), iv. 164–267. On Theodoret, see esp. pp. 166 n. 1, 189, 198 n. 2, 202, 209–10, 245.

[121] Ibid. 198 n. 2.

[122] Ibid. 215–16.

Cyril was as much concerned to assert against Apollinarianism as were the Antiochenes.[123] So in the end, his conclusion about Theodoret is not altogether different from Bertram's: 'Theodoret taught the same doctrine as Theodore [of Mopsuestia], but finally capitulated.'[124]

As an illustration of the way in which many historians have granted him only secondary notice, in Arthur McGiffert's *A History of Christian Thought*, Theodoret is important only as a historian and apologist against paganism.[125] The last volume of Lietzmann's *History of the Early Church* is another case in point. It brings us up only to the end of the fourth century in the history of dogma, but Theodoret does appear in the chapter on monasticism, as an example of the ascetical piety that Lietzmann considers superstitious.[126]

In *Fathers and Heretics*, the Bampton Lectures for 1940, G. L. Prestige in his chapter on Cyril recognizes the central role played by Theodoret in the defence of Antiochene Christology against that of Cyril. In the chapter on Nestorius, Prestige proves rather too much too easily in asserting that the common bond among the Antiochene theologians was not 'the specifically Nestorian strain of thought, which created difficulties in envisaging the unity of God and man in Christ', but rather 'their clear perception of the full and genuine human experience which the incarnate Son historically underwent'. Indeed, Chrysostom and Theodoret of Cyrus, 'among the greatest of that school', were among the majority of it who 'by no means . . . viewed His humanity in such isolation as to endanger the unity of His person', for, 'taken as a whole, the school of Antioch was just as orthodox as the school of Alexandria or that of Cappadocia, and contributed as much to sound belief as either of the others'.[127] Though Nestorius was one of this school, he was unable to maintain the unity of person in Christ, but about Theodoret's orthodoxy Prestige had no doubt at all:

What was at stake [between Cyril and Nestorius] was not the general substance of Antiochene teaching, which was thoroughly acceptable in a Chrysostom or a

[123] Adolf von Harnack, *History of Dogma*, trans. from the 3rd German edn. of 1900 by Neil Buchanan (repr. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1961), iv. 265–7; for the remark about Cyril, cf. pp. 175–7.

[124] Ibid. p. 166 n. 1.

[125] Arthur Cushman McGiffert, *A History of Christian Thought*, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), i. 260, 291, 311, 312, 323.

[126] Hans Lietzmann, *A History of the Early Church*, iv: *The Era of the Church Fathers*, trans. Bertram Lee Woolf (New York: Meridian Books, 1953), 169, 171. For Lietzmann, Theodoret was much too overawed by the disciplines practised by the Syrian hermits. Among other things he refers contemptuously to Theodoret's gazing with astonishment at Symeon Stylite's praying with a rhythmical falling to his knees and bowing his head on to his 4 sq. yd. platform atop his 70 ft. high pillar. Theodoret gave up counting after 1,244 such obeisances.

[127] G. L. Prestige, *Fathers and Heretics* (London: S.P.C.K., 1963), p. 133; cf. also pp. 143, 150, 153, 155 ff., 171, 173.

Theodoret, but the set of peculiarities in its presentation adopted from Theodore [of Mopsuestia] by Nestorius.[128]

Returning to the chapter on Cyril, Prestige praises the Alexandrine's greatness precisely on the grounds of the fury expressed by Theodoret on the former's death in Epistle 180, for 'small men do not earn such heartfelt obituaries, even from deeply indignant saints'.[129]

Theodoret has no theological function in J. F. Bethune-Baker's *Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine*, save for a remark in a footnote on the doctrine of the Trinity to the effect that he was the first definitely to deny that the Holy Spirit receives his essence from the Son as well as from the Father, in his reply to Cyril's Anathema IX. In the chapter on Christology, Theodoret is briefly recognized as simply one of the leaders of the Antiochene school.[130]

In *Early Christian Doctrines*, J. N. D. Kelly recognized Theodoret as the leading theologian of the Antiochene school after 431 and as the author of the union creed of 433. He presented a brief analysis of his Christology, and concluded that although he rejected the 'thoroughgoing use of the *communicatio idiomatum* advocated in the Alexandrian school', and 'failed to bring out that the hypostasis of the Word was the unique metaphysical subject in Christ', nevertheless, 'not even his worst enemies could with justice interpret his teaching as what has been traditionally designated "Nestorianism"'.[131] In his *Two Ancient Christologies*, R. V. Sellers did not deal with the Christology of Theodoret as a unity, but cited him constantly in his development of Antiochene Christology as a whole in chapter II and then in chapter III's development of the conflict between the two schools of thought and its outcome. Thus he rightly recognized him as one of the three or four great Antiochene theologians, and concludes that when Theodoret left Chalcedon to go more or less into obscurity, 'the school of Diodore and Theodore, it may be said, had come to an end'.[132] With Sellers's irenical approach to the conflict and his positive response to Antiochene theology in particular, it is not difficult to surmise his estimation of Theodoret. Sellers repeats the same position in *The Council of Chalcedon* some years later, saying that the condemnations of Theodore, the anti-Cyrillian works of Theodoret, and the letter of Ibas to Maris the Persian at Second Constantinople were unfortunate, because they meant that the 'neo-Alexandrians' had failed to perceive that

[128] Ibid. 143. [129] Ibid. 150.

[130] J. F. Bethune-Baker, *An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine to the Time of the Council of Chalcedon* (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1903), pp. 216, 284–5.

[131] J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 2nd edn. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 323–32, 338–9.

[132] R. V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies* (London: S.P.C.K., 1940), p. 242.

these Antiochenes 'were not dividing the one Christ into two Persons, but "recognizing the difference" of his Godhead and manhood in their union of his one Person'.[133] Such seems to me a good and succinct expression of the conviction shared by contemporary historians of dogma who prefer to understand the fifth-century Christological debate fundamentally in terms of both sides professing essentially the same faith but misunderstanding each other's different terminology.

The three most important works to focus their attention exclusively on Theodoret, at least until recent times, were by Garnier, the Jesuit editor of his works whose text is printed in Migne;[134] Adolfus Bertram, who in 1883 published in Latin what is still the most thorough examination of Theodoret's Christology; and N. N. Glubokovsky, whose two-volume Russian work on *The Blessed Theodoret: His Life and His Work* remains the most extensive examination of his subject.[135] The difficulty posed by the question of Theodoret's Christology is signified in the fact that all three of his most careful analysts came to distinctly different conclusions about it.

Garnier, in essence, concluded that Theodoret taught two Sons, and was therefore a Nestorian. He only defended what Theodore had originated: 'Theodore is therefor the author of the dogma, Theodoret the defender.'[136] Against the Arians, who in the beginning were his principal foes, he rightly upheld the divinity of the Word; against both Arians and Apollinarians, he insisted rightly on the humanity of Christ ('Theodoret understood rightly about the divinity of the Word, as is manifest from the books against Arians, and equally rightly concerning the humanity of Christ, which the disputes with Arians and Apollinarians demonstrate'[137]). Nonetheless, Garnier was much impressed by the list of those who have accused Theodoret of teaching a merely moral union of the divine and human natures in Christ: Cyril, Marius Mercator, Pope Vigilius, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Ecumenical Councils,

[133] R. V. Sellers, *The Council of Chalcedon* (London: S.P.C.K., 1961), p. 329.

[134] Garnier's dissertation, 'De fidei Theodoreti', covers cols. 394–455 of *PG*, 84, the fifth volume of the *Opera Theodoreti* which contains his additions to Sirmond's edition. Besides this dissertation, it contains the 'Auctarium ad opera Theodoreti', cols. 19 ff., and dissertations (1) 'De vita Theodoreti', cols. 89 ff.; (2) 'De libris Theodoreti', cols. 198 ff.; (3) 'De fidei Theodoreti', cols. 394 ff.; (4) 'De quinto synodo generali', cols. 455 ff.; and (5) 'De Theodoreti et Orientalium causa', cols. 550 ff.

[135] Bertram, *Theodoreti*; Glubokovsky, *Blessed Theodoret*. I note with thanks the help of my friend and neighbour, the Revd Thomas Hopko, pastor of St Gregory's Orthodox Church, near to my own parish, and member of the theological faculty of St Vladimir's Seminary in Westchester County, NY, in translating many important passages in Glubokovsky for me and for many hours of delightful discussion on Theodoret and the Nestorian controversy. There is also a supplementary study to Glubokovsky in V. Bolotov's 'Theodoretiana', *Christjanskoje Tschtenie*, 2 (1892), 142 ff., in Russian.

[136] *PG*, 84: 397. [137] Ibid. col. 401.

Pelagius II, Gregory the Great, Maximus of Antioch, Photius, Agobardus, and Baronius.[138] He asked whether Theodoret could be shown ever to have approved the 'hypostatic union', or whether he could ever have said that the Word of God himself experienced death on the Cross.[139] His answer is clear if not unchallenged afterward: 'Certainly he expressly rejected the hypostatic union.'[140] In Garnier there is not the slightest sense of any evolution in Theodoret's thought: in column 423, for example, the 431 *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum* is given the same weight in evaluating the final position of Theodoret as the *Eranistes* of 447–8.

Bertram, on the other hand, allowed that the *Reprehensio* represented Nestorian doctrine,[141] but argued that in his studies of the scriptures for his commentaries and his reading of the 'ancient' Fathers during the long decade between the union creed of 433 and the outbreak of the debates with Dioscorus in the late 440s, Theodoret came to perceive the error in Nestorianism and afterward rightly confessed the single 'subject' of the Word of God as the one who experienced all that happened in the human life of Jesus—in other words, the hypostatic union, using *communicatio idiomatum* correctly to refer the attributes of each of the divine and human natures to the Word as their proper subject.[142] Thus for Bertram, Theodoret rightly confessed that the Virgin is *Theotokos*, for he who was born of her humanly was the Word, who in his essence as divine was the Only-Begotten before time. For Bertram, when Theodoret hotly and absolutely refused to confess that God the Word suffered death on the cross, he was denying that God could die in his own proper nature as God, not that he experienced death in his humanity. It is to be noted, however, that Bertram seems to have relied almost exclusively on Theodoret's commentaries on the Pauline epistles for his evidence, with a few references to the *Eranistes*. Further, several important texts were simply not available to Bertram, since in his day they were attributed to others, and Theodoret's works of those names were thought to be lost. Such were the *Exposition of the Right Faith*, the commentary on Isaiah, *Questions and Responses to the Orthodox, On the Holy and Life-Giving Trinity, On the Incarnation of the Lord*, and the fragments published in this century from the Syriac *acta* of the Robber Council of 449 of the *Defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia*. Aside from the matter that the Pauline commentaries may indeed pre-date 431 and thus throw Bertram's entire thesis out of line, the recovery to Theodoret of these texts would require re-examination of that thesis.[143]

[138] Ibid., wherein he cites the opinion of each in cols. 402–11. [139] Ibid. col. 422.

[140] Ibid. [141] Bertram, pp. 77 ff. [142] Ibid., pp. 105–53.

[143] Cf. J. Lebon, 'Restitutions à Théodoret de Cyr', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 26 (1930), 523–50.

For Glubokovsky, Theodoret was a Chalcedonian before Chalcedon.[144] He is said never to have defended Nestorius on theological grounds or because of friendship, but merely because he considered it unjust to condemn a bishop unheard. From the beginning, Theodoret is supposed to have rejected Nestorianism, for he was the only one worthy of the title theologian in the Antiochene camp, and so was obviously the author or editor of the synodical letter from John of Antioch and his fellow Oriental bishops to Nestorius in 430 (referred to above) in which *Theotokos* is insisted on. So at Ephesus, which really to Glubokovsky was simply Cyril and Theodoret, he defended Nestorius on the ground that he deserved a fair trial (Theodoret did not even believe that Nestorius himself divided the one Christ into two Sons), and thus always insisted on the use of *Theotokos*, which was the key catchword at Ephesus, even if he did like to balance it with *Anthropotokos*, since he was fiercely defending the total humanity of Christ.

Theodoret wanted to interpret Nestorius, then, *in bonam partem*, but he was not so fair to Cyril, whom he consistently misunderstood and thought to be confusing the divine and human natures in such a way that created necessity (i.e. hunger, thirst, etc.) was introduced into the divine nature (*theotes*). His concern, then, was to defend the absolute immutability and impassibility of the divine Being and to assert the complete reality of historical humanity in Jesus. The course of the debate after 431 led him to see that he had to find a better way to express the union of God and man in Christ. To Glubokovsky, therefore, Theodoret was struggling Christologically as the best theologian of the time to resolve the problems raised by Nestorius and Cyril, one who believed that Cyril's insistence on 'one incarnate *hypostasis* of the Word' was incomprehensible in the light of Nicene emphasis on three *hypostaseis* in God.[145] For Theodoret, the Redeemer was a man with a rational soul, not simply the Logos having taken a soul-less body. The evangelical truth (one of Theodoret's own expressions), half-way between Arian denial that the Word is *homoousios* with the Father and Apollinarian denial of true, rational humanity

[144] Glubokovsky, i. 61–100.

[145] Cyril used 'one incarnate *hypostasis*' or 'one incarnate *physis* of the Word' interchangeably. Glubokovsky here appears to be referring to the phrase 'one incarnate *hypostasis* of the Word' which Cyril used in his Third Letter to Nestorius. On the ultimate derivation from Apollinaris of the phrase in the form 'one incarnate *physis* of the Word', cf. Hardy and Richardson, p. 352 n. 17; and Quasten, iii. 139–40. Why Glubokovsky thought Theodoret would have considered attributing one *hypostasis* to Jesus Christ 'incomprehensible in the light of the Nicene emphasis on three *hypostaseis*' in the divine Being is not immediately clear, unless it refers to Theodoret's persistent interpretation of Cyril's terminology as indicating a confusion of the divine and human natures into one or the other. For Theodoret, to say that the Christ is one *hypostasis* and that this *hypostasis* is the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God is to say that the humanity has been absorbed into the divinity or that the divinity has been changed into the humanity.

in Christ, was, as Glubokovsky finds in the *Eranistes*, that Christ is one subject who lives in two *essentiae* that cannot be confused into one *ousia* or substance. He understood Cyril's hypostatic union, *henosis kath' hypostasin*, as just such a confusion. It was, according to Glubokovsky, Theodoret's appeal to Leo that led to the latter's Tome (a strange conclusion considering that Theodoret seems to refer to the Tome in Epistle 113). The real issue with Theodoret is actually not so much the humanity of Christ, which was of course vitally important to him, but the immutability of God's Being. Cyril's 'one nature' (*mia physis*) deprives God of acting out of love in the Incarnation:

> The activities of physical laws and essential necessities must be distinguished by the full and complete exclusion of any kind of voluntary character. For example, thirst is in no way dependent on the presence or absence of water. Hunger doesn't ask whether the man is full or not: it belongs to human nature. If in this way of thinking one allows in Christ the *henosis physike*, then it will be necessary to introduce the understanding of inevitability into the very nature of divinity and in this way to deprive divinity of its absolute power of self-determination. And together with this it follows that the good pleasure of God must be done away with in the dispensation and all soteriology is annihilated.[146]

Glubokovsky has four rejoinders to Garnier. He cites Cyril's answers to Theodoret's replies to his fourth and tenth anathemas to the effect that Cyril perceived that Theodoret misunderstood him and was saddened by it. He (1) refutes Garnier's charge that Theodoret did not rightly admit the *Theotokos*, for in his reply to Theodoret's rejection of his first anathema Cyril himself was willing to understand him as in essential agreement with himself, even if, Glubokovsky admits, Theodoret expressed himself too extremely, a situation that led directly in his rejection of the second anathema to his denial of the hypostatic union (*henosis kath' hypostasin*). He (2) rejects this hypostatic union, not because his Christological model was essentially different from Cyril's, as Garnier concluded, but because the way he understands it, it must involve God in necessary passibility. The same point applies (3) to Garnier's charge of heterodoxy on the ground of Theodoret's rejection of 'one *hypostasis*'. Glubokovsky rejects Garnier's charge that Theodoret denied that the Word experienced death on the cross (4) on the ground that Theodoret affirms that the Word suffered on the cross in his own humanity, the same thing Cyril says and even put the same way, to Glubokovsky, as in the Tome of Leo.

Glubokovsky agrees that Theodoret's expression of the union of the two natures in Christ is not definite enough to say without any doubt that

[146] Glubokovsky, i. 69; translated for me by Father Hopko.

Theodoret was in this point orthodox. For example, it is not the divinity (*theotes*) that suffered death, but the form of the servant in union with the Word, who (the Word) makes it his own death by virtue of the union. In short, Glubokovsky is pleading that Theodoret be interpreted as much *in bonam partem* as Cyril. It is certainly possible to find Nestorian-sounding phrases in his work, but we ought to make as wide an allowance as we can, considering his Antiochene background and his opponents' use of Apollinarian formulae. Thus, Theodoret's one *prosopon* is functionally the same as Cyril's one *physis* or one *hypostasis*. If we are going to talk about union at all, Glubokovsky has Theodoret insisting, then we are dealing with two natures once divided but now united into one God-man:

Therefore what was common for the two opponents [Cyril and Theodoret] was 'Christ is one theandric Person'. They parted ways in the fact that one particularly emphasized the aspect of *diairesis* [or division], insisting that by the idea of *henosis* there is one prosopon really existing in the form of two *physeis*. But the other [St Cyril] focuses all his attention on the empirical fact of the one individuality or individualness of the Saviour, disallowing in any way a duality in the actual existing One inasmuch as Emmanuel was the subject. St. Cyril contemplated the Personality of the Saviour as a synthetic artist. Theodoret looked and judged it as a theoretical thinker with the precision of an analyst.[147]

Indeed, Glubokovsky goes so far as to say that Theodoret's proclamation of one Christ in two natures, acknowledging the Virgin as *Theotokos* even against his own Eastern allies, was not only his great glory before the whole Church, but that without Theodoret the Nestorians might well have carried the day.[148]

Even if they might differ about precisely what the positions were from which, and to which, Theodoret's Christological thought was evolving, recent historians have emphasized what they believe was an evolution in thought or at least terminology.[149] Of this evolution, Marcel Richard, one who in our time has written most frequently on Theodoret, puts the problem neatly:

That evolution is an indisputable fact. But its interpretation is certainly not easy. Many solutions have been proposed for the problem, which is as much psychological as theological, but to this day none have received unanimous approval.[150]

[147] Glubokovsky, i. 82; again translated by Father Hopko.

[148] Ibid. 96.

[149] Cf. e.g. M. Richard 'Notes sur l'évolution doctrinale de Théodoret', *Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 25 (1936), 459–81; Kevin McNamara, 'Theodoret of Cyrus and the Unity of Person in Christ', *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 22 (1955), 313–28; Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i: *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, trans. J. S. Bowden (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), pp. 419–27.

[150] Marcel Richard, 'Notes sur l'évolution', 459. The translation from the French is mine, in the quotations from Richard that follow.

He refers us to Bertram's study and notes the various solutions offered up to his day which Bertram had outlined in his own introduction, but then reports that Bertram's solution had aroused 'many criticisms',[151] and concludes that the recent recovery to Theodoret of works hitherto thought lost requires re-examination of the entire problem. He himself points out that any theory of doctrinal evolution in Theodoret, which he considered 'an indisputable fact', runs directly counter to Theodoret's insistence during his defence of his own position in the years 448–50 (for example, in Epistles 62 and 113) that he had never taught the doctrine of two Sons and referring his readers to the very works which, by reason of their pre-dating the 431 Council of Ephesus or having been written in reaction against it, are the source of the charge of Nestorianism against him. Theodoret, in short, is unaware of any change in his Christological doctrine.

In his 1936 article 'Notes sur l'évolution doctrinale de Theodoret', a model of very carefully reasoned historical research, Richard demonstrates his important discovery that in his early works Theodoret freely uses certain expressions for the humanity of Christ which were by then traditional in Antiochene theology, such as 'the assumed man' (*ὁ ἀναληφθεὶς ἄνθρωπος*), or 'the perfect man' (*ὁ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος*). Cyril violently objected to this terminology, which Richard labels 'the concrete expressions' (*les formules concrètes*); but in his defence of Antiochene Christology immediately after the Council of Ephesus, particularly in such fragments as we possess of the *Pentalogos* and again in the florilegia Theodoret used in *The Defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia*, written about 438, Theodoret had no difficulty showing that many Fathers revered at Alexandria as much as at Antioch had used this kind of expression to denote Christ's humanity. Such were Basil, Athanasius, the two Gregories, and Theophilus, as well as Ignatius of Antioch, Hippolytus, Eusebius of Caesarea, Eustathius of Antioch, and Amphilochius of Iconium, the cousin of Gregory of Nazianzus and zealous defender of the Nicene faith.[152]

Nonetheless, apart from the use of these concrete expressions in his apology for Diodore and Theodore *c.* 438 (and even there they appear only in quotations from the older patristic authorities to support his case for the two Antiochenes), although used liberally together with more abstract expressions for the humanity throughout everything we have which Theodoret wrote on the Incarnation before 432, after that date they are abruptly dropped and appear nowhere again:

[151] Ibid. n. 1. Bertram's account of solutions offered prior to his may be found at pp. 11–18.
[152] Richard, 'Notes sur l'évolution', pp. 464–6, 477, 481.

But it is very remarkable that not a trace of them is found in the *Eranistes* (about 447–448), the most considerable of all the Christological works of Theodoret, nor in any of the letters, so important for their dogmatic point of view, which he had to write between 448 and 450 to defend himself against the calumnies of the partisans of Dioscorus or Eutyches and to prove the purity of his faith.[153]

It is indeed a very remarkable break with Antiochene tradition, and though he is clear that it is beyond proof, Richard thinks the change came early in this period and was a result of his reading Cyril, particularly the Cyril of the reconciliation of 432–3. Though Theodoret was willing to defend the right of men like Diodore and Theodore to have used such expressions, Richard thinks he came to see the ambiguity of the expressions and so dropped them from his own theological vocabulary. Richard argues convincingly that 'opportunism cannot then suffice to explain Theodoret's change. It must be admitted that at some moment the Bishop of Cyrus realized the ambiguity of his expressions, and that, without doubt, was through reading the writings of Saint Cyril.'[154]

Nonetheless, it is clear that Richard considers this purely a change in terminology, for he constantly reminds his reader that Theodoret himself saw it that way, otherwise he could hardly have referred his own readers in the late 440s so frequently to his pre-432 works as evidence of the orthodoxy of his faith. It seems equally clear that Richard assumes that Theodoret's Christological model is essentially the same as that of Cyril, that the problem was one of finding the best language to say the same things. Thus Richard praises Pamphilius in the next century for paraphrasing one of Theodoret's passages from the *Expositio Rectae Fidei*, glossing, in a way Richard says Theodoret would have approved, the concrete expression 'the perfect man' with such terms as 'that is, soul and body', or 'that is, essence (*toutestin, ousian*)'. I conclude that in essence Richard actually agrees with Glubokovsky, and I am frankly puzzled as to just where he considers the indisputable fact of *doctrinal* evolution in Theodoret's thought to be.

Richard's article 'L'Activité littéraire de Théodoret avant le concile d'Ephèse', published the year before the one we have been considering, draws the same kind of carefully documented conclusions about the chronology of works written by Theodoret before the Council of Ephesus from a very precise analysis of Christological (and Trinitarian) concerns and, most significantly, terminological development. One comes to the same conclusion. Though Richard himself finds in the works of the later 430s a superiority 'in point of view of style and theological doctrine . . . over the earlier writings', a superiority 'due to the experience he had acquired in his unfortunate but loyal battles

[153] Richard, 'Notes sur l'évolution', p. 470. [154] Ibid. 480.

against Saint Cyril',[155] yet what he documents is strictly an evolution in terminology and expressions. Theodoret's manner of explicating the difference in the way divinity is present in 'the temple'—that is, in the humanity of Christ, and again everywhere according to divine omnipresence (*kat' ousian*) —may indeed have scandalized a Severus of Antioch; but Richard says that Theodoret's explanation here in one of his earliest works, the *Expositio Recta Fidei*, is 'a theology without doubt a little more unsophisticated, but not heresy'.[156]

In his works prior to the reconciliation with Cyril in 435, Theodoret makes a total distinction between the activities of the Saviour which are those done by 'the man' and those done by the Word of God, but after reading Cyril, he drops this kind of expression and refers both human and divine acts to 'Christ'. The central question now at hand, indeed, is precisely what Theodoret means by this 'Christ', whether this is a true *communicatio idiomatum*, so that Theodoret is applying all the characteristics of both human and divine natures to the *hypostasis* of the Word of God, or merely a kind of communication or sharing of names. Richard has no doubts that it is the former, but his way of saying this again raises the question of just where in his own mind the supposed theological or doctrinal evolution in Theodoret is, for he demonstrates this *terminological* evolution by citing first the *De Incarnatione Domini*, also a pre-Nestorian controversy work, to the effect that here 'Christ' designates not only the assumed man but also the assuming Word: 'The name "Christ" designates not only the assumed one but also the one who has assumed; it is the sign of the God and the man.'[157] But in the *Oratio X De Providentia*, a work Richard assigns to after 435 precisely because of this terminological evolution, he finds Theodoret saying, 'When you hear the Word "Christ", think of the Word, the Only-Begotten Son, begotten of the Father before eternity, wearing a human nature (*physis*).'[158] But there is for Richard no real change in *doctrine* between the two, for 'it is the same doctrine here and there, but is not the expression infinitely happier in the sermon on Providence?' Theodoret's Christological model is the same as Cyril's, basically, and an exposition of his Christological development is really a study of his coming to see that his earlier classical Antiochene theological

[155] M. Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire de Théodoret avant le concile d'Ephèse', *Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 24 (1935), 105.

[156] Ibid. 87–9.

[157] Ibid. 104–5. Richard is quoting the *Expositio* in *PG*, 85: 1472: *τὸ Χριστὸς ὄνομα, οὐ τὸν ληφθέντα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λαβόντα λόγον μετὰ τοῦ ληφθέντος δηλοῖ; τοῦ θεοῦ γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο σηματικόν ἔστιν.*

[158] Ibid., quoting *PG*, 83: 748: *Χριστὸν δὲ ὅταν ἀκούσης, νόει τὸν πρὸ αἰώνων ἐκ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα μονογενῆ υἱὸν λόγον, ἀνθρωπείαν περικείμενον φύσιν.*

terminology can be interpreted in ways that he, Theodoret, disagrees with and which consequently must be transcended by the discovery and application of new expressions to denote the continuing distinctions in Christ of the divine and human natures, but the attributions of the properties of both to the one subject of the Word of God.

In his chapter on Theodoret in *Christ in Christian Tradition*,[159] Aloys Grillmeier opens by recognizing the key role that Theodoret played, first in defending Nestorius—'at the request of Nestorius, John of Antioch handed on the task of refuting the twelve *Capita* (of Cyril) to Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus, and his brother in office, Andrew of Samosata'[160]—and then, as Grillmeier understands the situation, in the course of the debate assisting in the general evolution toward the Chalcedonian distinction of natures without division or confusion in one *hypostasis* of the Word in the Incarnation. He concludes that Theodoret's Christology was basically orthodox, for 'at least there remains room for a real, substantial unity in Christ such as Theodoret surely acknowledged, even if his basis for it was insufficient'.[161]

Three aspects characterize the problem of Theodoret's Christology. First, in company with Richard and the others, Grillmeier finds a genuine misunderstanding of Cyril's position which is cleared up after the reconciliation in the 430s. Speaking from the perspective of his Trinitarian terminology, Theodoret could originally accuse Cyril only of inventing in his unity *kath' hypostasin* an expression found neither in Scripture nor the Fathers and which by its very nature must confuse the divine and human. Secondly, he points out that Theodoret takes *hypostasis* and *physis* as synonyms meaning substance, essence, or nature; in other words, equivalent functionally or linguistically to *ousia*. His word for unity was the traditional Antiochene *prosopon*. Grillmeier cites Richard[162] to the effect that *hypostasis* is a word not really easily used by Theodoret in his Christological lexicon, and in effect it is in his gradual assimilation after 430 of Christological and Trinitarian language that Theodoret makes the Chalcedonian transition from equating *hypostasis* and *physis* to equating *hypostasis* and his own preferred *prosopon*, so that 'only at the Council of Chalcedon does the word ὑπόστασις acquire a positive significance for the Christology of the Bishop of Cyrus'.[163] However, Grillmeier himself notes that the assertion by J. Montalverne that Theodoret actually used the expression one *hypostasis* in Christ in *Eranistes*, Dialogue I, cannot be

[159] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 419–27. [160] Ibid. 419.

[161] Ibid. 423 n. 1.

[162] Ibid. 421 n. 2. Cf. also M. Richard, 'L'Introduction', 253. But Richard goes on here to cite Theodoret's refutation of Cyril's Twelve Anathemas to show that at that stage of his thought Theodoret equated *hypostasis* and *physis*.

[163] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. p. 421.

substantiated.[164] Further, Grillmeier's own interpretation of Theodoret's use of *hypostasis* and *prosopon* as virtually identical in an analogy made in the *Eranistes* based on the story of the sacrifice of Isaac depends on a translation of the Greek text which may reflect what Theodoret intended to express, but the text can be translated in other ways which assume anything but this virtual identity of *hypostasis* and *prosopon*.[165]

Thirdly, Grillmeier raises the question of the content of the 'christological idea proper' expressed in Theodoret's vigorous use of one *prosopon* in Christ, and concludes that there are inadequacies here, for Theodoret does not use the word to mean our concept of 'person with its ontological content', but rather 'for Theodoret, *prosopon* still has much of its original significance of "countenance" '.[166] The *prosopon* of Jesus, his outward countenance, reflects the glory of the indwelling Word; his face, as it were, is the manifestation of the invisible God in the most adequate means possible, as one of my own teachers would have put it, under the limitations of human existence. The Godhead and the manhood unite themselves into 'one combined appearance'.[167] Though for Grillmeier one can observe in Theodoret a 'real struggle to arrive at a substantial inward interpretation', and though he 'would be nearer to the Chalcedonian christology than has hitherto been assumed', yet his weakness is that

> his concept of prosopon does not aim at emphasizing the hypostasis of the Logos as the one and only one, although he surely meant a unity of person. This prosopon is constituted by the union of Word and manhood. . . . In Cyril's view . . . the being of Christ is centred in the hypostasis of the Logos. . . . For him [Theodoret] the common subject of the sayings is 'Christ' (as the conjunction of the two natures), so that here the divine and human expressions are really justified, as of one subject. On the other hand, he will not make the Logos the common subject of the divine and the human sayings. The reason for this refusal lies in the fact that he cannot distinguish the two kinds of saying: that which ascribes something to the Logos as the possessive and effective subject, and the other which expresses something of the Logos as of his essential nature. For him 'the Logos has suffered' means: the Logos has suffered in his divine nature. Therefore up to 448–9 he still found difficulty in recognizing the

[164] Ibid. n. 5. The reference is to *PG*, 83: 33 ff. Unhappily, the work by J. Montalverne, *Theodoreti Cyrensis Doctrina Antiquior de Verbo 'Inhumanato'*, Studia Antoniana, 1 (Rome: Pontificum Athenaeum Antonianum, 1948), was not available to me. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 419 n. 2, prefers Montalverne's 'thesis of the basic orthodoxy of Theodoret's christology' to that of Bertram.

[165] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 421. The reference is to *Eranistes*, III; *PG*, 83: 252. Grillmeier might better have cited the *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium* of 453. Here Theodoret seems to be using *hypostasis* and *physis* interchangeably in an exegesis of 1 Cors. 15 in his chapter on the heresy of Eutyches at the end of Book IV (*PG*, 83: 435–8). On the other hand, in Book V, chapter XIX, *De Resurrectione*, he seems to interchange *physis* and *ousia* (83: 513).

[166] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 423.

[167] Ibid. 424.

Theotokos title.... It is also clear from Theodoret's often repeated distinction in the exegesis of John 2: 19, 'Destroy this temple,' that he was not wholly successful in distinguishing the 'personal unity' from a 'natural unity' and making the hypostasis of the Word visible as the only subject of the metaphysical 'I' in Christ.[168]

For Grillmeier, then, Theodoret's 'basic orthodoxy' lies in *trying* to find his way out of the inadequacies of Antiochene tradition to a substantial unity of subject and person in Christ, which is the way he (Grillmeier) understands Chalcedon. It is, then, an approximating orthodoxy. On the other hand, quoting phrases from Epistles 145 and 146, which we shall have to consider later, phrases very similar to those that Richard found in *Oratio X de Providentia* cited above,[169] Grillmeier concludes that at the end of his Christological development, by 449, 'despite the difference in terminology, even in idea, the aspirations of the Bishop of Cyrus are also those of Cyril of Alexandria—a mediatory theology which avoids the division of Christ into two persons as much as it avoids the confusion of natures'.[170] Here Theodoret's body of the Lord has become itself impassible, incorruptible, and immortal, and it shows us 'no other *prosopon* than the Only-Begotten himself, who is clothed with our nature'.[171] For Grillmeier, this is unity of subject and of person in Christ, and it may be—indeed, obviously that is *the* question—but Grillmeier in the development of his thesis on Theodoret's Christology at this point simply quotes the letters and finds in them what he hopes to find without really showing how they overcome the difficulties he has earlier raised.

In a footnote to his treatment of the way in which Theodoret constantly refers to John 2: 19,[172] Grillmeier raised what to me is the ultimate issue: Theodoret seems clearly not to understand the right use of *communicatio idiomatum*. But if this is so—and the point of the next chapters will be to analyse the works of Theodoret to examine this question—could it be for any other reason than that Theodoret did not really achieve the escape from the limitations of Antiochene tradition that both Greillmeier and Richard hoped to find in him?

The next commentator to examine this problem in the light of an examination of the whole of Theodoret's theology is Kevin McNamara,[173] who arrived at fundamentally the same question I have just raised in the preceding paragraph. Theodoret, for him, simply could not see how the one personal subject of the humanity of Christ could be the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God without overthrowing the immutability of God: he could not

[168] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 425–6.
[169] p. 45 above.
[170] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 427.
[171] Epistle 145; *PG*, 83: 1389.
[172] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 426 n. 7.
[173] Kevin McNamara, 'Theodoret of Cyrus'.

distinguish between the Logos' suffering in his being and suffering in his *hypostasis*. His adoption of the title *Theotokos*, with or without *Anthropotokos*, does not prove the contrary. McNamara argued, and I think rightly, that Theodoret's use of *Theotokos* by itself was in the conscientious interest of ecclesiastical unity and because of the long tradition behind according this title to the Mother of Christ, particularly in the light of the way the Antiochenes could, as we have seen from the letter of John of Antioch, Theodoret, and the others sent to Nestorius at the outbreak of the controversy, use the title without compromising their fundamental concerns in any way. The test is not here, since to deny the title's appropriateness was by 432 universally agreed to be a sign of *theological* support for Nestorius. Rather, the test is in Theopaschite formulae and expressions. Of all the authors who have examined Theodoret's Christology, McNamara alone seems to have raised this issue as crucially and as strongly as my own reading of Theodoret's texts had already led me to consider it, as the crux of the matter before reading McNamara. An excellent example of the point is the way in which the early *De Incarnatione Domini*, written before the Nestorian controversy, easily accepts *Theotokos*, but energetically and very carefully rejects Alexandrine thought as Apollinarian precisely because it is Theopaschite.[174]

On the other hand, according to McNamara, in their anxiety to prevent the integrity of Christ's humanity being lost sight of, the Antiochenes tended to lose sight themselves of the fact that prior to the fourth century there had been no hesitation in predicating the human attributes in Christ of God the Word.[175] Inheriting this tendency, this last and greatest of the Antiochene Christologists could never, McNamara finds, see how the passions of the cross, or the ordinary human experiences such as learning and hunger and thirst, could be applied to the Word without equally applying them to the divine nature, which would then forfeit immutability and impassibility.

Thus McNamara refers to precisely the passages in Epistles 145 and 146 to which Grillmeier drew our attention, as well as to the defence of Chalcedon's one *hypostasis* in Christ that Theodoret made in his post-451 letter to John of Aegae. But McNamara reaches just the opposite conclusion from Grillmeier. In the case of the letter to John of Aegae, Theodoret seems only to be arguing that *hypostasis* can be used in the same way as he and the Antiochenes have always understood *prosopon*. This hardly means, *ipso verbo*, that he necessarily identified the *hypostasis* of Christ with the *hypostasis* of the Word (the crucial issue), as Grillmeier assumes. Nor, necessarily, do the expressions in Epistles 145 and 146 bring us nearer to conclusive evidence of a fundamental *doctrinal*

[174] Cf. ch. 15 of *De Incarnatione Domini* in particular; *PG*, 75: 1443 ff.

[175] Cf. the interesting examples that McNamara cites, 'Theodoret of Cyrus', 325 n. 1.

shift, *à la* Grillmeier, from an Antiochene inadequate sense of personal unity in Christ to an identification of the *hypostasis* of the Word and the *hypostasis* of Christ, for they are subject at least to the interpretation that they represent no more 'than an affirmation of the traditional Antiochene position to which Theodoret would at all times have assented, that Christ was not a different Son from the Word'.[176]

McNamara thus concludes that there is no conclusive evidence that Theodoret ever came to see a formal identification of the person of Christ with the person of the Word.

> Because he failed to make this identification, Theodoret's Christology never came to its due perfection.... One cannot then, it seems, recognize any deep line of division between Theodoret and Nestorius on the subject of the unity of person in Christ.[177]

In 1969 John Meyendorff came to the same conclusion in *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*. Though Theodoret was a 'genuine theologian... able to penetrate words and formulas and reach their meaning',[178] and recognized that what he meant by orthodoxy could be expressed in Alexandrian formulae, and that certain traditional Antiochene formulae, such as 'the assumed man', had outlived their usefulness and had to be rejected, and though Theodoret was accepted as orthodox at Chalcedon because of his anathematizing Nestorius and all who divide Christ into two Sons, and even for fifteen years until his death in 466 remained perhaps the most important spokesman for the Chalcedonian party, yet he remained steadfast to the end in his refusal to use Theopaschite expressions, to say that the Word died on the cross. That still would have meant for him not a union of natures but a confusion of one into the other, human nature transformed into the divine: Eutychianism, in short.[179] In the fifth book of the *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium*, composed probably in 453 and in any case after Chalcedon, 'he still objects with some polemical violence to any form of theopaschism'.[180] Therein he argues that Christ's death was a separation of the immortal human soul from the mortal human body, the divinity remaining attached or united to both

[176] McNamara, 'Theodoret of Cyrus' 327–8. Cf. p. 328 n.1, where McNamara refutes Grillmeier's claim that the remark in Epistle 145 denotes the final development in Theodoret's Christology that enabled him to cross into a truly Chalcedonian identification of the one *prosopon* of Christ with the Person of the Word, by citing a parallel statement in Theodore of Mopsuestia: 'How then is it possible to add that form of a servant which has been assumed as a fourth person in addition to these [the *Personae* of the Trinity]?' (*Epistula ad Artemium, PG*, 66: 1012). The idea and form of the statement is thus neither original with Theodoret nor one that he could have come to only very late in his Christological development.

[177] McNamara, 'Theodoret of Cyrus', p. 328.

[178] John Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought* (Washington: Corpus Books, 1969), p. 19.

[179] Ibid. 6, 19–20. [180] Ibid. 19.

and guaranteeing their reunion in the resurrection. 'Manifestly, the hypostatic union remains outside Theodoret's perspective. Christ's actions are only considered in the perspective of the 'two natures'; the words *physis* and *hypostasis* remain synonymous.'[181]

Theodoret rejected the theology of the 'assumed man', which for Theodore of Mopsuestia, according to Meyendorff, was the true subject of the passion, and then substituted, as Richard pointed out, abstract terms like 'humanity', 'human nature', or 'the things human'. When asked who it was who suffered on the cross, he answered 'the flesh'. This passion is attributed to the Word, or is appropriated by the Word since the flesh is his own, but to attribute it to the Word as subject would mean that the divine nature itself suffered, and God is no longer God.

Thus after Chalcedon, Theodoret justified that council's one *hypostasis* to John of Aegae by giving it an Antiochene interpretation:

> His tendency was to identify the single *hypostasis* defined by the council (and on account of which the Nestorians rightly regarded Chalcedon as a Cyrillian council) with the concept of a single *prosopon* always accepted by the school of Theodore of Mopsuestia.[182]

If Meyendorff's analysis here is correct, it would be the ultimate opposition to Grillmeier's thesis: Theodoret ignored the Cyrillianism of Chalcedon. He ignored the hypostatic union. After his participation in Chalcedon, his only way to justify the expression one *hypostasis* in two *physeis* is to make it mean a union in *prosopon*—that is, *kata prosopon*. The only other alternative was to be a Cyrillian. Which was it? Was he betraying the Antiochene Christ for the Cyrillian, as some of our authors have thought, and as did, apparently, many of his Antiochene friends? Was it a question of finding new terminology to express what was essentially the same Christological idea in both schools, hitherto simply misunderstood through different terminology? Or was it an authentic breaking out of an impossible metaphysic to embrace wholeheartedly the Cyrillian Christ, protected by the new terminology from Apollinarian or Eutychian confusion?[183]

[181] Ibid. 20. This must refer to Book V, chapter XV (*PG*, 83: 503–6), on the resurrection body. The terms used are *soma, psyche, physis*, and *theotes*. The way Theodoret uses them suggests the old habit of thought, *hypostasis* = *physis* = *ousia*, which must be Meyendorff's point. So far as I can see, Theodoret does not here actually use *physis* and *hypostasis* interchangeably in the text.

[182] Ibid.

[183] Gerard H. Ettlinger in his study and critical Greek edn. of the *Eranistes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) provides us with an excellent new critical edition of the *Eranistes*, but does not try in the slightest to resolve our problem. He would seem to lean in the general direction of Richard and Grillmeier in the Prolegomena's theological sections, pp. 3–8, in the way he refers to the *Eranistes* as essential for understanding the 'two natures doctrine which the

It is obvious that no conclusive answer has been given to this problem by the studies made to date that I have analysed. It has been necessary to probe them more deeply than I would ordinarily have liked in introductory prolegomena, precisely in order to show the lack of any consensus to date on the fundamental content of the Christology of this most central figure in the fifth-century debate and to hint at the complexity of the problem. Only in this way does it become clear that in order to try to go further ourselves, it will be necessary to look carefully at each of the important Christological works in the Theodoretiana in their *chronological order*. I shall basically follow the order of their appearing as outlined by Richard, his work here having become generally accepted. Richard's articles suggest that the natural order of examination would be, first, the works up through the Nestorian controversy, up, that is, to the union creed of 433. That will be followed by chapters on the dogma of Christ in the mature Theodoret: the Theodoret of the commentaries, the *Eranistes, De Providentia*, the *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium*, the apologia against Dioscorus and Eutyches, the Theodoret of Chalcedon. In all this, I shall make some attempt to contrast the model of Christ that emerges from Theodoret's works with that of Cyril of Alexandria as understood, say, by a Leontius of Byzantium.[184]

Council of Chalcedon opposed to Eutyches', in the way he rather begs the question in n. 2, p. 6, by translating overall *prosopon* as 'person', but merely transliterating *hypostasis* as *hypostasis* (*ousia* = essence, *physis* = nature, *morphe* = form, *henosis* = union—not to render both *prosopon* and *hypostasis* by transliteration implies acceptance of the thesis that Theodoret's *prosopon* is theologically the same as Cyril's and Chalcedon's *hypostasis*), and in the way he favourably cites in n. 1, p. 8, M. V. Anastos, 'Nestorius was Orthodox', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 16 (1962), 120, to the effect that the only real difference between Nestorius and Cyril was words. I personally do not find Anastos' thesis convincing or particularly probing of the issues involved. If, indeed, Nestorius misunderstood Cyril or never really got his point—or Theodoret too, for that matter—the same is true, it seems to me, of Anastos. Georges Florovsky, on the other hand, in his *Byzantine Fathers, V–VIII Centuries*, in Russian (Paris, 1933), shares Meyendorff's general perspective. He feels that no matter how orthodox Theodoret's language may be, one still senses that behind it lies a theology of two subjects. *Hypostasis* always means *physis*. One has the feeling that the Word did not so much assume human nature and so become man, but rather that the Word assumed a man whom he indwelt as in a temple, a metaphor Florovsky faults. In all his formulations, Theodoret underlines and sharply exaggerates the independence of the humanity 'so that it appears the humanity is a specific human being rather than the man who the Word became' (p. 90). In Theodoret the metaphor of the union of body and soul in human nature was used to stress the duality of Christ, whereas Cyril used it to stress the unity of Christ. Florovsky concludes that although Theodoret's Christology is not strict Nestorianism, the Antiochene tradition was brought to its perfection in Chalcedon, not Theodoret: 'To the bitter end, Theodoret thought in his own way' (p. 94).

184 For a summary of Cyril's Christology, cf. Appendix II.

2

The Antiochene Tradition Inherited by Theodoret

It is not surprising that there is the divergence of views on the interpretation of Theodoret's Christology which we have briefly considered in the previous chapter, for such is the situation in general for the whole of the Antiochene Christology to which Theodoret, with Nestorius, was heir. Theodoret's immediate predecessors in that tradition were Diodore of Tarsus, who died *c.* 390 after a vigorous struggle against the Arians, on the one hand, and justifying the humanity of Christ against Apollinaris, on the other, and Theodore of Mopsuestia, men whom Theodoret was to defend in 438 against Cyril as his own forerunners.[1] Though, as we have seen in the previous chapter, it is unlikely that Theodore was Theodoret's personal instructor, face to face, his theology without any doubt took Theodore's as its starting-point. Harnack goes so far as to say that Theodoret taught the same doctrine as Theodore, but capitulated finally at Chalcedon—which indeed is what makes him and the development of his apology for the Antiochene Christ so interesting.[2]

Though a prolific writer, so many of his works have perished that we cannot turn directly to Diodore to establish the general point of view of late fourth- and early fifth-century Antiochene Christology. It is, then, to Theodore of Mopsuestia that we must look, and indeed the debate has been a hot one in recent scholarship over the question of whether he was, as Cyril reports, the father of Nestorianism. As John S. Romanides pointed out in his article 'Highlights in the Debate over Theodore of Mopsuestia's Christology and Some Suggestions for a Fresh Approach', there is a group who

[1] In 381 Theodosius I had named Diodore as one of the bishops communion with whom was a test of Nicene orthodoxy. In ch. 39 of the *Historia Ecclesiastica* Theodoret praises Diodore and Theodore as defenders of orthodoxy against 'every heretical phalanx', esp. Arius, Eunomius, and Apollinaris. He says that Theodore had 'enjoyed the teaching of the great Diodorus'. In Epistle 16 he acknowledges them as 'my teachers', whom he had defended in his book against the indictments of them by Cyril.

[2] Adolph von Harnack, *History of Dogma*, trans. from the 3rd German edn. by Neil Buchanan, 7 vols. (repr. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1961), iv. 166 n. 1.

would recognize the essential orthodoxy of Theodore's Christology.[3] That is to say, they understand Chalcedon as allowing the Antiochene view, as chiefly represented by Theodore, and that under the pressure of the Monophysite schism, the East was forced to reject the balance achieved in 451 and to make the 'Theopassianism' of Cyril's Twelfth Anathema the 'tessera' of orthodoxy. This led to the condemnation in 553 of Theodore, the anti-Cyrillian works of Theodoret, and Ibas' letter. Among this group, though they might differ on particulars, Romanides would find in general agreement such scholars as E. Amann, R. Devreesse, J. L. McKenzie, Marcel Richard, R. V. Sellers, and

[3] *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 5 (Winter 1959–60), 140–85. For Theodore's Christology, cf., among others, H. Kihn, *Theodor von Mopsuestia und Junilius Africanus* (Freiburg, 1880), pp. 171–97, 393–409; E. Amann, 'La Doctrine christologique de Théodore de Mopsueste', *Revue de Sciences Religieuses*, 14 (1934), 160–90; *idem*, 'Theodore de Mopsueste', in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1946), xv. 258–66; M. Jugie, 'Le "Liber ad baptizandos" de Théodore de Mopsueste', *Echos d'Orient*, 34 (1935), 262–71 (against Amann's article of 1934); R. Arnou, 'Nestorianisme et néoplatonisme: l'unité de Christ et l'union des "Intelligibles"', *Gregorianum*, 17 (1936), 116–31; Marcel Richard, 'La Tradition des fragments de traité *Περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως* de Théodore de Mopsueste', *Le Muséon*, 56 (1943), 55–75; *idem*, 'L'Introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la théologie de l'incarnation', *Mélanges de Science Religieuse*, 2 (1945), 5–32, 243–70 (esp. 21–9); R. Tonneau, *Les Homélies catéchétiques de Théodore de Mopsueste*, Studi e Testi, 145 (Rome: Vatican City, 1949), 109–18; M. V. Anastos, 'The Immutability of Christ and Justinian's Condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 6 (1951), 123–60; H. M. Diepen, 'L'*Assumptus homo* à Chalcédoine', *Revue Thomiste*, 51 (1951), 579 ff.; A. Grillmeier, 'Die theologische und sprachliche Vorbereitung der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon', in A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 3 vols. (Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951–4), i. 120–59; *idem, Christ in Christian Tradition*, i: *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, trans. J. S. Bowden (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), pp. 338–60 (2nd edn. rev.; Atlanta: John Knox Press; London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. Limited, 1975), pp. 421–39 (there is no substantial change in the 2nd edn. other than updating the bibliography in several notes); K. McNamara, 'Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Nestorian Heresy', *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 19 (1952), 254–78, and 20 (1953), 172–91; F. A. Sullivan, *The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia*, Analecta Gregoriana, 82 (Rome: Analecta Gregonàna, 1956); P. Galtier, 'Théodore de Mopsueste: sa vraie pensée sur l'incarnation', *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, 45 (1957), 161–86, 338–60 (against Sullivan's book); J. L. McKenzie, 'Annotations on the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia', *Theological Studies*, 19 (1958), 345–73 (also against Sullivan's book); F. A. Sullivan, 'Further Notes on Theodore of Mopsuestia', *Theological Studies*, 20 (1959), 264–79 (in rebuttal to McKenzie); W. de Vries, 'Der "Nestorianismus" Theodors von Mopsuestia in seiner Sakramentenlehre', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 7 (1941), 91–148; I. Onatibia, 'La vida cristiana tipo de las realidades celestes', *Scriptorium Victoriense*, 1 (1954), 100–33 (against de Vries); L. Abramowski, 'Zur Theologie Theodors von Mopsuestia', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 72 (1961), 263–93 (also challenges de Vries); R. A. Greer, *Theodore of Mopsuestia: Exegete and Theologian* (London, 1961); U. Wickert, *Studien zu den Pauluskommentaren Theodors von Mopsuetia* (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1962); G. Koch, *Die Heilsverwirklichung bei Theodore von Mopsuestia*, Münchener Theologische Studien, 31 (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1965); R. A. Norris, *Manhood and Christ: A Study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). For Theodore's Christology in his commentary on the Gospel of John, cf. K. Schäferdiek, 'Theodor von Mopsuestia als Exeget des vierten Evangeliums', *Studia Patristica*, 10 (1970, Texte und Untersuchungen, 107), 242–6.

J. N. D. Kelly. Paul Galtier, writing in response to Francis Sullivan's *The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia*, would go still further to assert that, using different language and terms, Theodore was professing in substance the same doctrine, the same Christological model or concept of Christ, as Cyril. For Galtier, Theodore did not believe in a 'common *prosōpon*' or an outward countenance simply shared or utilized by two different and distinct psychological subjects or persons. His one *prosōpon* is the same idea, essentially, as Cyril's one *physis* or one *hypostasis*. Both mean the one Person of the Word of God as the psychological subject of the human life in Christ.

On the other side, against considering Theodore's Christology as orthodox by the standard of Chalcedon, Romanides ranks Sullivan, M. Jugie, W. de Vries, J. M. Voste, M. Anastos, H. M. Diepen, A. Grillmeier, T. Camelot, Kevin McNamara, and, eventually, himself.[4]

A fuller analysis of the modern discussion of Theodore's Christology is available in the second appendix to Richard A. Norris's *Manhood and Christ: A Study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia*, published in 1963 after Romanides' 1959 study.[5] Norris begins the modern analysis of Theodore and the Antiochenes in J. A. Dorner's *The History of the Development of the Doctrine of Christ*[6] and traces it through Harnack[7] to a kind of watershed study in Sullivan's book. Perhaps the best way to get at the substance of this modern discussion of Theodore's Christology, and so to the immediate background and tradition which it fell to Theodoret as his successor to defend in the Nestorian controversy to which it gave rise, would be to examine—with unfortunate but necessary brevity—the findings of Sullivan and Norris.[8]

Sullivan's study divides itself into two considerations. The first is the question of sources; the second, whether Theodore's Christology 'is really infected with the "Nestorianism" of which Theodore has stood so long condemned'.[9] Marcel Richard and R. Devreesse had argued that the condemnation of Theodore at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 was based largely on texts extracted from his *De Incarnatione* which had been tampered

[4] M. V. Anastos took a more positive view of Antiochene Christology a decade after his 1951 paper on Theodore in his 'Nestorius was Orthodox', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 16 (1962), 117–40.

[5] Norris, pp. 246–62.

[6] English translation by Alexander (Edinburgh, 1866).

[7] Harnack, iv. 164–74. Cf. esp. how Harnack finds the best expression of Antiochene Christology in the Confession of Theodore of Mopsuestia which he analyses at length in n. 1, pp. 171–3.

[8] Ch. 2: 'Antiochene Christology', in R. V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies* (London: S.P.C.K., 1940), pp. 107–201, is still a fine example of that group which would defend Antiochene Christology as essentially Chalcedonian.

[9] Sullivan, *The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia*, p. 285.

with by those hostile to Antiochene Christology.[10] Specifically, the fragments we now possess attributed to Theodore in the *acta* of the Fifth Council and in Leontius and Pope Vigilius were, they felt, derived from a collection of extracts which Cyril reports was handed to him in Jerusalem in 438 and which became the basis for his attack on Theodore and Diodore of Tarsus. They compared these fragments with independent Syriac parallels and concluded that the conciliar extracts were unreliable. Sullivan tests this supposition in a number of cases where there is no reason to doubt the Greek texts or where there is positive evidence of their authenticity, and comes to the conclusion that it is the Syriac translator who departed from the original, and that though perhaps important context for the fragments is omitted by their hostile compilers, yet the charge of deliberate falsification cannot be upheld. Norris accepts this conclusion as having 'settled the matter clearly'.[11]

Then, using these fragments and the others, Sullivan draws his conclusions about the Christology of Theodore, and thus of the Antiochene school. Though it often sounds orthodox, and though Theodore protests against charges that he teaches 'two Sons', his Christology is in fact dualistically Nestorian in fundamental character, as is demonstrated by examining what Theodore meant by one *prosopon* in Christ, by his failure to use a true *communicatio idiomatum*, and by his inability to distinguish between 'nature' and 'person'.

Sullivan traces the source of Theodore's Christology to Diodore's battle against Arianism and Apollinaris, to what he calls the 'Arian syllogism'. Here the major premiss was that the Word or Logos is the subject even of the human operations and sufferings of Christ. The minor premiss was that whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him in his divine nature, that is, *kata physin*. The conclusion was that the Word is limited in his *physis*, or nature, being passibly affected by the human operations and sufferings of Christ. Therefore, the divine Being, or *ousia*, cannot be predicated of the Word. He is other than God the Father in nature, or *physis*. Sullivan says that Athanasius and the Alexandrines rejected the minor premiss; the Antiochenes, the major one; and that this is the root of the differences in their Christological models or concepts of Christ. In their reaction to Arianism, Eustathius of Antioch, who had been at Nicaea in 325, and Diodore of Tarsus predicated two *prosopa* (which Sullivan here understands as two 'persons', or two subjects of experience) of Christ in order to maintain the

[10] R. Devreesse, Essai sur Théodore de Mopsuestia, Studie Testi; 141 (Rome: Pubblicazioni della Biblioteca Vaticana, 1948), p. 103, and also ch. 9; M. Richard, 'La Tradition des fragments . . .', pp. 55 ff.

[11] Norris, p. 260.

transcendence of the Word, the Son of God, the Only-Begotten of the Father before the ages. The subject of the passions, the one who hungered, thirsted, grew, matured in knowledge and wisdom, who suffered the cross and death, who was raised again, was the Son of Mary, the Son of David, Jesus the man (*homo*). Theodore of Mopsuestia holds to two *physeis*, or two natures, to achieve the same end of protecting the impassibility of the divine *ousia*, or Being, or substance, of the Word, but tries to solve the problem of the unity of Christ by insisting on one *prosopon* or outward countenance, or perhaps person, depending on whether one here agrees with Sullivan or not, who holds that in Theodore there are still two subjects of experience, otherwise the Arian syllogism holds and the Word is made passible. There still is in Theodore, that is to say, the *homo* Jesus, who is not the Word, and so *can* be the subject of birth, learning, temptation, hunger, thirst, pain, death, and resurrection. The basic conclusion is that to deny attributing human properties, or *idia*, to the Word to prevent God's being rendered passible, and so no longer God, requires in Antiochene Christology a human subject, the man Jesus, over against the Word in his own divine *ousia, physis-hypostasis*, and *prosopon.*

On the other hand, Sullivan argues that Athanasius, Cyril, and Dioscorus solved the problem of the Arian syllogism by denying the validity of the minor premiss, that whatever is predicated of the Word must always be predicated of him according to his divine nature, or *physis.* We shall turn to that side of the issue later.

The Antiochene tradition which Theodore of Mopsuestia inherited was, Sullivan concludes, irrevocably dedicated by its metaphysical principles to a refutation of Arianism which required a Christology of two subjects. Looking at the attitude of Theodore's predecessors on the principle of unity in the Incarnation whereby the Word or Logos himself is taken as the subject of all predication referring to the Christ,

> we saw that in the face of the Arian argument against the divinity of the Word, Athanasius still maintained this principle of unity, whereas the reply of Eustathius meant its abandonment. We likewise saw that Diodorus, in combatting the errors of Apollinaris, rejected that communication of idioms whereby the actions and passions of the humanity could be predicated of the Word. In order to safeguard the divinity of the Word, the Antiochenes established a rigid distinction between what could be said of the Word, and what of man. This led to the setting up of two subjects of predication, with the consequent division of Christ into the 'Son of God' and the 'Son of Mary'.[12]

[12] Sullivan, *Christology*, p. 286.

In his study of Theodore, Sullivan says he searched in vain for a distinction between what could be said of the Word and what is true of divinity as such—that is to say, between, using later terminology, the Word in himself, as *hypostasis*, and the *physis*, *ousia*, or *theotes* of the Word as God.[13] In Antiochene theology, then, at least up to Theodoret of Cyrus, there are no clear examples of any reference or predication to the Word except to him in his divine nature, or *physis*. The many 'elements' of Theodore of Mopsuestia's language suggesting 'that his *homo assumptus* [the humanity in Christ, the man Jesus] is really a subject *sui juris* of those actions and passions which cannot be predicated of the "divine nature" '[14] are, then, firmly rooted in the Antiochene metaphysic about the nature of God, in their accepting the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism, which in turn requires the rejection of the major. We shall find this characteristic of his predecessors firmly upheld in Theodoret, at least up to the reconciliation with Cyril in 433–5.

What principle of unity in Christ does Sullivan find in Theodore? He says that Theodore's interpretation of John 1: 14 pervades all his thought on Christ. The Word is not made flesh in the sense of being *changed*, for divinity cannot change into the being and nature of a creature. Rather 'Verbum factum est *in homine*.'[15] The Word 'became man' in the sense of taking up his dwelling in a man. No ordinary indwelling, this is an extraordinary co-operation of the Word with the *homo assumptus* and a *sharing* with him of the honours and dominion proper to the divine nature, or *physis* of the Word as God. The Word has divine dominion and honour and glory by nature; the *homo assumptus*, the man Jesus, united to the Word from the instant of his conception by, as it were, prevenient grace and election, in his consequent perfect obedience to the will of the Word, grows up into the life meant for Adam; he is indeed Second Adam, and as such, in his union of perfect love with the Word, is the ultimate manifestation to humankind of both what human life is meant to be and the love of the indwelling Word for humanity. He receives the divine names and glory by grace, not by nature. The Word is known and worshipped as so manifested in him.

His image, his outward countenance, or *prosopon*, not only manifests his own life, which it does as a function of nature, but also the indwelling Word, which it does as a function of grace and free will (both that of the *homo assumptus* and that of the Word). Thus the man's face is the image of the Word, so to speak: his human *prosopon* is the common *prosopon* both of himself and of the indwelling Word. Whatever Scripture or the creeds say of

[13] Sullivan, *Christology*, p. 287.

[14] Ibid.; the additions in brackets are mine, to indicate contextual meaning.

[15] Ibid.; the italics are Sullivan's own.

the Word or of the assumed man is to be referred to the one or common *prosopon*. It is the 'one *prosopon* of the Son', since the term 'Son' includes both him who is Son of God by nature—the Word, the Only-Begotten—and the man who shares in this title in his adoption by the grace of God, the 'Son in whom the Father is well-pleased'.[16] Of the one *prosopon* is predicated the title 'the Lord Jesus Christ', for the name signifies both him who is Lord by nature, and Jesus, the *homo assumptus* who may be called Lord by reason of his conjunction (*synapheia*) with the Word. Whatever is true of the Word or the man can thus be predicated of the one *prosopon*, but this is a communication of terms, significations, or names—which I shall label *communicatio nominum*, and, further, it is valid only in one direction. One can say in a certain sense that the *homo assumptus* is 'Son' and 'Lord', but it does not allow us to say that the Word was born of the Virgin: Mary is not *Theotokos*. 'The one *prosopon* of whom all is predicated is not God the Word.... It is a *common prosopon*, including both God the Word and the man in whom he dwells.'[17] Finally, Sullivan concludes

> that this is substantially identical with the doctrine of that letter of Nestorius which was condemned at Ephesus. The cardinal point of contradiction between Cyril and Nestorius turned precisely on the question whether or not God the Word is the subject of whom the Creed said: 'He was born of the Virgin Mary.' According to Nestorius, this can be said of 'Christ', of 'the Son', of 'the Lord'—but not of God the Word. In this he showed himself a faithful exponent of the principles of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The decision of the Fathers of Ephesus meant that it was not sufficient to unite the two natures in one *prosopon*. One did not do justice to the basic fact of Christianity unless one understood that this 'one person', this subject of whom the Creed said both that He was begotten of the Father, and that He was born of the Virgin Mary, is in fact none other than God the Word. If the failure to recognize this fact is the root-error of Nestorius, then it cannot be denied that Theodore of Mopsuestia, despite his orthodox intentions, was indeed what he has so long been called: the 'Father of Nestorianism'.

Sullivan's taking his starting-point for analysing the Antiochene tradition as its doctrine of the impassibility of the Word was prefigured in Harnack's *History of Dogma*, where he says that the Antiochenes were in essence Nicene defenders of the *homoousios*, one of whose two fundamental points was the absolute unchangeableness and impassibility of the nature of Godhead, to which they added in emphasis the perfect humanity of Christ, whose most important characteristic was its free will. But then, surprisingly, Harnack postulates that both these motives 'have at least no concern with the belief in the real redemption of humanity from sin and death through the

[16] Ibid.; the terms in quotation marks are Theodore's.
[17] Ibid. Sullivan's following conclusion is quoted from pp. 287–8.

God-man. *The Christology of the Antiochians was therefore not soteriologically determined;* on the contrary, the realistic-soteriological elements were attached to it by way of supplement.'[18]

Precisely the opposite is the theme of Richard Norris's *Manhood and Christ.* He interprets Theodore's Christology in the light of the Antiochene apologetic against Apollinarianism, and that in light of the role of free will in human sin and salvation. He recognizes and accepts as centrally important in Theodore's theology the anti-Arian polemic and the consequent need to safeguard the divinity of the Word by following a strict distinction between what is said of the Word and what of the man. But Norris is not satisfied that Sullivan's Arian syllogism and Theodore's 'praiseworthy desire to affirm the full divinity of the Word' provide the only clues and motivations in the latter's theology:

> It would be foolish to deny the significance of [Sullivan's] anti-Arian (and anti-Apollinarian) motif in Theodore's thinking about the Incarnation. Without deliberately looking for it, we have inevitably turned it up in the course of our own inquiry into Theodore's use of the two-natures doctrine. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether an appeal to these polemical necessities and interests can account for the full positive sense of Theodore's doctrine. Theodore is not merely another Eustathius or Diodore.[19]

Nor, for Norris, can the answer to the search for further causes of Theodore's theology be found in his Christological terminology. He refers to Galtier's study mentioned above in defence of Theodore's essential orthodoxy as showing, as Theodoret himself earlier claimed in his *Defensio pro Diodore . . . et Theodore*, that Theodore's use of *physis* and *prosopon*, and his continual reference to the human nature in Christ as the *homo assumptus*, were not idiosyncratic to him at all, but were common habits of his time.[20] Rather, his Christology must be seen as at least in part, *contra* Harnack, in his anthropology, and in turn in 'his insistence upon the active agency of Christ's humanity in the work of redemption':

> Theodore's thought requires not only that 'the Man' be a subject of attribution, logically independent of the Word: it requires also that he have a function, as a centre of voluntary activity, in the work of redemption. And just as this emphasis issues in a definite christological dualism, so it derives from what we have called the biblical strain in Theodore's doctrine of man and human nature: his comprehension of the problem of sin in terms of the categories of rational freedom and rational obedience to divine law.[21]

[18] Harnack, iv. 165–6; the italics are Harnack's. [19] Norris, p. 208.
[20] Ibid. 209. For Galtier, cf. 'Théodore de Mopsueste', esp. pp. 164 ff. and 167 ff.
[21] Norris, pp. 209–10.

This means that Norris must find at least part of the functional cause of Theodore's Christology in his anthropology. He begins his study, consequently, with an examination of the anthropology of Apollinarianism. He traces the peculiarities of Apollinarianism to its Neoplatonic anthropology in fact. The soul, or at least the rational part of the soul (*psyche, nous*), is substantially part of the world of intelligibles, and as such is naturally immortal, immutable, impassible, and good. In some way or other, however, it is subjected to mutability, passibility, mortality, and evil *by its enfleshment.* But salvation is not a mere pagan redemption of the intelligent soul from the body, but a question of overcoming the irrational motions of the flesh by the rule of reason: the redemption of the body itself through its divinization. The Incarnation is a sanctifying of the flesh by the indwelling of it by the Word functioning as the rational soul (*psyche* and *nous*) of Christ:

> [For Apollinaris] in man, spirit and flesh are at war. Moreover, the created human intellect is unable to reduce the flesh to obedience. On the contrary, it is itself, through its constitutional weakness, rendered subject to the passions of the flesh which it ought to govern. Hence the job of redemption, of sanctifying the flesh by bringing it into natural obedience to spirit, must be accomplished by the work of the divine Logos himself, who is exempt from that weakness and mutability which renders the human soul powerless in its conflict with the carnal passions.[22]

Norris finds that although Theodore of Mopsuestia sometimes leans toward this Neoplatonic explanation of sin as the work of the flesh, his fundamental anthropological insight is to insist that humanity's rationality is not in the human mind's natural ability to contemplate the Ideas and thus move towards contemplation of the One, but in its ability to know good and evil, and to choose between them. Human beings are created mortal (because in his prescience God foreknew that Adam would choose evil and thus forfeit his immutability and immortality and fall into mortality and passion) and so choose evil—but of their own free will. The 'Present Age' is basically pedagogic, a preparation through the experience of moral choice for the 'Second Age'. The human being attains perfection only with divine grace (Norris finding Theodore on this point 'clearly' not Pelagian, though one might possibly charge him, justifiably, with semi-Pelagianism), but Theodore's emphasis is on the cause of evil being in humanity's own free choice of it, and human mortality in God's prescience of that choice. People are deified or made perfect through grace in a growing up into moral maturity.

[22] Ibid. 116. Cf. pp. 95–122 for the full working out of the complexities of the impact of Apollinaris' anthropology on his soteriology and Christology, and then Norris's statement of the same anthropological problem in Theodore on pp. 154 ff.

Redemption, then, is worked in the Second Adam. God the Word takes the initiative and assumes a whole man into union with himself in εὐδοκία, or well-pleasing, because of his own divine freedom he desires and wills, without compulsion, to redeem humankind. His presence in this union can only be by the way he wills to be present, by that well-pleasing, for inasmuch as he is as God omnipresent in his divine Being, or substance (*ousia*), and in his working or activity (*energeia*), he can be present in Christ *kat' ousian*, or *kata physin*, by nature, or in activity no differently than in any other human being. The Word indwells the man, the *homo assumptus*, as Spirit and grace. Norris insists, in contradistinction to the normal, and indeed historical, tradition of understanding this point in Theodore, that the union (*henosis*) is *not* produced by the co-operation of the man in his free choice, but is the work of the Word from the time of the man's conception. It is not moral in the sense of the man's being adopted by the Word because the Word is consequentially well-pleased by the man's previous choice of obedience (even in grace) to the will of the Word. Because the Word willed to assume in grace and well-pleasing the man before the latter's conception, through the grace of that union so effected, the man is as a consequence enabled to co-operate with the will of the Word, and in this manner humankind's redemption is wrought through the perfect obedience of the man, who is thus the perfect agent of the will of the Word, who is himself the initiate of the man's every action, even though the man is responding to the Word's gracious initiating activity with a true moral freedom of will.

From a different, but complementary, direction, Norris is thus by the logic of this theory of redemption brought to second Sullivan's conclusion. There are in Theodore's doctrine of Christ two subjects, the Word and the man Jesus, each with his own proper nature (*physis-hypostasis*) and *prosopon*. On the other hand, the conjunction (*synapheia*) brought about by the Word's union with the man and arising out of his assuming him is manifested to the world as one concrete human existent. To think of each nature by itself is to acknowledge that each is a *prosopon* in itself. But to think of the union is to acknowledge one *prosopon* of the union, which arises out of it. In his discussion of the doctrine of the unity in Christ in Theodore, Norris points out Mopsuestia's use of the analogy of two human beings becoming one flesh in marriage, of Paul's saying that what his spirit wills his flesh does not, and so on, including calling each nature 'I' and also the one *prosopon* of the union likewise 'I'. A complete, real, and functional human soul is an essential for Theodore's Christ, for redemption is the result of the activity of both God the Word and man, God's giving and man's obedience (which is humanity's only proper function). Two centres of activity and psychological initiative are required.

For practical purposes, Theodore employs as synonymous expressions 'the nature who...' and 'the nature of him who...'—making, as Sullivan has painstakingly demonstrated, no distinction between the abstract and the concrete senses of 'nature'.[23] In the Interpreter's [Theodore's] terminology, 'human nature' essentially means 'the assumed Man' (i.e. Jesus), just as 'divine Nature' essentially means 'God' or 'the Son of God'. Such phrases signify not merely the totality of human or divine properties, but concrete human or divine subjects.[24]

When one turns from considering passages in which Theodore is discussing his doctrine of the two natures to passages in which he speaks of Christ or paraphrases Christ speaking, one of his favourite styles of writing or expounding or exegeting Scripture, this underlying assumption of his Christology 'becomes even more abundantly clear'. In his commentary on John 12: 30, Theodore says, quoted by Norris,

But I (the Lord is speaking), because I have led a blameless life and have paid the debt owed to the Law laid down by God; and (because) I have done everything according to his will and good pleasure; although there is no reason to be found for my deserving death, I shall not depart as did Elijah and Enoch..., but I shall accept death voluntarily, as though I were deserving of it, so that, before God the Lord of all, I may condemn him who has brought death. God the Word, who has assumed me and joined me to himself, faithfully gives me victory in the judgement. For he made me his once for all, when he assumed me.[25]

The *homo assumptus* is speaking of himself and refers to the Word as other, in the third person. Norris asks if this be a merely rhetorical, exegetical device and answers:

Scarcely. Rather, it appears to draw the consequence of Theodore's comprehension of the doctrine of the 'two natures'. The Man and the Word in Christ are not only two logical subjects, of which attributes may be predicated. They are psychological subjects as well, at once distinct and intimately related as two centres of will and activity.[26]

In fragments of *De Incarnatione* Theodore considers the co-operation (*synergeia*) of the man and the Word who is God the Son:

So it is plain too that he fulfilled virtue more strictly and with greater ease than was possible for the rest of mankind, in proportion as, according to his foreknowledge of a man's character, the divine Word united him to himself in the beginning of his formation (and) supplied a greater co-operation towards the right performance of what was needful.... He urged him on towards greater perfection and assisted him in the greater part of his labours, whether those pertaining to the soul, or even those pertaining to the body.[27]

[23] Norris is citing Sullivan, *Christology*, pp. 204 ff., 228.
[24] Norris, p. 200.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid. 201.
[27] Ibid.

Theodore uses the third-personal pronoun throughout, a usage, Norris points out, 'which corresponds to his employment elsewhere of the ἕτερος ... ἕτερος formula'. So the conclusion which sets the background for our consideration of Theodoret's Christology draws all this together:

The purpose of this manner of speech is not merely to indicate that God and Man in Christ are distinct subjects of attribution. Its usefulness lies in the fact that it enables Theodore, as no other mode of expression would, to express his view that the human and divine natures of Christ are the two terms of a relationship of action and response. The human nature is the subject of a voluntary obedience in which the divine Nature furnishes his closest possible co-operation. The point of Theodore's usage lies in his conception that the Man and the Word are two intimately related agents bent upon an identical project. It appears, then, from our survey of the ways in which Theodore develops and employs his doctrine of the two natures of Christ, that it coheres perfectly with his analysis of the work of Christ in terms of a double agency. Each of the natures, as he understands the matter, is a concrete subject, in both senses of that word: it is something of which properties may be predicated, and at the same time a centre of activity and initiative.[28]

The soul of the *homo assumptus* is a buffer state, both ontologically and psychologically, between the immutability of the Word and the mutability of humankind: the answer to the Arian syllogism again. Norris cites Theodore's treatise against Apollinaris with a quotation crucial to any understanding of the Antiochene tradition that Theodoret inherited:

(The divine Son) furnishes his co-operation in the proposed works to the one who was assumed. (Now) where does this (co-operation) entail that the Deity had replaced the (human) consciousness (*sensus*) in him who was assumed? For it was not his wont to take the place of consciousness in any, whoever they were, to whom he accorded his co-operation. If, moreover, he accorded to the one who was assumed an extraordinary co-operation, this does not mean (either) that the Deity took the place of consciousness. But suppose, as you [Apollinaris] would have it, that the Deity took the role of consciousness in him who was assumed. How was he affected with fear in his suffering? Why, in the face of immediate need, did he stand in want of vehement prayers . . . ?[29]

If a human soul, a human consciousness, a human personality be not predicated of Christ apart from and, in a very specific and narrow sense, over and against the Word (though obviously not in the sense of disobedience, but in an ontological sense), then one has attributed fear and suffering to the Word, rendered him mutable, and thus fallen into Arianism. For Theodore, Apollinaris is self-contradictory, for there are only two logical

[28] Norris, p. 201–2. [29] Ibid. 204.

alternatives: Arianism or two consciousnesses, the man assumed and the Word, the Only-Begotten, the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God. The charge brought against Cyril and his disciples of being Apollinarian is actually a charge of Arianism. Mary is not in any ontological sense *Theotokos*; nor does the Word suffer hunger, thirst, fear, especially a Garden of Gethsemane Tillichian fear of the threat of 'non-being'; nor does he suffer death. Both motives, then, the problem of the Arian syllogism, and soteriological needs, are at work: 'The characteristic actions and passions of a human nature cannot be predicated of the divine Son literally: he cannot be the subject of physical suffering or death or local motion. All these passions must be ascribed to the man.'[30]

But Norris is unwilling to concede Sullivan's conclusion that Theodore is the father of Nestorianism quite yet; nor can he agree with Galtier that Theodore and Cyril were using different terminology to express and work out essentially the same Christological idea or model—obviously. In his treatment of the unity of *prosopon* which follows what we have been considering, Norris stresses that the union does not *result from* the obedience of the man to the will of the Word. Theodore is not guilty of a kind of Pelagian self-perfection in Jesus that leads to his being adopted by the Word, one of the traditional approaches to his position. Rather, the obedience of the *homo assumptus*, though accepted freely by a truly human will, is the result of the assumption in the womb, as it were, and the grace freely bestowed there by the Word. If the Christology of Theodore thus derives from his anthropology—namely, that the Second Adam must be a man with human self-consciousness who can freely respond to the Law of God, through grace, in perfect obedience to the will of the Word—the union can only be prosopic. It includes two unmixed natures in one *prosopon*, but does not mean by that what Cyril meant at all, because Theodore is not asking the same questions. 'The doctrine of the one prosopon is not, therefore, to be taken as an equivalent for the later dogma of "hypostatic union"': the *prosopon* is a '*persona communis*', the outward unity of presentation resulting from the Word's indwelling the man by the Word's good pleasure, an *enoikesis kat' eudokian*.[31]

On the one hand, Theodore's anthropology requires the duality of natures and consciousnesses which, I think justifiably, led to the charge that he taught two Sons, a charge he refutes by asserting that there is only one Only-Begotten, in whose glory and name the assumed man shares. On the other, his search for a way to express the unity in Christ demanded by Scripture and the Christian tradition drives him to a doctrine of unity which is *not* a 'merely moral union', for he

[30] Ibid. 204–5. [31] Ibid. 232.

refuses to assimilate the unique case of the divine indwelling in Christ to an ordinary instance of divine co-operation with a man of good will. Rather, he seeks to overcome the obvious limitations imposed on him by his dualism by insisting upon the priority of the union even to the extraordinary co-operation which the Word accords to the Man in Christ. The result of his effort is a christology unique in the form it takes. What he argues in effect is that the moral relationship or co-operation between the Word and the Man is itself the result of the sole initiative of the divine Son, who 'works all things' in the Man whom he assumes. And it is this fact, the dominance of the Word, who is alone the agent of the union itself, which makes it possible to speak of the 'one prosopon' of Christ.[32]

If I have a problem with Norris's picture of Theodore's Christology, it lies here. On the one hand,

despite the ambiguities in his anthropology, and despite his genuine indebtedness to certain elements in the Platonic philosophical tradition, the determinant element in Theodore's whole system, christological and anthropological alike, is his interest in the problem of free rational obedience to divine law.[33]

But, on the other hand, 'the moral relationship or co-operation between the Word and the Man is itself the result of the sole initiative of the divine Son, who "works all things" in the Man he assumes'. If the obedience on which all hangs here is an obedience determined by the initiative of the Word, even in grace, is this an obedience which is truly rational and free? Has Theodore rightly solved the problem of freedom and unity in his prosopic union?[34]

In any case, it is clear that Theodore's Christology is irrevocably dualisitc by its essential methodology. Galtier is wrong: Theodore's prosopic union is not Cyril's union *kath' hypostasin*; nor is it the hypostatic union of Chalcedon. Though Norris would strongly affirm that Chalcedon and Theodore's Christology are both concerned to affirm three points: the perfect humanity of Christ, the perfect divinity of Christ, and the unity of Christ, nevertheless he also concludes that though concerned with the problem of the unity of Christ's Person, 'he did not choose to deal with it in the Cyrilline manner which the Chalcedonian Definition appears to canonize'.[35] Unlike Sullivan, however, Norris would not fault Theodore here and charge him with Nestorianism, for he believes that Theodore did not ask the same questions and so is not to be held responsible for not arriving at the same answer.

He does not set out to explain how it is possible for two contrary sets of attributes to be predicated of a single Person; for he does not understand the question of the Incarnation

[32] Norris, p. 233. [33] Ibid.

[34] To me, the problem is acutely raised by the way in which Norris phrases his conclusion on p. 234.

[35] Ibid. 235–6.

in these terms. To him, on the contrary, it appears essentially to be a question about the reconciliation of divine prevenience and human freedom in a single action, which is at once an action of divine grace and condescension, and an action of human obedience and self-sacrifice. But if this is so, then it becomes historically pointless to settle the question of Theodore's christology by enumerating the differences between his formula and that of Chalcedon, or that of Cyril. For this procedure inevitably suggests that Theodore is to be counted somehow blameworthy for failing to return what came to be the accepted answer to a question he did not ask.[36]

As far as it goes, one can only agree, but is that in fact the issue? Is not the question also to be raised of the sufficiency of Theodore's approach once the question has been asked by Cyril? This is not a question of his blameworthiness for asking perhaps a different set of questions from those asked in the next half-century, but whether his answer, once those questions had been raised, was sufficient. Second Constantinople believed not, and thought Chalcedon felt the same way. After all, precisely the same caveats may be raised in the case of Apollinaris himself, or even about Arius. Theology evolves by asking questions and trying to answer them, which answers more often than not lead only to further questions and answers. My purpose, however, is not to challenge Norris's conclusions here, but to use his findings for the fullest exposition of the Antiochene tradition as set forth in Theodore and inherited by Theodoret that I believe it to be.

Yet, before we can turn directly to Theodoret's earlier texts, I think it necessary to pause a brief moment longer to point out that Norris at least partially depends on Sullivan's findings on the authenticity of the Greek fragments in the conciliar florilegia which Richard and Devreesse had challenged.[37] In a 1958 study which Norris does not list in his 1963 bibliography, John L. McKenzie vigorously attacked Sullivan's conclusions about both the reliability of the conciliar Greek fragments and Theodore's Christology.[38] One of McKenzie's initial and major blows against Sullivan's thesis revolved around the question of whether Sullivan was right to argue that a fragment preserved in Greek by Leontius from Theodore's *De Incarnatione*, viii. 62, was authentic over against an alternative reading preserved in a Syriac manuscript (Cod. Brit. Mus. Add. MS 14669). This was one of the texts Marcel Richard had already referred to in favouring the Syriac version. Sullivan used Richard's retroversion of the Syriac text of this fragment back into Greek and placed this Greek version of Codex 14669 alongside Leontius' fragment of the same text. McKenzie uses Sullivan's quotation of the two texts. The question is a vital

[36] Ibid. 236. [37] Cf. above, pp. 55–6 and n. 10 and 11.
[38] McKenzie, 'Annotations'.

one, for on it hangs whether Theodore ever spoke of Christ as having two *physeis* in one *hypostasis*, so prefiguring the Council of Chalcedon.[39]

The Syriac preserves the context of the disputed fragment more fully. Theodore is describing the nature of the conjunction of the two *physeis* in Christ in terms of the body–soul analogy in a human being.

But if we consider the conjunction, we speak of one *prosopon* [and one *hypostasis*]. When we divide the *physis* of man, we in fact say that the *physis* of the soul is different from that of the body. For we know that both have their own *hypostasis* and *physis*, and believe that the soul separated from the body remains in its own *physis* and *hypostasis* and that for each of the two there is a *physis* and *hypostasis*. For we have learned from the Apostle to speak of the inner and the outer man (2 Corinthians 4: 16) and we name that which distinguishes them from what is common by adding the words 'outer' and 'inner' so as not to give them the simple title (man). But if they are united in one we say that they are one *hypostasis* and one *prosopon* and name them, the one as the other, with one name.[40]

Then the Syriac–Richard–McKenzie version continues:

In the same way we also say here (of Christ) that there is the divine *physis* and the human *physis* and—understanding the *physeis* in this way—the *prosopon* of the union is one. If then we try to distinguish the *physeis*, we say that the man is perfect in his *hypostasis* and the God perfect in his. But if we want to consider the union, we say that both the *physeis* are a single *prosopon* [and *hypostasis*] and acknowledge that because of its union with the Godhead the flesh receives honor beyond all creatures and the Godhead fulfils everything in him.[41]

The Syriac version thus pictures Theodore as specifically equating *prosōpon* and *hypostasis*, something he does nowhere else in his extant works. That is to say, when the *physeis*, or natures, of God and humanity are mentally

[39] The Greek is quoted in McKenzie, p. 347, with his discussion of the problem immediately following. McKenzie here is simply quoting the two parallel passages from Sullivan, *Christology*, p. 64. For the original retroversion back into Greek of the Syriac fragment, cf. M. Richard, 'La Tradition des fragments', pp. 64–5. Both the Leontius and Syriac fragments are cited in English in Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 1st edn., p. 351 (Leontius) and p. 359 (the Syriace MS); and in the 2nd edn., pp. 432, 438.

[40] I quote this first part of the passage in the English of Grillmeier, 1st edn., p. 359; 2nd edn., p. 438. To make the terminology as clear as possible I have rendered his 'person' as *prosopon* and his 'nature' as *physis*. The context of Grillmeier's discussion makes it clear that these are the Greek terms in question here. Whether the expression 'and one *hypostasis*' in brackets in the first sentence is what Theodore wrote or was the addition of a Syriac translator is the issue, as is the question with another 'and one *hypostasis*' at the end of the disputed passage quoted next. McKenzie is supporting the authenticity of the use of 'one *hypostasis*' in these two places, pp. 347–55; Sullivan rejected it as a Syriac interpolation in *Christology*, p. 343 n. 2; similarly Diepen in his 'L'*assumptus homo*'.

[41] Quoted from Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 1st edn., p. 359; 2nd edn., p. 438. The 'and *hypostasis*' in brackets is the second disputed use of the term here in question.

distinguished, this Syriac Theodore thinks of two natures, or *physeis*, and their subsequent *hypostaseis*, or concrete existents, and *prosopa*, or outward countenances. But when he thinks of the union, the *henosis* and *synapheia* (both Greek terms appear in Richard's retroversion of the Syriac), the two *physeis* are proclaimed as one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis*. *Hypostasis* functions on the side of *prosōpon* here, whereas in the rest of Theodore's extant works *hypostasis* always appears as a function of nature. To put it another way, considered separately each *physis*, or nature, has its own *hypostasis*, or separate concrete existence; considered in the union the two natures are only one *prosopon* (person?) and one *hypostasis*.

McKenzie here seems to be echoing Marcel Richard's 1945 article 'L'Introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la théologie de l'incarnation', where Richard uses this same Syriac text to argue that Theodore was the first to use the term 'one *hypostasis*' in the sense of the hypostatic union later defined by Chalcedon.[42] He points out that in his 'Commentaire du symbole de Nicée', Theodore says that the human soul has its own proper *hypostasis* apart from the body, in that it survives the body at death and so can subsist (i.e. have its own concrete existence) apart from the body. An animal soul has no such proper *hypostasis* apart from composition with a body, since it cannot subsist without its body, but 'the soul of the animals perishes when their blood is spilled'. Thus the question of whether a soul has or has not a *hypostasis* centres on its subsistability apart from the body ('the possibility of a separated existence'). Given these considerations, and in the light of Theodore's discussion extant in the Syriac fragment of soul and body as two *physeis* in the one concrete existent human being, one *prosopon* and *hypostasis*, we can, Richard concludes, understand how the two *physeis* in Christ are one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis* in terms of the union:

> If we consider separately each of the natures of the Whole which is Christ, we establish that both are susceptible of separate existence. We must then recognize for each a *hypostasis*—that is to say, a mode of proper subsistence. But if we consider Christ as a man in actuality, we see only one mode of subsistence, only one *hypostasis*: that of the union. Moreover, for the theologian, that is the only actual consideration, the separate consideration of natures being only an exercise of the spirit. One may thus state definitively that Theodore admitted the hypostatic union of the Word incarnate.[43]

Yet, having said that, Richard a little later must confess that he is not certain what is the relation in Theodore's system of this one *hypostasis* of Christ, which he believes he has found in this Syriac fragment, with the eternal

[42] M. Richard, 'L'Introduction', pp. 21–6.

[43] Ibid. 25–6; my translation of the French. Cf. ibid. 25 n. 1 for the reference to the commentary on Nicaea.

hypostasis of the Word. He has not, then, demonstrated to *his own satisfaction* that Theodore believed in the hypostatic union of Chalcedon, but only, if the fragment be in fact authentic, that Theodore prefigured Chalcedon's formula of two *physeis* in one *hypostasis* and *prosopon* in Christ.[44]

Sullivan had argued in his book that the Greek text in Leontius was the authentic one. It presents a very different point of view. Leontius did not preface his fragment of the *De Incarnatione* text we are considering with the discussion in the Syriac text of *physis, hypostasis*, and *prosopon* in a human person, soul, and body, but presupposes it by commencing 'In the same way'.

In the same way we also say here (of Christ) that there is the divine *physis* and the human *physis* and that—understanding the *physeis* in this way—the *prosopon* of the union is one. For when we distinguish the *physeis*, we say that the *physis* of God the Word is complete, and this (his) *prosopon* is complete—for it is not correct to speak of a *hypostasis* without its *prosopon*—and (we say) also that the *physis* of the man is complete, and likewise (his) *prosopon*. But when we look to the conjunction, then we say one *prosopon*.... So that even if we endeavour to distinguish the *physeis*, we say the *prosopon* of the man is perfect, and perfect also that of the divinity. But when we consider the union, then we proclaim both the *physeis* to be one *prosopon*.[45]

Here we see the usual way in which Theodore stressed two *physeis* in one *prosopon*. *Hypostasis* has strictly a 'natural' function: a *hypostasis* is a concretely existing instance of a given *physis*, or nature, and each *hypostasis* necessarily has its own *prosopon*. Each nature, the divine and the human, when considered separately, can be said to have its (his) own proper *hypostasis* and *prosopon*. When considered in terms of the union, there is only one *prosopon*. Presumably, each of the two natures would have its own *hypostasis*. Obviously this form of the text fits Sullivan's understanding of Theodore's Christology. Equally obviously, as McKenzie himself points out, the issue is how Theodore understood *hypostasis*.[46] If he did use *hypostasis* as the Syriac text indicates, Sullivan's and Norris's estimations of his Christology would be more difficult to maintain. If Leontius' text is accurate, that would be in their favour.

McKenzie's arguments[47] that the compiler of the conciliar florilegia which include this fragment deliberately altered them to make Theodore appear a teacher of two Sons in the Christ are interesting, but I believe that Sullivan surprisingly easily deflects and refutes them in his reply article published the next year in the same periodical.[48] In fact, he seems to handle all of

[44] M. Richard, 'L'Introduction', p. 28.

[45] Quoted from the English of Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 1st edn., pp. 359 and 351; 2nd edn., pp. 432, 438.

[46] McKenzie, p. 348. [47] Ibid. 348–50. [48] Sullivan, 'Further Notes'.

McKenzie's attacks on his book's two major theses without any difficulty. Regarding this fragment, Sullivan replies,

But one can say with assurance that at least in all the sources that have come down to us, with the unique exception of the disputed Syriac passage in question, Theodore speaks always of union in one *prosopon*, never of union in one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis*. This is not merely to argue that the latter expression is not typical of the language of Theodore; it is to say that it simply never occurs in his extant writings, whereas the other expression 'union in one *prosopon*' occurs a great many times. This at least raises the doubt whether it might have been the Syriac translator who introduced a formula which by his time had become the consecrated formula of Chalcedon.... On this, one might note first that P. Galtier, who certainly cannot be accused of merely offering arguments in defence of my thesis, sees no difficulty whatever about admitting the Greek text of Leontius here, and in fact sees it as much more consonant with Theodore's usual manner of speaking about the Incarnation than the Syriac version.[49]

I believe that I can safely refer the reader to the two articles themselves if he or she wants to pursue that argument further, for about the same time this debate was going on, a newly discovered and hitherto unknown Syriac fragment of Theodore's *Contra Eunomium* was published by Luise Abramowski, which conclusively settles the issue in Sullivan's favour, for it shows exactly how Theodore meant *prosopon* to be understood and that he did not speak of one *hypostasis* in Christ.[50] I quote the English translation of it in Grillmeier:

This together with many other things, the blessed Theodore, also, speaks in the 18th book against Eunomius (Cambridge University Library Or. 1319, fol. 91r), as follows: *Prosopon* is used in a twofold way: for either it signifies the *hypostasis* and that which each one of us is, or it is conferred upon honour, greatness and worship; for example 'Paul' and 'Peter' signify the *hypostasis* and the *prosopon* of each one of them, but the *prosopon* of our Lord Christ means honour, greatness and worship. For because God the Word was revealed in manhood, he was causing the glory of his *hypostasis* to cleave to the visible one; and for this reason, '*prosopon* of Christ' declares it (sc. the *prosopon*) to be (a *prosopon*) of honour, not of the *ousia* or the two natures. (For the honour is neither nature nor *hypostasis*, but an elevation to great dignity which is awarded as a

[49] Ibid. 267. Sullivan also points out that if the Syriac 'one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis*' were authentic, surely this passage would have been picked up by Facundus of Hermiane when he searched Theodore's works for quotations he could use to defend him in the sixth century, at a time when exactly this formula of 'one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis*' was the consecrated expression of Chalcedon.

[50] L. Abramowski, 'Ein unbekanntes Zitat aus *Contra Eunomium* des Theodors von Mopsuestia', *Le Muséon*, 71 (1958), 97–104, specifically p. 101, and also *idem*, 'Zur Theologie Theodors von Mopsuestia', pp. 263–6, esp. p. 264.

due for the cause of revelation.) What purple garments or royal apparel are for the king, is for God the Word the beginning which was taken from us without separation, alienation or distance in worship. Therefore, as it is not by nature that a king has purple robes, so also neither is it by nature that God the Word has flesh. For anyone who affirms God the Word to have flesh by nature (predicates that) he has something foreign to the divine *ousia* by undergoing an alteration (fol. 91v) by the addition of a nature. But if he has not flesh by nature, how does Apollinarius say that the same one is partially *homoousios* with the Father in his Godhead, and (partially) *homoousios* with us in the flesh, so that he should make him composite? For he who is thus divided into natures becomes *and is found (to be) something composite by nature.*[51]

When one is dealing with a concrete individual expression of a nature, or *physis*, such as a Peter or a Paul, or even the Word as the second *hypostasis*-Person of the Triune God, the *hypostasis* is a function of nature and has its own proper *prosopon* (exactly as in the Leontius fragment: 'a *hypostasis* is not *aprosopic*'). A man is a composite nature, or human *physis*, in the unity of soul and body. The *physis* of the soul has its own *hypostasis* and *prosopon* after death, when death has sundered the composition of soul and body in one concrete being, but in this life when united to the body, soul and body form a new composite *mia physis*. Consequently, each human person represents the one nature, or *physis*, and is one *hypostasis* with its one *prosopon*. On this level, for Theodore '*prosopon* here is the expression of a nature, ultimately of an *ousia*, which is, however, termed *hypostasis*, because it is a concrete, individual nature'.[52]

But when one deals with the conjunction of the divine and human natures, or *physeis*, in the Incarnation, the situation is metaphysically or ontologically entirely different. The two natures cannot be composed into one composite *physis à la* Apollinaris, for this is precisely the mixture that transforms the divine Being into a creature—the Arian syllogism again. Rather, by the unique, indestructible, inalienable, and inseparable conjunction (*synapheia*), the *prosopon* of the assumed humanity is recognized as the manifestation visibly in this world of the invisible divine *ousia* and *physis* and *hypostasis* of the Word: 'He [the Word] has not flesh by *physis*'. If God the Word did, then there would be one *hypostasis*, that of a composite nature, or *physis*, and Apollinaris would be correct, 'for he who is thus divided into natures becomes

[51] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 1st edn., pp. 352–3; 2nd edn., p. 433. The italics in the last sentence represent a correction in the German translation made by Abramowski. I assume that Grillmeier here signifies *physis* by 'nature'. Note that although Grillmeier wrote in German, both the 1st and 2nd eds. of *Christ in Christian Tradition*, vol. i, were published first in the English translation made by the Revd John Bowden and carefully read and corrected by the author. Cf. the translator's preface on p. ix of the 1st edn.

[52] Ibid., 1st edn., p. 353; 2nd edn., p. 433.

and is found (to be) something composite by nature'. Thus by conjunction, as Theodore sees it here, the outward countenance, or *prosopon*, of the Christ (i.e. of the man Jesus) is the focus of a completely equal sharing of honour, greatness, and worship. To see Jesus is as much as is ontologically possible to 'see' the Word. But this is emphatically not a 'natural' *prosopon*—nor is it the hypostatic union of Chalcedon. The example of the royal vesture shows the conjunction to be, metaphysically speaking, accidental.

Theodore manifestly cannot speak of one *hypostasis* in Christ. There is one *prosopon* of the conjunction, of equal honour and adoration, but to say *mia hypostasis* is to confess Apollinarian confusion of the *ousiai* of God and humanity into one *physis*. I conclude that Sullivan is correct both as to the authenticity of the Leontius fragment over against the Syriac fragment (which is thus demonstrated to be a post-Chalcedonian attempt to upgrade what Theodore had written) and as to the nature of Theodore's Christology.

The Grillmeier of *Christ in Christian Tradition* works all this out in the two or three pages of his chapter on Theodore of Mopsuestia which deal with this fragment, and concludes that Theodore has moved beyond the 'realm of the moral and accidental' union to seeking 'an essential unity such as exists between *hypostasis* and *prosopon*'. I do not understand what Grillmeier means by this other than a kind of vague groping towards something he refers to over and over as 'essential', or 'ontic', union of the two natures in Christ. One thing is clear: for Grillmeier, Theodore has not reached hypostatic union, for he concludes his discussion of this fragment from *Contra Eunomium* thus:

> In this way, then, Theodore posits *one prosopon* in Christ, and this *one prosopon* is achieved by the Logos giving himself to the human nature which he unites to himself. But this self-giving is not understood as a 'unio in hypostasi et secundum hypostasim' in the sense of later theology.[53]

Given this extensive discussion of the *Contra Eunomium* fragment and the reference that Grillmeier makes in a footnote to the light it throws on the disputed Leontius and Syriac forms of the *De Incarnatione* passage,[54] I am absolutely astounded to find Grillmeier on an earlier page quoting the Leontius fragment to discuss what Theodore means by one *prosopon* without the slightest indication that there is any problem regarding its authenticity,[55] and then a few pages later concluding the entire chapter on Theodore, having discussed the *Contra Eunomium* fragment at length in between the two, with

[53] Ibid., 1st edn., p. 354; 2nd edn., p. 434.
[54] Ibid., 1st edn., p. 359 n. 1; 2nd edn., p. 438 n. 61.
[55] Ibid., 1st edn., p. 351; 2nd edn., p. 432.

the entire Syriac fragment (in English, of course), to demonstrate that Theodore may have been the first in Eastern Christology to give us the Chalcedonian formula, even though on the preceding page his footnote says that the *Contra Eunomium* fragment 'shows quite clearly that Theodore does not speak of one *hypostasis* in Christ'.[56]

In any case, given the present state of the question of Theodore's Christology, the Sullivan–Norris picture of that Christology is the best background I can lay for an examination now of the texts of Theodoret of Cyrus. I expect to find a very similar Christology here, which may indeed throw some light on the debate on Theodore's Christology itself.

[56] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 1st edn., pp. 359–60; cf. p. 359 n. 1; 2nd edn., pp. 438–9; cf. p. 438 n. 61.

3

Theodoret's Early Christology

Though some investigators have taken exception here and there, in general the conclusions to which Marcel Richard came in the two articles to which I referred at the end of Chapter 1 concerning the chronology of Theodoret's works have withstood the test of time since 1934–5.[1] As we saw there, the works prior to 432 employ a terminology which tends to refer to the humanity of Christ with such concrete terms as 'the assumed man'. The pre-432 works divide themselves into two rather obvious categories for our examination: the earliest works and those of the Nestorian controversy itself. The former will be covered in Chapters 3 and 4, the latter in Chapter 5.

Richard argued that the *Expositio Rectae Fidei* pre-dates the Nestorian controversy. In the beginning of that work Theodoret mentions a work against the Greeks which Richard identifies as the *Graecarum Affectionum Curatio*, which must have been written, then, before 431, even perhaps prior to 423. The *Opus adversus Judaeos*, also mentioned at the beginning of the *Expositio Rectae Fidei*, is now lost, but would have come between these two works. The treatises *Adversus Arianos et Eunomianos*, *Adversus Macedonianos* (or *De Spiritu Sancto*), and *Contra Marcionitas*, mentioned by Theodoret in chapter 3 of *De Trinitate*, are also lost, unfortunately, but would have come most likely between the *Expositio Rectae Fidei* and *De Trinitate*, which Richard dates slightly before 431. It is the first part of the double work *De Sancta et Vivifica Trinitate* and *De Incarnatione Domini*. I think that Richard has rightly solved the problem of dating *De Incarnatione Domini* by showing that its combination of basically pre-Nestorian controversy terminology and theological concerns with certain remarks that could only reflect that debate is the result of a hasty and minimal editing of the pre-431 *De Incarnatione* by Theodoret to bring it up to date for use in the debate. In other words, we have a post-Ephesus but earlier than 432 edited version of a work from before 431.

[1] Marcel Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire de Théodoret avant le concile d'Éphèse', *Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 24 (1935), 83–106; *idem*, 'Notes sur l'évolution doctrinale de Théodoret', *Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 25 (1936), 459–81.

The pre-432 works of the Nestorian controversy itself which will be of interest to us in this chapter and the next two are Theodoret's reply to Cyril, the *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum*, from the beginning of 431; Theodoret's correspondence during the controversy, particularly Epistle 151 to the monks of the Orient; and the *Pentalogos*, written against Cyril's Council of Ephesus.

Lastly, *Questiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos* remains unnoticed by Richard, at least in these two articles, but I would date it prior to 431, because I find in it no indication of the Nestorian controversy or any special interest in the unity of person in Christ.

In other words, in the next three chapters we will be considering the following:

Graecarum Affectionum Curatio, pre-431, perhaps pre-423
Expositio Rectae Fidei, pre-431, perhaps pre-428
Questiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos, pre-431
De Trinitate and *De Incarnatione*, essentially pre-431
Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum, early 431
Correspondence during the Nestorian controversy
Fragments of the *Pentalogos*, last half of 431

GRAECARUM AFFECTIONUM CURATIO

For reasons we shall later explore more fully, Marcel Richard dated Theodoret's *Expositio Rectae Fidei* in the period before the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy.[2] In the same article he goes on to argue that the great apologetic against a paganism that Julian the Apostate had relatively recently laboured mightily to give new birth, the *Graecarum Affectionum Curatio*, is the work against the Greeks which Theodoret mentions at the very beginning of the *Expositio*.[3] Theodoret mentions a work against the pagans among his treatises in his defensive Epistle 113 to Pope Leo, but the reference is somewhat confusing, and it is not clear whether this work is among those written twenty, eighteen, or twelve years before this letter from the 449 crisis. Richard cites Baronius as preferring 439; Garnier, 427; and Schulte, 437; all three, apparently, from the evidence in Epistle 113.[4] He recounts that Kösters

[2] Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire', pp. 84–9. [3] Ibid. 89–92. [4] Ibid. 90.

preferred a date prior to 437 and would have preferred to put it before the Council of Ephesus, but felt he could not prove that early a date.[5]

Richard suggests two characteristics of the work which point in that direction. Book VI, given over to consideration of divine providence, concludes with a discussion of the Incarnation. The style seems to Richard archaic when compared to treatises of definitely later date or even to the *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum* from the beginning of 431. The distinction between the two natures of Christ is carefully drawn, but with scarcely an allusion to the unity of person. Theodoret takes great care to assign to each nature activities of Christ idiomatic to it: sleep, exhaustion, the cross, and death are attributed to the passible nature; the empowering divine nature is wonder-working, making the feet of the body walk on water. After Theodoret's debates with Cyril, he remains dyophysite but takes as the subject of attribution for the terrestrial activities of Christ the common person, or *prosopon*, not the human nature. It is hardly likely that he would have been able to make the kind of distinction of attribution we find in the *Curatio*, without allusion to the unity of person in Christ, after the heat of the debate with Cyril.

Richard finds his second evidence for a pre-431 date also in Book VI. Theodoret turns to fulfilled Old Testament prophecy as a proof of the truth of the Gospel. But after citing only a few examples, he says he cannot continue for lack of space, and concludes, 'But since the multitude of the things said does not permit me to do this, I ask you, O men, to believe the prophecies and heed the deeds crying out.'[6] The *Opus adversus Judaeos*, mentioned in the *Expositio Rectae Fidei* immediately after the work against the Greeks, had just this as its purpose. Knowing from his later works how easily Theodoret could turn in such a situation to referring his reader to another work of his on a given subject, we can surmise that had he already written the *Opus adversus Judaeos* when he penned these words in the *Curatio*, it would have been quite out of character for him not to refer his *Curatio* readers to it. For example, in the autumn of 450 he is defending himself in Epistle 145 to the monks of Constantinople when he lists a work against the Jews among his treatises against heretics, saying that he never ceased trying to convince the 'Jews that about [Christ] the prophets uttered their predictions'. Richard concludes that the *Curatio* pre-dates *Adversus Judaeos* and the *Expositio*.

Richard's dating of the *Curatio* is corroborated by Pierre Canivet, who in 1958 published the most recent critical edition of it.[7] To Canivet, Richard's

[5] Ibid., n. 4, citing L. Kösters, 'Zur Datierung von Theodoret, *Ἑλληνικῶν Θεραπευτικὴ Παθημάτων*', *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie*, 3 (1906), 349–56.

[6] Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire', p. 92, quoting *PG*, 83: 989.

[7] Théodoret de Cyr, *Thérapeutique des Maladies Helléniques*, texte critique, introduction, traduction et notes de Pierre Canivet, SJ, *SC* 57, pp. 28–31.

argument from terminological evolution is supplemented by certain internal indications. The hagiographic documents in Books VIII, 69, and X, 47, suggest to him that the work was written in the area of Antioch or Apamea rather than Cyrus. The local saints whose example is evoked pertain to the areas of Theodoret's youth and monastic period, not to Cyrus, from which Theodoret mentions no one. Canivet thinks that the *Curatio* seems more the work of a monk than a bishop. In it Theodoret mentions the mountains and plains anchorites in the expansion of the Gospel, but not ordinary people who form the source of inspiration for this topic in his later works. References to the Persian persecution of Christians are in terms more immediate and passionate than in the *Historia Ecclesiastica* of the late 440s, where he puts these events definitely in the past. For Canivet, Theodoret gives the impression of a security in faith by the tranquil assurance with which he cites contradictions between their own philosophers against the pagans, and the French scholar asks whether Theodoret could have been quite so sure of himself if the pagans could have replied by pointing to the internal Christian dissension between 431 and 451. Finally, Canivet asks if a work with such considerable citation of authors, documentation from many areas, and a careful scholastic structure could be other than the product of a time of leisure, rather than the hectic life of a bishop.

The *Curatio* consists of two groups of five books each, with an introduction in Book I and a concluding epilogue in Book XII. Books II–VI are concerned with metaphysics, the Christian systematic over against the pagan. With what Canivet describes as a 'stunning provision of proper names and technical terms', Theodoret considers pagan and Christian concepts of the First Cause (Book II); the creation, first of the spiritual world of angels and demons (Book III) and then of the material world (Book IV); humanity, made in the image of God, body and soul (Book V); and finally, providence (Book VI), where he explicates the relationship between God and creation. For Theodoret paganism in whatever form is unable to recognize either creation or providence. Revelation permits to the Christian the additional assertion that God is Triune and that the Word of God, the Logos, was incarnate to restore humanity to the divine image and so save us. Thus Book II, on the First Cause, concludes with an exposition of the Trinity, while Book VI, on providence, finds its logical conclusion in a development of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Theodoret's progression of thought is carefully worked out throughout. Our Christological concerns really come with the end of Book VI, since this being a philosophical-theological treatise he does not mention the Christ in the first group of books until this point.

Books VII–XI are an 'ensemble moral' dealing with five themes: bloody sacrifice, the martyrs, the law, oracles, and the Last Judgement. These topics

are dealt with because of their existential apologetic value. Pagan philosophers taunted the martyrs as absurd. A fairly recent evolution in the Church, the cult of martyrs had been attacked at the beginning of the fifth century by Eunapius of Sardis, who repeated the criticisms of Julian the Apostate. Oracles were often used by pagans to attempt to prove to the masses that Christianity was the source of the ills of imperial Roman society by incurring the wrath of the gods. For example, the oracle of Apollo near Antioch refused to prophesy as long as the body of the martyr Babylas lay so near by. During the fourth century, pagans had often charged the Church with having abandoned the 'sweet' laws of Roman culture to put themselves under the laws of savages and barbarians. Lastly, since pagan intellectuals accused Christianity of using mere 'words and booboos' about eternal fire to frighten people into virtue, rather than bring them to it by love of the good, discussion of judgement and the last things was already a classic topic among Christian apologists. Finishing with this topic also gave Theodoret the opportunity to conclude his apology with an appeal for conversion and for his readers to consider their eternal good.

Julian had tried to show that Christianity belonged to the level of uncultured ignorance. It was a malady affecting the intelligence. The 'Galileans' reject and despise the reading of good authors who would enrich the heart and the spirit. They prefer their own holy books and vegetate in moral and intellectual mediocrity, devoid of those virtues which are the font of the good citizen. Theodoret responds to this classic Hellenistic reproach by charging that the pagans are in fact the true malady. Pagan philosophy is opposed to the true philosophy, that wisdom which is a gift of God. Without it, it is the pagan who is uncultured, incapable of coming to a total knowledge of the truth, to *gnōsis*. It is impossible to attain to this proper *gnosis* without faith in God. If the pagan will not accept faith as the first step toward genuine perfection, he enchains himself in incredulity and ignorance, which are the sources of all vice. In short, Theodoret turns on Julian his own device of considering Christians as sick people more in need of pity than hatred. For Theodoret, the effective medicine for Hellenism is opening pagans to the true intellectual light which will dissipate the darkness of their spirits.

Then in Book XII he finishes his work by comparing in concrete ways Christian and pagan philosophy: pagan philosophers theorize about virtue, while Christians practise it. Christianity is the true practical goodness. Christianity is the true *gnosis*, the true philosophy, the true virtue, the true ethic which Theodoret opposes to the illnesses of Hellenism. Christology is important here only inasmuch as it illustrates these themes, a fact which indicates that the work belongs chronologically among the concerns of the early Theodoret, either the monk refuting the influences of Julian in the environs of Antioch, or the young bishop eager to draw heretics and pagans

into the folds of the true faith. Nonetheless, we can find here interesting aspects of Theodoret's Christology and anthropology.

The discussion on the Incarnation comes at the conclusion of Book VI, sections 74–92.[8] The lncarnation is the ultimate expression of the providential relationship between God and creation, the ultimate act of divine love. It is discussed with relative simplicity, with no indication that the Nestorian controversy was known to the book's author. The Only-Begotten, the Logos, the Demiurge of creation, in order to work humanity's salvation, takes human nature (*anthropeia*) as a tent (*skene*) in which to veil the invisible God. The human *physis*, or nature, bears the sufferings of Christ, while the invisible, divine *physis* empowers the wonders done through the visible nature, such as walking on water. There is a careful distinction between the two *physeis*, or natures, which are in no way confused with each other or with a third, new, composite *physis* such as the *mia physis* of Apollinaris. There is no mention of a hypostatic union; indeed, the word *hypostasis* appears only once in the entire work, in Book II, 82, where Theodoret remarks that Plotinus wrote a book about the three primal *hypostaseis*. In his own terminology in this work, Theodoret uses *prosopon* to designate even the distinctions in the Trinity, not *hypostaseis*. That is a word which has no terminological function whatever in the Trinitarian or Christological vocabulary of this work. In the light of the controversy over Cyril's union by *hypostasis* in the Twelve Anathemas, Theodoret could hardly have avoided using or refuting the term in the *Curatio* had he written it after 431.

The problem of the union is really no problem at all—another pointer to a pre-431 date. The author merely asserts that the Logos takes flesh (*sarx*), the visible *physis* which veils the invisible *physis*. The visible *physis* is what is derived from the womb of the Virgin. By this taking, the Logos is incarnate. The 'human form', one of the expressions preferred by the Antiochenes is described as the 'veil of the flesh'.[9] The visible is kept sinless, and the invisible pure and undefiled, for the latter has no share in the sufferings of the flesh. Already we have one of the keys to Theodoret's interpretation of traditional Antiochene Christology: he will, as we shall very quickly see, speak of the Word as the 'same one' (*autos*) who, begotten of the Father before time, takes the visible of the Virgin and so is made visible; but the question becomes how the one whose own proper nature is the divine nature can in himself experience the passions of the flesh, in which his own nature has no share. The question is whether Theodoret overcomes Sullivan's Arian syllogism and its

[8] References to the text of the *Curatio* are to book and subsection. The critical text used is that of Canivet (see n. 7). An older text can be found in *PG*, 83: 783–1152.

[9] Book VI, 78.

premiss that whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him *kata physin* (that is, according to his divine nature). Theodoret is clearly here concerned to assert the continuing distinctions between the divine and human natures, to protect the divine nature against passible participation in the experiences which are properly human. The divine Word becomes in some sense visible by virtue of his union with or taking to himself the human form. How this is to be understood is not clear.

In sections 77–80 of Book VI, each *physis* remains intact; the union does not mix them. The human tent supports the passions such as thirst, hunger, sleep, fatigue, the cross, and death, while the divine works wonders, giving fleshly feet the power to walk on water, providing enough bread to feed thousands from five loaves, and healing eyes imperfectly formed in the womb, and so on:

> Congealing around himself the human tent in the virginal mother, he came out a visible man and God to be worshipped: on the one hand begotten of the being of the Father before all time, on the other taking that which can be seen by the senses from the Virgin, the same one is new and eternal. For the union (*henosis*) did not mix together (*synechee*) the natures (*physeis*), nor has it made the creator of time under time nor displayed the one from before time as that which has come into being in time. Rather each nature has remained unmixed: on the one hand the nature which suffers the passions of the nature (I refer to hunger and thirst, sleep, fatigue, the cross, and death), on the other the divine nature which energizes and customarily works wonders. (My translation.)

The union is defined only in the sense of denouncing the Arian or Apollinarian mixture of natures which substitutes the Word for the human mind of Jesus, and yet the first portion of the quotation might have been accepted by Cyril; at least, he could have read into it his own Christological model. A closer reading of it, however, really gets us no closer to the Alexandrine's hypostatic union. The union is the Antiochene prosopic union, which is all that has to be found here: the Word is said to be visible (though in his own being he is not) by virtue of his union, whatever that is, with the visible human tent. It is possible that Theodoret meant to say more, but this is the most we can actually find in the words themselves. Note in this regard that it is not the divine nature as such, considered mentally as apart from the Word or, rather, united to the Word in a similar way as the human nature is to be united mentally to the Word, which is not made 'under time', but rather the Creator himself. This indicates that to Theodoret's mind the assumption is being made that to speak of the Word is to speak of him *kata physin*. To speak of the Word is to speak of the divine nature, and vice versa. It is not that the Word suffers hunger and thirst and the other human passions in and through his proper human *physis*, which is to be conceived of as much his as the divine

physis, but rather the human nature suffers these passions in much the same way as we would say a human person (or the later Chalcedonian use of *hypostasis*) suffers them. Theodoret so strongly distinguishes the natures as to make each the subject of attribution, rather than the Word, as would be the case in an accurate use of *communicatio idiomatum*.

In section 82, the Only-Begotten, the Logos before time, the Maker of all things, takes human nature and is incarnate (*ten anthropeian physin labon enanthropese*) to effect our salvation. 'Taking human nature' is the *Curatio*'s explanation of Incarnation. We cannot learn here, apart from the hints in the foregoing quotation, what this taking means. Finally, in section 87, the crucified one is to be confessed as God (*theologountes*), though this does not particularly help us understand whether the principle underlying the expression is a true *communicatio idiomatum* or simply an exchange of names between the two natures (i.e. 'God' is a name proper to the divine nature of the Word, but may be used of the human nature because of the union between the two natures in the Incarnation).

Theodoret's basic anthropology is found in Book V, which deals with the nature of humanity. He contrasts the 'massive contradictions' within Hellenism on the nature of humanity with what he finds to be the uniform testimony of Scripture, asserting that the consistency of scriptural truth ought to weigh more with us than the fact of its barbarian origin versus the cultured but inconsistent thought of the Greeks.

For Theodoret, Scripture teaches that God created man from the earthly elements and woman from man, so that there is only one human *physis*, or nature, not a different one for every ethnic culture. The body (*soma*) takes its form in the womb from semen, and a reasonable, intelligent soul (*psyche*) is created *ex nihilo* for each new body and sent into it. The human soul is immortal, and its reasonable part is capable of dominating the passions.[10] Thus in Book V, 76, the *physis* of the human *psyche* is immortal, with the reasoning, rational part of it governing the passions, which in themselves are necessary and beneficial to the human *physis*. Apparently, then, sin and evil consist in allowing, by free choice of the will, the passions to dominate the rational part of the soul, or *psyche*. Human beings can and should do the opposite. Theodoret uses the word *hegemonikon* to designate the rational (*logikon*) part of the *psyche* in section 22 (also with a participle form in section 20) in the context of his discussion of the various Hellenistic schools on the nature of the soul: 'It is easy to see all the divergences which separate them [the Hellenists] when they try to localize the reason (*ton hegemonikon*).'[11]

[10] Book V, 50–5, 76–80.

[11] Canivet says, p. 232 n. 2, that he is here translating *hegemonikon* as 'reason' after the Stoics.

Human *physis* would seem to be a dyophysite combination of the immortal *physis* of the *psyche* (rationality being a part of this *physis* and not apart from it as a third element in human nature) and the mortal *physis* of the *soma* or body. In general the word *soma* appears as the opposite of *psyche*. The body is made of *hyle*, the soil of the earth, the three basic elements; the soul is spirit, rational, immortal, created for each *soma* taking foetal form in the womb. *Soma* is that part of the composite one *physis* of humanity which is mortal and passible. In Book VIII, 31, 32, and Book IX, 36, it is the dead or inanimate thing. In VIII, 37, 52, and 66, as well as IX, 32, it refers to the dead martyrs. In XI, 58, it is what is to be raised in the resurrection of the dead. The *soma* of Christ is mentioned as such only in VIII, 37, where Theodoret describes the Lord's death as Christ having left his *soma* dead on the cross. Judging by the definition of viability which Richard found above (pp. 67–8) in Theodore of Mopsuestia, the soul is obviously a *physis* in its own right, which requires the conclusion that human nature is actually a composite *physis* of rational, immortal *psyche* and mortal *soma*. It is this composite human *physis*, then, that is predicated of Jesus, that is taken by the Word as his human tent.

Before moving on to the *Expositio Rectae Fidei*, a glance at a few more of Theodoret's terms will prove useful. Tent (*skene*) is used, as we have seen in the quotation from Book VI, 79, above, as the equivalent for the human *physis* or nature of Christ. In Book X, 83, having quoted Amos 9: 11–12 to the effect that God will raise up the tent of David in that day, Theodoret says that if one wants to know what the tent of David is, one should look at John 1: 14, a remark that points to his preference for scriptural expressions and motifs and helps us get a little firmer grip on the way he relates these words to each other, for in that passage becoming *sarx* and 'tenting' among us is the way the Word manifests his glory: 'And the Word became flesh (*sarx*) and dwelt (*eskenosen*) among us . . . ; we have beheld his glory. . . .' *Sarx*, or flesh, is probably something more than *soma*, for it appears to function in the *Curatio* as the equivalent of humanity or human nature. In X, 54, when Caesar Augustus ruled the universe, 'our Saviour was born *kata sarka*', and in X, 63, our Lord is from the race of Jacob *kata sarka*, and God speaks to 'the Lord Christ as to a man, naming him Jacob and Israel because of the visible nature'. *Communicatio idiomatum* or a communication of names only? In short, *skene, sarx*, and human *physis* are functional equivalents.

Impassibility is not neglected: *apathes* is the character of incorporeal *physeis* (III, 94). It is an adjective never in this work applied to human beings. It is God, the divine *ousia* who is impalpable, invisible, impassible, and incorruptible (III, 16). The Son is called Logos because he 'has come before time and impassibly . . . ; that is, the Son was begotten from God the Father'.

Lastly, the use of *prosopon* in the *Curatio* shows us the typical Antiochene preference for this term over *hypostasis*. Indeed, it is not even used Christologically in a formal sense at all, since Theodoret is not really concerned in the *Curatio* with the problem of the unity of the two natures. In four of its eight appearances in the work, it replaces *hypostasis* in referring to the distinctions (*diaphoron*) in the Trinity: in II, 62–4, there is 'one . . . *physis* of the Trinity . . . and the distinction (*diaphoron*) of the *prosōpa*'.[12] In three of the other four appearances of the word, it can only mean face, countenance, visage. In Book V, 50, Yahweh breathes into the *prosopon* of Adam to give him the breath of life. The word occurs in the context of a discussion on the origin of humankind, Theodoret quoting the Septuagint of Genesis 2: 7—the man became a living *psyche* because God breathed into his *prosopon* the breath of life after forming him from the dust of the earth. In Genesis 2: 6, the flood which comes up from the earth waters all the *prosopon* of the earth. In Book V, 4, Theodoret quotes i Samuel 16: 7 to the effect that while human beings look at the *prosopon*, God looks into David's heart. Finally, in XII, 10, the word appears in the context of introducing a character, a *persona dramatis*, into a discussion. It is difficult to tell from this brief evidence exactly what *prosopon* means to Theodoret. He quotes Scripture to the effect that it means outward countenance, a usage not unlike that which we have seen in Theodore of Mopsuestia. On the other hand, for all practical purposes he does not use *hypostasis* at all; it simply is not part of his theological vocabulary in this work; he prefers *prosopon* as the equivalent of *hypostasis* in Trinitarian terminology. As far as the *Curatio* goes, *ousia* and *physis* seem to have the same function, denoting being, nature; *prosopon* denotes the way or ways an *ousia-physis* manifests itself or appears to the senses. *Prosopon* thus becomes the word which Theodoret uses to denote individual examples or concrete instances of a nature. It is his preferred term for individuality.

The discussion of terms such as *physis*, *hypostasis*, and *prosopon* in this analysis of the *Curatio* raises for us right at the beginning of Theodoret's body of works the question of whether there is an ontology to which we could turn to understand better his underlying assumptions. In his discussion of the Christology of Tertullian and the Cappadocians, Grillmeier develops what he calls the Stoic doctrine of being as such a key. In general, his position is supported by Christopher Stead and J. M. Rist in their discussion of the Stoic categories of being, although Stead is careful to point out that the Stoic theory of categories probably changed 'to meet the needs of controversy, and its technical terms are not always used with consistency', a point as valid among Christian writers of our period as among pagan. Indeed,

[12] The same usage also appears in X, 87.

It may seem extraordinary that pagan and Christian writers alike should have been so well acquainted with the terminology of categorial theories, both Aristotelian and Stoic, and yet prove so totally incapable of applying either theory in a consistent manner. One reason for this lies in an obscurity and confusion about the function of such theories which goes back to Aristotle himself and which has not yet been completely removed.[13]

For example, the word *ousia* can denote a wide variety of ideas. It can denote the entire universe in its original or even final unstructured state. Or it may denote concrete individual beings, or one of the four basic elements of the universe which can change into one another, or compound substances, the constituent material of particular things. But in the context of uncovering the way in which a concrete individual being can be thought of as coming into being, *ousia* means more or less the basic stuff or matter to which qualifying form is added. Another word often used to denote the same concept is *hypokeimenon*, 'substrate', or substantial, indeterminate, and undefined matter. An example might be given of bronze as *ousia*. A sculptor starts with bronze, which remains what it is when qualifying form is added to it by the artist to create an individual statue. It will always be bronze, and will return to being unformed bronze when the form of the particular statue which it now is has been melted away.

Thus a concrete, existing individual, such as a particular horse or human being, is conceived of as formless being or matter or substrate, *apoios ousia* or *hypokeimenon*, having had added to it at least two levels of 'quality' or *poiotes*; that is to say, the things which form or characterize the unformed substrate into a specific individual. Consider the case of two doves. They are distinguished from each other, actually exist as two distinct individuals, because of their individualizing and particularizing qualities, qualities proper only to each one: *proprietates*, *idios poia* or *idiomata*. On the other hand, at least in our minds we distinguish these two individuals from other individuals, such as horses or human beings, because they share certain common qualities we call doveness (there was debate among the Stoics as to whether these common qualities could actually be said to exist, since they really seem to be only ideas in our minds and to have no corporeal existence as such except as incorporated in actually existing individuals). These common characteristics signify the nature which a specific individual shares with others of the same species or genus. They are the specifying quality or *koine poiotes*.

[13] Christopher Stead, *Divine Substance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 125. For Stead's development of the Stoic doctrine of being or categories of being, see chs. 3 and 5. J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), ch. 9, pp. 152–72. See A. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 2nd edn. rev.; 1975), i. 367–77, for the use of the Stoic doctrine of being in Cappadocian Christology, and pp. 124–31, where he applies this analysis to Tertullian.

In other words, when the undetermined matter is characterized by specifying quality, such as horseness or humanity, one is on the level of considering being or nature: *ousia* and *physis*. When particularizing qualities, the *idiomata*, are added to *physis*, there is then an actual concrete existent of the nature in consideration: a particular human being or horse, a Socrates or Diogenes. At this level of being, the term is *hypostasis* or, as is sometimes used, the *prosopon*. The specifying and particularizing characterisitcs (*poiotetes*) are terminated as *species* or *eidos*, *forma* or *morphe*, *character*, and *schema*.[14]

To show that this 'Stoic doctrine of being' underlies Cappadocian Trinitarian doctrine and Christology (and thus can be useful to us for understanding the Antiochene Theodoret), Grillmeier examines Epistle 38 of Basil (which he says should be attributed to Gregory of Nyssa[15]). Basil (or Gregory) begins with the universal nature or *koine physis*, sometimes *koinotes tes physeos*. This is shared by 'the different particulars of a species'. These 'particulars' are differentiated among themselves by the particularizing characteristics or properties: *idion (or idiazon), idia, idioma (idiomata* in the plural). These particularizing and individualizing *idiomata* constitute the universal or *physis* into an *hypostasis* or particular existent of an *ousia-physis*. Among the particularizing properties are all the inward and outward peculiarities by which an individual human being, say, may be known and recognized. Even the 'moral conduct of a man is not kept apart, but is here incorporated into the ontological analysis of concrete being'.

When this analysis of being is transferred by the Cappadocian to the problem of unity and distinction in the Trinity, the 'community of being' (*kata ten ousian koinotes*) is contrasted with the particularizing characteristic of the peculiarities by which the substance is actually perceived and known: *idiazon ton gnorismaton*. *Hypostasis* 'is the conflux of the particularizing characteristics of each member' of the Trinity.[16] The expressions *character* or figure, *schema* or form, and *icon* or image signify the 'particularizing characteristic' or *idion* of each of the three *hypostaseis* of the one divine being. Finally, Epistle 38 comes to *prosopon* to denote the visible and recognizable *hypostasis*; it signifies the way the identifying *proprietates* or *idiomata* 'make it possible to contemplate, to see, to distinguish the *hypostasis*'. The Cappadocian writes,

> Thus the *hypostasis* of the Son becomes as it were form and face (*prosopon*) of the knowledge of the Father, and the *hypostasis* of the Father is known in the form of the Son, while the proper quality (*idiotes*) which is contemplated therein remains for the plain distinction of the *hypostases*.[17]

[14] This is summed up by Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 2nd edn. rev., i. 372–3.
[15] Ibid. 373; cf. n. 53. [16] Ibid. 374, quoting *PG*, 32: 336.
[17] Ibid., translating and quoting *PG*, 32: 339–40.

Prosopon has its old meaning of countenance, and yet Grillmeier goes on to point out that Gregory can use *prosopon* very frequently for *hypostasis*, more often than Basil, who could use the expression 'the particularity of the *prosopa*' (*ton prosopon idiazon*) to denote the way the distinctions in the Trinity are produced by combining the particularizing characteristic with the universal in the divine being, but who preferred the formula one *ousia*, three *hypostaseis*, because one *hypostasis*, three *prosopa*, could easily give way to Sabellianism.[18] The point I would stress is that when carefully considered in the total scheme of this analysis of being, *prosopon* signifies the visibility or recognizability of the *hypostasis*, which is the fundamental term for an actual concrete existent individual, and yet precisely because of this, it could be used by Gregory more or less interchangeably with *hypostasis*, or even in preference to the latter, to denote individuality. The parallel preference in Theodoret's Antiochene tradition for *prosopon* as the term for individuality in Trinitarian terminology has, thus, a certain exalted precedence.

We see a beginning of transferring these terms to the Christological problem with the Cappadocians, though Grillmeier, for one, characterizes their solution to the problem of maintaining the unity and distinction of natures in Christ as too much in 'the realm of material categories'.[19] Indeed, he sees an almost direct line between the Cappadocians and Nestorius.[20] For him, Cappadocian Christology understood the unity of Christ in terms of the Stoic *krasis di' holon* doctrine, a theory in which two natures can be thoroughly mixed together without either losing its properties. The careful preservation of natural properties to each of the natures in Christ did allow Basil, for example, to explain how the divinity remains impassible, the subject of the passions being the humanity, which is body and soul. The body suffers hunger, thirst, and fatigue; the soul is subject to anxiety, ignorance, and sorrow. The Word takes to himself a soul and a body that suffer the passions natural to humanity, not those brought on a human being by a will rebellious against God. There is, then, a true theological function for a human soul in the Incarnation, but 'Basil does not [even so] think to transfer to it the spiritual decisions that are decisive for our redemption'.[21]

Like the Theodoret of the *Curatio*, Gregory of Nyssa is more concerned with carefully assigning to each nature its properties than in working out the unity of person in Christ. The *homo assumptus* formula is frequently used by him, and he refutes the Apollinarians' *mia physis* Christology with a consistent one of two *physeis*. Christ's death is the separation of his human soul from his human body, not that of the Logos from the flesh. The unity in Christ is

[18] Ibid. 374–5, esp. n. 55. [19] Ibid. 369. [20] Ibid. 368. [21] Ibid.

described in terms of the mingling of the two natures, but in such a way as to retain to each its properties, even if Gregory's understanding of the Incarnation seems to involve the progressive transformation of the humanity into the divinity of the Logos—so much so that there seems no humanity left at all when the Christ returns in glory at the end of time. Grillmeier finds that this problem of the unity is solved by Gregory by using the Stoic doctrine of being to say that there is in Christ a real human *physis*, the *κοινὴ ποιότης* of humanity, the universal substance of humankind; but Gregory will not attribute to Christ's human *physis* the particularizing characteristics which would make it a human *hypostasis*. The humanity has reality, but no human *idiomata*; there are only the *idiomata* of the Logos as divine *physis*-*hypostasis*. Thus the Apollinarian charge of the Cappadocians teaching two Sons is refuted:

> The first fruits of human nature which were taken by the omnipotent Godhead are mingled in the Godhead like a drop of vinegar in a vast sea, but not in its own particular properties (*tois idiois autes idiomasin*). For if the Son were to be known in the ineffable Godhead in a *physis* of a different kind, identified by its own peculiar characteristics (*idiazousi semeiois*), in such a way that the one were infirm, or small, or corruptible, or transitory, and the other were powerful, and mighty, and incorruptible, and eternal, this would be to postulate two Sons.[22]

Gregory's solution of how to unite two distinct *physeis* in the one Son is not that of Theodoret, but the fundamental metaphysical assumptions of the Cappadocians and Theodoret's Antiochene tradition are the same.[23] I cannot but wonder if the phrase above, 'For if the Son were to be known in the ineffable Godhead in a *physis* of a different kind', might not indicate that Gregory too assumed that whatever is attributed to the Logos himself must be attributed to him *kata physin theou*. The Cappadocian–Antiochene apologetic against Apollinarian one *physis* Christology, in any case, is rooted in attributing to the Christ two real natures: the divinity of the Logos, and a full, real humanity, understood in terms of the anthropology of their times as a rational *psyche* united to the *soma*. Divine empowering is attributed to the divine *physis*, the passions of the Christ to the humanity. If Theodoret dwells in the *Curatio* on the distinction of *physeis* without showing much concern for solving the problem of the unity in one Son, and if he prefers *prosopon* as a term to express the individuality of a concrete existent of a *physis*, even in discussions of the Trinity, these policies are typical of the general Eastern

[22] Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, 2nd edn. rev., i. 376; translating and quoting *PG*, 45: 1275.

[23] In Dialogue I of the *Eranistes* Theodoret will make the technical Stoic distinction that the difference between *ousia* and *hypostasis* is 'the *koinon* to the *idion*'. Cf. Ettlinger's new critical text, p. 64, line 12.

apologetic of his time against Arians and Apollinarians, the arch-enemies of his early episcopate.

EXPOSITIO RECTAE FIDEI

In this elementary introduction to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, Theodoret explains the union and distinctions of the two natures in Christ with two analogies: first, that of the union of soul and body in human beings, and secondly, the union and distinction of light and the solar body in the sun. Then he takes exception to explaining the presence of the Godhead in Christ by the expression of divine presence *kat' ousian*, for to him that implies overthrowing the divine omnipresence throughout creation. Marcel Richard, as we saw above, found each of these arguments developed in such an elementary manner that he concluded that Theodoret had to have composed them before his public debate with Cyril—before 431.[24]

Ten years after the Richard articles, R. V. Sellers wrote to defend a date in 447.[25] He thought that 'the Sons of the Church' to whom the *Expositio* is addressed were the B'nai Q'yâmâ or 'Sons of the Covenant' in Edessa, who were also called 'Sons of the Church', and who in the late 440s were at loggerheads on the doctrine of Christ with Ibas, bishop of Edessa and ally of the bishop of Cyrus. In 448 Theodoret wrote to Timothy of Doliche, Epistle 130, that he had recently composed 'a brief instruction'. Finding what he believes to be a close connection between the *Expositio* and the *Eranistes* of 447 in subject-matter, and noting that immediately after mentioning this 'brief instruction' Theodoret says that if he can find a scribe to copy it, he will send Timothy a copy of what he has written to defend his Christological position 'in the form of a dialogue' strengthened 'by the teaching of the Fathers', which would seem a rather obvious reference to the *Eranistes*, Sellers concludes that the *Expositio* was written very soon after the *Eranistes*, which then becomes the 'refutation of the Jews and Greeks' to which Theodoret refers in the opening lines of the *Expositio* (taking issue with Richard, who thought that this would be the *Curatio*). If indeed this be at all accurate, Theodoret failed, as Sellers points out, for by Easter of 448 the Edessan 'Sons

[24] M. Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire', pp. 84–9. Preserved in the works of Justin, the *Expositio* was definitively restored to Theodoret by J. Lebon, 'Restitutions à Théodoret de Cyr', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 26 (1930), 523–50. Lebon's argument recognizes that the work predates the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy; cf. pp. 541–2.

[25] R. V. Sellers, 'Pseudo-Justin's *Expositio Rectae Fidei*: A Work of Theodoret of Cyrus', *Journal of Theological Studies*, 46 (1945), 145–60.

of the Covenant-Church' were complaining about Ibas, leading to the Emperor's charge confining both him and Theodoret to their dioceses and their subsequent condemnation and deposition at the Latrocinium in 449.

M. F. A. Brok ably refuted Sellers's points a few years later, in 1951.[26] The argument about the Edessan 'Sons of the Covenant' carries little weight for him, for two reasons. In the first place, Sellers failed to note that Rabbula's rules for the B'nai Q'yâmâ distinguish carefully between the 'Sons of the Covenant' and the 'Sons of the Church', the latter title including everyone for whom the rules were drawn up, the former excluding priests and deacons. Secondly, it is clear that in the *Expositio* Theodoret was addressing himself to the same people to whom he wrote his work against the Jews and the Greeks, and in the latter case we know that these are Christians in general; for when he wrote the *Expositio*, he used the title 'Sons of the Church' when he needed to appeal to the faith of his readers, the human reason of the unbaptized or unenlightened Jews and Greeks being incapable of penetrating into the divine mystery of the Church's belief in Christ.

More importantly, Brok agrees with Richard that there is a perceptible change in style and manner of expression between Theodoret's Christological argumentation in the *Expositio* and that in the *Eranistes* and the other works of the 440s. After 431 Theodoret is very careful to express himself as clearly as possible in dogmatic debate, but the ambiguity of the arguments in the *Expositio* allowed Severus to charge the author of the *Expositio*, who he says was Theodoret, with Nestorianism. The work does not allude to Eutychianism, hardly likely in a treatise on the Trinity and the Incarnation in the late 440s, at the height of Theodoret's bitter struggle with Eutychianism, when virtually everything he wrote is aimed explicitly in that direction. The *Eranistes*, which Sellers took to be the work against the Jews and the Greeks mentioned early in the *Expositio*, is not an apology for Christian faith against the Jews and the Greeks, but a defence of Antiochene Christology against Eutychianism. The content of Epistle 130 to Timothy of Doliche makes it clear that it is the Person of Christ which is at issue. Timothy had written to ask about the passion of Christ; Theodoret responds in the letter with a brief explanation of the two natures and the impassibility of the Word, and concludes by saying that he will have copied and sent to him his recent work refuting those who impute passibility to the Word, describing said work as a dialogue in question and answer form with the evidences from the Fathers. This can only be the *Eranistes* of 447. Then the 'brief instruction' on the subject in question (i.e. Eutychianism, or the imputation of passibility

[26] M. F. A. Brok, 'The Date of Theodoret's *Expositio Rectae Fidei*', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 2 (1951), 179–83.

to the Word), which Sellers identified with the *Expositio*, would more likely be the brief summary which concludes the *Eranistes* itself: namely, the *Demonstrationes per Syllogismos* (*PG*, 83: 327 ff.; Ettlinger, pp. 254–65). That would indeed form a useful supplement to the content of Epistle 130, whereas 'Theodoret expresses himself so inaccurately in this work [the *Expositio*] that in later times its orthodoxy could be doubted. In this quarrel, in which exactness of terminology was a principal requirement, the *Expositio* could only have harmed the cause of the Antiochenes.'[27] I conclude that the *Expositio Rectae Fidei* should be treated as an introduction to the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation which was written sometime comfortably before the Nestorian and Eutychian controversies prodded Theodoret to an exceedingly more careful expression of Antiochene Christology in uneasy reconciliation with the post-Ephesus Cyril of Alexandria.

Chapters 10–18 are concerned with the economy of the Incarnation, but an examination of his terminology in chapters 1–9 on the Trinity will provide us with useful insights regarding the interplay of *prosopon* and *hypostasis*, created and uncreated being, and his doctrine of being in general.[28] In chapter 2 Theodoret asserts against the heterodox that both Scripture and philosophy agree that there can be only one First Cause, one God. This one God is perceived—presumably in the historical process in history—as 'known in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit'. This is because 'from the same being (*ousia*) the Father begot the Son, and also from the same being brings forth the Spirit'.

In chapter 3 the terms for the oneness of God, for the one deity and divinity, are *ousia* and *theotes*, while distinctions in the divine being are

[27] Ibid. 180 f.

[28] The *Expositio Rectae Fidei* is to be found in J. C. T. Otto (ed.), *Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum*, Tom. III, iv: *Iustini Philosophi et Martyris Opera*, 3rd edn. (Jena: Sumptibus Gust. Fischer, 1880), part i, pp. 2–67. Another of Theodoret's works, *Quaestiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos*, also attributed to Justin and so preserved, is in part II, pp. 2–247.

The *Expositio* was included in the works of Justin from at least the seventh century, according to Sellers's article. But Severus of Antioch gave Sellers the clue to its true origin by quoting several passages from it under Theodoret's name. He says that his Chalcedonian opponent, the Grammaticus, by listing these three quotations among his Patristic proof texts undergirding Chalcedon over against the Monophysite, has taken as one of his 'Fathers' the very man, Theodoret of Cyrus, who divides the two *physeis* of Christ, and by so doing preaches two Sons. At the beginning of the sixth century, then, Severus knew Theodoret as the author of the *Expositio*, but after the condemnation of Theodoret's earlier works at Constantinople in 553, his authorship is either forgotten or the title and author's name removed so that the work can be used for sources and proof texts by Chalcedonians against the Monophysites. At any rate, according to Sellers, the *Expositio* was being 'mined for proof texts' by the Dyothelites. The texts were then being attributed to a *Περὶ Τριάδος* called the 'third book' of Justin. Sellers concludes that these seventh-century writers found the text of the *Expositio* without title or author, and since the opening sentences are reminiscent of Justin's *Apology*, they inferred honestly enough that this was another work by Justin, whose orthodoxy was unimpeachable for their purposes (cf. p. 147).

indicated by 'the modes of existence' (*hoi tes hyparxeos tropoi*) and *hypostasis*. It is the manner in which the divine being develops, or is said to develop, in relation to being perceptible to rational created beings that allows us to differentiate within the one divine being. The Father, thus, is the 'Unbegotten', an expression which 'marks out the *hypostasis* of the Father. The Son is the Begotten, the Spirit, the Led-out (*to ekporeuton*'). Throughout this chapter three terms are used almost interchangeably to signify concrete existence of an *ousia*: 'existence' (*hyparxis*), 'to have being', and *hypostasis*. So it is that Theodoret can say that when we speak of the one having being unbegottenly, the second begottenly, and the third processively, we refer to the *idiomata* by which we perceive the distinctions in God; but when we signify being on the level of *ousia*, we are referring to what is indicated by the common (*koinon*) name of divinity, or *theotes*.

Theodoret explains all this by an analogy with Adam, who has a different 'mode of originating' from his own offspring. Adam is by another human parent unbegotten (*agennetos*) since he was formed by the hand of God, but Adam's offspring are all *gennetoi*, generated, or begotten in human birth. Yet this distinction does not obliterate the common human *ousia* of Adam and his offspring.

It seems evident enough that Theodoret is working within the framework of the Stoic doctrine of being, outlined above from Grillmeier. *Ousia* or *theotes* is what is common or *koinon* to the three *hypostaseis*, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The *koinon* is the one divine being, God. The actual concrete existents in which this one being 'has being', by which the one being is known to us, are hypostasized by the *idiomata* of unbegottenness, begottenness, and procession: the Father begetting the Son from the same being, and leading out the Spirit from the same being.

In chapter 4 the crucial distinction is made between God and the creature. There are only two fundamental kinds of being, created and uncreated. Since the Son and the Spirit are not enumerated among the created *physeis* in the hymns of David and the expressions of Paul, they are not within the category of created *physis*, or nature, and so must belong to the one uncreated *physis*—the being, God. This is further demonstrated, according to chapter 5, by the way in which the New Testament, especially Paul, constantly includes the expressions Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; or 'the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit'; or freely interchanges the Spirit of Jesus, the Spirit of God, and the Spirit of the Father. All are of the one divine *theotes*, which is for this chapter the term for unity in God: 'For [the terms] Christ and God and Spirit teach . . . the one *theotes*.' On the other hand, in this chapter the term for Trinitarian distinction within the Godhead is not *hypostasis*, but *prosopon*. The use of *prosopa* need not indicate

that the word is philosophically the equivalent of *hypostasis*, but rather points to the way in which the Antiochene tradition prefers this term for the distinctions within the Godhead as well as the unity in Christ insofar as it indicates the outward perceptibility of the concrete reality being referred to—in the case of the Trinity's distinctions, this is pointed to by the earlier use of God as 'known' in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This would at least point to the Stoic doctrine of being as the probable metaphysical assumption underlying Theodoret's apologia for the Nicene faith. Inasmuch as a *prosopon* is the outward countenance of a *hypostasis*, and is thus that by which human sensibility experiences the *hypostasis*, it would have been easy for this Antiochene to use the former as a term of preference for indicating the distinctions within the Godhead. After all, he had a good Patristic tradition for it in the Cappadocians. In chapter 6 the work of creation pertains equally to all three *prosopa*, for when David says in the Psalter that the Lord founded the earth and the heavens, he includes the Son and the Spirit in the word 'Lord'. The Scriptures teach that Son and Spirit are not inferior in power to the Father, for they are quoted to show that all three do what each wills. For example, there is one divine will and power of authority, Jesus willing to cleanse the leper and the one, self-same Spirit willing to give to each as he wills.

Chapters 7–9 summarize Theodoret's position. There is nothing between the two categories of created being and uncreated being. The Scriptures 'yoke' the Son and the Spirit with the Father, and not with created beings, and so include them in the category of uncreated being. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are, therefore, *hypostaseis* (this time Theodoret uses this term for the distinctions within God) of the one deity, the one common *ousia*, who is known as one in three and three in one.

The mystery of God's being is beyond human rational ability to comprehend, but Theodoret uses an analogy to work at it which will in part reappear later in the chapters on the Incarnation. He likes the analogy of 'light from light', which has the advantage of being thoroughly Nicene. Light is light, the same *ousia*, both generated and flowing out of its source. And light shines from light impassibly, without cutting or separation. Thus the Church puts forth 'the knowledge of the one divinity in three perfect *hypostaseis*'. Likewise, the rationality of the economy of the Logos, to which Theodoret now turns his attention, is ineffable, but must be carefully examined nonetheless.

In chapter 10 Theodoret makes a general statement which, though it uses Antiochene ideas and expressions which would have aroused the suspicions of Cyril of Alexandria—such as the Logos forming a temple for himself, the perfect man—is perfectly open to an interpretation or model of the Incarnation in which the Word is himself the subject of the attributions of all that the Christ is and does. He then illustrates his meaning by three analogies which

are so strangely developed in light of the terms of the debates after 430 that they convinced Marcel Richard that this had to be a work written long before Theodoret's controversy with Cyril.

The Logos, without abandoning heaven, comes down to us to set right the results of Adam's transgression. Soteriology is the function of the Incarnation. Using the Virgin as an intermediary, the Logos enters her womb as if some divine seed and forms a temple for himself, described as the 'perfect man', an action which 'ousiostasizes', or creates the nature of, the form of the temple. The Word is then described as putting on or clothing himself with 'this one' (*touton*) in the most intense union possible, so that the Word can then be said to have come forth from the womb at the same time God and man. The masculine accusative singular form of *touton* clearly implies that at least here before 431 the 'perfect man' of Antiochene tradition is in Theodoret's mind just that. It is not simply an abstract human nature which is hypostasized by the Word in himself—the enhypostatic union of later Christology.[29] We are concerned with a fully human *hypostasis*. We cannot, therefore, conclude from Theodoret's expression of the Word's having come forth from the Virgin's womb 'both God and man' that Theodoret is a Chalcedonian before Chalcedon. This can also just as easily be what we found in Theodore of Mopsuestia: though there would be two subjects in 'Christ', the Word and the man, by virtue of the intensity of the union the Word may be said to come forth God and a human being (the antecedent in the text of the aorist participle for 'having come forth' is the Word, not Christ).

As man, he lives blamelessly and voluntarily takes on death. By the high ethical level of his life, by fulfilling the Law, he makes Adam's transgression disappear, and by accepting a death completely undeserved by sin, he destroys what Adam owes. As God, he raises that which death dissolved and so destroys totally death itself. 'As man he was destroyed, as God he rose from the dead.' The disparate verbs' actions, Theodoret says, are thus to be attributed to two *physeis*, the divine and the human. In conclusion, Theodoret confesses 'the one Son, eternal before the ages, recent in time according to holy scripture'. The hint that this might not be the Chalcedonianism before Chalcedon that some have found in Theodoret is augmented by the analogies in chapters 11 and 12 and then by his exposition of how the Word is present in the perfect human being.

[29] See Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii: *From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590–604)*, part II: *The Church of Constantinople in the Sixth Century*, trans. from the German by John Cawte and Pauline Allen (London: A.R. Mowbray & co.; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1995), ii. 282–286, 436.

The first is the analogy so beloved of every party to the Christological debates, for all had to explain how the unity of two natures, soul and body, in each single human being is related to the union of Word and flesh in Christ. Theodoret points out that this analogy is appropriate to the Incarnation in some ways, but not in others.

It is appropriate inasmuch as a human being is one but has two distinct *physeis*. To each *physis* is reckoned appropriate functions. For example, the rational soul designs a boat, but the hand executes the building of it. So the one Son of God, the Word, is one though he has two *physeis*, to each of which is attributed appropriate activities of the Christ in the Gospels. 'Inasmuch as he is from the Father and is God he works wonders. Inasmuch as he is a human being (*anthropos*), he submitted willingly and naturally (*physikos*) to the cross and passion and things like our sufferings.' But how does the Word experience our passions and remain impassible? Obviously, the adverb *physikos* refers to passions experienced in the human *physis*. How is it said that the Word then suffers them? Have we moved beyond the problem of the Arian syllogism wherein whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him according to his divine nature?

This brings us to how the analogy is inappropriate for the Christological problem. A human being *is* not two *physeis*, but rather is constituted one being *from* two *physeis* (reminiscent of the phrase shortly to become infamous). One distinguishes, says Theodoret, between what goes together and what results from the putting together. The *soma* is produced from fire and air, water and earth, but it is no longer these things, but from them. 'Thus the human being, composed of *psyche* and *soma*, is other than the things from which he is.' We build a home out of different materials, but we call a building a building, not stones or wood or whatever building material we used, although the various materials retain all their own properties even after the building is destroyed. A human being is the union of soul and body, a third entity over against each singly. This can be seen from the way in which the body remains what it is even after the dissolution of the union (note that the word Theodoret uses here for union is *synapheia*, a conjunction, sometimes a term used of marriage). The *psyche* at death remains a spiritual, rational nature, but the human being, whom the union of soul and body had produced, has perished. This entire development is the same anthropology which we have already examined in the *Curatio*, where indeed it is much more completely worked out. What is clearer here is the way in which the composite human *physis* is a third something over against its composing *physeis*. Still, this is not a confusion in which the composite elements lose their properties, or *idiomata*, but a conjunction, a *synapheia*.

The inappropriateness of the analogy of the union of soul and body when applied to the Christological mystery is that Christ is not a third *physis*, or thing, made out of divine nature and human nature as though he were other than these two, but he *is* both. He may then be understood as God from the working of wonders, while sufferings like ours manifest him as man. We are, nonetheless, still no closer to understanding precisely who the subject is who experiences the human passions, the Word in himself through a human *physis* which is as much a part of his coming into being in terms of relationship to us in history as his divine *physis* is his, or a perfect man who is conceived of as a distinct subject of experience as well as attribution. For the analogy here under consideration breaks down, says Theodoret, precisely at this point. In the composite *physis* which is humanity, the soul suffers and participates in the passions of the *soma*, but no one of the faithful, says he, would assert or accept predicating passion of the Word. The key to Theodoret's Christological use of the body–soul analogy lies in the question of the Arian syllogism. He gives no hint of suspecting that the Word can suffer in himself, in his *hypostasis*, through his human *physis* and not in his divine *physis*: no one of the faithful would assert or accept attributing passion *to the Logos*. The problem raised here is worked out in the *Eranistes*, Dialogue III—to the same conclusion, I believe. In any case, the care with which it is approached in the *Eranistes*, when compared to the briefness of the exposition here, indicates that the *Eranistes* reflects an author clearly influenced by years of debate with Cyril, the *Expositio* the work of a man sketching out the skeletal fundamentals of the faith as his tradition had received it, illustrating it with a few brief analogies—hardly the picture of an author engaged in a decades-long, bitter struggle over Nestorianism and Eutychianism.

In chapter 12 Theodoret turns to another analogy which will not reappear in any other of his works: the union of light and the solar body. Before the solar body was created, light was diffuse, and Theodoret likens this primal light, created through the first word of God, to the Word who made it. The solar body is likened to the human body. The light is one thing, another the solar body which receives it. Now there is one sun, one light, but two *physeis*, the one of the light, the other of the solar body. So also there is one Son, the Lord Christ, the Only-Begotten, but also two *physeis*, the one beyond us and the one which is ours.

There is no distinction between the operation (*energeia*) of the light and the solar body capable of receiving it, unless such distinction be made in thought as to which *physis* an operation is proper (*idia*). So also in terms of the overall operation of the one Only-Begotten Son of God one does not separate from 'the one sonship' the works done by Christ, although one might in thought understand a thing done as proper to one *physis* or the other.

It is an interesting analogy, even an attractive one for its purpose of illustrating how it is possible to conceive of something that is an obvious unity in itself but is composed of two still distinguishable *physeis*. But it is still rather much on the level of a building made of different materials that is one building, yet the materials remain what they were—hardly sophisticated enough to deal with the problems raised, for example, by Cyril's Twelve Anathemas. Richard's comment is apt:

> One understands that this cosmological comparison might have tempted the piety of Theodoret. However, without being dangerous, it is a little awkward, and like every comparison it is open to criticism. Also one can be surprised that its author, who had noted with great care on the preceding page the imperfection of the example from anthropology, should not here express any reservation. Without doubt, he had not yet learned to be wary of critics. He will become more prudent, and perhaps for this reason this comparison does not reappear in any of the works which he wrote on the Incarnation after the Council of Ephesus. Here again the *Expositio* stands alone.[30]

The rest of the *Expositio*, save for the summation in chapter 18, is given over to the question of how it can be said that the Word is divinely omnipresent in his divine nature (*kat' ousian*) and how he is present in his temple, the assumed perfect man. This leads Theodoret to a discussion of what he considers the fundamental error of his opponents, who, he believes, are confusing the divine *ousia* and the human, created *ousia* into some new third thing that is neither, or the one into the other. Though this question of the Word's presence *kat' ousian* everywhere, as contrasted with the mode of his presence in the temple he assumes, is not again raised in any of Theodoret's other works—another indication for Richard of a pre-431 date—this assumption that a 'one nature' (*mia physis*) Christology inevitably requires a confusion of divinity and humanity into each other is one of the key and often repeated aspects of Theodoret's thought.

The question the 'unbelievers' raise, according to Theodoret in chapter 13, runs this way: how is the Logos present everywhere according to his essential natural characteristics (*kat' ousian*), and how is he present in his temple? If he is in his temple in the same way as he is divinely ubiquitous, then the temple has no special presence in it. In that case, how are we to treat the text, 'In him dwelt bodily all the fulness of deity'?[31] But if one should grant that he is more present *kat' ousian* in the temple than in all things, then one has in effect said that he is not ubiquitous by his divine nature.

[30] Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire', p. 88. The translation from the French is mine.
[31] Col. 2: 9.

It is difficult to determine the identity of Theodoret's 'unbelievers' here. It is difficult to tell whether they are people who would insist that the Word must be present in his temple *kat' ousian*, perhaps some kind of Apollinarian; or people who would undermine Christian Trinitarian faith by alluding to a supposed absurdity in asserting that Christ is divine *kat' ousian*, by nature, perhaps one form or another of local Arians, non-Christian pagans, or Jews. Part of the difficulty is that one is not certain exactly where the unbelievers' question stops and Theodoret's answer begins. In either case, however, as Theodoret proceeds with his answer, it becomes clear that once again at the very bottom of the problem is Sullivan's Arian syllogism, at least as far as Theodoret's theology is concerned.

The bishop of Cyrus—if indeed he is bishop of Cyrus at this date—replies that there are only two ways in which the creative power of anything can be present in it, either *per accidens* (*kata symbebekos*) or by essence (*kat' ousian*), in terms of its nature. Theodoret argues, not altogether to the point, that in the case of divine creative power being present *per accidens*, it would be in things before they existed, since accidents do not exist in themselves but in things existing *kat' ousian*. That being ridiculous, the divine creative power (*dynamis*) must be present *kat' ousian*. Leaving aside the logic of how the question of divine nature's ubiquity is related to when a created thing has come into existence, we come to the two truly central problems that Theodoret is really raising for himself here. He takes it for granted that all will accept the premiss that the divine *ousia* is ubiquitous by nature. This being so, does this mean that the temple of the Word has nothing more of God's presence than any other created being? What is special about God's presence in his temple?

Typically, Theodoret's first answer is that this matter is ineffable, and that only faith is the ultimate answer. Then he moves to the fundamental problem he sees here: to postulate a divine presence in the temple *kat' ousian* that is meant to differentiate the temple from other created being and to explain what is special about God's presence in Christ is to involve us in the hypothesis of a combination (*krasis*) or mixing (*sygchysis*) of divine *ousia* and created *ousia* into one new thing—which for Theodoret is the same thing as asserting a change of the *soma* of Christ into the divine *ousia*.[32] His opponents were trying to say that the Christ is by nature the Word. There is one Christ, the divine Word, or *theia ousia*. Humanity is deified or sanctified by being taken up into his life and so perfected, but not changed in human essence. Theodoret, caught in the metaphysics of his doctrine of being, cannot

[32] Cf. *sygchysis* in Appendix III in regard to the expression '*confusion* or *sygchysis* of two or more realities or things into a third, new entity'.

understand what they are getting at. He can see only two alternatives, each of which is obviously absurd. Either the human *soma* becomes the divine *ousia*, in which case it is no longer anything in itself, and Christ is not consubstantial with us; or the *soma*, having been converted into divine *ousia*, forms a second divine being (*theia ousia*) in union with the *ousia* of the Word—a kind of deified humanity. He appears to think that the second alternative is what his 'unbelievers' actually mean when they insist on the deification (*apotheosis*) of the *soma* but also on its continued creaturely status, consubstantial with us.

But to Theodoret this is utter nonsense, for his metaphysic allows no middle thing between uncreated divine being (*theotes*) and that which is created (*ktisis*): 'Why the necessity of a change in the *soma*, since we have now remade it into creaturely being (*ktisten ousian*)?' His opponents are those who seek the destruction of the two *physeis* in Christ by this change of the *soma* into deity through combination (*krasis*) and mixture (*sygchysis*). They are so confused and contradictory that 'they first affirm that the Word has become flesh, and then that the flesh has had its being transformed into the Word'. He asks how the Logos can remain what he is, God, and yet become a creature, a man. He points out that his opponents assert that though remaining God, he became flesh, according to John 1: 14. But, Theodoret asks, 'How did he remain and become? For if he remained what he was, how did he become what he was not? If, however, he became what he was not, how did he remain what he was?' Theodoret is of the opinion that if they can believe that the Logos 'becomes' while remaining what he was, they then could equally easily believe that he is everywhere present by nature, *kat' ousian*, and present in his own proper temple in a chosen manner.

Theodoret is arguing from a specific philosophical point of view. He is concerned with a doctrine of being, with the properties of natures, with how a given thing or nature can remain one thing, with one set of common properties, and become another thing at the same time with a completely different set of properties. His Christology is conceived—and this seems typical of Antiochene Christology—more or less exclusively in terms of the limitations which the doctrine or philosophy of being puts on understanding what God has willed to accomplish for our salvation in Christ. He is locked into a metaphysic from which he cannot escape: to speak of the Word is to speak of him always according to his own proper divine nature: *kat' ousian* or *kata physin*. He cannot conceive philosophically of any other way to handle the problem. The expression *kat' ousian* arouses in him an entire Christological metaphysic in which it is not possible for him to suspect that his opponents, whoever they might have been, were concerned to express by that term, not the ubiquity of God by nature, but that the one who is the personal centre of this particular human life, which is truly human, is none other than the truly divine Word.

His argument demonstrates the crudity of their terminology as well as his own inability to conceive of the Christological problem in other than the terms and limitations of the Stoic doctrine of being.

He continues his refutation of the 'unbelievers' by asking what it means to talk of the deification, or *apotheosis*, of the *soma*. If the change of him who remains what he was is logical nonsense, this is worse nonsense to Theodoret. He asks whether the *soma* is changed into divine *ousia* or whether it remains the body of a human being, incorruptible and immortal through union with the Word. If it is the latter, then it is still body, since God is not *soma*, and it lays claim to divine dignity, not by *physis*, but in the will of the Word. If the former case, how can it metaphysically be said that the Word 'changes the *soma* on account of the union into his own *ousia*'? Either the thing changed becomes nothing and the Christ is not consubstantial with us, or the *soma* is not changed into the *physis* of the Word but remains another *ousia* in union with that of the Word, deified or sanctified by virtue of the union with the Word. So once again we return to the radical distinction between created and uncreated being. His opponents say that the Word does not absorb the body into his own *ousia*, and thus into its own non-being, but rather that this deified second *ousia* is of the created order, over against 'the one *ousia* begotten from the Father'. But, argues Theodoret again and again, there can be no such thing which being one *ousia* is both a created being and begotten of the Father from his own divine being, something 'in between deity and creature'. Anyway, if his opponents admit, as they do, that this 'deified' *soma* is really a creature, why all this talk of change? We are back where we began, 'since it has been turned back again into created *ousia*'.

So how can the Word be present by nature—*kat' ousian*—everywhere and be present differently in Christ? Theodoret says in chapter 17 that just as the sun shines equally on everything, but the healthy-eyed, the purblind, and the blind receive its effulgence in different degrees, so we, weak in eye and misty-eyed with the filth of sin, cannot accept the in-breaking of divine light. But his temple, with most pure eye, can accept the light, having been formed by the Spirit and being altogether free from sin. The Word is present in all things *kat' ousian*, but not in us with the same intensity as in the temple: 'For just as the sun shines equally on all but is not received equally by all, so the Word, though in all by nature (*kat' ousian*), is not equally in the others and his own temple.'

Two points are to made in conclusion. The first, from Richard's 1935 article,[33] is that Theodoret never returns in his works against Cyril and the Monophysites to this question of the presence *kat' ousian* of the Word in

[33] Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire', p. 88.

the assumed temple. If used as a refutation of Cyril's union *kata physin*, 'it needed subtle distinctions which of course are not even begun in the *Expositio*'.[34] This is the strongest indication of a date for the *Expositio* before the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy, but it is seconded by Theodoret's reply that the difference between the presence of the Word in the temple and in us is one of degree, certainly an assertion that would be open to attack by the Cyrillian. It simply is not put sophisticatedly enough to stand with the late 440s works. It scandalized Severus, who inferred from it that for its author the Word was in the temple, the man from Mary, as in the saints.[35] Richard believed that chapter 17 was not necessarily Nestorian, though many before him had thought this[36] but that while its analogy is susceptible to a Chalcedonian interpretation, the 'comparison is unhappy' and quite open to further discussion. Consequently, when Theodoret has had the experience of having his exposition of the faith challenged, when he comes to defend himself against the charge by the Cyrillians that he taught two Sons, 'he will not allow himself similar carelessness. To admit that the *Expositio rectae confessionis* was composed after the Council of Ephesus would be to admit that Theodoret has learned nothing from his battles against St. Cyril, while all his other writings prove the contrary.'

The second concluding point is that the analogy here still has not allowed us to resolve who is the subject of the attributions of the *idiomata* of each *physis*, whether the Word himself or only what will be later explicitly termed the *hypostasis* of each *physis*: one subject, the Word, or two subjects, Word and the hypostasized perfect man. As we have seen, Severus in the early sixth century concluded from chapter 17's discussion of divine presence *kat' ousian* or by act of divine purpose and from the analogy of the light of the sun that for the *Expositio's* author the Word was in the temple, the man from Mary, as in the saints. Sellers thought this was unfair.[37] He believed that its author believed that the Word, the second Person of the Trinity, had in Jesus Christ made for himself the temple of the Virgin and was in consequence one Son, at once both divine and human. There is only one activity of this sonship, though the reason may distinguish two distinct natures of the one Son. For,

> in regard to the teaching of chapter xvii, what the author would enforce is clearly the conception that, while everywhere present according to essence, the Logos 'according to a determined purpose' was fully present in a real and fully appreciative manhood, specially created to receive Him—which surely is another way of saying that 'in

[34] Ibid. [35] Lebon, 'Restitutions à Théodoret de Cyr', p. 538.
[36] Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire', p. 88. [37] Sellers, 'Pseudo-Justin's *Expositio*', pp. 155 f.

addition to' being omnipresent as God, and so remaining what He was, the Logos took to Himself a complete manhood, there being constituted one Son *κατ' ἄκραν ἕνωσιν* in order to effect man's salvation. It would seem altogether unfair to set down this writer as an exponent of Nestorianism.[38]

But is it? There are the express words of Theodoret, in the quotation above concerning the way in which the sun's light shines equally on all but is not perceived equally by all, that the difference in the Word's presence in the human temple and in the saints is one of difference of degree of receptivity. Is it fair to fault Severus for taking the author apparently quite literally at his word? If Sellers is right in his analysis above, then the passion of the human sufferings is experienced by the subject the Word, albeit through his human *physis*. But again we have the express words of the author when he carefully faces this issue in chapter 11. When applied to the Incarnation, the analogy of the union of soul and body in one human being breaks down exactly here, for whereas the soul participates in the body's passions in a human being, no one of the faithful, according to Theodoret, would assert or accept predicating passion to the Word.

It is time to summarize what we have been able to discover about the Christology of Theodoret prior to the outbreak of the Nestorian crisis and the principles that underlie it. Theodoret's main concern is to distinguish carefully between two natures, or *physeis*, in Christ in order to preserve perfectly the impassibility of the Word. The strong soteriological basis in Theodore of Mopsuestia for asserting a perfect humanity free to choose to respond in obedience to the Logos, which Norris found in Theodore's anthropology and which for him was a second imperative alongside the Arian syllogism of Sullivan leading toward the predication of two subjects in Christ, the Word and the man Jesus, is not really functional here in Theodoret's Christology so far. Both the *Curatio* and the *Expositio* insist that the Word 'took' humanity, a human body, the perfect man, the human nature 'for our salvation', but the free choice of this humanity to obey the Word's will has not so far assumed as important a role in his working out his Christology as Norris found it had in Theodore. Though Theodoret can say that the 'same One' is both God and man, was eternal in his deity before all worlds, and new in time in the humanity taken from the Virgin, suffered and died on the cross, yet none of the faithful will attribute passion and suffering to the Word. Theodoret, in other words, is not able to escape the metaphysical necessities of a doctrine of being that at the very least is so similar to Grillmeier's definition of the Stoic doctrine of being that its terms are completely common to it. The *idion*

[38] Sellers, 'Pseudo-Justin's *Expositio*', pp. 155 f.

of suffering is proper (*koinon*), not to the *hypostasis* of the Word (I use this post-Chalcedonian way of expressing things not to condemn Theodoret but to try to express what I am getting at as clearly as possible), but to the *physis* and *hypostasis* of the humanity, the perfect man, the temple and tent which is worn by the Word. If passion cannot be attributed to the Word, then we can assume only that it is *said* to be of the Word by virtue of the union (*akra henosis*) or combination (*synapheia*) of Word and the human being. Precisely what it means to Theodoret to say that the Word does not suffer himself but does suffer through the humanity is the question at issue.

So far, his interest is not truly in describing the union of the two *physeis*; his concern is to preserve the distinction in natures over against any one *physis* doctrine. Christ is not some new thing (*hypostasis*?) come into existence out of deity and humanity, in the same way that a human being is an existent of the one human *physis* composed out of the prior *physeis* of rational, immortal *psyche* and earthly *soma*. Christ *is* both *physeis* by virtue of the Word, who is in himself the one Only-Begotten Son of God, taking on and wearing like a tent the temple of the perfect man, the perfect humanity. Rather than the one *physis* of the soul and body analogy, Christ is like a building, which is *called* a building though its composite *physeis* (stones, bricks, wood, etc.) remain exactly what they were, for a one *physis* doctrine, Theodoret is completely convinced, necessarily involves a mixture or confusion, a *sygchysis*, of the two natures into each other, deity into humanity, humanity into deity, or both into some new thing between uncreated, divine being and created being. Either of these two alternatives is philosophical nonsense. To paraphrase Grillmeier's expression about the Cappadocians, Theodoret seems so far in his works caught within the categories of material existence. He does not seem to be dealing with the personal category. The Incarnation was not to deify our humanity, for that would overthrow our nature and cause us to be nothing. Rather, by taking the perfect man and empowering the wonders of his life, the Word restores humanity to the divine image and so saves us.

In so many words, Theodoret here seems to be so thoroughly distinguishing the *physeis* and their *idiomata* or properties (the human nature suffers the passions as a human person does; the Word 'suffers' them only by virtue of his 'taking' that nature, the same way in which the invisible remains invisible but is manifest in the *soma*) that each *physis* is made the subject of the attributions of its properties. There is indeed only one Son, the Word, but does not Theodoret's Christological metaphysic inevitably lead to the necessity of predicating two subjects in the manner of the Sullivan–Norris Theodore of Mopsuestia?

QUAESTIONES ET RESPONSIONES AD ORTHODOXOS

This rather introductory work,[39] which provides answers to sixty-one fairly simplistic questions—such as why the Church faces east to pray, why Christians do not kneel on Sundays or during Eastertide, how there could have been three days before the sun was created on the fourth, the fate of persons dying unbaptized in infancy, and on astral navigation—must pre-date the controversy with Cyril and the Council of Ephesus, as there is not in it the slightest indication of any Christological debate at all. Further, Trinitarian and Christological concerns and terminology correspond exactly with what we have discovered in the *Curatio* and *Expositio*. Evil is the deprivation of good, and humankind's sin, our guilt under the Law, is that we do not do the good that we could do. To restore the fallen image of humankind to the image of God, God acts Trinitarianly and Christologically. There is one *ousia* of God, which or who is known in three *hypostaseis*, or modes of being (*tois tes hyparxeos tropois*). Christologically there is not the slightest interest in the unity of *prosopon*, but the emphasis is, once again, on the distinction of the divine and human *physeis*. In question 67 (pp. 97–9), the ineffable generation of Christ prophesied by Isaiah is not that 'according to the flesh', but rather that 'according to the divinity'. Other than the explicit statement (p. 133) that Christ is not guilty of actual sin, we learn nothing new here.

[39] The text is in Otto (ed.), part II, pp. 2–247, the *Quaestiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos* having been attributed, like the *Expositio Rectae Fidei*, to Justin after the condemnation in 553 of Theodoret's earlier works. The *Catena* on Luke's Gospel by Nicetas of Heraclea, reports Quasten, *Patrology*, iii: *The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon* (Utrecht and Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers; Westminster, Md., 1963), 549, quotes a passage of question 58 as from Theodoret, and the manuscript of the text in the metochion of the Holy Sepulchre in Constantinople (no. 452, *saec.* X), from which A. Papadopulos-Kerameus published his text in 1895, itself explicitly attributes the work to Theodoret. See also F. X. Funk, 'Le Ps.-Justin et Diodore de Tarse', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 3 (1902), 947–71. For further information on the question of authorship, see M. Richard, 'Les Citations de Théodoret conservées dans la chaîne de Nicétas sur l'évangile selon Saint Luc', *Revue Biblique*, 43 (1934), 92 n. 1.

4

Two *Physeis* in One *Prosopon*

De Sancta et Vivifica Trinitate and *De Incarnatione Domini*, the halves of a two-part work, mark the transition from Theodoret the anti-Arian and anti-Apollinarian to Theodoret the anti-Cyrillian. In their original form they must pre-date 431, as we shall see below, but the present form of *De Incarnatione Domini* shows the marks of a hasty editing during the Nestorian controversy. It represents the fullest systematic presentation of Theodoret's early, firmly Antiochene Christology, and its editing in the heat of controversy gives us an indication of the way in which Theodoret was responding to the crisis of the Council of Ephesus. We shall find here many answers to questions which the earlier works raised. First, however, the questions of date and authorship.

Both halves of the single treatise were preserved by being attributed to none other than Cyril of Alexandria himself.[1] A. Ehrhard first showed in 1888, on the grounds of internal evidence, that they are really Theodoret's works, and further proof from external sources has since been supplied by Eduard Schwartz in 1922 and J. Lebon in 1930.[2] Schwartz found three quotations from *De Incarnatione Domini* attributed to Theodoret in the anti-Nestorian work of Marius Mercator written while he was in Constantinople from 428 to 432 and several other quotations from the same work in the Lukan catenae of Nicetas. In 1930 Lebon showed that Severus of Antioch unhesitatingly quotes from it as Theodoret's in *Contra Impium Grammaticum c.* 520, and concludes from the way in which a few textual variants have been introduced between the time of Severus' Syriac text and the Greek text that has come down to us under Cyril's name that it must have been some neo-Chalcedonian writer

[1] *PG*, 75: 1147–90, 1419–78. English translations provided in this chapter are my own unless otherwise indicated.

[2] A. Ehrhard, *Die Cyrill von Alexandrien zugeschriebene Schrift περὶ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου ἐνανθρωπήσεως, ein Werk Theodorets von Cyrus* (Tübingen, 1888). Ehrhard's study was also published in *Theologische Quartalschrift*, 70 (Tübingen, 1888), 179–243, 406–50, 623–53. E. Schwartz, i: *Die sogennanten Gegenanathematismen des Nestorius.* ii: *Zur Schriftstellerei Theodorets* (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-philologische und -historische Klasse' (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademic des wissen schafteur, 1922). It is the second part of this short study with which we are concerned here, pp. 32–40. Finally, see again Lebon, 'Restitutions à Théodoret de Cyr', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 24 (1930), pp. 524–36.

who removed the introductory material (partly preserved by Severus) and attributed the double work to Cyril in order to gain the authority of that worthy for Chalcedon's two-natures doctrine in the conflict of the neo-Chalcedonians with the Monophysites.

The work must pre-date 431—at least in its original state. The fact that *De Incarnatione* is quoted by Marius Mercator in the materials he gathered in Constantinople during the Nestorian controversy between 428 and 432 is prima facie evidence of that. Schwartz also pointed out that Theodoret mentions both treatises in a letter (preserved in the Latin translation of the *Collectio Casinensis*) he sent to the assembly in Constantinople immediately after the close of the Council of Ephesus.[3] It is clear that some time has passed since he wrote them: 'Si vero vacuare potuero, et ea quae de sancta trinitate et de divina dispensatione olim a me scripta sunt, dirigo vobis.' On the other hand, in Epistle 113 Theodoret mentions a treatise 'about theology and the holy Incarnation' among the things he had written a dozen years or more before this 449 letter to Leo. From that Ehrhard had concluded that these two works were written between 430 and 437. It seemed to him that the way the two natures of Christ are related in *De Incarnatione*, the way the two titles *Theotokos* ('Mother of God') and *Anthropotokos* ('Mother of the Man') appear together, the rejection of *krasis* as an appropriate description of the union of the two natures, and the insistence on a permanent distinction of the two natures indicate that Theodoret wrote *during* the Nestorian crisis.

Marcel Richard has resolved this difficulty by pointing out that the energetic polemic against Cyril which characterizes Theodoret's *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum* and the *Pentalogos*, or five books, against Cyril's position, as well as the correspondence during and after the Council of Ephesus, is entirely lacking in *De Incarnatione Domini*.[4] It and the *De Trinitate* are content to explicate orthodox teaching and attack only dead heretics. Yet, while it can surely be pointed out that Theodoret has already rejected the term *krasis* in his apologia against the Apollinarians in the *Expositio Rectae Fidei*, and that Theodore of Mopsuestia and Diodore of Tarsus had linked *Theotokos* and *Anthropotokos* long before Nestorius rejected the former, yet the way in which these terms and ideas are used in parts of *De Incarnatione* suggests that at the very least there was a revision of the text after the Council of Ephesus. In any case, the *terminus ad quem* even for such revisions would be late 432, for if one wants to see in 'the heirs of the errors of Apollinaris' Cyril and the Fathers of Ephesus, then one must account for the fact that in *De Incarnatione*

[3] Schwartz, *Zur Schriftstellerei Theodorets*, p. 31. The letter is item 129 in *Collectio Casinensis, ACO*, Tom. I, vol. iv, p. 81. See n. 4 on this letter in M. Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire de Théodoret avant le concile d'Ephèse', p. 94.

[4] Richard, 'L'Activité littéraire', 94–9.

the heirs of Apollinaris are reproached for denying an intelligible, rational *psyche* in Christ. Yet Theodoret learned soon after Ephesus, as we shall see, that 'cette erreur ne pouvait pas être reprochée à saint Cyrille'.[5]

Theodoret rejects a unity of *krasis* or *sygchysis* in chapter 32, because this would push each *physis* beyond the limits of its *ousia*, and God would not be known as God, nor the man as a human being,[6] a somewhat different idea than the *krasis-sygchysis* we found rejected in the *Expositio Rectae Fidei*, because that was a change of each *physis* into a joint third *physis* neither divine nor human, uncreated nor created. But the idea of *krasis* rejected in *De Incarnatione* is exactly what we shall shortly find in the refutation of the Twelve Anathemas and the *Pentalogos*.

Together with the other Antiochenes who wrote to Nestorius under the name of John, patriarch of Antioch, in 430, Theodoret could use *Theotokos* as a proper title for the Lord's mother without in any way linking it to *Anthropotokos*.[7] Why does Theodoret introduce this linkage of the two terms in chapter 35 at the conclusion of *De Incarnatione* as though he were considering the essence of the faith, when he could more properly have done so in chapter 23, which is entirely dedicated to the Virgin Birth, but which does not even mention any titles for the Virgin? Had he been preoccupied with the question of *Theotokos* and/or *Anthropotokos* when he wrote chapter 23, could he possibly have omitted such a discussion there? We see the same sort of thing with *krasis*, rejected in chapter 32. The preceding chapters are devoted to refuting the incomplete Apollinarian humanity, and then there suddenly appears a rejection of the union that Theodoret thought he found in Cyril. Richard concludes, rightly I believe, that these two treatises were written before the Council of Ephesus; but when Theodoret set himself to sending a copy of them to his friends in Constantinople in the last half of 432—the allusion in the letter in *Collectio Casinensis* 129—as a theological explanation of and justification for his opposition to Cyril and the Council Fathers, he recognized that there were gaps in *De Incarnatione Domini* in terms of the immediate needs of the hour. It needed to be retouched for the purposes at hand: a mixture of *physeis* is rejected in the same terms that he will shortly use in the two later works against Cyril, and, for the moment anyway, *Theotokos* must be linked to *Anthropotokos* to insure the reality of the Lord's humanity, a practice he is willing to abandon by the time of the union creed of 433. This retouching barely shows in chapters 31, 32, and 35, and even less clearly in chapters 21, 22, and 24.[8] In other words, with *De Incarnatione Domini* we

[5] Ibid. 95. [6] *PG*, 75: 1472. [7] *PG*, 77: 1456.

[8] It may be noted that none of these chapters are quoted by Marius Mercator, the very chapters one would expect this anti-Nestorian to have mined for references had they been in the form of *De Incarnatione Domini* he had before 432.

begin to move from considering simply the early and formative Christology of the bishop of Cyrus into his defence of Antiochene faith against the supposed Apollinarianizing of Alexandria and his allies.

Theodoret's opponents in *De Trinitate* are the old enemies: Arians, Sabellians, Photinus, and Marcellus. The theological exposition of the Nicene faith is essentially the same as in the *Expositio Rectae Fidei*, though now Theodoret greatly elaborates evidences from Scripture to demonstrate his points. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are in Scripture always ranked together over against created beings, and thus must be uncreate and before time. God is known by us in our history in three *hypostaseis*, or *prosopa*. There is one *ousia* and *physis* of the divine being, which is the *koinon*, or commonality, among the three *hypostaseis*. The *idiomata* that distinguish the *hypostaseis* are again the unbegottenness of the Father, the begottenness of the Son before creation and time (time itself being a creature), and the procession of the Holy Spirit. Throughout the exposition it becomes abundantly clear that Theodoret's concern undergirding his Christology is the metaphysical problem of the Arian syllogism: the impassibility of God the Word.

One of the proofs of the Son's consubstantiality with the Father is that he has indivisibly the same names and actions. Since he is eternally with the Father, there is no time when he was not, and as God he is not subject to time, but is its maker.[9] The problem was, of course, to show that the Word is the maker of time. The scripture testifies, says Theodoret, that the Word was in the beginning. If the Word was in the beginning, when was it that he was not, as the Arians have it? For it is not possible to conceive of a time before the beginning, and the text says the Word *was* in the beginning, not that he *became* at the beginning as a first creature: not *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν*.[10] If the Son is not eternal with the Father, then he came into existence after the Father, and a necessary time is interpolated between Father and Son—as the Arians hold. But this makes the things made, including time and the aeons, which by necessity are subsequent to that which is in the beginning, prior in time to the maker, for the Gospel says that all things were made through the Word and not one thing, not one created thing, was made without him. If, then, the aeons are creatures of the Word, they cannot pre-exist their maker. Obviously, says Theodoret, there can be neither time nor the aeons which include time until there is light, in order that there be sunrise and sunset with which to measure time. Thus the Son pre-exists time and everything which becomes.

This proof against Arianism's 'there was a time when the Word was not' moves into chapters 7–10 to illustrate what it means to say that the Word is

[9] Ch. 5; *PG*, 75: 1152. [10] Ch. 6; *PG*, 75: 1152–3.

the first born, *prototokos*, of all creation. The illustration makes my point that what is at stake Christologically is the impassibility of God. Theodoret says that in theology the words ἦν, ὢν, ὑπάρχων, and ἐστιν are joined together. The one who speaks with Moses names himself *ho on*, the one who is,[11] and 'even the champions of blasphemy' admit that inasmuch as the mediator between the Father and creation is the Son, it is he who spoke with and appeared to Moses, the patriarchs, and the prophets. It is the Son who thus is *ho on*, just as it is the Son who is *choregos*, director, of the New Covenant. The Old Covenant was given to Moses by the lawgiver, *ho on*, and in the Gospels the Lord Christ (using the Greek word *despotes* for Lord, which was the normal title for the emperors) gives the new law which supersedes and fulfils that given Moses: 'It was said to the ancients, "You shall not commit murder, but I say to you ...."' He does not overthrow the existing Torah, but makes it more exact and teaches us the way it is to be kept. It is one and the same Word who gives both.

It was obvious to anyone with a mind that God the Word, who having taken up our *physis*, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant [citing Philippians 2: 6–7], gave the way of understanding to Jacob..., the old law to Moses in the desert...and said... *ho on*, etc.[12]

Thus the terms in Scripture which are temporal refer to the assumed *physis*, those which are eternal to God the Word: ὢν, ἦν, ὑπάρχων refer to God the Word; ἐγένετο (the Word *became* flesh), ἐλάβε (the Word *took* the form of a servant), etc. do not refer to God (they are not *theologountes*) but to the proclamation of the mystery of the economy.

Throughout John's Gospel, the Evangelist

frequently uses 'ἦν' with the deity, but when he comes to the economy of the Incarnation, he necessarily uses 'ἐγένετο', for the first-fruits assumed from us by God the Word was not eternal, but came into being at the end of the ages, and was assumed by God the Word.... So the form of the servant was not pre-existent, but that which was eternal took the form of the servant. Therefore God the Word is not a creature, nor something made, nor from that which is not, but having been begotten from the Father is always with the Father and receives from right-minded people worship with the Father.[13]

[11] Exod. 3: 13–14: 'Then Moses said to God, "If I come to the people of Israel and say to them, 'The God of your fathers has sent me to you,' and they ask me, 'What is his name?' what shall I say to them?" God said to Moses, 'I AM WHO I AM' (Septuagint: Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν). And he said, 'Say this to the people of Israel, "I AM (Septuagint: Ὁ ὢν ἀπέσταλκέν με πρὸς ὑμᾶς) has sent me to you."'

[12] Ch. 7; *PG*, 75: 1153–6.

[13] Ibid. My English translation from the Greek text.

Theodoret's problem is the Arian syllogism, quite clearly. If Christ be understood as having one *physis* and is also described as *egeneto*, etc., then it follows that the Word cannot be *ho on*. The Word would fall into the category of creature, a thing made, and there would have been a time when he was not. The solving of the problem raised by the Arian syllogism means that the two sets of reference terms, *being* over against *becoming*, require two *physeis*, the eternal, uncreated *theotes*, the one who is God the Word, on the one hand; and on the other, the assumed *physis*, the form of the servant, the creature, the thing made, that which has temporal creation, that *became* flesh. For Theodoret the formula 'one enfleshed *hypostasis* (or *physis*) of God the Word', which he would shortly find in Cyril, could mean only an Apollinarian passible God or Arianism's created Word.

Theodoret must, then, refute the Arians who would argue that the Word's genesis from God must involve division, flowing, birth pangs, and thus passibility in at least the Word, if not the Father. Essentially Theodoret's reply is that the word *genesis* is applied to the relationship between Father and Son analogically. Passions are proper only to bodies, but God is without a body, and so without passions. If his opponents want to insist that generation cannot be used of beings without bodies, then Theodoret wonders why they felt free to say that God creates impassibly. On the human level the act of creation involves necessarily care, toil, sweat, instruments, and pre-existent matter, even failures and so on. But in God's case even Theodoret's opponents concede that the term 'Creator' is applied analogically, for God creates forthwith simply by will out of nothing. If God can create impassibly, Theodoret concludes, he can beget impassibly. Human words apply to divine activities only analogically.

This brings his discussion to the word *prototokos*, first-born, a term which, his opponents charge, ranks the Word among the creatures. Theodoret answers that the Word is begotten of the Father impassibly, just as the human being conceives or begets a human word impassibly. He is called Son because he comes forth from the Father, and he is called God because he participates in the paternal *physis*. On the other hand, he is called first-born, or *prototokos*, not because he is a creature, but in reference to the economy of salvation. He is the first-born among many brothers, but *kata physin* not in reference to his divinity but according to his humanity. We are kin to him only in terms of the shared human nature.[14]

Finally, the same terms we have already encountered in the *Expositio Rectae Fidei* reappear here, and they reinforce the earlier evidence that consciously or not Theodoret is using something very much like Grillmeier's understanding

[14] Ch. 10; *PG*, 75: 1157–60.

of the Stoic doctrine of being. God is one being because Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share a common *physis* (*koinonian tes physeos*). In chapter 12 there is one *physis* and a distinction in *prosopa* or *hypostaseis*. In the summary chapter 28 there is one *physis*, *ousia*, or *theotes*, which is known in three sets of characteristics (*trisin idiotesin gnorizomenen*), for the Triad is known in three *hypostaseis*.

Turning to *De Incarnatione Domini*, the foundation of the Christological problem is laid out in a very full development of Theodoret's anthropology. Indeed, aside perhaps from the 447 *Eranistes, De Incarnatione* gives us the fullest picture of Theodoret's understanding of human nature and the Incarnation. The image of humankind, of *anthropos*, that emerges from chapters 2–4, 9, and then 17–19 is clearly bipartite.[15] The tripartite anthropology of Apollinaris, who would divide the one *physis* of humankind into body, soul, and mind (*soma*, *psyche*, and *nous*) is for Theodoret one of the keys to his heresy.[16]

The human *physis* is for Theodoret the crown of creation, and as such is made by God from 'what had not been'. That, of course, is Theodoret's catchphrase for a creature. He establishes firmly at the very beginning that human *physis* is a composite nature, but above all a *created* reality. God willed to change clay into the *physis* of humanity by adding beauty and *psyche* to it. The *psyche* is not the living, vital principle alone, as in Apollinaris, but a rational soul. Adam was created with inner tranquility from passion, for his *psyche* was made rational, intelligent, and immortal in itself. The mind, or *nous*, is the rational part of the *psyche* and is repeatedly described as the *hegemon* or governor of the *anthropos* (i.e. the driver of the chariot, of which the passions are the wilful horses requiring training, discipline, and control).

Adam is *anthropos*, human as opposed to the beasts over whom God has set him as the *archon*, or ruler, of all creatures. The woman, the *female physis*, is bone of his bone, the same human *physis*, not some other *physis* from Adam as the male human being. For Theodoret the name 'Adam' signifies 'dust', to remind the *anthropos* of his origin in earthly dust, lest he become proud and fall into rebellion against his maker.[17] Thus, even though God made this clayish human form as his own *icon* or image, he gave Adam, in his rational and immortal soul, self-determination as well as the rule of creation. The key to humanity's relationship to God, therefore, lies not in the passions of the *soma*, but in the self-determination of the soul's *nous*, or *hegemon*, for it is the *nous*, in turn the *archon* of human *physis*, which causes sin by wilful disobedience to the Word of God.[18] Once disobedient, the *psyche* loses control

[15] The Greek text of *De Incarnatione Domini*, with Latin translation, is in *PG*, 75: 1419–78.

[16] Cf. ch. 19; *PG*, 75: 1452–4.

[17] Ch. 3; *PG*, 75: 1422.

[18] Chs. 16–17; *PG*, 75: 1444–8.

of the passions of the body to which it is united, and the entire human *physis* requires renovation: the *soma* of earth and clay, yoked to passions, with the rational, immortal *nous*, the *icon* of its creator. In so many words, salvation was undertaken by the free choice of God's love, not for soul-less and thoughtless things, stones devoid of *psyche*, but for human beings, *anthropoi*, possessing rational, indwelling, immortal *psyche*. A doctrine of the Atonement that does not involve the redemption and restoration of the human *psyche-nous*, which is the locus of sin, is not salvation at all, for it is only through *nous* that the body-*soma* becomes part of rational creation and can wrestle with evil. Theodoret follows steadfastly in the steps of the Cappadocians and his master of Mopsuestia.

One more point on Theodoret's anthropology which will be important: death is the separation of the body from the soul, which remains immortal. Christ's death is not the dissolution of the union between the Word and the human nature. It is the separation of the human soul and mind from the human body; the Word does not experience this death in his own *physis*, for the Word is impassible.[19]

The *anthropos* was created to rule a garden paradise, a gymnasium of virtue. Even in the garden divine law was given him, in this case not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (chapter 5). The commandment was given, says Theodoret, that Adam might know his Creator, for law is useful to rational beings. Indeed, lawlessness marks irrational human behaviour. Obviously, insofar as Adam was the only existing *anthropos*, other commandments were irrelevant. Being alone he could do no murder, adultery, theft, etc.

Adam's sin in disobeying the commandment not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil lay fundamentally in his pride, or *superbia* (chapter 3). He followed Satan in rebelling against the sovereignty of God. This leads first to exile from the Garden and to being yoked to labour, toil, sweat, and bodily passions, and ultimately to death, which is a kind of liberation insofar as it brings to a halt the working of evil and frees the *anthropos* from his toilsome labours (chapter 6). Humankind thus has fallen into fratricide (Cain and Abel), wanton violence, injustice, mutual slaughter, rapaciousness, and all the other sins which issue from human self-centredness (chapter 7).

The *anthropos* is in a state of alienation from God, but 'the creator did not renounce the nature which he had formed, but skilfully and in various ways he accomplished' his purposes. Theodoret continues in chapter 7 with the ways

[19] Ch. 19; *PG*, 75: 1452–4.

in which God sought humankind's repentance; the chapter is a veritable outline of the Old Testament, God

curing, rebuking, invoking, introducing reverent fear, counselling, promising recompense . . . , chastising wrong-doers, crowning the good . . . , saving the one with his kind by wood and maintaining a spark for the *physis*, flooding the earth, destroying utterly with water the doers of evil . . . , girding up his loins and burning impious cities with heavenly fire, but the one living among them but not sharing their godlessness freeing from that punishment, presenting good seasons . . . , increasing inarticulately the seed cast down by humans, commanding the trees to burst with the fruits of plenty, by famine instructing those who profited nothing from prosperity, sending diseases and then dispelling them again . . . , not abandoning those who lived in godliness, but appearing to them and speaking as a friend with them, through them foretelling the things about to be.[20]

All this is to rekindle the spark of the human *physis*. Ultimately, the divine *philanthropia* leads through discipline, law-giving, and prophecy to the touchstone of the saving economy, the Incarnation (*enanthropesis*).

Though these acts of divine benevolence benefited a few persons, the rest of humankind was fixed in almost utter ruin, which brings us in chapter 8 to the ineffable mystery of the 'economy', Theodoret's term for the Incarnation.[21] The Word of God himself, the Demiurge of all creation, the infinite, uncircumscribed, the unchangeable, the font of life, the living *icon* of the Father, the radiance of the glory, the character of the divine *hypostasis* (recalling the Epistle to the Hebrews) takes up human nature (*anthropeian physin*) and renovates the *icon* now proper (*oikeian*) to him which had been corrupted by sin. This image of humanity the Word receives into himself, 'not transforming the divine nature into the human but joining (*synapsas*) the human to the divine; for remaining what he was, he took what he was not'.

Much of this we have seen before. Now Theodoret developes his case by founding it on Philippians 2: 5–7, one of the classical Antiochene proof texts, and then spending essentially the remainder of *De Incarnatione* refuting various heresies, and so carefully demonstrating fairly exactly what he means by the Word's having 'taken up' human *physis*. As we might expect, the heretics refuted are Arius, Eunomius, and Apollinaris. Marcion, Manes, and Paul of Samasota are mentioned, but only in passing.[22]

The 'form of God' who empties himself in Philippians 2: 5–7 signifies the divine *ousia*, for 'no one but a mad person would say that the bodiless and uncompounded God has form and distinction of parts'.[23] Since 'form of God' refers to the entire *ousia* of God, Paul's term for humanity, the 'form of

[20] *PG*, 75: 1425–6. [21] Ibid. 1425–8.
[22] Chs. 9 and 10; *PG*, 75: 1427–34. [23] Ch. 8; *PG*, 75: 1427–8.

a servant', refers not only to the outward appearance of humankind, but to the entire human *ousia*. This must be demonstrated by refuting the Arians and the Apollinarians. It is to be noted that throughout this chapter 8 Theodoret uses *ousia* and *physis* completely interchangeably.

In chapter 9 Theodoret defines the apologetic task. On the one hand, Arius and Eunomius assert that a man without a soul was assumed by God the Word (Theodoret is obviously inserting his own understanding of the divine status of the Word here); on the other, Apollinaris, while rightly recognizing the divinity of the Word, attributes a soul, or *psyche*, to the humanity assumed by the Word, but it is a *psyche* devoid of *nous* ('thinking I know not what the human *psyche* to be'). Marcion and Manes, and 'the rest of that gang of impiety', altogether deny the mystery of the economy by denying any reality at all to the flesh of the Lord, for to them the Word appeared only with the phantasm of a body among human beings. Because Arius, Eunomius, and Apollinaris say that Paul's expressions 'form of a servant' and 'the likeness of human beings' in Philippians 'denote only that which appears of our nature', it is necessary to set out (at no little length) the hermeneutic of Philippians 2: 5–7.

In chapter 10, therefore, Theodoret refutes Arianism with the argument from *De Trinitate* on the significance of Paul's use of 'being' over against 'becoming' and also, for the first time so far in the works we have been examining, puts emphasis on the freely won victory over sin by the 'perfect man' as a significant key to understanding the economy of salvation. In so many words, both Sullivan's Arian syllogism and Norris's stress on the necessity of predicating a human subject in Jesus in order to involve human, freely willed obedience to God's will in the Incarnation now come clearly to the forefront in Theodoret's defence of what will clearly emerge as the Christology of the Antiochene Theodore of Mopsuestia.

The Arian syllogism appears throughout the chapter. To Theodoret it is clear from Paul's expression 'who was in the form of God'[24] that the Word is the divine being:

> Thus Paul in a few words refutes the mania of Arius and Eunomius, for he did not say he became in the form of God, but that he was in the form of God. Nor did he say that he did not count it robbery to be equal to himself, nor to angels, nor to a creature, but rather to God the Father.[25]

The 'form of God' refers to what the Word is in himself, to his *ousia* and *physis*. He is that; he *is* the divine *ousia*. He does not *become* in time a form or image of the glory of the Father. The rest of the chapter and the entire work is then given to showing how the attributes of passibility in Christ are not to be

[24] Phil. 2: 6. [25] *PG*, 75: 1429–30. See the Greek text of Phil. 2: 6.

referred to the divine *physis* but to the human *physis*. One of the favourite proof texts of the Arians which they held demonstrated that change and passibility must be attributed to the Word is also from this passage in Philippians, at 2: 7b–8a: 'being born (*genomenos*) and being found in human form'.[26] Theodoret's response is that the Word in his being, in his *physis* or *ousia*, does not 'become' or change his nature into the outward appearance of a human being, but rather that these terms refer not to the Word's *physis* but to the operation (*energeia*) by which he works out the economy of our salvation. In other words, Paul's 'being in the form of God' signifies the Word's divine *ousia*; his 'becoming in human likeness and being found in human form' refers to his taking up, or assuming, the human nature. The Word is not the subject of change and passibility. Nor is he guilty of sin when he takes up that human nature which fallen human beings corrupt by sin. The human *physis* assumed by the Word is free from sin, so that in the 'perfect man's' living a life free of sin, sin is condemned in the flesh of Christ:

> Therefore we have been taught that sin is condemned in the flesh. For our Saviour, having become in the likeness of the flesh of sin, condemned sin in the flesh, since on the one hand he took up human nature, yet on the other he did not accept the sin which had so long dominated it.[27]

Notice the use of a common *prosopon* as the subject of the attributions of both the divine and human *physeis*. In Philippians 2: 5 it is 'Christ Jesus, who being in the form of God . . .' Here it is 'our Saviour'. Theodoret is being most careful in his exegesis. The Word is the divine *ousia* who takes up or assumes human *physis* (which in this case is sinless). On the other hand, it is 'Christ' or 'our Saviour' who is both *physeis*. So far, this is exactly parallel to the *Expositio Rectae Fidei*. The unity of the divine and human *physeis* is not analogous to the unity of soul and body in an individual human *hypostasis* in which a new composite *physis* underlies that person. 'Christ' is not a composite *physis*, a new third entity, or nature, for that would, according to Theodoret, involve the Word in a metaphysical alteration of the divine *ousia*, giving this problem of one *physis* that slightly different twist which Richard found.

Thus the deniers of the Trinity are refuted by Paul's words.[28] These include Sabellius, Marcellus, and Photinus, who 'deny the three *hypostaseis* and

[26] My English translation is adapted from the NRSV, which, unlike the punctuation in the Greek text of Theodoret in Migne, places a full stop between 'in human likeness' and 'And being found'. Note that Paul had used the plural form: 'ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος'. Is this an intentional alteration by Theodoret from the plural 'in human likeness' to the specifically singular 'in the likeness of the [assumed?] man'?

[27] Ibid. Theodoret here develops his exegesis of Phil. 2: 5–7 via Rom. 8: 3–4.

[28] The *PG* editor notes, col. 1430, n. 3, 'In this and the following work, Cyril names no heretic later than Eunomius.' Theodoret was, of course, the actual author, not Cyril.

confuse the particularizing characteristics (*idiotetas*) of the divinity, so blaspheming. For other (*heteros*) in *hypostasis* is the one who is in the form of God, and other that one (*kai allos*) in whose form he is.'[29] Again Theodoret uses terminology and concepts from the Stoic doctrine of being. Paul of Samosata is also shamed by Philippians 2: 5–7, for the Saviour is shown here to be not a mere human being, but the Word of God assuming a human *physis*. Paul of Samosata 'is taught, by the divine Paul, God the Word who has assumed and the human *physis* which has been assumed'. Whether Cyril would see much difference between Theodoret's Antiochene Christology and Paul of Samosata is a point in question. It is interesting that the problem in Paul of Samosata's theology for Theodoret is that Theodoret sees him as failing to involve the Word in the Incarnation. Theodoret ranks Paul of Samosata as a Trinitarian heretic, one who denies that it is the second *hypostasis* of the divine Being who is directly involved in the Christ. He does not deal with Paul of Samosata's anthropology, with whether he conceived of Jesus' humanity as fully human or not. His anthropology seems acceptable to the bishop of Cyrus; it is his theology that is lacking. Christ is not only the man, but in Philippians 2: 5–7 St Paul clearly uses the term 'Christ' to refer to 'God the Word who assumed and the human *physis* which was assumed'. The argument seems strained, and perhaps indicates a certain unease, conscious or unconscious, the Antiochene theologian might have felt in dealing with the problem of Paul of Samosata's condemnation for asserting the integrity of rational soul and body in Jesus and his distinction from God. Paul of Samosata's shame and impiety are of 'one who denies the generation of the Saviour before time, enjoying the use of Jewish concepts, and confesses only that from the Virgin'.[30]

Clearly Theodoret does not have rigid categories of Trinitarian over against Christological heresy. They are really one and the same problem ultimately. The Arians and the others are wrong because they do not rightly understand the relationship between the Word and the humanity in the 'economy'. This, in turn, brings Theodoret to one who confesses rightly that the Word is of God, consubstantial with the Father, but whose Christology, or conception of the union of Word and humanity in the economy, in fact becomes once again a Trinitarian problem by overthrowing the very nature of God through changing God into a creature. The villain of the rest of the piece is, of course, Apollinaris. Once again the hermeneutic of Philippians 2: 5–7 teaches even him the truth.

[29] *PG*, 75: 1429–30. Note the masculine ending of *heteros* and *allos*. It is not that the natures are other and other, for then the ending would be feminine. Rather, this is the Word as a rational subject as one 'other', and the assumed man as the 'other' rational subject.

[30] Ibid. 1431–2.

According to Theodoret, the form of the servant assumed by the form of God is neither a mere appearance of a human being, as with Marcion and Manes, nor a *soma* indwelt by the Word in place of the soul, or even a body and soul with the *nous* replaced by the Word as divine *Nous*, as with Apollinaris. Rather, the form of the servant is the entire human *physis*, body united to a rational, human soul:

Again Apollinaris is taught, together with Arius and Eunomius, how the immutable God the Word was not changed into the *physis* of flesh, but having taken our *ousia* [note again the interchangeability of *ousia* and *physis*] worked our salvation. We have shown through what we have said that the *ousia* of the man was called 'form of a servant', for if the form of God signifies the *ousia* of God—the divine being without shape or form, being simple, non-composite and shapeless—manifestly the form of the servant should be understood reasonably as the *ousia* of the servant. The *ousia* of the servant, that is of humankind, and not only the visible *soma*, but the entire *physis* of the man, is recognized by the thinking person.[31]

This brings Theodoret to the conclusion of what amounts to the introduction to *De Incarnatione Domini.* He has set out the problem, reaches this initial conclusion, and then devotes the succeeding twenty-five chapters to demonstrating his thesis against Apollinaris. Since the initial conclusion is the kind of summary statement about the 'Lord Jesus Christ', the common *prosopon*, which seems sometimes to equate this common *prosopon* with the Word, sometimes to set it over against the Word—in short, a statement very characteristic of the Antiochene Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia—by itself it leaves us about where we were at the end of examining the *Expositio Rectae Fidei.* The subsequent defence of it is consequently highly interesting for our interpretation of Theodoret's Christology. The expressions of Paul in Philippians 2: 7–8 about Christ's having become in the likeness of humankind and being found in the shape of a human being must be understood to refer to the Word's taking a sinless human *physis.* They mean

that our Lord Jesus Christ, having our *physis*, did not suffer according to all things equal to us. For he himself was born from a woman, but not like us. For he sprouted from a virginal womb. He was perfectly human as are we, on the one hand, but on the other he had more than we of the indwelling of and unity with God the Word. On the one hand he had ensouled flesh which was reasonable, as do we, but on the other he did not suffer the motions of sin as do we, but in a *soma* warred upon by sin he abolished the tyranny of sin. . . . The bodiless Word of God appeared as a human being having assumed human *physis.* Therefore [Paul] adds the phrase 'as a human being' (*hos anthropos*) lest we reason some change to have occurred in the invisible God.[32]

[31] Ibid. [32] Ibid. 1431–4.

A Cyril or a Severus might well want to ask how the indwelling and 'energizing' of the humanity of Christ by the Word here in Theodoret differs from that which Philippians 2: 13 ascribes to the rest of humankind: 'For God is at work (*energon*) in you, both to will and to work (*energein*) for his good pleasure.'

The exposition that follows in the rest of the book resumes the discussion on the doctrine of the Atonement. Chapter 11 shows how Theodoret can easily shift back and forth from talking about the Word's becoming human to talking about the Word's assuming a perfect or a visible man. The latter is what he means, obviously, by 'the Word became flesh'. On the one hand he can use expressions that sound like a true *communicatio idiomatum*, and then in the same sentence talk as if he conceived the humanity as a subject entirely distinct from the Word. In this chapter 11 he says, for example,

the creator had pity on our nature warred on by the evil one and shot by the sharp missiles of sin and given up to death, and he came to the aid of the *icon* and prevailed against the enemy... by becoming one of those liable and being warred on, having veiled the magnificence of the divinity in the economic meanness of the humanity, and having committed the visible man (*ton horomenon anthropon*) to battle, he crowned him when he [the visible man] had conquered. Having from childhood taught him virtue and having brought him to the height of righteousness, he guarded him unconquered and free of the missiles of sin, though nevertheless having allowed him to be under death that he might refute the injustice of sin and utterly destroy the power of death.[33]

Death is the just recompense for those who have come under sin. Yet the man who is altogether free of sin is obviously worthy to enjoy life, not death. By condemning to death him who had conquered sin, sin and death are caught in a manifest injustice and necessarily must be put out of authority, says Theodoret, because of their injustice. This is what Paul means in Romans 8: 3–4. Here Theodoret understands Paul as saying that the goal of the Law was to justify the nature of humankind.

It was unable to do this, not because of its own weakness, but through the indolence of its hearers. For leaning toward the pleasures of the flesh, they fled the hard work of keeping the precepts and sided with the luxuries of the body. Therefore, he says, the God of all, having sent his Son in the likeness of the flesh of sin, that is, on the one hand in human *physis*, but on the other hand free of sin, for sin condemned sin in the flesh, having refuted its injustice because it subjected to the penalties coming to sinners him who was innocent and free of sin. He has not done these things in order to justify the man whom he assumed (*hon anelaben anthropon*), but in order, he says, that he might fulfil the justification of the Law in us who walk not according

[33] *PG*, 75: 1433–4.

to the flesh but the spirit. For the good work of our Saviour applies to the entire *physis* of human beings. Just as we have participated in the curse of our ancestor Adam and have all become subject to death just as he, so likewise we make our own the victory of our Saviour Christ and shall participate in his glory and shall share in the enjoyment of the kingdom.[34]

Our participation in Christ's victory over sin and death is in our being empowered by grace to 'walk not according to the flesh but the spirit'. The problems that circulate around the terms of Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism are never raised by Theodoret, but several things are abundantly clear. For Theodoret, the reconciliation of humankind to God is focused and won in the victory of Christ's humanity over temptation, a victory that requires the active participation of a human will and *nous*. Secondly, this victory is won by Christ's sinlessness. Any doctrine of the Incarnation that so identifies Christ with the human status that it involves him in being subject not only to temptation but to sin as well—as some modern theologians have done[35]—overthrows Theodoret's entire conception of the Atonement. Unless he is sinless, Christ has accomplished nothing, and the victory is still unwon. He might as well not have been raised from the dead. Thirdly, the sole hope of the rest of humankind is our participation in Christ's victory.

In chapters 12–15 Theodoret explicates what Christ's human sinlessness means by expounding the temptations of Christ in the wilderness. By assuming human nature, the Word is breaking into the house of Satan, the strong man of the parable. What begins in the exegesis as almost an impersonal human nature assumed by the Word is unveiled as the 'second subject' of Sullivan's interpretation of Theodoret of Mopsuestia.

God the Word assumed our beginning on behalf of our entire *physis* in order that bringing it through all virtue, he might provoke the antagonist to battle, demonstrate the athlete unconquered, and so on the one hand crown this one (*touton*) and on the other proclaim the defeat of that one, and so make all bold to resist him.[36]

Note that the humanity is first described as 'nature' and 'it', and then personally by *touton*, the masculine accusative singular demonstrative pronoun.

In chapter 13 the tyranny of the *archon* of this world is overthrown because the Saviour is free of all sin in the great battle in the wilderness after Jesus' baptism. It is not the Word of God who wages this struggle, but the temple whom the Word formed in the Virgin's womb. Theodoret's explication of the

[34] Ibid. 1433–6.

[35] Cf., e.g., John Knox, *The Humanity and Divinity of Christ* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), ch. 4, pp. 53–72.

[36] *PG*, 75: 1437–8.

temptations shows more clearly than anything else in the corpus of his works, to my mind anyway, that the Word and the humanity are two distinct subjects in his mind, and that when he makes attributions to the Word, he *always* does so *kata physin*, according to the Word's divine nature. Theodoret writes,

Jesus is led by the Spirit into the wilderness after the Baptism to be tested by the devil. God the Word is not led out, but the temple assumed by God the Word from the seed of David. For the Holy Spirit did not lead out God the Word into battle with the devil, but the temple whom he formed in the Virgin for God the Word.[37]

Like the Old Testament patriarchs, the Word is not above fooling Satan. The temple fasts forty days in order to manifest human hunger and weakness,

lest his antagonist flee joining battle with him (*pros auton*), lest having recognized the hidden one (*ton kryptomenon*), he flee the struggle with the visible thing (*to phainomenon*). For this reason after the aforementioned number of days, the passion of the human *physis* appeared and soon was given to hunger, giving occasion to [Satan] through hunger. For he dared not approach, seeing many divine occurrences around him, such as angels dancing in chorus at his birth, a rising star conducting the magi to worship, the directors of that angelic phalanx who saw him pursuing all justice from childhood, abominating wrongdoing and loathing evil . . . for the Father testifies from on high, 'This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased. . . .' But when he saw him (*auton*) needing human sustenance and unable to persevere beyond the men of old, Satan drew nigh, supposing he had found a great opportunity and believing he was about to conquer easily.[38]

Note again the interplay of personal pronouns and participles for the Word with both impersonal and personal ones for the assumed nature.

When Satan began the desert temptations, he did not believe what the heavenly voice had testified concerning Jesus and defied him to verify his identification as the Son of God by performing marvels, by turning stones into bread. 'But Christ hides the divinity, engaging in dialectic by means of the human *physis*.'[39] Christ's answer that humankind is fed not by bread alone but that it is God's Word that satisfies the whole of the human *physis* pains the devil, because it means that the man before him has successfully resisted the temptation to power through marvels. Yet, as Theodoret reads the text, hearing that Christ is a man, the devil resumes hope and again attacks the undefeated athlete. But coming to Jesus, as to Adam, the devil found what he did not expect and experienced utter defeat, angels coming afterward to minister to Christ and celebrate his victory over temptation, 'rejoicing in the freedom of human fellow-slaves and joyful in seeing the defeat of the adversary'.

[37] *PG*, 75: 1437–8. [38] Ibid. 1439–40. [39] Ibid. 1441–2; ch. 14.

The point of all this is exactly its thrust against Apollinaris. It is not God the Word who struggled with temptation and with Satan, but a human being, for if the Word took the place of the mind in the humanity he assumed, it means that the devil could beg off having lost the struggle with the Word, a struggle he couldn't hope to win in the first place because the Word is not subject to temptation. It also means that the human mind, which is the locus of human will and thus of the decision that leads to sin, is not redeemed because it was not assumed and did not participate in the struggle with temptation. Theodoret writes,

[Apollinaris] says that God the Word inhabits the assumed flesh in place of its *nous*. But if the assumed *physis* had no human *nous*, it was God struggling with the devil, God who tied up the victory. But if God is the one who conquered, I enjoy nothing of the victory, having brought nothing to it. Rather I am stripped naked of this joy therefore, as though prancing on another's victory trophies. But the devil brags and boasts, thinks great things and exalts himself, having wrestled with God and been beaten by God. For it is a great thing to be bested by God. Because if God the Word was in the assumed man in place of *nous*, the devil could reasonably plead his case, saying, 'Lord and Maker of all, it was not with you that I accepted battle, for I know your dignity, I understand your power, I know your domination. I confess slavery, even if I do suffer from apostasy. I concede to the angels of victory and all the heavenly host, of whom once I, the miserable one, was in the beginning. No, I accepted battle with this one (*touton*), whom (*hon*) you formed from dust and made in your *icon* and honoured with reason and established a citizen of paradise and manifested as lord of earth and sea. This one I incessantly conquered, until today, wounding him and committing him to death. But having led this one (*touton*) into the stadium and commanded him to wrestle with me, be yourself a spectator, even judge/president of the match. If you desire to play the role of gymnastic instructor, teach him to wrestle; show him the holds of victory; urge him on as you will; only do not yourself wrestle alongside him. . . . These things the devil could justly say to our Saviour Christ, as if he were not a human being (*anthropos*) but God wrestling in the place of humankind. For if there were in him no human mind, God, being in the place of mind, energizes the things pertaining to the mind. God was then the one in the body cohungering; God the one thirsting and labouring, submitting to all the other human passions. And if God was the one who wrestled and won the victory, I am devoid of the victory, God being the one who accomplished all justification. If it was as the confessors of Apollinarian subtleties say, then it was impossible to fulfill in human *nous* the laws of justification, and God the Word did not assume this one.[40]

Theodoret perceives only two possible alternatives. Either the Word replaces and functions for the human *nous* in the assumed humanity, causing

[40] Ibid. 1443–4; ch. 15. The use of masculine forms, articles, and pronouns clearly shows that Theodoret thought of the assumed human *physis* as the *homo assumptus*, a human being of fully rational mind and body, a distinct subject other than the Word.

the mixing of the divine *ousia* into a new and single *physis* which is actually a change of divinity into a passible *physis*, or there are two subjects, for it is not the Word who is led into combat with Satan in the desert, but rather the man Jesus Christ. This is clearly the double subject model of the Incarnation that Norris and Sullivan found in Theodore of Mopsuestia, and just as clearly it is not hypostatic union as conceived of by the bishops at Chalcedon in 451. There is not the slightest hint that Theodoret can conceive of attributing anything to the Word except *kata physin* in terms of his divinity. This is not merely saying that the Word wrestled with Satan in and through the humanity which he had made hypostatically as much his as his divinity, for it is quite clear that the man and the Word must be two distinct subjects, or Theodoret's entire apologia against Apollinaris collapses. Either the Word replaces the human *nous*, and we are still in our sins, or the Word trains the man to wrestle victoriously with Satan. There is no in-between zone. In the Greek original, the use of neuter articles, participles, and pronouns is balanced by the interchangeable use of personal masculine forms as well, leaving us with no doubt as to how the impersonal expressions in the rest of the book are to be understood in the light of chapter 15.

In chapter 16, with a variation on the theme that what is not assumed in the Incarnation is not redeemed, Theodoret points out that sinful human beings could use Apollinarian Christology to excuse their failure to live according to the Spirit. Here *nous* and *nous hegemon* are used interchangeably. The argument is straightforwardly anti-Apollinarian; its usefulness here is to demonstrate again the key role that a distinct human governing, rational consciousness, making decisions of the will to resist sin, plays in Theodoret's Christological assumptions—over against the Word as a distinct subject:

> They [the Apollinarians] open the gate of excuse to all sinners and transgressors of the divine laws, for they would say to the God of all, 'Lord, we have not offended unpardonably, neither worthily of retribution, having received a governing mind which is weak and unable to keep your laws.... You yourself, O Master, have come in *sarx*, and though you assumed our *sarx*, you rejected the *nous* as inhibiting the acquisition of virtue and easily submitting to sin's beguiling.... You took the place of *nous* in the flesh and thus by that means established justification and defeated sin. For you are God, doing what seems right by will.... But we, having human *nous* which you were not willing to assume, necessarily come under sin, being too weak to follow in your steps.'[41]

Since whatever must be attributed to the Word is to be attributed to him in his divine nature, and since there must be a human governing mind in Christ, any Christology, Theodoret seems to conclude, that does not provide for a distinct

[41] *PG*, 75: 1443–6.

human subject over against the Word can only confuse the two natures into a new third nature and at the same time overthrow God's claim on human obedience, for human *nous* would have been left in sinful weakness.

At the risk of tedium, I cannot resist quoting a passage in chapter 17 which summarizes succinctly and movingly the essence of Cappadocian–Antiochene insistence on a full, living humanity in Christ:

Since the whole human being had been misled, the whole human being came under sin, and the *nous* accepted error before the *sōma*. For first the consent of the mind delineates sin, even if the body, through actualizing it, gives sin form. Reasonably, then, the Lord Christ, desiring to raise up the fallen *physis*, puts his hand to the entirety. I mean he raises the fallen *sarx* and the *nous*, which latter is what was made in the *icon* of the creator.... Therefore he does not dishonour the honourable, that very thing which is in need of healing. He does not assume that which is perishing and serving disease, old age, and death, but overlooks that which is rational, immortal, and made in the *icon*.... Rather the whole *physis*, having decayed, he renovated.... The body, of the strangest things, of clay and earth, yoked to passions, this he joins to himself and assumes and establishes at the right hand of majesty, but rejects the invisible mind, immortal, the governor of life, made in the divine *icon*, honoured with incorruptibility, the body's charioteer, helmsman and music, by which human *physis* is not irrational but filled with wisdom, skill, and understanding...? Through the mind the body becomes part of rational creation, and there are laws and prophecies. Through it are the struggles and wrestlings with evil, and the victories, praises, and crowns. Through it, thus, the body struggles and has the games' crown: the kingdom of heaven. On account of it was our Saviour's coming and the mystery of the Incarnation accomplished. Salvation undertook passions not for soul-less and thoughtless things, nor irrational creatures, stones devoid of *psyche*, but for human beings who possess indwelling, immortal *psyche*.

With this groundwork laid, Theodoret felt himself in a position to refute in chapter 18 Apollinaris' use of John 1: 14: 'And the Word became *sarx* ....' According to Theodoret, *sarx* does not refer here simply to the *soma*, but rather denotes the entire human *physis*. Having quoted several passages to show that Scripture often denotes the whole human being by referring to a single human part, that *sarx* frequently signifies in the Scripture the full human nature,[42] Theodoret concludes that

it is obvious how 'the Word became flesh' signifies not only the visible living thing, but the whole man (*holon ... ton anthropon*). Nor does he [the Fourth Evangelist] say there was some change of divine *ousia* into *sarx*, but proclaims the assumption of the human *physis* by God the Word. It is just as the statement, 'Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us'. He does not mean the change of the

[42] Ibid. 1449–50: Gen. 46: 27; 6: 3, 41; Ezek. 18: 4; Isa. 40: 6; Ps. 77: 39; Gal. 1:15.

font of good into a curse, but rather the relief of sin's curse which has come through him. Likewise, 'he became sin for us, he who had known no sin' does not signify a change of righteousness (for God is changeless and unalterable . . .) but the assumption of our sins. Thus 'the Word became flesh' indicates no alteration of deity, but the assumption of human nature. The evangelist proclaims the ineffable love of God for humanity as he teaches how he was in the beginning, who was God, and who was with God, who never was not, who created all things, who brought into being the things which were not, who was life, the true light, assumed the perishable *physis* and made the passions of human beings his own, so working out the salvation of humankind. And desiring to show more widely the greatness of his benevolence, he makes no mention of the immortal *psyche*, but speaks of only passible *sarx*. . . . By the part he points to the whole.[43]

The assumption of *sarx* most emphatically does not mean the change of the Word into created *ousia*—which by necessity is involved if the Word replaces the human *nous* in Christ in a composite *mia physis* of Word and human *sarx* (defined as *soma* alone). Rather, Theodoret writes,

There is one who indwells according to nature, and another who is the temple (*ἕτερος δὲ ὁ κατοικήσας κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ἕτερος ὁ ναός*). Therefore he said to the Jews, 'Destroy this temple and in three days I shall raise it [him?: *egero auton*] up.' The destruction of the temple is the disjoining of *psyche* and *soma*, for death is the retirement of the *psyche* from the *soma*. Therefore a separation of the *psyche* works the destruction of the temple. If, then, the Jews destroyed the temple on the cross, giving it [him?] over to death, the destruction of the temple meant the separation of those things which had been conjoined, but God the Word raised the destroyed one . . . not as without *psyche* or *nous*, but the perfect man God the Word assumed. For if God the Word had taken the place of the immortal *psyche* in the assumed *soma*, he would have said to the Jews, 'Destroy me, and in three days I shall be raised. . . .' But he says, 'Not I, but the temple assumed by me shall be destroyed by you.'

The context ('Not I but the temple . . .'), plus the play on *heteros . . . kai heteros* in the recent Trinitarian controversies, a play on words of which Theodoret must have been quite aware, would point to the supposition that grammatical agreement with the masculine *naos* is not the only reason for Theodoret's use of the famous *heteros . . . kai heteros* here. It is as clear as words can make it that Theodoret can envisage only the two alternatives we have seen constantly. On the one hand, there can be what Theodoret considers the Apollinarian confusion of the two *ousiai*; or on the other, two distinct subjects: the 'I' of the Word and the 'I' of the 'perfect man'. This is clearly not the hypostatic union of Chalcedon.

[43] *PG*, 75: 1449–52.

The remainder of the work brings back into play many of the more or less standard Theodoret–Antiochene phrases, and now it is clear how they are to be understood. In chapter 19 Apollinarianism is rejected specifically because to Theodoret its tripartite anthropology inevitably involves the Word in mutable passions. The Apollinarian division of the *psyche* into an animative *psyche* and a rational *psyche*, the latter being the one replaced in Christ by the Word, will not hold, for in Matthew 26: 38 it is the Lord himself who said, 'My soul is afflicted unto death'. Theodoret argues,

The perception-experience of affliction is a function in us of logical *psyche*. If God the Word took the place of *nous*, it was he who experienced the passions of the *nous*; he it was who was afflicted and afraid, who was ignorant, who agonized, who was strengthened by angels. If the inheritors of the Apollinarian foolishness shall say these things, they must be ranked with the Christ-fighters Arius and Eunomius. Their blasphemy is equal; they are one brotherhood. Let us listen rather to the Lord, who says, 'I have power to put down my soul and again to take it up. . . .' We learn from these words how the one who puts is other than the one put (*heteros ho titheis, heteron de to tithemenon*). On the one hand, God it is who puts and takes, but the *psyche* which is taken and put; God who has the power, the *psyche* which is taken by the power.[44]

Though once again Theodoret returns to the use of neuter forms or forms agreeing with the feminine *psyche* when referring to the assumed humanity, the metaphysical principle underlying his argument is clearly that of Sullivan's Arian syllogism. It is not God who was afflicted, who agonized, who was ignorant or afraid, for what is predicated of God the Word must be predicated of him *kata physin* as God. There must be a human subject distinct from the divine subject who suffered these passions in a human *nous* and *soma*.

In his exegesis of Isaiah 7: 14, Matthew 1: 23, Colossians 2: 9, and Luke 2: 40 and 52, all in chapter 20, Theodoret is working with his concept of prosopic union in such a way that though that which is born of Mary is said to be both God and human, the subject that increases in wisdom and stature is not the Word but 'Jesus', or 'the human mind'. Isaiah's statement that Emmanuel means 'God with us'

shows us that the foetus conceived of the Virgin is simultaneously God and human. Being the one thing, and having taken up the other [this time Theodoret uses neuters for both *physeis*, the Word and the man: *to men hyparchon, to de labon*], he is perfect in both. For through the expression 'with us' the perfection of the man is manifested, for each of us has perfectly the *physis* of humankind. By 'God'. . . the divinity of the Son is known. . . . Luke clearly shows us the human mind of the Saviour, for he says 'The boy increased and grew in spirit and was filled with wisdom and the grace of God was upon him. . . . Jesus increased in stature, wisdom, and favour with God and

[44] Ibid. 1453–4.

humankind.' Now the increase in wisdom pertains not to God . . . who is eternally perfect, receiving neither addition nor dimunition, but to the human mind which does advance in stature, wants instruction, receives skills and understanding, and step by step comes to perceive human and divine reality.[45]

It is not the Word who suffers these things through a human nature as much his own as his divinity, but the human mind over against the Word. The play on words is crucial. It can sound so Chalcedonian, almost Cyrillian, and yet the key to its interpretation we have seen in the previous chapters. On the one hand, the foetus receives the name 'God with us' and is thus declared to be simultaneously God and human, perfect in both natures, and thus is the one who is the one thing and takes the other. Yet Theodoret's entire metaphysic up to this point defies us to say that this foetal human *physis is* the divine *physis.* Rather the foetus is the Christ, the name that Theodoret applies to the common *prosopon* of the two *physeis* and two subjects. Human growth, like human death and other human passions, does not refer to the divine but to the human *nous*, the human subject. Here the name Emmanuel has the same function for Theodoret that 'Christ' normally does—to signify the common *prosopon.*

All this becomes even clearer in the exegesis of Hebrews in the following chapter 21, which in itself is one of the finer statements of classical Antiochene Christology. Two *physeis* are distinguished in action and operations, but conjoined in one *prosopon* from the very beginning of the epistle, according to Theodoret. The thing assumed from us is what is anointed by the Holy Spirit and exalted to the right hand of the Father to become greater than the angels because of his suffering and resistance to temptation. Once again we see the play on the one who *is* what he is—God and Lord—and the thing, or the assumed man, or the anointed man, assumed from us, who *becomes* greater than the angels on account of the union with the one who assumed it or him. In each *physis*, because of the union, we worship the one Son, the Word. It is not the Word who dies, or who is tempted, or who prays in agony, or who suffers in order to grow in sanctification, but the assumed man, the anointed man, Jesus, the seed of David.

Theodoret balances Hebrews 1: 3 and 4 by referring 'he is the effulgence of the glory and impress of [God's] *hypostasis*'[46] of verse 3 to the Word and the expression 'he has sat down at the right hand of the majesty on high in his having become more than the angels' of verse 4 to the distinct human *physis.*

Now the expression 'having become' is opposed to 'being'. He who *is* the effulgence of the glory and impress of *hypostasis* does not *become* greater than angels but *is* not only

[45] *PG*, 75: 1453–6. [46] My translation of the Greek text of Heb. 1: 3.

greater than angels, but creator and Lord. If becoming is opposed to being, through the latter we perceive the one who is, through the former that which is assumed from us, which has become greater than angels on account of the union with the one who assumed.[47]

But when 'Paul' says to the Son, 'Your throne, O God, is for ever..., you have loved righteousness and hated lawlessness, and therefore God, your God, has anointed you...' (Hebrews 1: 8–9, quoting Psalm 45: 6–7 from the text of the Septuagint), it takes all of Theodoret's devotion to what I have called the communication of names to solve this riddle, for how is God anointed by God? He asks,

How is he to receive a kingdom when he has the kingdom by nature...? Being king is the opposite of being anointed for the kingship on account of having loved righteousness and hated lawlessness.... Therefore we shall reason that the God whose throne is for ever is the one who is eternally. But the man who was anointed sometime later (*ton... christenta*) for hating sin and loving righteousness is the thing assumed for us, the thing from David, the thing from Abraham (*to ex hemon lephthen, to ek David, to ex Abram*)... having received all the *charismata* of the All-Holy Spirit. But in each *physis* let us worship the one Son.[48]

Note: the assumed thing is the anointed man: *ton... christenta*.

When 'we see Jesus a little lower than the angels', we are seeing the temple assumed from us (*anthropon de ton ex hemon analephthenta naon*) whom God the Word visits with his presence and so unites to himself. The assumed man is the proper icon of God the Word, but this does not mean that Theodoret conceives of a hypostatic union in which the Word himself takes on human experiences through a human *physis* as much his as his divine *physis*, for to Theodoret the Word does not earn being anointed Messiah, does not suffer the passion of death, does not offer prayer to the Father—the assumed man performs these human functions, or *idia*:

He ['Paul'] expounds this 'a little lower than the angels we see Jesus on account of the passion of death'. The immortal God the Word did not die, but rather it was the mortal nature. Therefore he [Jesus] is set a little below the angels, they being immortal, his nature being mortal. But God the Word is not inferior to angels, but their Lord.... And later he says, 'Who in the days of his flesh offered prayers and supplications to him able to save him from death, and he was heard because of his piety' (5: 7). Just so, being son he learned obedience from what he suffered, and being perfected he has become for all who hearken to him the cause of eternal salvation. Who, then, was the one praying, offering beseechings and petitions with a great cry and tears? Who was the one who lived in reverence and so persuaded him whom he

[47] *PG*, 75: 1455–6; my emphasis. [48] Ibid.

petitioned? Who was the one who learnt obedience from what he suffered, having experience for his teacher and not having known obedience before testing? Who was the only partly perfect? Not God the Word, the perfect, the one who knew all things before they came to pass but learns nothing by testing; who is held in reverent fear by all but reverences none himself; who receives every tear from every face but is compelled by no suffering to weep; who is impassible and immortal but has no fear of death to petition to be freed of death with clamour. Therefore these are *idia* of the assumed humanity, which was afraid of death and was continuously in prayer, the indwelling deity giving it over to fear in order that through sufferings the nature (*physis*) of the assumed man might be seen.[49]

There could be no clearer statement of the Antiochene two-subject Christology. God the Word does not experience human passions; the humanity, the man, Jesus suffers these human *idia*. The man prays; the man fears death; the man learns. The high priest we now have, who has himself been tempted even as we are in every way but who did not sin, is not the Word:

The seed of Abraham is therefore another from the one who apprehends this one (*heteron toinun to tou Abraam sperma para ton epilambanomenon toutou*). Blessed Paul knew the seed of Abraham was the Saviour Christ according to the flesh, for he says, 'He did not say, "To your seeds", as to many, but as to one, "To your seed", who is Christ' [Gal. 3: 16]. Thus, to be tempted like us, but without sin, is not a property of God the Word, but of the assumed seed.[50]

Quite clearly, there is no idea here of a true *communicatio idiomatum*: to be tempted is no property, no *idiotes*, of God the Word. The properties of the human *physis* are not properties of the *hypostasis* of the Word, in Chalcedonian fashion, because that would transgress the metaphysic of Theodoret's doctrine of being: to speak of the Word is to speak of him—without exception—according to his divine nature. I believe that the failure to find in Theodoret so far a true *communicatio idiomatum* or attribution of the properties of both *physeis* to the one *hypostasis* of the Word, coupled with a constant dread of anything remotely similar to Theopaschite concepts—any idea, that is, that the Word could experience in himself the passions and death of the human *physis* as it could be said a subject of that *physis* would—together are the crucial evidences that Theodoret's Christology is firmly rooted in a doctrine of being that requires two subjects, one for each *physis*. And I further believe that we will find no real change in his Christology in the period after 432 in these areas.

What we have here becomes clearer in the concluding chapters 22–35, where the kind of prosopic union emerges which we found at the conclusion

[49] *PG*, 75: 1457–8. [50] Ibid. 1459–60.

of the chapter of this book on Theodore of Mopsuestia. The properties of each nature are retained to it, and it alone. The *prosopon* of the *physis-hypostasis* of humanity ontologically or metaphysically manifests that human *physis-hypostasis*: the outward countenance of Jesus of Nazareth is properly that of the humanity. It is not the proper or ontological or metaphysical *prosopon* of the Word; however, the Word appropriates it by assuming it into a unity of *henosis*, or *synapheia*, by which he indwells the humanity, the perfect man, the assumed man. Thus the countenance of the man, the man's own proper *prosopon*, is utilized to manifest the invisible visibly: to see the face of Jesus Christ is to see and know, as closely as human eyes and sense can, the invisible and ineffable *physis* of the Word, even though that human *prosōpon* is not ontologically proper to the Word. Consequently, the proper *names* of each *physis* may be named to the common *prosopon*. The Word may be *called* Son of Man, the humanity *called* Son of God. 'Jesus Christ' is the proper name of the humanity, for it is the humanity which (who) is anointed Messiah by the Spirit, but the common *prosopon* is signified by the name 'Christ', since it is no longer adequate after the unity or assumption of the humanity to refer to the Word alone. 'Christ' refers to the *prosopon* which is proper to the man and which is what Theodore of Mopsuestia called a *prosopon* of honour for the Word. Thus the bishop of Cyrus concludes his exegetical attack on Apollinarianism with this remark about the Epistle to the Hebrews: 'Thus the divine Paul, through the entire epistle, proclaims both the properties of the natures and the unity (*henosin*) of *prosopon*. Therefore he names Jesus Christ both a human being (*anthropon*) and God.'[51]

Chapter 23 is given over to the birth of Christ, although there is no discussion here, where one would expect it, of the vexing question of the title *Theotokos*. The Word does not, in Theodoret's conception, himself experience birth, but may be said to 'issue forth from the Virgin' by virtue of the union with the humanity that does experience human birth:

> For he fills all things but is himself infinite and without border.... He inclined the heavens and came down.... So he made himself a home; he prepared himself a temple; he formed an unsown and uncultivated tabernacle, since the first who served sin was fatherless, having only the earth as mother.... Therefore, the Only-Begotten Word of God took the materials of formation from the Virgin and in this way created an uncultivated temple and united the same to himself and so issued from the Virgin.[52]

It is this common *prosopon*, 'Christ', which accepts our passions. Such are proper to the human *physis-hypostasis* and its own *prosopon*, and by virtue of

[51] Ibid. [52] Ibid.

the union the effectual saving result of them may be said to belong to the Word, though in this work at any rate Theodoret is very careful to attribute passion only to 'Christ' as the man, as human *physis*, and as the common *prosopon*. The Word is not said to suffer, but utilizes the humanity's passions to effect our salvation. So in Chapter 24:

Thus having been born, the Lord Christ (for it would not be right after the birth to call him only God the Word or a human being stripped of deity, but Christ, which signifies both the nature which assumed and that assumed) accepted in all ways our passions, except for sin.... He was raised on milk...; by Simeon he was worshipped and simultaneously called Saviour and Lord...; he grows in stature and wisdom and is subject to his parents...; he kept the law's feasts; he attended the temple regularly; he put to shame the slow wit of the Jews, and he did this being at the time only twelve years after birth. He is sought by his parents; lost he is reprehended by his mother; he answers somehow softly revealing his deity: 'Know ye not...?' Thus he showed how he is not only the thing visible, but also God hidden in the visible thing, beyond time, eternal, proceeding from the Father.[53]

Chapter 25 recapitulates how Christ's miracles manifest the deity and also includes an interesting theory of sight ('he opens the orifices of the body through which the *optikon* of the *psyche* diffuses upon the outside realities') and a firm affirmation of the sanctity of marriage. Chapter 26 is entitled 'That he willingly accepted the saving passions', but is a rather flowery version of the Lord's passion by a Greek man of letters which adds nothing to our understanding of how Theodoret would relate Christ's human passions to the Word. Chapters 27 and 28 cover the same ground as the earlier statements about the Atonement, with the addition that the water and blood flowing from the side of the crucified Lord are to be taken as symbols of Baptism and the Eucharist. In all this it is the term 'the Lord Christ' which is the grammatical subject of the actions or properties of both natures (or psychological subjects). It is the Lord Christ, the common *prosopon*, who accepts the saving passions, who was given over to death and the grave. It is the Lord Christ who dissolved the ancient power of evil and provided incorruptibility to those shackled to corruption. It is the Lord Christ who

having rebuilt the destroyed temple and resurrected it, showed the dead awaiting his resurrection true and firm promises. In this way... the nature assumed from us has attained the resurrection by the indwelling of and unity with the divinity, and having put off the corruptible with the passions, it changed into incorruptibility and immortality. Thus you shall be freed from the hard bondage to death, and having thrown off death with the passions, you have put on impassibility. And therefore he sent out the gift of Baptism to all humanity through the apostles.[54]

[53] *PG*, 75: 1461–3. [54] Ibid. 1468.

There is one sentence in chapter 29 which, when taken out of context, might seem to imply that an *idiotes* of the humanity could also be proper to the *physis* of the Word as God:

Again when the dead hear the voice of the Son of Man [in John 5: 27–9] calling them to resurrection either of life or judgement, this is proper (*idion*) not to the humanity alone, but to the inworking divinity and the visible humanity because of its unity to and conjunction with the divinity.[55]

It is quite clear from everything above that Theodoret cannot be taken to mean that a property of humanity is being attributed to the divine *physis*, though that is literally what the text says. The context makes clear that what is at stake is not the property of the human voice, but the name 'Son of Man'. Because of the unity in a common *prosopon*, each nature may take the *names* ontologically proper to the other: a *communicatio nominum*. This is not, most emphatically, a *communicatio idiomatum* of each *physis* to the *hypostasis* of the Word, but rather an entirely different method of dealing with the way in which Scripture attributes the various Messianic titles to the Word and to Jesus as to one.

Thus the Lord Christ was born, so nourished, having worked miracles, having suffered for these reasons, been crucified, died, having sent preachers, his holy disciples, to all people, was assumed into heaven. The Apostle teaches us these things summarily in [1 Tim. 3: 16].... But [the text says God] was justified by the synergy of the Spirit. Is, then, the justifying Spirit greater than the justified Son? Of course not. For that thing which is of us (*to gar hemeteron*) was justified by the God manifested in it. God, having been inseparately united to it, trained it in the highest virtue, guarded it from tasting the darts of sin..., straightway freed it from that tyranny of death and communicated his own life to it and took it up into the heavens... and gave it the name above every name, having given it his own glory. And taking the name of its nature, the eternal Word of God was pleased to be called Son of Man, as the Apostle says [in Eph. 4: 10]. The one who descended from the heavens was not the seed of David, but the heavens' maker, the Word of God who is beyond all time.... On account of the unity with the human thing he assumes the name of Son of Man. In other places scripture so names him: 'If you see the Son of Man ascending where he was before...'—but this is not the form of the servant, but the form of God.

Theodoret then continues with the sentence quoted immediately above.

This communication of names works in both directions, as Theodoret makes clear in chapter 30.

Thus God the Word appropriates the meanness of the form of the servant and though being God, he wills to be called human. And just as he assumed the humility of the

[55] Ibid. 1469.

man, so also he communicates to him exaltation. For the babe of the Virgin is called Emmanuel and the child wrapped in swaddling clothes, lacerating the nipple and being fed with milk is called angel of great counsel, amazing counsellor, mighty God, powerful *archon* of peace, Father of the ages to come, Son of the Most High, Saviour, Lord, Creator of all. For he says, 'one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things are'. Verily, the names 'Jesus' and 'Christ' are significant of the Incarnation.... Therefore the name 'Christ' denotes not only the one assumed, but the assuming Word with the one assumed, for it signifies the God and the man. For Paul attributes the creation and the ordering of all to the one seen on account of the union (*henosin*) with the hidden thing. Thus elsewhere the Christ is called God above all [Rom. 9: 5 follows].[56]

As far as the doctrine of being goes, 'Jesus Christ' is proper only to the assumed man; the title is said of the Word's *physis* because he appropriates it in the union, for, as Theodoret concludes chapter 30 in a sentence which neatly summarizes the fundamental Antiochene emphasis, 'Now the descendant of David is not God in himself, and God over all, but he is the temple of the God who is above all, having the deity united and coupled to himself'.[57]

This statement, which in the overall context of the work indicates that only a two-subject model of Christ is conceivable to the bishop of Cyrus, is immediately followed in chapter 31 with a concluding paragraph or confession of faith almost identical with those we shall see in the works after 432. For Theodoret, the Nicene faith is that there is one Son, the Word of God, who shares a common, single *prosopon* of honour with the 'man' (a distinct human subject) whose *prosopon* it is ontologically. The one Son is known and adored and worshipped in the common *prosopon.* Note how striking is Theodoret's use this time of abstract and impersonal, neuter terms *in the Greek text* for both *physeis*:

Therefore, 'Jesus Christ is the same, yesterday, today, and forever'. For we do not divide the economy into two *prosopa*, nor do we preach or teach two sons in the place of the Only-Begotten, but we have learned and we teach that there are two *physeis.* The one thing is deity, the other thing humanity. The one thing is that which is, the other thing that which has become. The one thing is the form of God, the other thing the form of the human being. The one thing is that which has taken, the other thing what was taken. One thing was the destroyed temple and another thing the God who resurrected this destroyed one (*... ἕτερον γὰρ θεότης, καὶ ἕτερον ἀνθρωπότης· ἕτερον τὸ ὂν, καὶ ἕτερον τὸ γενόμενον· ἄλλο ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μορφὴ, καὶ ἄλλο ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μορφή· καὶ ἄλλο ἡ λαβοῦσα καὶ ἕτερον ἡ ληφθεῖσα· ἕτερον ὁ λυθεὶς ναὸς, καὶ ἕτερον ὁ λυθέντα τοῦτον ἀναστήσας θεός*).[58]

Finally, in chapter 32, the last Arian and Apollinarian error must be refuted, and once again the logic of the Arian syllogism rises to play its role. Theodoret decries the use of 'pouring together' (*sygchysis*) and *krasis* as the proper way to understand the union, or *henosis, synapheia,* and *koinonia* of the two *ousiai*-

[56] *PG*, 75: 1469–72. [57] Ibid. 1472. [58] Ibid.

physeis in one *prosopon*, for such pouring together or mixing by logical necessity requires change. Theodoret is obviously using the Stoic doctrine of being:

Thus we do not pour together (*sygcheomen*) the *physeis* nor teach a mixing (*krasis*) of creator and created, but rather take mixing (*krasis*) as the same as confounding together (*sygchysis*). Rather we recognize the *physis* of God the Word and acknowledge the *ousia* of the form of the servant, each *physis* singly, as we worship one Son. For Christ is named each in each.... Those who use 'mixing' mean by it confounding, and confounding means change. Once change has entered, no more would God remain in his idiomatic *physis*, nor the human being in his. For that necessitates that each depart the limits of being (*ousia*), and God would not be recognized as God nor the man as a human being.[59]

Theodoret then turns to the perfect example of how two *physeis* can be united in a single living reality without 'departing the limits of their natures': the union of *soma* and *psyche* in a human being as the *icon* of the Incarnation.

We do not talk of mixing soul and body, but of union (*henosthai*), coupling (*synephthai*), dwelling (*oikein*), and inworking. One would not say the soul is mortal or the body immortal without being entirely in error. But while we distinguish each nature (*physis*), we recognize one living thing composed. We name each *physis* with different names, the soul or the body, but the living being composed from both we give another name, for that we call a human being. Thus taking these as the image of the economy, we escape that blasphemy; abandoning the word mixture (*krasis*), let us be constant in the use of *henosis, synapheia*, and *koinonia*, teaching the distinction of *physeis*, but the unity (*henosis*) of *prosopon.* Thus we refute the blasphemy of Arius and Eunomius, applying to the form of the servant the things said and done by the Saviour Christ, but the high, divine, and great attributing to the high and great divinity above every mind.[60]

The bishop of Cyrus thus seems to be using the analogy of the union of soul and body in one human person in precisely the way he said in chapter 11 of the *Expositio Rectae Fidei* was inappropriate when referred to the Incarnation.[61] There he insisted that Christ is not a third thing made out of divinity and humanity as a human being is a living being composed of soul and body, a third entity over against each of the two *physeis* composing it. But here the common *prosopon* functions exactly that way as 'Christ', even though his essential point is, clearly, that the two constituting *physeis* remain distinct, though Christ is one living being. Nonetheless, as we have seen above, Christ is not one *prosopon* in exactly the same way as a human being may be said to have or be one *prosopon.* Using the exposition in chapter 11 of the *Expositio*, we know that though he does not make it obvious here for his own apologetic

[59] Ibid. 1472–3. [60] Ibid. 1473. [61] See above, pp. 95–6.

reasons, Theodoret was quite aware of the difference in the way he understood the one *prosopon* out of two distinct *physeis* in a human being and in Christ.

The natural conclusion of *De Incarnatione Domini* falls in chapters 33 and 34. In the former Theodoret catalogues as a fifth-century Hellenistic Christian the works of the Paraclete in the faithful, concluding in chapter 34 that seeking to know things about the begetting of the Son or the procession of the Spirit is a blasphemous arrogance like the sin of Adam. Rather, being content with Scripture and the testimony of the Fathers, we shall then live in *apatheia*. Chapter 35 appears to have been added after the Council of Ephesus. The Virgin is to be called both *Theotokos* and *Anthropotokos*, for the Christ she bore is both God and human. The latter title indicates that she generated the form of the servant in *physis*; the other, that the form of the servant had the form of God united to it—which is somewhat different from saying with Cyril that God the Word was born into human life through her. Finally, it is suggested that this unity is the same one with the Word to which every faithful Christian is called, for 'having made ourselves temples for God through purity of life, let us receive him as inhabitant . . . , as we await the blessed hope and epiphany of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ'.[62]

The evidence here gathered at toilsome length is conclusive: the Christology of Theodoret of Cyrus, at least as he went to Ephesus in 431, is exactly the same as Sullivan and Norris found in Theodore of Mopsuestia. Indeed, it might well throw light on the debate over Mopsuestia's faith. Remembering his doctrine of being, his *communicatio nominum*, or communication of names (though not properties) pertaining to each of the two *physeis* to the one *hypostasis* of the Word of God, the way he illustrates the freedom of the human will in the temptation in the wilderness, how it is not the Word of God but the assumed man who grows in stature, wisdom, and knowledge, and who prays in fear, dies, and is raised, I do not see how any other conclusion can be reached but that Theodoret's Christology at this stage of development required two subjects in the shared *prosopon*, or outward countenance, through which the visible manifested the invisible.[63]

[62] *PG*, 75: 1477.

[63] Among the varied titles given to the human *physis* in *De Incarnatione Domini* are the following examples (which are not an exhaustive list): ch. 10: 'form of a servant' (*morphe doulou*), 'the assumed human *physis*', 'our *ousia*', 'the *physis* of the human being', 'the perfect man' (*ho teleios anthropos*); ch. 11: 'the visible man' (*ton oromenon anthropon*), 'the man whom [the Word] assumed' (*hon anelaben anthropon*), 'who (or which?) was assumed from us' (*τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀναληφθέντι*); ch. 12: 'the temple taken from the seed of David by God the Word', who is the one led out into the wilderness to face Satan, as opposed to the Word himself, 'the visible thing' (*to phainomenon*), 'the man/temple assumed from us'. Often the simple term 'the man' or 'the human being' (*ho anthropos*) appears, and in ch. 31, the summation confession of faith, the humanity is simply 'humanity' (*anthropotes*).

5

The Nestorian Crisis

The events leading up to the deposition of Nestorius at Ephesus in 431 have been related in Chapter 1, including Theodoret's central role in the development of the Antiochene defence.[1] What lies before us in this chapter is an examination of the Christological concepts and terms employed by Theodoret in that controversy and in the movements that eventually led to a shaky peace with Cyril in the years 432–5. An examination of the texts will show that the Christology of this period is exactly what we have uncovered in *De Incarnatione Domini*. Indeed, the discovery of that work as Theodoret's allows us to see more clearly how the texts of 431–5 are to be interpreted, which in turn allows us to settle some of the disagreements among earlier students of Theodoret's works. The materials to be examined include the *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum*, undertaken early in 431 at the request of John of Antioch as a rebuttal from the Antiochene side to Cyril's third letter to Nestorius with its subjoined twelve anathemas or chapters; Epistles 150–79, which are concerned with the Nestorian crisis, the Council of Ephesus, and its aftermath; a few epistles from *Collectio Casinensis*, a Latin version of events surrounding Ephesus and the Union Creed of 432–3; and the few fragments of the *Pentalogos* which are extant, a work written by Theodoret against the Cyrillian Council of Ephesus.

The *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum* is prefaced by Epistle 150, which is to be dated in February 431. Celestine and Cyril, patriarchs of Rome and Alexandria, had written to John, patriarch of Antioch, regarding the condemnation of Nestorius by the Western bishops in Rome in August 430. That in turn had led in all probability to John's having Theodoret, who was in Antioch when those letters arrived, actually write his letter to Nestorius urging the patriarch of Constantinople to accept the traditional title of *Theotokos* for the Lord's mother.[2] Early in the next year, having received the

[1] See above, pp. 14–22.

[2] *NPNF*, iii. 324 n. 3. Cf. above p. 00, and Ch. 1, nn. 62 and 63 regarding the texts of these letters. The Greek text for Epistles 150 and 151 is in *PG*, 83. Together with Epistles 169 and 171 they are among the four Greek epistles of Theodoret extracted from the *acta* of the Ecumenical Councils; cf. above Ch. 1, n. 4 and Appendix I. The critical text for Epistle 150 is in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, pp. 107–8. English translations of the Epistles of Theodoret are taken from *NPNF*, iii.

text of Cyril's third letter to Nestorius, John sent a copy to Theodoret asking for a reply to the Twelve Anathemas which conclude that letter. In Epistle 150 Theodoret makes it clear that to him the Twelve Anathemas are simply Apollinarianism:

I have been much distressed at reading the anathematisms which you have sent to request me to refute in writing, and to make plain to all their heretical sense [wrote Theodoret to John]. I have been distressed at the thought that one appointed to the shepherd's office . . . should give utterance to . . . heretical and blasphemous words, and renew that vain and impious teaching of Apollinaris which was long ago stamped out.

Theodoret goes on to say that he has set out each of Cyril's anathemas and then with the help of Scripture and the apostolic testimony of the Fathers refuted each in turn.

EPISTLE 151

Before examining each of the anathemas and Theodoret's reply, however, I turn slightly aside for a moment for a look at Epistle 151.[3] Its contents make clear that it was written at the same time as the *Reprehensio*: he is replying to the Cyrillian anathemas, and yet there is no indication that there has been any convocation at Ephesus to date. Cyril had weaned away the monks of his own Egypt and even Constantinople to his side, and now Theodoret writes to the monastics of Euphratensia, Osrhoene, Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia to bolster the Antiochene cause. Though not as detailed, and omitting the crucial discussion of the temptation in the wilderness, Epistle 151 offers us exactly the same theological position that we found in *De Incarnatione Domini*, often with the same arguments and even the same scriptural proofs. Since this letter can be dated so precisely, its agreement in thought and style with *De Incarnatione* is further evidence in favour of the date assigned to that work by M. Richard.

The responsibility for the 'present crisis' is laid at the door of Cyril, with . . . those who have striven to corrupt the apostolic faith, and have dared to add a monstrous doctrine to the teaching of the Gospels; with them that have accepted the impious chapters which they have sent forth with anathematisms to the imperial city, and have confirmed them, as they have imagined, by their own signatures. But these chapters have sprouted without doubt from the sour root of Apollinaris; they are tainted with Arian and Eunomian error; look into them carefully, and you will find that they are not clear of the impiety of Manes and Valentinus.[4]

[3] *PG*, 83: 1416 ff.; *NPNF*, iii. 325 ff.

[4] *PG*, 83: 1417–18; *NPNF*, iii. 325.

The heretics are the same condemned so vigorously in *De Incarnatione*—Marcion is added in Theodoret's brief remarks about the first anathema or chapter of Cyril to round out the earlier book's list of arch-enemies of the Nicene faith as it reappears in this Epistle 151. Again we see the very same theological arguments as we found in *De Incarnatione Domini.* The only possible alternative view to a Christology of two natures, if one is to posit the true divinity of the Word, is in fact to overthrow it by altering the Word's *physis* into humanity: 'In his very first chapter he [Cyril] rejects the dispensation made on our behalf, teaching that the Word of God did not assume human *physis*, but was himself turned into flesh' (*all' auton eis sarka metablethenai*).

The discussion of Cyril's second and third chapters introduces one of the few new themes in the epistle as Theodoret brings the theology of *De Incarnatione* to bear on Cyril's new expression 'hypostatic union' (*ten kath' hypostasin henosin*).[5] Again, for Theodoret this kind of union can result only in the mixture and confusion of the two *physeis.* The discussion of the fourth chapter leads directly and explicitly to the logic of the Arian syllogism as the underlying root of Theodoret's Christology: a genuine *communicatio idiomatum* is denied, because to fail to apply the various properties of the natures to the appropriate nature alone, to attribute, for example, the suffering of the passion of the cross to the Word's Godhead (as Theodoret understands Cyril's assertion that the Word died on the cross), is to undermine the Word's divinity and to fall into the Arian heresy of making the Word into a creature.

In his second and third chapters, as though quite oblivious of what he had stated in his preface, he [Cyril] brings in the hypostatic union, and a meeting by natural union, and by these terms he represents that a kind of mixture and confusion was effected of the divine nature and the form of the servant. This comes of the innovation of the Apollinarian heresy.

In his fourth chapter he denies the distinction of the terms of evangelists and apostles, and refuses to allow, as the teaching of the Orthodox Fathers has allowed, the terms of the divine dignity to be understood of the divine nature, while the terms of the humility, spoken in human sense, are applied to the nature assumed; whence the rightminded can easily detect the kinship with impiety. For Arius and Eunomius, asserting the Only-Begotten Son of God to be a creature, and made out of the non-existent, and a servant, have ventured to apply to his Godhead what is said in lowly and

[5] Theodoret claims that the expression *kath' hypostasin* is newly invented by Cyril, a claim Cyril himself seems to concede. Cf. *Apologia contra Theodoretum, ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, pp. 114–15; *PG*, 76: 400–1; also Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition* i: *From the Apostolic* 2nd edn. rev. (Atlanta: John Knox Press; London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., 1975), p. 482 n. 35; M. Richard, 'L'Introduction du mot *Age to Chalcedon (457)*' "hypostase" dans la théologie de l'incarnation', *Mélanges de Science Religieuse*, 2 (1945), 243–53. Richard finds that the expression in question appeared for the first time in Cyril's second dogmatic letter to Nestorius: i.e. in Jan. or Feb. 430 (*ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 1, pp. 25–8).

human sense; establishing by such means the differences of substance and the unlikeness. Besides this, to be brief, he argues that the very impassible and immutable Godhead of the Christ suffered, and was crucified, dead, and buried. This goes beyond even the madness of Arius and Eunomius, for this pitch of impiety has not been reached even by them that dare to call the maker and creator of the universe a creature.

At this point Theodoret leaves off refuting specific chapters or anathemas from Cyril's Twelve and turns for the rest of Epistle 151 to an exposition of Antiochene Christology that is simply a condensation of *De Incarnatione*. The same scriptural proof texts, the same arguments, the same concerns, all appear again. What is interesting is the way *De Incarnatione*'s themes and arguments are tied to confessional statements that are as broad as possible for the sake of winning to his side these presumably swayable monastics and which, consequently, can often sound to those who have not carefully studied *De Incarnatione* very Chalcedonian, even occasionally Cyrillian.

Apparently interpreting Cyril's ninth chapter as teaching a procession of the Holy Spirit from the Word, Theodoret attacks him as blaspheming 'against the Holy Spirit, denying that he proceeds from the Father, in accordance with the word of the Lord, but maintaining that he has his origin from the Son'. The Egyptian confesses this 'fruit' of Apollinaris and Macedonius, but

We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ, perfect God and perfect human being, of a reasonable soul and body, was begotten of the Father before the ages, as touching the Godhead; and in the last days for us human beings and for our salvation was born of the Virgin Mary; that same Lord is of one being with the Father as touching the Godhead, and of one being with us as touching the humanity.

This confession is Antiochene Christology at its best, stressing that the divine in Christ is truly and fully divine, as divinity was defined and understood in this particular controversy, and on the other hand, equally stressing the absolute reality of the human life lived in Jesus of Nazareth. Theodoret does indeed, here as elsewhere, define his anthropology in terms of the philosophy-science of his day. That is not truly critical here. What he is above all concerned to say is that whatever it means to be human, to live a human life at its best, as God intended human life to be lived, must be predicated of Jesus of Nazareth, or 'the faith which we have received and in which we have ourselves been baptized, which we strive to preserve uninjured and undefiled', is overthrown.

What would a Cyrillian think of the kind of unity of person confessed here, though? Is it the same concept as Cyril's? Theodore's? There can be no doubt that it is Theodore's as I worked that out in Chapter 2 above, for Theodoret immediately goes on with his confession of faith to discuss the unity strictly in terms already examined in *De Incarnatione*:

For there was union (*henosis*) of two *physeis*. Wherefore we acknowledge one Christ, one Son, one Lord; but we do not destroy the union; we believe it to have been made without confusion (*asygchyton*), in obedience to the word of the Lord to the Jews, 'Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up.' If on the contrary there had been mixture and confusion, and one *physis* was made out of both, he ought to have said, 'Destroy me and in three days I shall be raised'. But now, to show that there is a distinction between God according to his *physis*, and the temple, and that both are one Christ, his words are 'Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up', clearly teaching that it was not God who was undergoing destruction, but the temple. The *physis* of this latter was susceptible of destruction, while the power of the former raised what was being destroyed.

In *De Incarnatione* this argument about the way in which the Word indwells the temple follows on Theodoret's exposition of the temptations in the wilderness and must be interpreted in its light: the two *physeis* are two subjects, no matter how much this confession insists 'our Lord Jesus Christ [is] . . . the same Lord . . . of one being with the Father as touching the Godhead, and of one being with us as touching the humanity'. The union is prosopic in the sense we found it in *De Incarnatione*.

The rest of Epistle 151 continues with the same themes and examples that we have already considered in *De Incarnatione*. Christ is the name which is applied to the prosopic union. There is nothing here to indicate that Theodoret has gone beyond the two-subject prosopic union. The confession that 'Jesus Christ is very God and very man', that 'we do not divide the one (*ton hena*) into two *prosopa* but believe that two *physeis* are united without confusion (*asygchytos henosthai*)' is simply the old assertion that the unity of *prosopon* is not founded upon a single *hypostasis* or *physis* composed out of two previously distinct, but now mixed, *physeis*. There are for Theodoret only the same two alternatives as heretofore: either the two *physeis* are confused into a third, composite *physis* (just as the single human *physis-hypostasis* is composed out of two previously distinct *physeis*, with the result that the human soul actually suffers the body's passions); or else there is a prosopic union in which the *physis* of the Word remains exactly what he is as divine while assuming or taking a fully human, created *physis* in order to manifest the invisible through the visible prosopic countenance of the human *physis*. The *prosōpon* is common in this sense, and so names and glory may be shared, but not passions.

Theodoret moves on from this confession to fault precisely the same heretics, and for the same reasons, as in *De Incarnatione*. Marcion and Manes deny the reality of the human *physis*. Sabellius and Paul of Samosata, among others, deny the divinity of 'the eternal Christ'. Arius and Eunomius would have the Word assume only a body without a soul, while the soul which Apollinaris predicates of the Christ is unreasonable. The Jesus who increases in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and humankind is not the eternally perfect deity (*theotes*)

but the human *physis*—not the Word in his human *physis*, note, but the active subjects are 'eternally perfect deity' over against 'the human *physis*'.

The human qualities of the Lord Christ, such as hunger, thirst, weariness, sleep, fear, prayer, and ignorance, are said to be characteristic of that which had its beginning from us, while the divine activities of the Christ—healing the lame, raising the dead, multiplying the loaves, etc.—are 'works of the divine power'. Consequently, while the confession may sound very Chalcedonian, there is really nothing new here which would require us to see in it anything more than the prosopic union of the more fully developed *De Incarnatione Domini*. On the one hand, we find,

In this sense [following immediately on 'works of the divine power'] I say that same Lord Christ both suffers and destroys suffering; suffers, that is, as touching the visible, and destroys suffering as touching the ineffably indwelling Godhead.

But, on the other, it is again not the Word who suffers the passion of the cross in himself, but rather,

Let the word 'weakness' teach us that he was not nailed to the tree as the Almighty, the Uncircumscribed, the Immutable, and Invariable, but that the *physis* quickened by the power of God was according to the Apostle's teaching dead and buried, both death and burial being proper to the form of the servant.

The Virgin is both Mother of God and Mother of man in so far as she is the source of the human *physis* in whom we see, and so can adore through the shared *prosopon*, the one who is the Only-Begotten Word of the Father before all time. It would be appropriate to style the Virgin *Theotokos* exclusively only if Christ be God alone and had taken his divine origin from her. To be theologically accurate, it is necessary to name her *Theotokos* and *Anthropotokos* in order to point properly to both *physeis*. Only in panegyrics and hymns may one without offence take advantage of rhetorical licence to use the most august names exclusively, to style her only *Theotokos*. This brings us to the concluding confessional statement, a statement I marked in my own copy of it as apparently Cyrillian in model when I first read it. But the entire terminology of the letter, the concerns it argues, the conclusions reached, all show that this letter is contemporary with *De Incarnatione* and must be interpreted in its light. There is nothing here to enable us to get beyond the prosopic union we have so far been able to establish.

From these [scriptural] quotations it is made plain that according to the flesh, the Christ was descended from Abraham and David and was of the same *physis* as theirs; while according to the Godhead, he is everlasting Son and Word of God, ineffably and in superhuman manner begotten of the Father, and co-eternal with him as brightness and express image and Word.... We assert therefore that our Lord Jesus Christ is Only-Begotten and first born Son of God; Only-Begotten both before the Incarnation

and after the Incarnation, but first born after being born of the Virgin. . . . The divine scriptures state God the Word alone to have been begotten of the Father; but the Only-Begotten becomes also first born by taking our *physis* of the Virgin, and deigning to call brothers those who have trusted in him; so that the same is Only-Begotten in that he is God, first born in that he is man. Thus acknowledging the two *physeis* we adore the one Christ and offer him one adoration, for we believe that the union took place from the moment of conception in the Virgin's holy womb. Wherefore also we call the holy Virgin both *Theotokos* and *Anthropotokos*, since the Lord Christ himself is called God and man in the divine scripture. The name Emmanuel proclaims the union of the two *physeis*. If we acknowledge the Christ to be both God and man and so call him, who is so insensate as to shrink from using the term *Anthropotokos* with that of *Theotokos*?

REPREHENSIO DUODECIM CAPITUM SEU ANATHEMATISMORUM CYRILLI

By February of 431 Theodoret was ready with his response to the November 430, third letter of Cyril, with its twelve subjoined anathemas, to Nestorius.[6] As we saw above, Epistle 150 prefaced the *Reprehensio* and makes clear that Theodoret read Cyril's anathemas as Apollinarian 'impiety'. Wondering whether such 'impiety' could actually come from the bishop of Alexandria, he says that he has refuted it by comparing it with 'the words of the Holy Spirit' in Scripture. In the subsequent refutation of each of Cyril's anathemas, one by one, it is clear that he is writing from the vantage-point of the theology and arguments, once again, of *De Incarnatione*, and that he completely misunderstands the basic point of Cyril's understanding of Christ—that the Word's humanity in Christ is so much his that he experiences in himself as of himself what is proper to it, that he himself, the Word, lives a human life in the Incarnation without ceasing to be what he is in his divine being. He understands Cyril as denying a rational soul to the Word's humanity in the first place and, in the second, as asserting a unity which involves the impassible Word in a change of his divine *physis* into a created, passible *physis*. Once again the problem is the Arian syllogism: there are only three possible alternatives for Theodoret: the dyophysite Christology of Antioch expounded

[6] *NPNF*, iii. 324 n. 3. Theodoret's *Reprehensio XII Anathematismorum* was condemned at Constantinople in 553, but survives in Cyril's apologetic rebuttal in his Epistle to Euoptius. The Greek text is in *PG*, 76: 385–452; critical text in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, pp. 107–48. An English translation of the *PG* text, used in this chapter, is found in *NPNF*, iii. 26–31. For the Nestorian Syriac version of the *Reprehensio*, cf. A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur* (Bonn, 1922), pp. 106 ff. Cf. also S. Pusey, *S. Cyrilli Alex. Epistolae Tres Oecumenicae* (Oxford, 1875), pp. 382 ff.

in *De Incarnatione Domini*, Arianism, or Apollinarianism. Cyril, for Theodoret, clearly falls into the last category.

In his first anathema Cyril had insisted that Emmanuel must be confessed as God in truth, and that therefore the Virgin is *Theotokos*, for 'she bore in the flesh the Word of God become flesh'. In the prefacing epistle Cyril denied that the title *Theotokos* is attributed to the Virgin 'as though the nature of the Word had the beginning of its existence from flesh'.[7] He seems to be insisting in the anathema that what he is concerned with is not so much the question of what nature—human or divine—is born or conceived or arises from the Virgin's humanity, but rather that through taking up human nature the Word experiences the totality of human existence, including the experience of human conception and birth. Cyril in that epistle insisted that 'all the terms used in the Gospel are to be referred to one Person (*prosopon)*, the one incarnate *hypostasis* of the Word'.[8] Obviously Cyril is making a distinction—even if perhaps unconsciously—between what is predicated of the *ousia* of the Word and what of the *hypostasis* of the Word, which he links to *prosopon*—at least here. In other places his ease in discussing the one *physis* incarnate or the one *hypostasis* incarnate can just as easily lead to confusion, especially for an Antiochene like Theodoret, but it would seem that though he may have failed to develop a consistently careful terminology to express his idea of Christ, yet what he was trying to do was to break what we have come to call the Arian syllogism by asserting that what is predicated of the Word need not be predicated of his divine nature, or *ousia*; he denied the minor premiss that whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him *kata physin.*

Theodoret is so trapped in his Antiochene metaphysic of the absolute unchangeableness of the divine *ousia-physis* that he simply cannot begin to grasp this essential point behind Cyril's language, a terminology whose lack of careful and consistent precision was bound to mislead a consistently precise mind like Theodoret's. His rebuttal of Cyril's first anathema consists of essentially two arguments, both of which are completely familiar to us by now.[9] The first is that in so far as the *physis* of the Word cannot be changed into a created *physis* of *sarx* or flesh and still remain what it is, we cannot say that the Word takes his beginning from the Virgin and is born of her. Rather,

[7] Edward R. Hardy and C. C. Richardson (eds.), *Christology of the Later Fathers*, The Library of Christian Classics, 3 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), p. 352. The Greek text is in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 1, pp. 33–42; also in T. H. Bindley (ed.), *Oecumenical Documents of the Faith*, 4th edn. rev. by F. W. Green (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1950), pp. 105–23.

[8] Hardy and Richardson, p. 352. For further remarks about Cyril's Christology as I interpret it here, see Appendix II.

[9] *NPNF*, iii. 26; *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, p. 109.

the second point, on account of the union of *henosis* between the Word and the form of the servant, that is 'the man' (*anthropos*) united to the Word, the Virgin is *called* (*prosagoreuesthai*) *Theotokos*. The interplay of Arian syllogism and a *communicatio* not of the *idia* or characteristics of each nature but of names could not be clearer. *De Incarnatione* has shown us how Theodoret's method of reasoning and terminology can only lead to a dual-subject Christology. In response to Cyril's first anathema, Theodoret thus writes:

But all we who follow the words of the evangelists state that God the Word was not made flesh by nature (*physei*), nor yet was changed into flesh; for the divine is immutable and invariable.... And if the immutable cannot be changed, then God the Word was not made flesh by mutation, but took flesh and tabernacled in us.

Whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him *kata physin*. Going on to develop his point that *Theotokos* is a title of honour and not one used *kata physin*, Theodoret continues much as we would expect:

The form of God was not changed into the form of a servant, but remaining what it was, took the form of the servant. So God the Word was not made flesh but assumed living and reasonable flesh. He himself is not naturally conceived of the Virgin, fashioned, formed, and deriving beginning of existence from her, he who is before the ages God and with God...but he fashioned for himself a temple in the Virgin's womb, and was with that which [or was with him who: τῷ πλασθέντι καὶ...] was formed and begotten. Wherefore also we style that holy Virgin *Theotokos*, not because she gave birth in natural manner to God, but to a man united to God who had fashioned him.... But since the form was not stripped of the form of God, but was a temple containing God the Word dwelling in it...we call the Virgin not Mother of man (*Anthropotokos*) but Mother of God (*Theotokos*), applying the former title to the fashioning and conception, but the latter to the union.... Therefore the child is called Emmanuel on account of God who assumed, and the Virgin *Theotokos* on account of the union of the form of God with the conceived form of a servant. For God the Word was not changed into flesh, but the form of God took the form of a servant.[10]

Note the use of the so-called concrete expressions for the human nature: 'the man united to the God who formed him', the scriptural Emmanuel meaning 'the (masculine) one assumed from among us for our sakes as well as God the Word who has assumed'.

In his second anathema Cyril introduced the famous expression: 'the Word of God...was united by *hypostasis* to flesh and is one Christ with his own flesh.'[11] It meets in the *Reprehensio* the same reaction we have already seen above in Epistle 150. Theodoret points out that the expression 'the Word was

[10] Ibid. 109–10.

[11] Cf. n. 4 and 7 above on the questions of the novelty of this expression and Cyril's meaning in it.

united to flesh *kath' hypostasin*' is an innovation unknown to Scripture or the Fathers interpreting Scripture. He can only understand Cyril to mean by a union *kath' hypostasin* one in which the divine *physis* has been confused into a creature, since for Theodoret *hypostasis* is here functioning ontologically: to speak of the Word's *hypostasis* is to speak of him in terms of his natural attributes, to speak of him *kata physin*. To say that the Word is united to flesh *kath' hypostasin* is for Theodoret the same thing, resulting in the exact same problem of postulating change in the immutable Godhead, as in the doctrine of the first anathema, which he refuted on the ground that the Word 'did not become flesh by nature (*physei*)'.[12] For the bishop of Cyrus *hypostasis* is still a function of *physis*. To speak of the Word's *hypostasis* is to speak of him *kata physin* as the divine *ousia*:

If the author of these statements means by the union (*henosis*) according to *hypostasis* that there was a mixture (*krasis*) of flesh and Godhead, we shall oppose his statement with all our might . . . for the mixture (*krasis*) is of necessity followed by confusion (*sygchysis*); and the admission of confusion destroys the individuality of each *physis*. Things that are undergoing mixture do not remain what they were.[13]

The union according to *hypostasis*, then, of Cyril's second anathema is simply an innovative term whereby to say the same old Apollinarian thing. Any *mia physis* or *mia hypostasis* Christology (obviously this is what Theodoret understands Cyril to be getting at with his new term) inevitably involves us in a Christology in which the divine and human natures are confused into some new *physis* which would be on the level of creature and thus could not be divine, and also one in which the Word replaces the human *nous*. This latter point is clear from the way in which, in the *Reprehensio's* refutation of Cyril's new term, Theodoret immediately moves from the quotation above to the proof text cited in *De Incarnatione* and Epistle 150, John 2: 19.

We must obey the Lord when he exhibits the two *physeis* by saying to the Jews, 'Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up.' But if there has been a *krasis*, then God has not remained God, neither was the temple recognized as a temple; then the temple was God in *physis* and God was temple, for such follows by rational necessity from the definition of mixture. He ought to have said, 'Destroy me and in three days I shall be raised,' if there had really been any mixture and confusion. As it is, he exhibits the temple undergoing destruction and God raising it up. Therefore the union according to *hypostasis* (*henosis kath' hypostasin*), which they give us here in the place of *krasis*, is superfluous. It is enough to mention the union, which sets before us the properties (*idiotetas*) of the *physeis* and teaches us to worship the one Christ.[14]

[12] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, p. 108. [13] Ibid. 114. [14] Ibid. 114–15.

Once more there are only two Christological possibilities: the Antiochene two-subject model, which follows by logical necessity from the metaphysic of the Arian syllogism, or the Arian–Apollinarian 'confused' *mia physis* model, which overthrows the divine nature of the Word.

That for Theodoret two natures necessitate two *hypostaseis* becomes as clear as is humanly possible in his refutation of Cyril's third anathema.[15] In it Cyril had condemned dividing 'the *hypostaseis* of the one Christ after the union (*henosis*), joining them only by a conjunction (*synapheia*) in dignity, or authority or power, and not rather by a coming together (*synodos kath' henosin physiken*)'.[16] Theodoret cannot understand what Cyril is getting at by his rejection of *synapheia* as an unsuitable term for describing the union of the divine and human *ousiai* but accepting *synodos* as an adequate descriptive term. What, he asks, is the difference? What can Cyril mean by this *synodos physike*?

For Theodoret it is a logical absurdity, for not only would such a 'coming together' in a union on the hypostatic level of being's becoming involve the divine *physis* in mutability, but it would also subject God as God to necessity, the necessity of the laws of human nature. Theodoret reverts, in order to demonstrate the orthodoxy of confessing two *hypostaseis* in one Christ after the union, to the logic of his old argument about the presence of God in the tabernacle through the divine will which he had earlier used in the *Expositio Rectae Fidei*.

> Nature (*physis*) has a compulsory force and is involuntary; as for instance, if I say we are naturally (*physikos*) hungry, we do not feel hunger of free-will but of necessity...; we naturally are thirsty; we naturally sleep; we naturally breathe; and all these actions, I repeat, belong to the category of the involuntary. If then the union of the form of God and the form of a servant was natural (*physike*), then God the Word was united (*synephthe*) to the form of the servant under the compulsion of necessity, and not because he put in force his loving kindness, and the Lawgiver of the universe will be found to be a follower of the laws of necessity.[17]

The *kenosis*, or self-emptying, of the Word in Philippians 2: 7, however, demonstrates that the taking of the form of the servant was an act of the Word's own divine free will and to the conclusion that 'if he was united by purpose and will to the *physis* assumed from us, the addition of the term *physike* is superfluous'.[18] Our confession, then, is to be simply of 'the union', without calling it a natural union, and that in turn requires, for Theodoret, the confession of two *hypostaseis* after the union:

[15] Ibid. 116–18. [16] Hardy and Richardson, p. 353.
[17] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, pp. 116–17. [18] Ibid.

The apprehension, then, of the union implies previous apprehension of the division (*diairesin*). How then can he (Cyril) say that the *hypostaseis* or *physeis* may not be divided? He knows all the while that the *hypostasis* of God the Word was perfect before the ages; and that the form of the servant which was assumed by that *hypostasis* was perfect; and this is the reason why he said *hypostaseis* and not *hypostasis* [in Cyril's third anathema]. If, therefore, each *physis* is perfect, and both came together, it is obvious that after the form of God had taken the form of a servant, piety compels us to confess one *prosopon* and one Son and one Christ; while to speak of the united *hypostaseis* or *physeis* as two, so far from being absurd follows the necessity of the case.[19]

Two *ousiai* necessitate two *physeis*; two *physeis* mean two separate sets of properties, or *idiomata*, and consequently two *hypostaseis*. The doctrine of being leaves as the only possible union the kind of prosopic one that Theodoret has used consistently to date. There is here no *communicatio idiomatum*. This is clear from the conclusion of his apology against Cyril's third anathema, where Theodoret introduces the inevitable analogy of the union of mortal and immortal natures in one human being. Interestingly enough to us, he avoids discussing how the unified human individual may or may not be a single *hypostasis* or a composite *physis*:

For if in the case of the one human being (*anthropos*) we divide the *physeis*, and call the mortal nature body, but the immortal nature soul, and both a human being, much more consonant is it with right reason to recognize the properties alike of the God who took and of the human being (*anthropos*) who was taken.... If the Apostle [in 2 Cor. 4: 16 and Rom. 7: 22] divides the natural conjunction (*physiken sunapheian*) of the synchronous natures [of the inner and the outward human being], with what reason can the man who describes the mixture (*krasin*) to us by means of other terms indict us as impious when we divide the properties of the natures of the everlasting God and of the human being assumed at the end of the days?[20]

The properties (*idiomata*) of the immortal soul are not attributed to the mortal body in the one human being; but they are attributed to the composite *physis* or *hypostasis*. Theodoret does not say as much directly, but from what we have seen earlier of his anthropology, this must be assumed here. True, in this refutation his concern is to insist on two *hypostaseis* in Christ after the union and not so much to be concerned to discuss the union itself. None the less, he does here insist that the *idiomata* of each *physis*-*hypostasis* be retained to it, and he does insist on confessing specifically 'one *prosopon* and one Son and Christ'. Are the properties, or *idiomata*, of each *physis*-*hypostasis* to be 'communicated' or attributed to the one *prosopon* in the same way that mortality and immortality are communicated or attributed to the

[19] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, pp. 116–17. [20] Ibid. 117–18.

one composite *physis-hypostasis* which is an individual human being? There is nothing here to compel us to draw this conclusion, which would be in direct contradiction to everything we have seen so far in Theodoret's Christology. The prosopic union is not at all the same thing as the composite *physis-hypostasis* of Theodoret's earlier anthropology. And that is probably the reason why he avoids discussing here his anthropology's *mia physis* doctrine: his apologetic needs require him to stress two *hypostaseis* in a human being, body and soul, which both retain their opposing *idiomata*. His emphasis is on the essential duality in a human being. Carrying the anthropological analogy too far will take him exactly where he does not want to be, at a *mia physis-hypostasis* composite human nature that will involve him in the kind of *communicatio idiomatum* that will transform his prosopic union into a (*henosis physike*), a blasphemous *krasis*, or mixture, transforming God and the man into the kind of mixed and 'becoming' creature that we human beings are. The analogy, in other words, as we have seen several times already, holds only in so far as it throws light on the distinction of natures. The union of soul and body into a composite nature of *hypostasis*-individual is not at all the same thing as the prosopic union of the two *hypostaseis* in Christ.

This conclusion is once again sustained in Theodoret's refutation of Cyril's fourth anathema, in which the Alexandrine had anathematized

> anyone distributing between two *prosopa* or *hypostaseis* the terms used in the evangelical and apostolic writings, whether spoken of Christ by the saints or by him about himself, attaching some to a man thought of separately from the Word of God, and others as befitting God to the Word of God the Father alone.[21]

Theodoret responds that there are only two choices: his own Christology or Arianism. In yet another clear restatement of Sullivan's Arian syllogism, Theodoret is manifestly saying that whatever is said of the Word is said of him *kata physin* as God. Our Antiochene's refutation of Cyril's anathema is a *locus classicus* for the way in which his party developed their Christology from the Arian syllogism. He affirms the minor premiss of the syllogism (that whatever is said of the Word is said of him *kata physin* as God), and so must either lapse into the Arian denial of the Word's divine *physis* or deny the major premiss that the Word is the subject of the human operations and sufferings of Christ.

> He [Cyril] uses this language while glorifying himself that he is at war at once with Arius and Eunomius and the rest of the heresiarchs. Let then this exact professor of theology tell us how he would refute the blasphemy of the heretics, while applying to God the Word what is uttered humbly and appropriately by the form of the servant.

[21] Hardy and Richardson, p. 353.

They indeed do this while laying down that the Son of God is inferior, a creature, made, and a servant. To whom, then, are we, holding the opposite opinion and confessing the Son to be of one being and co-eternal with God the Father . . . to refer the words, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' or 'Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me'; or 'Father, save me from this hour'; or 'That hour no man knoweth, not even the Son of Man'; and all the other passages spoken and written in lowliness by him and by the holy apostles about him? To whom shall we apply the weariness and the sleep? To whom the ignorance and the fear? Who was it who stood in need of angelic succour? If these belong to God the Word, how was wisdom ignorant? How could he speak the truth in saying that he had all that the Father has, when not having the knowledge of the Father . . . ? But if the truth does not lie, neither is God the Word ignorant of the day which he himself made, and which he himself fixed, wherein he purposes to judge the world, but has the knowledge of the Father as being unchanged image. Not then to God the Word does the ignorance belong, but to the form of the servant, who at that time knew as much as the indwelling Godhead revealed. . . . How for instance could it be reasonable for God the Word to say to the Father, 'Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me'? Therefore, these words are not the words of God the Word, but of the form of the servant, afraid of death because death was not yet destroyed. Surely God the Word permitted the utterance of these expressions allowing room for fear, that the nature (*physis*) of him that was born might be manifest and to prevent our taking that which was of Abraham and David as an appearance or fantasia. The crew of the impious heretics has given birth to this blasphemy through entertaining these sentiments. We shall therefore apply what is divinely spoken and acted to God the Word; on the other hand, what is said and done in humility we shall connect with the form of a servant, lest we be tainted with the blasphemy of Arius and Eunomius.[22]

This is simply the two-subject Christology of *De Incarnatione Domini* and Theodore of Mopsuestia.

In his fifth anathema, Cyril had denounced calling Christ a 'God-bearing man (*theophoros anthropos*) and not rather God in truth, being by nature one son, inasmuch as the Word became flesh, and is made partaker of blood and flesh precisely like us'.[23] Theodoret responds that many of the Fathers, including Basil, used the term 'God-bearing man' of Christ, and says that 'we call him God-bearing man, not because he received some particular divine grace, but as having united to himself all the divinity of the Son'.[24] He agrees that the Word became flesh, but not in the sense of being changed into flesh but of being in union (*henosis*) with the flesh and an immortal soul. Once again he misses Cyril's point and assumes that the latter was asserting a composite *physis* Christology involving change in the Word. This leads to

22 *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, pp. 121–2.
23 Hardy and Richardson, p. 353.
24 *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, p. 126.

Theodoret's rather strange way of saying that the Word is a reality over against the reality of the full human *physis*:

For if the Word was changed into flesh, he did not share with us in flesh and blood; but if he shared in flesh and blood he shared as being another besides them; and if the flesh is anything other besides him, then he was not changed into flesh.[25]

Quite obviously, for Theodoret, God the Word does not partake of flesh and blood 'precisely like us'. He concludes by using his communication of names to explain how Christ is one Son. In the prosopic union the divinity of the Word is worshipped as we worship him who is invisible visibly through the countenance-*prosopon* of the assumed reality: 'Therefore, making use of the name of the union, we worship, on the one hand, the one who assumed and that which was assumed as one Son, but on the other hand we point out the distinction of the natures.'[26] With its impersonal 'that which was assumed' (τὸ ληφθέν), the phrase could easily enough be interpreted in a Chalcedonian sense, but there is nothing so far in all of this to indicate that we can get beyond a two-subject Christology. In reality, Theodoret's refutation of the fifth anathema is nothing more than a repetition of by now common enough themes, coupled with a justification of using the term 'God-bearing man' on the grounds, sound enough, that it was used before him by theologians generally recognized as Fathers of the Church.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid. The translation in the text is my own. In regard to 'the distinction of the natures' (*ton de physeon ten diaphoran*) which Theodoret mentions here, the Eutychian controversy in the next decade will bring out a terminology of one *hypostasis* of the incarnate Word in two *physeis* which will be adopted as dogmatic at Chalcedon. In his letters to the Emperor Theodosius II and to Leo, 'Archbishop of Rome', following the 448 trial and condemnation of Eutyches at Constantinople, Flavian, 'Archbishop of Constantinople', confesses 'the one Christ after the enfleshment (*sarkosin*) and incarnation from the holy Virgin to be from [some MSS read 'in'] two *physeis* in one *hypostasis* and in one *prosopon*' (ACO, Tom. II, vol. i, part I, pp. 35–6). In the minutes of the trial of Eutyches read out at Chalcedon, Basil of Seleucia claims that in condemning Nestorius, Cyril of Alexandria had recognized in Christ both 'perfect deity... and perfect humanity', and then Basil went on to confess 'the one Lord Jesus Christ known in two *physeis*, for he had the one [*physis*] in himself from before all time as the radiance of the glory of the Father, and as born from his mother for us, he took up the [other *physis*] from her and united it to himself *kath' hypostasin*' (ACO, Tom. II, vol. i, part I, p. 117). Basil of Seleucia was immediately seconded at Eutyches' trial by Seleucus of Amaseia, who also used the same 'in two *physeis*' expression (ibid. 117–18). For a fuller introduction to the sources of these expressions, and the equivalence of 'from two *physeis*' and 'in two *physeis*' in Flavian's letters, see Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i. 523–6. At his trial, Eutyches rejected 'in two *physeis*' and accepted 'from two *physeis*' before the union, but only one *physis* after the union. This would become the slogan of the post-Chalcedon Monophysite party. On the logical difficulty of this slogan (there cannot have been two *physeis* before the Incarnation, since the humanity of Jesus was brought into existence only with the Incarnation), see Thomas Camelot, 'De Nestorius à Eutychès: l'opposition de deux christologies', in A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, (Würzburg: Echlerverlag, 1951), i. 233 n. 87.

Theodoret has made his point. In his subsequent refutations of the sixth through to the twelfth anathemas he does no more than repeat the same arguments. What they add up to is neither more nor less than the Christology and the apologetic devices and themes of *De Incarnatione*. He often seems to miss Cyril's fundamental point in each anathema, which is not surprising, since he has missed the essence of Cyril's Christological model and persists in understanding him in the simplest way as an Apollinarian. For example, when Cyril in the seventh anathema condemns saying that 'Jesus was energized as a man by the Word from God, and clothed with the glory of the Only-Begotten, as being another besides him', Theodoret responds disingenuously: 'If the *physis* of the man is mortal, and God the Word is life and giver of life, and raised up the temple which had been destroyed by the Jews, and carried it into heaven, how is not the form of the servant glorified through the form of God?'[27] Theodoret has simply ignored the key phrase in Cyril's anathema, 'as being another beside him',[28] and sets up a straw man to knock down.

In his eighth anathema Cyril strikes at the heart of the way in which Theodoret has persistently described the union in one *prosopon* of two *hypostaseis*:

If anyone dares to say that the man (*anthropon*) who was assumed ought to be worshipped with God the Word and glorified with him, and with him styled God, as being one in another—for the constantly added 'with' forces one to think this—and does not rather honour Emmanuel with one veneration, and send up to him one doxology, inasmuch as the Word has become flesh, let him be anathema.[29]

Again Theodoret chooses to ignore the challenge to his two-subject Christological model and answers with phrases which would sound Chalcedonian if one did not have *De Incarnatione* to interpret what lies behind them:

As I have often said, the doxology which we offer to the Lord Christ is one, and we confess the same to be at once God and man, as the method of the union has taught us; but we shall not shrink from speaking of the properties of the natures. For God the Word did not undergo change into flesh, nor yet again did the man lose what he was and undergo transmutation into the nature of God. Therefore we worship the Lord Christ, while we maintain the properties of either nature.[30]

'Christ' is the name for the *prosopon* shared by the *hypostasis* of the human *physis*, whose it properly is, and also by the *hypostasis* of the Word, perfect from before time. This method of union is not the same as Cyril's *henosis physike* or the hypostatic union of Chalcedon.

[27] *ACO*, Tom. I, part 6, p. 130.
[28] Cyril's Greek text reads 'ὡς ἑτέρῳ παρ' αὐτὸν ὑπάρχοντι'.
[29] Ibid. 131. The English translation is in Hardy and Richardson, p. 354.
[30] *ACO*, Tom. I, part 6, p. 132.

Theodoret's refutation of Cyril's ninth anathema is interesting in its doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit. Predictably, he asserts over against Cyril that it is not God the Word who is formed by the Spirit in the womb of the Virgin or anointed by the Spirit at the Lord's baptism, 'but the human *physis* assumed by him'. Further,

we shall confess that the Spirit of the Son was his own (*idion*) if he spoke of it as of the same *physis* and as proceeding from the Father, and shall accept the expression as consistent with true piety. But if he [Cyril] speaks of the Spirit as being of the Son and having his origin through the Son, we shall reject this statement as blasphemous and impious.[31]

In his refutation of the tenth anathema Theodoret again returns to his insistence that it is not the Word who suffers the passions and ignorances of the Christ, who learns perfection by toils of virtue, who was not perfect by nature, but the seed of David:

Who (*tis*) then is he who was perfected by toils of virtue . . . ? Who (*tis*) is he who learnt obedience by experience, and before his experience was ignorant of it? Who (*tis*) is it that lived with godly fear and offered supplication with strong crying and tears, not able to save himself (*heauton*) but appealing to him that is able to save him and asking for release from death? Not God the Word, the immortal, the impassible, the incorporeal, whose memory is joy and release from tears. . . . It is on the contrary that thing which was assumed (*to . . . lephthen*) by him of the seed of David, mortal, passible, and afraid of death. . . . It was the *physis* taken from us for our sakes which experienced our feelings without sin, not he that on account of our salvation assumed it.[32]

Note how the Greek pronouns referring to the humanity vary between agreeing with the feminine *physis* and masculine or neuter forms in the question of who the subject of the experiences in Christ was.

These conclusions of Theodoret arise from his exegesis here of Hebrews. The Word cannot be the subject of the experiences of Jesus as 'our great high priest', for that would imply that the Word is a creature. Quoting Hebrews 3: 1–2, Theodoret follows the paragraph above with this conclusion to his refutation of the tenth anathema:

'Consider the apostle and high priest of our profession, Jesus, who was faithful to him that appointed him as also Moses was faithful in all his house.' But no one holding the right faith would call the unmade, the uncreated God the Word, coeternal with the Father, a creature, but the human being (*anthropon*) assumed from us; not God the Word of God is appointed high priest for us, but on the contrary, him (*ton*) of David's seed, who being free from all sin was made our high priest and victim, after

[31] Ibid. 134. [32] Ibid. 136–7.

offering himself on our behalf to God, having in himself the Word, God of God, united to himself and inseparably conjoined.[33]

Inasmuch as the *homo assumptus* is the one who as high priest in Hebrews learns obedience through suffering human maturation, ignorance, and temptation, and who successfully resists temptation to offer himself sinless for us, and inasmuch as Theodoret clearly insists that this man is not to be identified (as experiencing subject) with the Word who is uncreated and immutable, but rather is a creature, can we find here any Christological model but that of Theodore of Mopsuestia as Sullivan outlined it? Clearly it is not the Word who is the subject of the human experiences of the high priest in this epistle. To postulate that would be to call the uncreated and unmade Word a creature. Rather, in Hebrews the high priest who learns obedience, suffers temptation, is ignorant, is the *physis* assumed by the Word. The high priest, for Theodoret, is the assumed man (*analephthenta anthropon*), not the Word, who 'is himself God the Word from God'. The assumed man is the seed of David who has in himself united to himself and connected to himself the Word. How does this differ from the doctrine condemned by Cyril's sessions at Ephesus as Nestorianism?

Theodoret's response to Cyril's eleventh anathema makes it impossible to reach any conclusion other than that the bishop of Cyrus could envisage only the two Christological models we have constantly seen throughout his works: either one is Apollinarian or one confesses two *physeis* and two *hypostaseis*. He completely misses the point of Cyril's one *hypostasis* model in which the eternal Word is the subject of the human experiences in the Incarnation, interpreting as an Apollinarian denial of a rational soul in the Lord's humanity Cyril's anathematizing 'anyone who does not confess that the flesh of the Lord is life-giving, and the proper flesh of the Word . . . but as of another besides him, associated with him in dignity, or having received merely a divine indwelling'.[34] Citing Cyril's anathema, he says he will make use of it

to make his heterodox belief plain. In the first place he has nowhere made mention of rational flesh, nor confessed that the assumed man was perfect, but everywhere in accordance with the teaching of Apollinaris he speaks of flesh. Secondly, after introducing the conception of the mixture under other terms, he brings it into his arguments; for there he clearly states the flesh of the Lord to be soulless. . . . Hence it is plain that he does not confess God the Word to have assumed a soul, but only flesh, and that he himself stands to the flesh in place of soul. We on the contrary assert that the flesh of the Lord having in it life was life-giving and reasonable on account of the life-giving Godhead united to it. And he himself unwillingly confesses the difference between the two *physeis*, speaking of flesh and 'God the Word' and calling it

[33] *ACO*, Tom. I, part 6, p. 137. [34] Ibid. 142.

'his own proper flesh'. Therefore God the Word was not changed into the nature of flesh, but has his own flesh, the assumed *physis*, and has made it life-giving by the union.[35]

The theme of the twelfth anathema is Theopaschitism, Cyril insisting that 'the Word of God suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh and tasted death in the flesh and became the first-born of the dead'.[36] Theodoret replies that passion is idiomatic to the passible, but that the impassible is above passions. 'It was then the form of the servant that suffered, the form of God dwelling with it and permitting it to suffer on account of the salvation brought forth of the sufferings, and making the sufferings its own on account of the union.' Theodoret's conclusion is precisely the two-subject Christology at which Cyril was striking: 'It is not God who suffered but the man assumed by God from us.... He who is life itself is not slain but the one who has the mortal nature.'[37]

THEODORET'S CHRISTOLOGY AT THE COUNCIL OF EPHESUS

The outline of events at Ephesus from June to August of 431, and then of the resulting schism between Antioch and Alexandria, has been sketched above in Chapter 1. Of interest here are the attitudes toward Cyril's theology in Epistles 152–70. What emerges is that Theodoret went home from Ephesus with the same Christology with which he had arrived there, that of *De Incarnatione*, convinced that Cyril's anathemas represented a rebirth of Apollinarianism. The material is interesting in its revelations of the way the debate—or non-debate, as the Antiochenes complained—developed.

Cyril arrived first at Ephesus and convened his council of 198 bishops on 22 June in the Church of St Mary the Virgin. John of Antioch, with fourteen of his bishops, did not arrive in Ephesus until 27 June. They had not been able to start from Antioch from their dioceses until the octave of Easter on 26 April, and having assembled there by 10 May, were further delayed—as John explains in Epistle 152 to the emperor Theodosius—by a severe famine and then stormy rains. As soon as they did arrive at Ephesus, John assembled his forty-three supporters into the Antiochene Conciliabulum.[38] Mutual excommunications and depositions of each group against the other quickly resulted, and both appealed to the Emperor, who granted at least five audiences at Chalcedon to John of Antioch, Theodoret, and three other Antiochene

[35] Ibid. 142–3. [36] Ibid. 144. [37] Ibid. [38] *NPNF*, iii. 333 n. 1.

bishops. Epistle 164 rejoices prematurely that the Emperor had decided in the Antiochenes' favour. However, Epistle 165, written apparently by Theodoret after the fifth audience with the Emperor, mourns:

As to the very pious and holy bishop Nestorius, be it known to your piety [Andrew of Samosata] that we have tried to introduce a word about him, but have hitherto failed because all are ill-affected toward him. . . . The partisans of Cyril have deceived everyone by domineering, cheating, flattering, and bribing, and have more than once besought the very pious emperor and noble princes both to send us back to the East and let your holiness go home. For we are beginning to learn that we are wasting time in vain, without nearing our end, because Cyril everywhere shirks discussion, in his conviction that the blasphemies published in his twelve chapters can be openly refuted. The very pious emperor has determined, after many exhortations, that we all go everyone to his own home, and that, further, both the Egyptian and Memnon of Ephesus are to remain in their own places.

The audiences with the Emperor were held in the Rufinianum, a villa near Chalcedon, according to Epistle 163.[39] The way things were to go must already have been hinted at, for Theodoret reports in that same letter that as soon as the delegates from the Oriental Conciliabulum arrived in Chalcedon, they 'heard that eight days before we had arrived the Lord Nestorius was dismissed from Ephesus, free to go where he would, whereat we were much distressed, since verily deeds illegally and informally done now seem to have some force'. Two themes reappear over and over in these Epistles 152–70. First is the same denunciation we have seen now in the *Refutatio XII Anathematismorum*: the Antiochenes will not commune with any who do not perceive the Arian and Apollinarian 'blasphemy' in the twelve chapters. Second is bitterness that though both sides in the controversy have pronounced excommunication against the other in formal assemblies at Ephesus, and so both sides should refrain from ordaining or celebrating the Eucharist until the excommunications could be formally lifted and resolved by an imperially recognized synod, the followers of Cyril and Memnon of Ephesus are allowed churches to celebrate the sacraments, the Antiochenes not. In Epistle 167 Theodoret complains directly to the emperor Theodosius that his party responded immediately to the Emperor's request for their understanding of the situation by coming to Chalcedon to lay their case before him, but that Cyril's party refused

to take up the quarrel for the chapters and enter into discussion concerning them . . . ; they persisted in their heretical procedure, and yet they were allowed to attend the churches, and to perform their priestly functions. We, however, alike at Ephesus and

[39] *NPNF*, iii, 336, where the Greek original in ACO, Tom. I, vol. i, part 7, p. 77, is translated as 'Rufinianum'.

> here, have been for a long time deprived of communion; alike there and here we have undergone innumerable perils; and while we were being stoned and all but slain by slaves dressed up as monks, we took it all for the best.

While the Antiochenes waited in Chalcedon, Theodoret bitterly complains to the Emperor, Theodosius himself

> ordered the very men who were being accused of heresy and had been therefore some of them deposed by us, and others excommunicated and thereafter to be subjected to the discipline of the Church, to come to [Constantinople] and perform priestly functions, and ordain [Maximianus as successor to Nestorius]. We, however, who in the cause of true religion have undertaken a struggle so tremendous . . . have neither been bidden to enter the city to serve the cause of the imperilled faith and strive for orthodoxy; nor have we been permitted to return home.

No sycophant, Theodoret concludes this letter by bluntly informing the Emperor that schism will 'grow beyond all expectation', and that many

> indeed of the supporters of true religion will never allow the acceptance of Cyril's doctrines; we shall never allow it, who all are of the diocese of the East of your province, of the diocese of Pontus, of Asia, of Thrace, of Illyricum, and of the Italies, and who also sent to your piety the treatise of the most blessed Ambrose, written against their nascent superstition.

This Epistle 167 appears to have been composed before the 25 October consecration of Maximianus to succeed Nestorius at Constantinople, for Theodoret concludes it by imploring Theodosius 'to issue an edict that no ordination take place before the settlement of the orthodox faith'.

In Epistle 169 Theodoret writes to Alexander of Hierapolis that in one of the audiences, the Emperor took him aside privately to ask him what to do. Theodoret writes that he responded that Theodosius should do what his *comes largitionum* had done in Ephesus: namely, forbid either party to assemble 'before our meeting together to make known your righteous sentence'. The Emperor was unwilling to 'order the bishop', obviously Cyril, and Theodoret took quick advantage of the situation by the rather imperious, 'Neither shall you command us, and we will take a church and assemble. Your piety will find that there are many more on our side than on theirs.' He pointed out that when the Antiochenes did assemble in Chalcedon to spur on their supporters there, they 'had neither reading of the holy scripture nor oblation, but only prayer for the faith and for your majesty, and pious conversation'.

The result was imperial permission for the Orientals to continue these preaching missions in favour of their cause. Theodoret describes one such in the same letter:

On the fourth occasion I spoke at length about the faith and they listened with such delight that they did not go away till the seventh hour but held out even till the midday heat. An enormous crowd was gathered in a great court, with four verandahs, and I preached from above from a platform near the roof.

In the end, of course, this Antiochene effort proved fruitless, and just before the Cyrillians celebrated their victory by consecrating Maximianus the new patriarch of Constantinople in late October, the Orientals were sent home. Epistle 170, written to Bishop Rufus, sets out their theological viewpoint here at the very end of the 431 Council. Its Christology is pure Theodoretiana, right out of *De Incarnatione* and *Refutatio XII Anathematismorum*. We, writes Theodoret, appealed to the Nicene Creed, but many members of the Council had, 'to use the word of the prophet, "gone aside"', for they had abandoned the faith they received from the Fathers and had 'subscribed [to] the twelve chapters of Cyril of Alexandria, which teem with Apollinarian error, and are in agreement with the impiety of Arius and Eunomius'. The Orientals have in turn deposed Cyril and Memnon of Ephesus, 'the former as prime mover in the heresy, and the latter as his aider and abettor in all that has been done to ratify and uphold the chapters published to the destruction of the Church'. Further, 'we have also excommunicated all that have dared to subscribe [to] and support these impious doctrines till they shall have anathematized them and returned to the faith of the Fathers at Nicaea'.

Theodoret goes on to describe how Theodosius met with them five times, but the proofs that he and the other Orientals had in hand against the twelve chapters did not convince the Emperor. What is interesting to us is the familiar ring of his argument:

For in these very chapters the author of the noxious productions teaches that the Godhead of the Only-Begotten Son suffered, instead of the humanity which he assumed for the sake of our salvation, the indwelling Godhead manifestly appropriating the sufferings as of its own body, though suffering nothing in its own nature; and further that there is made one nature of both Godhead and humanity—for so he explains 'The Word was made flesh' as though the Godhead had undergone some change and been turned into flesh.

And, further, he anathematizes those who make a distinction between the terms used by apostles and evangelists about the Lord Christ, referring those of humiliation to the humanity, and those of divine glory to the Godhead, of the Lord Christ. It is with these views that Arians and Eunomians, attributing the terms of humiliation to the Godhead, have not shrunk from declaring God the Word to be made and created, of another being, and unlike the Father.

What blasphemy follows on these statements it is not difficult to perceive. There is introduced a confusion of the natures, and to God the Word are applied the words 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' and 'Father, if it be possible let this

cup pass from me,' the hunger, the thirst, and the strengthening by an angel; his saying, 'Now is my soul troubled,' and 'my soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death,' and all similar passages belonging to the humanity of Christ. Anyone may perceive how these statements correspond with the impiety of Arius and Eunomius; for they, finding themselves unable to establish the difference of being, connect, as has been said, the sufferings, and the terms of humiliation, with the Godhead of the Christ.

We have seen all this repeatedly. Theodoret went home from Ephesus with exactly the same Christology with which he went to the Council: the Christology of *De Incarnatione* and the *Refutatio*.

AFTERMATH TO EPHESUS: THE PENTALOGOS AND RECONCILIATION WITH CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA

The Antiochenes' return home, their two synods (one at Tarsus on their way home, the second at Antioch before the end of 431) upholding the decisions of the Conciliabulum, the reunion of Cyril and John of Antioch in 432–3, and Theodoret's resistance to reunion with them until 435 have all been recounted above in Chapter 1.[40] Here we want to look briefly at the theological content of the documents involved.

After returning to Cyrus late in 431, Theodoret set himself the task of defending his party's position with the *Pentalogos*, or *Five Books against Cyril and the Holy Council of Ephesus* (as the Latin editor of the *Collectio Palatina* terms it). The work has perished, mainly due to its condemnation in the thirteenth canon at Constantinople in 553. In the *Auctarium Theodoreti* Garnier published what he thought were fragments of the *Pentalogos*, which he labels *Theodoreti Pentalogium de Incarnatione*.[41] Eduard Schwartz and Marcel Richard have shown conclusively that most of this material is actually from Theodoret's *De Incarnatione*, save for three fragments which are identified as from the *Pentalogos* in Nicetas' catena on Luke.[42] Schwartz has also published in the *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*

[40] pp. 17–20 above.

[41] *PG*, 84: 65–88.

[42] Eduard Schwartz, *Zur Schrifstellerei Theodorets*, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerishchen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1922, 1, Abhandlung. (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Kommission des G. Franzschen Verlags (J. Roth), 1922), pp. 33, 35; Marcel Richard, 'Les Citations de Théodoret conservées dans la chaîne de Nicétas sur l'évangile selon Saint Luc', *Revue Biblique*, 43 (1934), 88–96. The three fragments which are actually from the *Pentalogos* in Garnier's *Auctarium* are *PG*, 84: 68D9–72B10 (=*ACO*, Tom. I, vol. v, part 1, pp. 166–7: items 4–5), 72B11–C3, and 85A12–B11 (=*ACO*, p. 167, item 6).

some seventeen items dealing with the *Pentalogos*, of which fifteen are excerpts from the text, all from the *Collectio Palatina*, a Latin collection of material dealing with the results of the Council of Ephesus.[43] Of these, items 4 and 5 are the same as Garnier's first authentic fragment (although Garnier gives us a somewhat fuller text), and item 6 corresponds with Garnier's third fragment. That leaves us with fifteen Latin fragments from the *Collectio Palatina* (three of which reappear in the Greek text in Garnier) and one Greek fragment in Garnier that does not appear in these Latin excerpts: sixteen fragments in all. They give us no new information on Theodoret's Christology, but rather represent themes, concerns, and expressions directly from *De Incarnatione*, *Refutatio XII Anathematismorum*, and the correspondence from Ephesus. It is all very familiar.

The issue, in *ACO* item 1, is Cyril's chapters.[44] Since the Council accepted them, largely, Theodoret believes, in ignorance, he feels it his duty to refute them more thoroughly than he has heretofore. Item 2 gives us the familiar communication of names, the name Emmanuel suggesting the two natures: 'Emmanuhel autem et eius qui sumpsit, et eius qui adsumptus est, naturas insinuat.' Note the by now not unusual play on the personal pronouns: 'the natures of him who assumes and of him who was assumed'. He who assumes and he who is assumed share common names on account of the unity (*unitas*) of God with 'him who is assumed from us'. Item 3 brings us to the familiar theme of a confusion or mixture of natures effecting a new single *substantia* which is neither God the Word nor the temple, but 'God would be the temple and the temple in nature God, for that is the effect of a mixture (*admixtio*)'. This immediately leads into how inconvenient this would be to a proper exegesis of 'Destroy this temple and in three days I shall rebuild it'.

Items 4 and 5 deal with exegeting the annunciation narrative and appear in a fuller Greek text in Garnier. Theodoret notes that when Gabriel lauds the newly conceived Christ in the womb of the Virgin, he always uses the future tense: 'He says, "He shall be great" (he does not say he is great); and "He shall be called Son of the Most High" (he does not say he is so called or is such) . . .', and so on. In other words, we have again the play on God the Word as eternally *being* what he is, over against the *becomingness* of the holy thing to be born of Mary. This leads directly to the old question of the Arian syllogism and the passibility of God:

[43] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. v, part 1. The excerpts from *Pentalogos* are found on pp. 165–9. See the preceding note for the corresponding fragments in Garnier.

[44] Ibid. 165. I shall simply refer to the *ACO* fragments hereafter by item number as they appear on pp. 165–9. Reference to Garnier in *PG* 84 will be in the context of discussing the *ACO* fragments with which they overlap. The English translation of these Latin fragments that follows in my discussion is my own.

What say you to this who attribute to the Truth proper passions on account of human struggles and so suffer struggles to be inferred to God? To whom do these accord? To God, who always is, to the Lord, to the King, to the Holy One, to the Son of God, or to him, the temple, which is assumed from the seed of David (aut ei templo quod ex semine Dauid sumptum est)?

Item 5 leads from this to the explanation of what the Antiochenes mean by their angry rejection of the accusation of worshipping two sons:

Therefore he did not foretell that God the Word was going to be great after birth from the Virgin, but the temple which was assumed from the Virgin, and united to the One assuming, and even co-named Son of God himself, that we should not adore two sons, but gazing on the invisible God in the visible temple, ascribe to that One one glory of veneration.

The Word is the One Son of God. By virtue of the union, the assumed temple is called, *co-named*, Son of God, which ontologically he or it is not, in order that by gazing on him—that is, by virtue of the prosopic union—the Word, the only true Son of God, may be venerated. As we shall see a little later, the only way in which Theodoret can see anyone's being justly condemned for worshipping two sons is if he denies any union of the man Jesus with divinity at all, such as was the case, he thought, for Paul of Samosata. In other words, a 'merely man' Adoptionism is for Theodoret 'worshipping two sons'.

In item 6, it is not God the Word who needs to be filled with the Spirit to meet Satan in the desert or who needs the power of the Spirit to go into Galilee to preach and heal, but rather the temple. Item 7 is the usual play on the 'I' who shall resuscitate the destroyed temple. In item 8 it is not the Most High who is exalted to the right hand of God, but 'that nature which God wakened, which the Jews killed, hanging it (*quam*) on a tree'. In item 9 it is the one raised and anointed with power in Acts 10 who is needful of the Spirit's virtues, not the Word of God who united the temple to himself and so works humanity's health. There is here a curious play on masculine and neuter pronouns, the humanity sometimes being described as '*qui*' and sometimes with a '*hoc*' in agreement with the neuter *templum*:

'solvite templum hoc et in triduo reaedificabo illud'. Ergo qui die tertia resurrexit, hoc suspenderunt in ligno Iudaei, hoc unxit deus spiritu sancto et virtute? Non enim deus verbum unctione vel operatione sancti spiritus eguit, sed templum quod ex semine David adsumens sibimet copulavit credentibusque tribuit omni modo sanitatem.

Item 11 seems to make a clear distinction between two subjects, for in exegeting 'Jesus Christ the same, yesterday, today, and forever', Theodoret asks:

how is the same one himself today, yesterday, and forever, temporal and eternal, in time and above time? For if he is eternal, he is not temporal, and if in time, he is not above time. (quomodo idem ipse heri et hodie et in saecula, et temporalis et aeternus, et in tempore et super tempora? Nam si aeternus est, temporalis non est, et si in tempore est, super tempus non est.)

In item 12 Theodoret insists, as always, that a distinction is to be made, as regards what is said of or by Christ, between that which belongs to the divinity and that which belongs to the humanity, and he adds, more or less, that the devil may take the anathemas proclaimed contrariwise at Ephesus, which in any case frighten only the more simple-minded. He defends the reputation of Theodore of Mopsuestia in item 14, failing to understand why he is attacked by the opposition after so many years of toil for the faith. Finally, in item 16, he denounces Cyril's Ephesine Council for letting loose again the blasphemy of Apollinaris. In the past he was able to reach only a few by personal contact; now, through the Cyrillian Council, 'that same one dances in the middle of the cities. You decorate yourselves with his proclamations' errors and novelties of expressions, bringing back his blasphemy which once had been consumed in the times.' One can hardly fault Theodoret's rhetorical wit.

Item 17, the last in the Latin *Collectio Palatina*, explains, rather intemperately for this usually cautious apologist, how the Antiochenes are able justly to talk sometimes of two *prosopa* in Christ, sometimes of one. In it is clearly reflected the role that the Stoic doctrine of being plays in Theodoret's Christology, and while it says nothing that we have not already encountered in his Christology and that of Theodore before him, the way he puts it could only have inflamed the Cyrillians. Further, it is interesting that here he prefers the analogy of the union of husband and wife in one flesh to that of the union of soul and body in one human being.

What, he says, the Lord uttered about man and wife, how already they be not two, but one flesh, corresponds without doubt with the natures remaining under distinction. And just as there is here nothing at odds with the number two because only one flesh is mentioned (for clearly one refers to the kind), so here unity of person is not at odds with a difference of natures (ita et hic personae unitas nihil obest differentiae naturarum). Therefore when we discern the natures, we say the nature of the Word of God is whole and the person without doubt perfect (for it is not possible without a person to affirm a substance), and also we similarly confess a perfect human nature with its own person. But when we consider the conjunction, then precisely we announce with merit one person. (Denique cum naturas discernimus, dei verbi naturam integram dicimus et personam sine dubitatione perfectam [nec enim sine persona fas est asseuerare substantiam], perfectam quoque naturam humanam cum sua persona similiter confitemur; cum vero ad coniunctionem respicimus, tunc demum unam personam merito nuncupamus.)

The fragment in Garnier's *Auctarium* which does not appear in the *Collectio Palatina*, *PG*, 84: 72B11–C3, explains how Jesus advanced in wisdom and grace. As we have seen before often enough, that which grows in wisdom and grace is the human soul and body, not God the Word, 'from which it is manifest that God the Word assumed a rational soul'.

If anything, these fragments of Theodoret's *Pentalogos*, assuming we can trust what an obviously unfriendly collector has passed on to us in Latin, reinforce our interpretation of Theodoret's Christology as the same as Mopsuestia's two-subject Christology, particularly in the Latin items 11 and 17.

By the next year, 432, Antioch was beginning to feel the pinch of isolation from the imperial court and the strain of schism. Gradually, led by John of Antioch, most of the Antiochenes came to accept the loss of Nestorius and turned to finding some way to reach a theological compromise with Cyril. We have seen in Chapter 1 how Theodoret joined John and other of the Oriental bishops at Beroea or Antioch and was most likely the drafter of six short articles of faith which were then carried to Cyril by Paul, bishop of Emesa. Since they were apparently designed so that reunion could be effected if Cyril accepted any one of them, we possess only the one he in fact accepted and reproduced as the formula of union in his 433 letter to John of Antioch.[45] After the usual appeal to the Nicene Creed as the ultimate norm of the faith to which nothing may be added, Theodoret framed the crucial paragraph in terms that could be easily interpreted from the point of view of the Christology we have seen him develop up to this point, while omitting for the sake of peace terms that outraged the Cyrillian party. Even the insistence that 'evangelical and apostolic phrases about the Lord' be attributed to the proper natures is phrased most tactfully.

We confess, then, our Lord Jesus Christ, the unique Son of God, perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and body; begotten of the Father before the ages according to the Godhead, the same in the last days for us and for our salvation born of Mary the Virgin according to the humanity; the same consubstantial with the Father in Godhead, and consubstantial with us in humanity, for a union of two natures took place; therefore we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord. According to this understanding of the unconfused union we confess the holy Virgin to be *Theotokos*, because God the Word was made flesh and lived as man, and from the very conception united to himself the temple taken from her. As to the evangelical and apostolic phrases about the Lord, we know that theologians treat some in common, as of one *prosopon*, and distinguish others, as of two natures, and interpret the God-befitting ones in connection with the Godhead of Christ, and the humble ones of the humanity.

[45] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 4, pp. 15–20; text and translation in Bindley, pp. 138–48, 220–3; the translation used here is in Hardy and Richardson, pp. 355–8.

The perfect diplomatic statement: both parties could read in it their own Christology, their own model of Christ. Absent are the offensive insistence on two *hypostaseis* and the insistence that 'Christ' is one *prosopon* but not one *physis*—in other words the Antiochenes find words and terms to express their prosopic union which Cyril can interpret as expressing his hypostatic union. But there is nothing here that would require us to see the formula of union as the Antiochenes giving up their prosopic union, which is the crucial issue for this study.

Cyril had been careful in his third dogmatic letter to Nestorius to insist that the divine *physis* was not changed into the human, nor the human into the divine, just as he had been equally careful to stress that the flesh the Word 'became' was 'man ensouled with a rational soul'. For him the Godhead and the humanity remain realities in the one *hypostasis* of the Word of God after the union, which would conceivably allow him to understand the final sentence of the formula of union, not as a direct contradiction of his fourth anathema ('If anyone distributes between two *prosopa* or *hypostaseis* the terms . . . , let him be anathema'), but as expressing his very point in that anathema. That would be so, if in reading it he took the formula's one *prosopon* to signify what he meant by one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis*, and the two *physeis* to mean what he meant by continuing Godhead and humanity—that is, natures. In other words, this part of the formula could easily be read by an Antiochene as a classical statement of his prosopic union, while on the other hand, Cyril, without necessarily actually using the words themselves, would have to have read this sentence in such a way that he was actually making the distinction between *physis* and *hypostasis* that was to make Chalcedon possible eighteen years later. The Antiochenes could certainly in good conscience say that the 'evangelical terms' could be applied to the one *prosopon* of the union, while at the same time they would also need to be assigned, when looking at the two *physeis* and the two *hypostaseis* they saw in the 'Christ', some to the one *physis*, others to the other *physis*. On the other hand, associating the formula's term *physis* ontologically with the continuing realities of Godhead and humanity which he is altogether prepared to concede in the union, Cyril would not have found it impossible to allow a distribution of terms to these natures as long as they equally applied to his concept of the one *hypostasis* of the Word of God himself. The formula's diplomatic phrasing allows both Antiochene *communicatio nominum* and Cyrillian *communicatio idiomatum*.

In addition to citing the formula of union as acceptable to him, Cyril's letter went on to explain, once again, how for him the Word forever remains what he is as God, that he is impassible, that the flesh is truly human, and all this in terms remarkably Antiochene. Both sides were striving to find peaceful

solutions. Cyril hotly denies that the body of Christ 'came down from heaven and was not of the holy Virgin', that is, inconsubstantial with us:

For you must surely understand that almost all our fight for the faith was connected with our declaring that the holy Virgin is *Theotokos*. But if we say that the holy body of Christ the Saviour of us all was from heaven and not of her, how could she be thought of as *Theotokos*? . . . But since God the Word, who descended from above and from heaven, emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, and is styled Son of Man, while remaining what he is, that is, God—for he is unchangeable and unalterable by nature—now being thought of as one with his own flesh, he is said to come down from heaven . . . for there is one Lord Jesus Christ, although the difference of the *physeis* is not ignored, out of which we say that the ineffable union was effected. As to those who say that there was a mixture or confusion or blending of God the Word with the flesh, let your holiness stop their mouths. For some probably report this about me, as though I had thought or said so. But I am so far away from thinking thus that I think they are out of their minds who can at all suppose that a shadow of turning could occur in connection with the divine nature of the Word. For he ever remains the same, and is not altered; nor indeed could he ever be altered or subject to variation. In addition we all confess that the Word of God is impassible, though in his all-wise dispensation of the mystery, he is seen to attribute to himself the sufferings undergone by his own flesh.

Peace was made. Both sides could see their own very different Christologies in these expressions and be content to let be. Indeed, both sides seem to have decided that the other thought what they thought. Witness Cyril's opening remark:

That the division which arose between the Churches was entirely superfluous and unjustified, we are now thoroughly convinced, since my lord the most God-beloved bishop Paul has produced a paper containing an unimpeachable confession of the faith, and assures us that this was drawn up by your holiness and the most devout bishops there.

But, as we shall see, it was not to be.

As recounted in Chapter 1 above, John of Antioch accepted the reunion joyfully; Theodoret did not. His Epistles 171 and 172 show us that he interpreted Cyril's letter exactly as I suggested above, that he understood Cyril to be withdrawing the Twelve Anathemas, and that in no way did he understand his acceptance of Cyril's letter as orthodox to imply that he was deserting Nestorius. Indeed, he remained out of communion with Cyril and John for two more years, until it became clear that John could accept communion with him while Theodoret still insisted that he did not condemn Nestorius (even if forced by political necessity to recognize the reality that Nestorius was deposed from the see of Constantinople, unjust as that was)

and that accepting the formula of union did not mean accepting the Twelve Anathemas. In Epistle 171 he writes to John of Antioch to say that the bishops of his area have assembled and

> read the Egyptian's letter. We have carefully examined its purport, and we have discovered that its contents are quite in accordance with our own statements and entirely opposed to the twelve chapters, against which up to the present time we have continued to wage war, as being contrary to true religion.
>
> Their teaching was that God was carnally made flesh; that there was a union of *hypostasis*, and that the combination in union was of *physis*, and that God the Word was the first-born from the dead. They forbade all distinction in the terms used of our Lord, and further contained other doctrines at variance with the seeds sown by the apostles.... The present script, however, is beautified by the apostolic nobility of origin. For in it our Lord Jesus Christ is exhibited as perfect God and perfect human being; it shows two *physeis*, and the distinction between them; an unconfounded union, made not by mixture and compounding, but in a manner ineffable and divine, and distinctly preserving the properties of the *physeis*; the impassibility and immortality of God the Word; the passibility and temporary surrender to death of the temple, and its resurrection by the power of the united God.

Theodoret's attitude towards Nestorius was consistent throughout the crisis. In fact, he was not in any way to deviate from the position he held in the fall of 431 until he was forced to anathematize Nestorius openly at the same city twenty years later. In his Epistle 169 Theodoret had written to Alexander of Hierapolis that 'the most pious emperor especially cannot bear to hear his [Nestorius'] name mentioned', but Theodoret vowed that he would 'not cease to serve the interests of this our father'. It was a vow he was to keep faithfully until the bitter pill of Chalcedon in 451.

During the negotiations with Cyril the next year, it is clear that Theodoret considered Nestorius to be perfectly orthodox in the sense of sharing completely the same Antiochene Christology that he himself confessed, and that one of the stumbling blocks for union with the Cyrillians was the Alexandrine's insistence that Nestorius be anathematized. In Epistle 177 he writes to Andreas of Samosata that he is as yet unsatisfied with the latest letters from Cyril because they still require for reunion that the Orientals condemn Nestorius' doctrine, and 'your holiness knows well that if anyone anathematizes without distinction the doctrine of that most holy and venerable bishop, it is just the same as though he seemed to anathematize true religion'. In items 155 and 159 in the Latin *Collectio Casinensis*[46] he repeats the same insistence that Nestorius has been wronged unjustly and cannot be abandoned by those who share his faith, 'because I would not bear to consent

[46] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. iv, pp. 104, 106.

to the deposition of my most holy lord, Bishop Nestorius, most beloved of God.... Nor, therefore, let anyone represent to your holiness that I would ever consent to do this, God cooperating with me and strengthening me'. In Epistle 174 he writes to Himerius of Nicomedia that Cyril's letter is in harmony with the Antiochene doctrine, and that Himerius may in good faith communicate with the Egyptians and Constantinopolitans 'because they profess to hold our faith', so long as Himerius has recovered the 'churches entrusted divinely to you', and so long as he need not give his consent to the alleged condemnation of 'the very holy and venerable Nestorius'. So it goes on through Epistles 175–8.

The point is clear: throughout the period Theodoret considered both Cyril and Nestorius to have been charged with heresy, and it would be unjust to commune with the one and not with the other who was innocent of the charges against him in the first place. For Theodoret, reunion with Cyril meant the latter's capitulation to the Oriental position, which is that of Nestorius; it meant dropping the Twelve Chapters and the condemnation of Nestorius, and acknowledging two *physeis* in Christ. All but the rejection of Nestorius were met by the formula of union in 433. For two years, as we have seen in Chapter 1, Theodoret held out, and finally had his way. He had accepted the orthodoxy of Cyril's formula of union and the way in which Cyril interpreted it to mean there was in the union no change of *physis* of the Word of God, and union with John of Antioch did not require him to consent to anything more than to condemn anything in Nestorius' writings that might be contrary to evangelical and apostolic doctrine. For Theodoret there was nothing to condemn, of course. As we have seen, this was merely a politic way for both him and John of Antioch to maintain a clear conscience, for he clearly interpreted the formula of union to mean that Cyril repudiated the Twelve Chapters and adopted the position of the Antiochenes and Nestorius. Epistle 173 puts it plainly:

> For they who by their impious reasoning had confused the natures of our Saviour and therefore insulted the most holy and venerable Nestorius . . . have once again learned the truth, adopting the statement of him who in the cause of truth has borne the brunt of battle. For instead of one nature they now confess two, anathematizing all who preach mixture and confusion. They adore the impassible Godhead of Christ; they attribute passion to the flesh; they distinguish between the terms of the Gospels, ascribing the lofty and divine to the Godhead, and the lowly to the humanity. Such are the writings from Egypt.

The Christology of 435—that is, at the moment of reconciliation with Cyril by reunion with John of Antioch, who was already in communion with Cyril since 433—is simply that of *De Incarnatione*: the two-subject Christology of

Theodore of Mopsuestia. All the usual fundamentals we have seen developed appear over and over again. Reunion with Cyril was interpreted by Theodoret to mean Cyril's coming over to his own point of view, which he, incidentally, clearly identifies with Nestorius'. I now turn to examining the question of whether or not Theodoret modified his Christology during the period of writing his scriptural commentaries, the apologia for Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia against Cyril's attack on them, the great Christological work the *Eranistes*, and then, finally, after Chalcedon, the *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium*—modified it, that is, from a two-subject prosopic union model to a truly hypostatic union, as Bertram claimed and Grillmeier hoped.

6

The Mature Theodoret, 433–445

A decade of uneasy peace followed, until the Eutychian controversy erupted in the late 440s.[1] It was a period of much writing for Theodoret, including his biblical commentaries on the Song of Songs, Daniel, Ezekiel, and the Twelve Minor Prophets in the early 430s, and those on the Psalter, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the Pauline epistles sometime after 435. Between 438 and 440 Theodoret entered into a spirited *Defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia* against the attack made on them by Cyril of Alexandria. This was followed in 440 by his history of Syriac monasticism, *Historia Religiosa.* An uncharacteristically quiet period followed (perhaps the time of preparing the second set of biblical commentaries mentioned above) before Theodoret's great *summa* on Christology appeared, the *Eranistes*, in 447 or 448. There quickly followed the *Historia Ecclesiastica* (448–9), *There is One Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ* (448), and another large collection of letters written to defend himself against the attacks of Dioscorus' party. After the Council of Chalcedon we have a second edition of *Eranistes* (indeed, this is the only version we have), fragments of a letter from Theodoret to John of Aegae on why he agreed to the one *hypostasis* formula at Chalcedon, the very interesting *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium*, which contains a chapter of disputed authenticity on Nestorius, and two works of *Quaestiones* on the Octateuch and the Kings and Chronicles.

None of these use those earlier Antiochene 'concrete formulae' which had been so favoured by Theodoret to describe the humanity in Christ, such as 'the perfect man', or 'the assumed man', except in one work. In the *Defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia* he liberally quotes older Fathers of the Church, approved at Alexandria, who had used such formulae in the past, to show that Diodore and Theodore could not be condemned solely on the basis of their use of such terms. But even here, Theodoret does not use the 'concrete formulae' any longer in his own explanations of the Incarnation. What is found, then, is an interesting shift in terminology and language that

[1] Many of Cyril's followers were very unhappy with his terms of restored communion with Antioch in 433, regarding any statement which Theodoret of Cyrus could sign or draft as being *ipso facto* suspect of heresy.

can often sound remarkably Cyrillian. The question is whether this also represents a change in Christological model, in the way Theodoret perceived the Christ. I believe that the issue is determined, once again, by the way he handles the issues of *communicatio idiomatum* and Theopaschitism.

After looking very briefly at the tenth of his sermons on providence, I shall examine in this chapter the Isaiah and Pauline commentaries, the most important for the question of Theodoret's Christology, then in the next chapter the *Eranistes*, followed by *There is One Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ*, the epistles of the late 440s, the fragments of the letter to John of Aegae, and the *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium.*

DE PROVIDENTIA ORATIONES DECEM

There are extant ten sermons or discourses on divine providence by Theodoret. Earlier authors such as Garnier, Schulze, Bardenhewer, and Opitz dated them prior to the Council of Ephesus, whereas later writers like Richard, Bertram, and Brok put them after 435, finding in them some suggestions of doctrinal development.[2] Obviously addressed to an educated audience, most likely at Antioch, the first five orations argue from natural order to divine providence, the second five from moral and social order. The tenth sermon lifts up the Incarnation as the ultimate proof of divine providence. I found three remarks in it of Christological interest, but while they do support the idea that Theodoret gave up the use of the so-called concrete terms to refer to the humanity of Christ after 433, they show us nothing to demonstrate that he had moved beyond a Christology of prosopic union. In columns 751–4 he refers to the familiar theme of Christ's victory over Satan in the wilderness temptations, but unlike the case in *De Incarnatione* or the materials from the debate around the Council of Ephesus, there is no clear account of just who it is who won the victory over Satan, whether the eternal Word or the temple assumed by him. Rather, the victor is referred to simply in terms of the names

[2] *PG*, 83: 555–774. There is an English translation by Thomas Halton, *Theodoret of Cyrus on Divine Providence*, Ancient Christian Writers, 49, ed. Walter J. Burghardt and Thomas C. Lawler (New York: Newman Press, 1988) and a French translation by Yvan Azéma, *Discours sur la providence* (Paris: Société d'Édition 'Les Belles Lettres', 1954), both without a Greek text. In his introduction Azéma argues for a date of *c.* 437. Marcel Richard, 'Notes sur l'évolution doctrinale de Théodoret', *Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques*, 25 (1936), 477, dates *De Providentia* between 433 and 437 because there is no use of the 'concrete formulae' for the assumed humanity. Regarding references for other authors' dating, see J. Quasten, *Patrology*, iii: 545.

applied heretofore to the common *prosopon*: Second Adam, Christ, or the Saviour. Is the distribution of actions and properties to each of the natures not the issue here in these sermons on divine providence, as it had been in *De Incarnatione*? Is Theodoret avoiding the issue where it need not be raised? Has he changed his terminology, or his Christological model?

Shortly before that discussion is a remark about the Incarnation which seems so characteristic of what we have seen before: statements which could be read as representing Cyril's model of Christ, but which can just as well represent Theodoret's Antiochene prosopic union:

> [J]ust as the Only-Begotten Son of God himself (who is the form of God . . . the One who is in the beginning . . . being God through whom everything has come into being) took the form of a servant, and became in the likeness of humanity, and was found in the shape of a human being, as a man, and appeared on earth, and lived with human beings, took up our weakness, and endured our diseases.[3]

A statement follows soon after this one that does omit the concrete terms for the humanity which were so offensive to Cyril's party, but which represents in reality the same Antiochene concept of how the Virgin can be styled *Theotokos* which we have already frequently found:

> The Virgin was the one who conceived and bore the Lord Christ. And when you hear 'Christ', have in mind the Only-Begotten Son, begotten of the Father before time, wearing human nature (*physis*), and do not consider defiled God's proclaimed economy, for nothing can stain the pure nature (*physis*).[4]

'Christ' refers to the common *prosopon*, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Theodoret simply leaves out offending terms, but he is still busily denying the major premiss of the Arian syllogism. The only thing that has changed in these sermons on divine providence is the omission of those concrete terms for the humanity. This is still Theodoret's prosopic, not hypostatic, union.

THE ISAIAH COMMENTARY

Theodoret wrote commentaries on the Song of Songs, Daniel, Ezekiel, and the Twelve Minor Prophets which are difficult to date precisely. They were followed

[3] *PG*, 83: 745–7. The translation of the original Greek is mine. *The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon* (Utrecht and Antiverp: Spectrum Publishers; Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1965).

[4] Ibid. 748. The English translation is mine.

by one on the Psalms, which M. Brok dated between 441 and 449.[5] The commentary on Isaiah, which Theodoret says in his prologue he wrote as the last of his commentaries on the prophets except for one on Jeremiah, seems to follow. Then would come that on Jeremiah, followed by commentaries on Paul's epistles, and finally, in the 450s, by a treatise in the form of question and answer on the Pentateuch, Joshua, Judges, and Ruth, and another on the Books of Kings and Chronicles.[6] Quasten describes these as 'among the finest specimens of the Antiochene School' of biblical exegesis, in which Theodoret 'adopts a middle course, avoiding the radicalism of Theodore of Mopsuestia and his excessive literalness and allowing an allegorical and typological explanation, whenever this appears preferable'.[7] For one example, Theodoret rejected the idea that the Song of Songs is a human love poem, preferring an exegesis of it as the love of Christ for the Church, making ample use of Origen's commentary on the book. He considered Theodore of Mopsuestia's account of it as Solomon's answer to criticism of his marriage to an Egyptian princess as 'not even fitting in the mouth of a crazy woman'.[8]

Of all these, the commentaries on Isaiah and the Pauline epistles are important for this study. The Isaiah commentary was virtually unknown until its publication from a single manuscript in 1932, found in the Metochion of the Holy Sepulchre in Constantinople by August Möhle.[9] The commentary was unknown to Jacob Sirmond in his 1642 edition of Theodoret's works. He had to content himself with what he could find of it in the Patristic catenae on the Septuagint text of Isaiah. Likewise, Schulze was unable to locate a manuscript of it for his eighteenth-century edition of Sirmond's work. Thus the material under this title in *PG*, 81: 215–94, represents what Sirmond could find in only three manuscripts of the two distinct families of Patristic catenae on the text of the prophets. Consequently, as Möhle says, it 'shows gross defects'.

In the commentary Theodoret's theological opponents are the Arians. This is at best an indirect attack on Cyril's Ephesine Christology, since, it will be remembered, to Theodoret the pre-Union Creed Cyril was simply an Apollinarian who refused to attribute a rational soul to Christ's humanity.[10]

[5] M. Brok, 'Touchant la date du commentaire sur le psautier de Théodoret de Cyr', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 44 (1949), 552–6. Cf. also the introduction to Theodoret of Cyrus, *Commentary on the Psalms*, The Fathers of the Church, 101, 102 (Washington.: Catholic University Press, 2000, 2001).

[6] Cf. Quasten, iii. 539–42. [7] Ibid. 539. [8] Ibid. 540.

[9] *Theodoret vom Kyros, Kommentar zu Jesaia*, ed. August Möhle, Mitteilungen des Septuaginta-Unternehmens der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, 5 (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1932).

[10] It may be that Theodoret avoids any *direct* attack on Cyril's theology since he is technically at peace and in communion with Cyril, whose party is politically dominant. The bishop of

And for Theodoret that led inevitably to Arianism, since it involved the Logos in human passions. On the other hand, it is possible that Theodoret felt no need to continue a battle he thought that his Antiochene party had won in what appeared to him Cyril's capitulation in the 433 Union Creed. He is writing a biblical commentary, and his concern reverts to his ancient one before the conflict of 431–3. His purpose in exegeting Isaiah's prophecies is to assert firmly the divinity of the Logos over against his ancient enemies, the Arians.

Over and over again in commenting on individual verses Theodoret stresses the one divinity (*theotes*) of the Father and the Son and the different persons in the Trinity. The word Theodoret continues to prefer to express the distinctions in the Godhead is *prosopa*. Only once or twice does *hypostasis* appear in the work. As we have seen heretofore, *physis* is used interchangeably with *ousia*, appearing much more frequently than the latter term, and is used to signify the human and the divine natures in 'the Christ', or 'the Lord Christ'.

In Christ there is the divine *physis*, the 'one divinity' of the Father, to whom the Son is *homoousios*, and there is also a fully human nature (*anthropeia physis*). This term, together with *anthrōpotikos*, *anthropotes*, and *anthropos*, are the terms used throughout to describe Christ's humanity. Save perhaps for the last above, the 'concrete terms' for the humanity, such as 'the assumed man', are not used, as Richard found for all the post-433 works, save the *Defence of Diodore and Theodore*. In the passion of Christ, it is the humanity or human nature which suffers and dies; the *theotes* remains untouched, though the Logos is said to 'make the passion his own'. Growth processes are attributed to the *anthropos*, the human being, or the *anthropine physis*.

There is almost no effort to articulate how the divinity and the humanity are made one in the Incarnation. As in the earlier works, how the Logos assumes the humanity into union with himself is not explained or even discussed. We see the old familiar distinction between the way the Logos *is* and the way the humanity *becomes*. In so many words we confront the theology of *De Incarnatione* toned down and expressed without the 'concrete terms' that caused such offence to Cyril's party. There is little here to help us decide whether Theodoret has moved from his earlier Christological model to Cyril's hypostatic union. We encounter the same kinds of confessional

Cyrus was at pains not to attack the Alexandrine party directly later in the *Eranistes* (447–8) or even while writing *Historia Ecclesiastica* after being exiled by the 449 Council of Ephesus. It may also be true that they are correct who think that Theodoret had altered his terminology, perhaps even his Christology, as a result of reading Cyril. In any of these cases, he would not have attacked the victorious Alexandrine party openly. To attack the consequences of Arianism is a subtle but entirely characteristic approach on Theodoret's part to get at what he saw as the dangers in Alexandria's Christology.

statements we have seen before, statements that, taken by themselves, *could* certainly be interpreted as reflecting an evolution toward a genuine hypostatic union; but there is nothing which compels them to be understood that way, particularly since in his treatment of passibility Theodoret still seems totally unable to say that the Logos suffers and dies on the cross. As before, this is always the function of the humanity. In other words, a true *communicatio idiomatum* still does not appear. A few examples from the text will suffice.

In his commentary on Isaiah 5: 1–7, Theodoret writes that the 'Beloved' who has planted a vineyard (Israel) is 'the Only-Begotten Word of God'. Indeed, it was always the Word who tended Israel 'from the beginning'.[11] Discussing 7: 14, 'the Virgin is with child and will soon give birth to a son whom she will name Emmanuel', Theodoret does not refer to the *Theotokos* debate in any way, but devotes himself to refuting arguments that the mother of Christ was not virginal at his conception. It is an apology against 'the accusation of the Jews'. On the other hand, Theodoret's exegesis of the word 'Emmanuel' gives us one of those passages that certainly sounds Cyrillian, did we not already have ample cause to suspect that his use of words such as 'name' and what he means by the visible nature making the invisible nature visible reflect his Christology of prosopic union:

> For Isaiah names the foetus Emmanuel. The name signifies the God with us, the incarnate God, the God who has assumed human nature, the God united (*henothenta*) to this nature, the form of God and the form of the servant made known in one Son. And so he foretells this way the human and the divine properties.[12]

We have seen all this before. If one came to this passage, and others like it in this Isaiah commentary, without having studied the earlier works, one might well find expressed in it Cyril's hypostatic union. On the other hand, in the light of the analysis of the earlier chapters we have seen how Theodoret characteristically describes his concept of prosopic union in terms of a common name shared by the Word, who has taken the free, rational human subject into union with himself. We have seen how his concept of prosopic union involves the Word's using the *prosopon* which is proper to the human *hypostasis* to 'make known' his own invisible *hypostasis* and *prosopon*. Lastly, Theodoret once again characteristically insists on the continuing distinction of the two natures, each with its own properties retained precisely to itself. I can see nothing here, of necessity, beyond the concept of prosopic union found in all Theodoret's earlier works. What he has done is simply omit the

[11] Möhle, p. 23. References to Theodoret's Isaiah commentary will be to this text, given in page numbers of the text or simply to the chapter and verse in Isaiah, the commentary being arranged that way. The English translations from Möhle's Greek text are mine.

[12] Ibid. 39.

more grossly offending of the so-called concrete terms, though even in this commentary the expression ‘the human being’ (*ho anthropos*) is used.

In his exegesis of Isaiah 7: 15–16, Theodoret expresses himself in a way that at first glance seems almost Monophysite, but closer analysis shows that he is insisting on the distinction of the natures and attributing to each nature the *idiomata* appropriate to it—in other words, the old communication of names from one nature to the other because of the prosopic union is what we have here, and not a true *communicatio idiomatum*. His text of the verses reads: ‘Before he (Emmanuel) knows or prefers evil, he will choose the good. Wherefore before the child knows good or evil, he will be disobedient to evil to choose the good.’ He says in his exegesis that this statement pertains not to the man but to the Word:

> This does not characterize a human being (*anthropon*) but is beyond a human being (*anthropon*). For the nature of human beings, when newly born, does not receive the ability to distinguish between the good and the lesser, but requires the maturity of times and durations and then learns what is good and what is evil. But Emmanuel rejected the choice of the lesser from swaddling clothes.

The One who is from the beginning, the divine Word, always knows the difference between good and evil. Due to his electing the man into union with himself and his consequential grace imparted to him, the man avoids evil from birth. The man, the man’s nature, does not exceed his nature, does not know how to choose between good and evil until he reaches the mature insight that experience brings, but the Word does, and by his grace keeps the human being from sin until he reaches that point. Clearly ‘the child’ of Isaiah’s text is understood by Theodoret as ‘not knowing’, and that means that the man, the humanity, is doing exactly what is appropriate for him in Theodoret’s prosopic union. His knowledge is limited to that of a babe. It is the Word to whom it is appropriate or proper to say that he knows the difference between good and evil and will choose the good before the child knows that distinction. In short, a Cyrillian could certainly read his faith into Theodoret’s exegesis, could find hypostatic union here; but likewise, there is nothing here to preclude Theodoret’s earlier Antiochene prosopic union. As with the formula of union, both sides could easily utilize this pacific exegesis. The offending terminology is gone. It is carefully worded. But it is not a statement that clearly indicates that Theodoret has done anything more than drop offending terminology. It is not the Word, for example, who has to grow in understanding through his own proper human nature, but the man. The Word in himself is always insightful. What is attributed to each, the Word and the human nature, the man, is attributed *kata physin*, according to nature. The Arian syllogism remains unbroken.

When exegeting 8: 9–10, which explains that the name 'Emmanuel' means 'God with us', Theodoret does not discuss the union of divine and human natures in the Christ, but simply uses this as an anti-Arian proof text. Emmanuel is God who has 'sovereignty over all'.[13]

So too Isaiah 9: 6 (9: 5 in the text of the septuagint), 'For to us a child is born, to us a son is given' is exegeted as simply an anti-Arian argument. The best Septuagint reading is 'And his name will be called *Angelos* of Great Counsel', and it is the reading that Theodoret prefers to the variant 'Wonderful Counsellor, Mighty God, Powerful Prince of Peace, Father of the age to come'. These are all, in any case, proper names for the child. Theodoret accordingly interprets the first of the two readings to describe Emmanuel as the announcer with his own voice of the Father's counsel and will. He does go on, however, to exegete the Christological titles in the variant reading. 'Wonderful Counsellor' indicates that Emmanuel 'shares in the paternal will, as knowing whatsoever the Father knows'. Nothing could be more powerfully anti-Arian than 'Mighty God'. 'Powerful Prince of Peace' means, writes Theodoret, that Emmanuel is 'powerful not as accomplishing under the power of another, but as he himself the master of all things, a fact which refutes the abomination of Arius, for it points out that he is of equal honour to the Father, not his assistant'.[14] Finally, 'just as Adam is named father of the present age, thus he is also of the age to come'.

While, on the one hand, Theodoret has used these prophetic names to assert the divinity of the Word, he applies 'upon the throne of David' to Emmanuel as 'the child which has come from David according to the flesh'.[15] But again this need indicate nothing more than Theodoret's heretofore characteristic communication of the name 'Emmanuel' to both natures, rather than a true *communicatio idiomatum*. Once again his explanation of 'For to us a child is born . . .' could easily be read as Cyrillian by an Alexandrine: 'The child born for us is the Only-Begotten Son of God putting on the human nature and working our salvation.'[16] On the other hand, it could just as easily be read as prosopic union by one of the Antiochene party, the Word 'putting on the human nature' through conveying to the *prosopon* of the human child the honour of being called Son of God by virtue of the union. To see the child, consequently, is to have the invisible 'made visible'.

He sums this up very neatly in terms that are so very typically his, simply omitting the controversial terms and selecting others which carry the same

[13] Möhle, p. 44.
[14] Ibid. 49.
[15] Ibid. 50.
[16] Ibid. 48.

significance but in which the Cyrillians could find their own Christology, saying of Isaiah 11: 1, 'And a staff shall come forth from the root of Jesse':

Here he shows plainly the generation of Emmanuel from the Virgin and then the pregnancy from the Holy Spirit. For [quoting Isa. 8: 3] he says, 'They came to the prophetess and she conceived.' For in the virginal womb the All-Holy Spirit formed the temple of the Word of God, the form of a servant, which taking up from her pregnancy God the Word united to himself. Afterward he shows us the worth of the child born and teaches his divine names, that he is the mighty God, the powerful Prince of Peace, the Father of the age to come. And then he teaches his fleshly kinship because he comes forth according to the flesh from Jesse, and Jesse is the father of David.[17]

Commenting on Isaiah 11: 10, 'and the resting place [of the root of Jesse in which the nations hope] shall be a glory', Theodoret refers to the growth of Emmanuel, but not in such a way as to suggest that he is doing anything more than attributing a property of the human nature to the common *prosopon* which shares the names of each nature; that is, he does not clearly attribute growth and human maturation to the *hypostasis* of the Word:

Since he spoke of his growth and pointed to the economy's successful activities and its origin, he also points out the passion occurring in its midst, after which he gained the rule of the world. Therefore, on account of this he gives the death the name of resting-place and glory. For unknown before the Incarnation by the nations, after the Incarnation and the passion he receives divine worship from all as Creator and God.[18]

To judge from his previous works, Theodoret need mean here no more than that the Word is properly worshipped as Creator and God, and that because of the union with the man or the human nature, the *prosopon* proper to the man or the humanity may, not because it truly is the *prosopon* of the divine but because of the honour of the union, be said to be worshipped. In any case, he sounds almost contemporary in the way he states that Emmanuel, though the union with the pre-existent Word is from the moment of conception, does not receive the status of being worshipped by the nations until after the passion.

Theodoret returns to the discussion of attributing human growth processes, experiences, and maturation to the *anthropos* when discussing the Suffering Servant poems. Considering the descent from Abraham in Isaiah 42: 6, he says carefully that these things are said of 'the one whom he calls the Servant and they are said as to an *anthropos*'.[19] The human attributes here, Theodoret says, are those in Luke 2: 40 and 52—Jesus' growth in stature, wisdom, grace, and in the Spirit—and then he moves on to Matthew 26: 39, 'Father, . . . let this cup pass from me.' To ascribe, he says, growth in wisdom

[17] Ibid. 59. [18] Ibid. 62. [19] Ibid. 66.

and grace and in the Spirit and then fear of death to the Word's divine being is to dare to call that divinity a creature.[20] This is very carefully worded: human passions attributed to the *divinity* of the Word do indeed render the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God a creature. It is essentially an anti-Arian point. In *De Incarnatione* Theodoret made it quite clear that he broke the Arian syllogism by denying that the Word is the subject of the human passions, and so far here in the Isaiah commentary there is nothing to make us believe that he has really understood what Cyril was getting at: namely, denying that what is attributed to the Word must be attributed to him in his divine nature (*kata physin*). To say that Theodoret has changed from his earlier Christological model of two subjects and adopted Cyril's one-subject Christology would mean that he understands consciously that he could deny that human passions should be attributed to the divine *physis*, or nature, of the Word, but that they could be attributed to him, that is, to his *hypostasis*, because he makes the human *physis* his own and experiences human passions as the subject of them. In all fairness to the search to find this Christological change in Theodoret at this point, as opposed to terminological evolution, I think we have found nothing so far that could demonstrate that he has made this change in ontologically distinguishing between attributions to the *physis* and to the *hypostasis* of the divine Word. To my mind, this is the key to the issue of Christological evolution. To sum up, once again, a Cyrillian could certainly read his faith into this exegesis, but there is no reason to suppose that Theodoret meant anything more here than his constant, persistent, never varying refusal to attribute passion to the *physis*-*hypostasis* of the Word lest the Arians be proved correct in denying his divine status.

Other Cyrillian-sounding phrases occur throughout the exegesis, but the same point could be made of them all. To support my supposition that he is still using *hypostasis* here the same way as in the earlier works is the way he uses *theotes, ousia,* and *physis* completely interchangeably in his exegesis of Isaiah 43: 11 and 42: 8. He has dropped certain expressions for the humanity of Jesus which he has learned are extremely offensive to the Cyrillians and thus dangerous to him. For the sake of peace he omits them. But nothing else has changed.

Theodoret's comment on 42: 13 succinctly summarizes his theology of the Atonement. We are liberated from the power of evil by what the Christ has worked: 'He has dissolved the power of death; he has beaten back the course of sin; he checked the tyranny of the devil; he has quenched the imposture of the idols.'[21]

[20] Möhle, 66. [21] Ibid. 167.

In his commentary on 48: 16, involving more Trinitarian apologia against the Arians, he asserts, as we would expect, the equality and oneness of the *theotēs*, divinity, of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and finds their distinction in teaching 'the properties of the *hypostaseis*'.[22] My point is that he is still using this terminology in accordance with the doctrine of being outlined in the earlier chapters. What has changed is not his Christology or his ontology, but simply the omission of a few objectionable phrases. We find, for example, the following expression in Theodoret's exegesis of 49: 1–3. When the Servant says, 'From my mother's womb he called my name,' Theodoret says that the expression refers to 'the *prosopon* of the Lord Christ, who is the seed of Abraham according to the flesh, through whom the nations received the promise'.[23] We know from the earlier works that 'Lord Christ' is one of Theodoret's favourite names for the common *prosopon* of the union, and there is nothing here to lead us to think that he is doing anything more than working with his earlier concept of prosopic union.

Penultimately, Theodoret has one passage that has drawn considerable attention as indicating a genuine evolution in Christological thought or model. In exegeting Isaiah 49: 3, he denies that there are two Sons. It is not 'ἄλλος . . . καὶ ἄλλος . . . but the Son himself (or the same Son)'. Isaiah's expressions are to be thought of as referring, he says, to the humanity,

> for he is named Israel according to the humanity, and Jacob and David and son of David and seed of Abraham and all such names. He calls him servant, since the form of a servant which God the Word assumed was from the servant nature. Now this refers not to the glory but to the nature. For the servant is not the form of a servant . . . even as the Lord Christ was eternally the Son as God, so he took it up to be Son as human. For it is not that that one is one Son (*allos hyios ekeinos*) and this one another (*allos houtos*), but the same is Son as God and takes it up to be Son as a human being.[24]

But does this really reject a two-subject Christological model? We have seen Theodoret again and again in his debate with Cyril, particularly in his defence of Nestorius, reject the idea or at least the expression of two Sons. He denied that anybody, save perhaps Paul of Samosata, ever taught two Sons. In other words, as we saw above, 'two Sons' to Theodoret means simple Adoptionism. And he could say all that while clearly in fact adhering to a two-subject Christological model at least up to and through the Council of Ephesus and its aftermath. I would suggest that a careful reading of this passage reveals exactly the same thing. Of course there are not two Sons of God, Theodoret says. There is one Only-Begotten of the Father. To speak of two Sons is to

22 Ibid. 191. 23 Ibid. 192. 24 Ibid. 193.

speak of two Only-Begottens, which is nonsense, or it is to say that the man Jesus became Son of God only because, without the prevenient grace and will of the Word before his conception, he lived a perfect life as a Son of Israel, of the covenant, as Second Adam. That would be 'Son' in the perfectly human sense, what God intended human beings to be, Adam to be, but it is not the sonship of the prosopic union which Theodoret has explained so carefully heretofore, although that sonship wherein the human *prosopon* shares in the 'glory' of the divine Word's sonship by honour of the union does include this purely human sonship. Rather, for Theodoret there is the one Only-Begotten Word of God, the divine Son, the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity. The man is not another Son in this sense, but the one Son is 'Son of God and takes it upon himself to be Son as human' by assuming into union with himself the temple, who is another subject, a human subject who experiences the human passions and death, but who is not Son of God in his own independent stance apart from the Word. There is indeed one Son of the common *prosopon*, the Word. And he is said to be Son of God as human by virtue of the union with the man. The same One is Son by being the divine Word and Son, the same Son, as human by virtue of his union, his prosopic union, with the humanity, with the man. But this does not mean that Theodoret is denying that the man or the humanity is another subject, the subject of the passions, of growth, and of death—that is to say, what the Cyrillians meant by two Sons.

Theodoret was being very careful not to cause offence to the victorious Alexandrine party. He was a very careful logician and selected his words with great care. The Cyrillians would read this with relief, and someone not thoroughly versed in the way in which Theodoret developed his Christology in the earlier works could easily see here genuine movement toward Cyril's hypostatic union. But it does not seem to be the case.

In the last part of the commentary he moves to consider the case of Christ's death, and here, just as in the question of *communicatio idiomatum* throughout the work, we find nothing new at all. Theodoret is very careful to continue his characteristic attribution of all passion and death to the humanity, or the man. It is the human body, the *soma*, that is nailed to the cross. Death is the separation of the human soul from the human body. The Word does not experience this passion or death in himself, in his *theotes*, but is said to have 'appropriated' the passion by virtue of the prosopic union: 'For the body was nailed to the cross, but the deity appropriated the passion.'[25]

In his study of the Isaiah commentary, K. Jüssen thought Bertram's belief was correct that Theodoret, though a Nestorian at Ephesus, had accepted Cyril's Christological model by the time he wrote the commentary. His

[25] Möhle, 211. Cf. also the exegesis of 53: 8.

evidence was the impersonal way in which Theodoret describes the humanity and his rejection of *allos... kai allos*.[26] I do not think this is the case. I have found nothing here that requires us to move beyond the prosopic union Christology we found in the earlier works. Theodoret, in order to maintain ecclesiastical peace and to protect himself against the more politically powerful party of his opponents, expresses himself much more carefully and omits the more concrete or personal among his terms for the humanity of Christ, but that is all.

THE COMMENTARIES ON THE EPISTLES OF ST PAUL

Exactly the same situation arises in the Pauline commentaries as we have seen in the one on Isaiah.[27] The concrete terms used before the formula of union disappear entirely. Attribution is made to 'the Christ' of properties of both natures, but there is nothing to indicate that this 'Christ' has progressed beyond being the name for the common *prosopon* of Theodoret's earlier Christology. Again there is nothing that requires the reader to see more than a communication of names, or, on the other hand, to be certain that it is not a genuine *communicatio idiomatum* of the properties of each nature to the one *hypostasis* of the Word, save for the fact that Theodoret is very careful, again, to deny that the Word suffers passion or death, experiences predicated, as we have seen endlessly, to the humanity. What has happened is that Theodoret continues to use a Christology of prosopic union, as he has all along, very carefully couched in terms and expressions calculated to avoid offending the politically dominant Alexandrians or to disrupt the shaky union of the Churches. It is equally clear, again, that anyone coming to this material without having first seen what 'the Christ', for one example, meant to Theodoret earlier could very easily find here a Christology of genuine hypostatic union.[28]

[26] K. Jüssen, 'Die Christologie des Theodoret von Cyrus nach seinem neuveröffentlichen Isaias-Kommentar', *Theologie und Glaube*, 27 (1935), 451–2.

[27] There is no modern critical edition of the Greek text of Theodoret's commentaries on Paul's epistles. The text we have is found in *Interpretatio in Quatuordecim Epistolas S. Pauli, PG*, 82: 35–878. An English translation is available in *Commentary on the Letters of St. Paul*, trans. Robert C. Hill, 2 vols. (Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2001). The English translations of the Greek text in this chapter are, however, my own.

[28] P. M. Parvis, in an unpublished paper entitled 'Theodoret's Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul: Historical Setting and Exegetical Practice' (Christ Church, Oxford University, 1975), does exactly this. Comparing the exegesis of Theodoret with that of Theodore of Mopsuestia, he finds this dropping of 'concrete terms' coupled with the attribution of the properties of both natures to 'the Christ'. He concludes that Theodoret's Christology here has developed a much

As with the Isaiah commentary,[29] the ostensible enemy is found in the Arian camp (we will remember that heretofore Theodoret has seen the Alexandrine 'Apollinarians' as simply another kind of Arians). There are quite clearly the two natures, or *physeis*, deity (*theotes*) and humanity (*anthropotes*). The divine *physis* is completely impassible, while all experience of growth, passion, and death is referred to the human *physis*. Against the 'Arians', Theodoret is at pains to stress that the Word remains what he always has been—divine—by attributing all passibility to the 'assumed humanity' (an interesting variation on 'assumed man'). The 'Christ' suffers in his humanity, but it is simply not possible to say from these texts in themselves whether this is anything more than the suffering of the man which is 'appropriated' by the Word, just as the man is said to be 'worshipped' by virtue of the common *prosopon*.

In the kenotic hymn of Philippians 2: 6–11, the Word, being in the form of God, does not consider it a thing to be rapaciously held on to, but humbles himself to take up the form of a servant. Theodoret begins his exegesis of this passage (which we have seen him deal with already more than once) with an assertion that the Word, as form of God, is equal in being (*ousia*) to the Father.[30] 'Form of God', that is, is a term that applies properly to the Word in his *ousia*.[31] Its use refutes the Arians, for Paul did not say that the Word 'became in the form of God but is'. As form of God, then, the Word is equal in *ousia* to the Father, and does not change in his being in the act of humbling himself to become incarnate: 'humbling himself, he not only did not at all lose what he had as God, but as a man he took this upon him.'[32]

greater sense of personal unity in Christ than one finds in Mopsuestia. On the other hand, at least in the paper itself, Parvis gives no indication of appreciating how Theodoret used terms in his earlier works—other than noting his dropping the so-called concrete terminology to refer to the humanity after 433—and concludes that attributing human experiences to 'the Christ', as well as speaking of the Word as being 'the Christ', points to a single-subject Christology of a genuine *communicatio idiomatum* (though he does not use that term) over against Theodore of Mopsuestia's double-subject Christology. It seems to me that to progress to a point of being able to assert such a development with any assurance of certainty would require us to find a clear statement of *communicatio idiomatum* of the human *physis* as it is actualized in Jesus Christ to the *hypostasis* of the Word, or some clear statement that the Word himself experiences the passion of the cross in himself without ceasing to be the divine One. This is precisely what we do *not* find.

[29] For the dating of these commentaries in the 440s, see above, pp. 169–170.

[30] *PG*, 82: 569–74.

[31] Ibid. 569. Theodoret exegetes the 'who was in the form of God' of Phil. 2: 6 in this way: 'For being God, and God in *physis*, and having equality with the Father'. See also 572D, where he asserts that the form of God is the *ousia* of God, and the form of a servant specifies the assumed *ousia*.

[32] Ibid. 572.

If being in the form of God means to Theodoret that the Word's divine *ousia* is exactly the same as that of the Father, does this mean that taking up or assuming the form of a servant, or human *ousia*, is to be thought of as the Word's being a human *ousia* in the same way as it can be said that he is the divine *ousia*? Or does the Word's taking up the form of a servant mean what it has always heretofore meant to Theodoret: that he is the divine *ousia* and *hypostasis* in himself and takes up union with the human nature which is—or becomes—its own *hypostasis*, the union being prosopic as we have defined it? In an interesting and perhaps telling choice of words, he strongly denounces those who 'confuse (*sygcheontas*) the *hypostaseis*' as well as those who blaspheme the divinity (*theotes*) of the Only-Begotten or who deny the humanity (*anthropotes*). Then he condemns those who deny the duality (*duada*) of *prosopa*.[33] Though ostensibly directed against Arians, these two statements clearly show that Theodoret is still thinking in terms of the way in which two different *ousiai* and *physeis* in the union in Christ necessitate two different *hypostaseis*. This points towards the conclusion that Theodoret is still thinking in terms of prosopic union. The Word's assuming the form of a servant does not mean that the Word is in himself the subject of the human passions. Commenting on Philippians 2: 7 ('and being born in the likeness of human beings, and being found in human form'), Theodoret makes a remark that justifies this conclusion:

> Paul says this about the Word of God, that being God he did not appear as God, but rather put around himself the human nature. For this applies to him 'as a human being'. For the assumed nature was this thing ontologically. He himself was not this, but he put this around himself.[34]

Theodoret does not want to arouse Alexandrine fury. He is avoiding many of the classical Antiochene expressions. He is stressing the Word as the ultimate initiator of the saving activity in Christ. He wants to find a way to affirm that there is only one Son of God, the Word, the Only-Begotten. But at the same time he needs to reaffirm the impassibility of the divine nature and the divine *hypostasis*, the Word of God. He denies that there are two Sons, asserting only the sonship of the Word in his proper nature and *hypostasis*. He no longer speaks of 'the assumed man'. He substitutes 'assumed humanity' or 'assumed nature'. But to say that the Word does things in Christ 'as a human being' does not have to mean that he takes up humanity into his own *hypostasis*. When Theodoret goes to such pains to say that 'he himself is not

[33] Ibid. Theodoret lists Sabellius, Photinus, Marcellus, and Paul of Samosata as those who deny the duality of *prosopa* and so are guilty of confusing divinity into impassioned flesh.

[34] Ibid. 569C.

this, but puts this on', can it mean more than prosopic union? Could this phrase, then, be a key to understanding what Theodoret means in his commentary on Isaiah, and will mean a little later in the Pauline commentaries and the epistles of this decade, when he says that the Son is not ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος? We may conclude that just as he never admitted that his earlier two-subject prosopic union involved preaching two Sons, so this expression does not have to mean that he has progressed beyond prosopic union or that the human nature does not have its own proper human *hypostasis*. It means only that the Word is the only proper or ontological Son of God; that only the second *hypostasis* of the divine *ousia* may *properly* be called Son of God. Further, the *hypostasis* Son of God, the Word of God, the Only-Begotten from before all time, must remain something other than 'the assumed humanity', lest the impassibility of the second *hypostasis* of the divine *ousia* and *physis* be imperilled and Arianism be confirmed. The presumed Apollinarianism of Alexandria, which it is impolitic to attack head-on, inevitably leads to Arianism, and so may be more subtly attacked. The drift of the entire argument indicates that Theodoret has not broken the minor premiss of Sullivan's Arian syllogism, that whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him in his divine nature, *kata physin*.

In these commentaries on Paul's letters, Theodoret often follows the commentaries on Paul by Theodore of Mopsuestia closely enough to show that he was well versed in them. A comparison of the two on this passage in turn shows just how far Cyrus has gone beyond Mopsuestia's terminology.[35] Mopsuestia was careful to predicate all the terms of pre-existence and exaltation of Philippians 2: 6–11 to the divine nature, and all those having to do with becoming exalted and suffering to the human nature, even though he too was careful to speak of the unity of *persona*. Theodoret, however, refers all predication to the Word, distinguishing between the Word as form of God and as such 'being God and God in nature', on the one hand, and the Word incarnate 'as a human being', on the other. Looking at it from just this perspective, Theodoret's exegesis appears much closer to Cyril's Christology, undoubtedly giving rise to the conviction of scholars such as Bertram and others more recently that he had been converted to Cyril's Alexandrine and Ephesine one-subject Christology through reading Cyril's works after 431. But looking at Theodoret's exegesis from the perspective of having, as it were, gone through the debates around the Council of Ephesus with him and having seen how his terminology has evolved, we can see that this need not be the case at all. Clearly one could find Cyril's Christ in the language of the Isaiah commentary, and this as yet single example from the Pauline

[35] Parvis, pp. 142–3.

commentaries. And it may indeed have been that Theodoret was trying to find his way to a genuine ontological union in one Person, as Grillmeier has put it. But to say that the Word is the second *hypostasis* of the triune divine *ousia* and *physis*, and that this is what it means to say that he always has been, from before all time, the form of God, and then to say that he assumes the form of a servant, which is the *ousia* and *physis* of humanity, and therefore *not what he is*, and that it is in this assuming or taking up the human nature that the Word can be said to be exalted from the earth to the glory of God 'as a human being', while all this is indeed language that could carry Cyril's Christology, it need be no more than Theodoret's classically Antiochene prosopic union. To say that the Word 'as a human being' is exalted from the earth to heaven (that is to say, to predicate human properties of the Word) need only be another instance of the old communication of names: what is proper to the assumed humanity may be *said* of the assuming nature. We have seen all this endlessly. Theodoret may indeed have been convinced that his earlier way of putting his fundamentally two-subject Christology was too divisive, both Christologically and politically, and he may well have been adapting his terminology to stress the oneness of the Incarnation in his classic way of attributing all initiation for our salvation to the Word, and so stressing that whatever is effected in the salvation history of the assumed nature is ultimately the work of the Word and is to be referred to his initiative under the expression 'the Word as a human being'. But this does not mean that he can perceive that human properties and experiences, human passions and death, human *idiomata* can be attributed to this same *hypostasis* of the Word in the same way as divine *idiomata* are, because the human *physis* has been taken up into his own, proper life and is his just as is the divine *physis*.

Turning to Paul's hymn to Christ as the icon of the invisible God in Colossians 1: 13–22, the comparison between Theodore's commentary and Theodoret's is interesting, but not conclusive.[36] Theodore openly distinguishes between the assumed man, in union with whom, through similarity of nature, we find our salvation, and the assuming Word. The 'son of love' in verse 13 of Paul's letter is not the Word to Theodore, for human beings cannot be united to the Word, the creator of all. Rather, for him, we are united to the assumed man and participate in his honour by virtue of being of similar nature. Thus 'son of love' refers to the assumed man, not the Word, because the assumed man is not son of the Father by nature, but by adoption, as are we.

Theodoret writes in a very different atmosphere. His exegesis is rather simplistic, considering the care with which he could address such passages and themes in earlier works, and the text really gives us little to work with to

[36] Ibid. 143–8.

get to the Christological model he is actually assuming. The antecedent for the entire exegesis comes in his remarks on verse 14, which attribute our redemption, the forgiveness of our sins, to the shedding of the blood of 'the Lord Christ', that term he has always used for the common *prosopon*.[37] Not the Law of Moses, but the Lord Christ, who was the giver of the Law to Moses, has given us redemption through the salvation of baptism. 'Who is the icon of the invisible God' Theodoret interprets to refer to the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father:

Clearly he bears the characteristics of him who has begotten him. This is what is said by the Lord to Philip, 'He who has seen me has seen the Father.' He begot Adam as his icon, that is, like him in every way. Therefore an icon is what signifies consubstantiality. On the one hand inanimate icons do not have the being of those things of which they are icons. On the other hand, animate icons, having indistinguishability, do have the same nature (*physis*) as the archetype.[38]

The most we can say from this with certainty is that for Theodoret, he who has seen the *prosopon* of Jesus Christ, the Lord Christ, has had manifested to him through that visibility the invisible *ousia* and *physis* of the Word. As that *ousia* and that *physis* are those of the icon of the invisible God, they are the same, *homoousion*, with those of God. This again is nothing new. It is considerably more carefully worded than Theodore's commentary, to be sure, but aside from dropping the concrete formulae (such as 'assumed man'), there is really nothing here that would necessarily carry us beyond the Christology of *De Incarnatione*.

Theodoret goes on to exegete what might have seemed the bothersome phrase 'first-born of all creation' in a way to stress the full divinity of the Word:

If he is Only-Begotten, how is he the first-born? If first-born, how is he Only-Begotten? But he is named Only-Begotten in the divine Gospels. Therefore, he is first-born of the creation, not as having creation as a sister, but as begotten before all creation. For how can the Creator be brother to creation? For if, according to the heretics' reasoning, he is a creature, then he has creation as sister, for it is not possible, according to them, that the same one be both brother of this and Creator. But the divine scripture calls him Creator. And if he be Creator, then he is not brother; and if not a brother, then he is not a creature. Thus the divine Apostle does not call him the first creature, but the first-born; that is, the first. Thus he is also the first-born from the dead, for he was the first risen. Thus also the divine Apostle calls the Church the assembly of the holy first-born ones.

[37] Theodoret's exegesis is in *PG*, 82: 595–602. [38] Ibid. 597B.

Theodore had taken verse 14, 'who is the icon of the invisible God', to refer to the assumed man; Theodoret refers it to the Word as divine, just as he finds a way to apply 'first-born' to the Word's divinity, while Theodore applies it to 'him who is Christ according to the flesh'. But ultimately the use of 'Christ' is the same, to refer, that is, to the common *prosopon*.

Verse 18, 'And he is the head of the body, the Church', Theodoret explains as referring to the Incarnation: 'From theology he turns to the economy. For he is head according to the human reality; the head is of the same being as the body. Thus he is of one being with us as a human being.'[39] The antecedent is still the 'Lord Christ' of the exegesis of verse 13, so that it is not possible to say anything more about how the Word is incarnate 'as a human being'. To be in prosopic union with the humanity, to take up the humanity (formerly the 'assumed man') into that union, is to be of the same being with us. Clearly the human nature, the human *physis*, is of the same *ousia* with us. The question is how the human *physis* is united to the Word's *physis*, in prosopic or hypostatic union.

He returns, then, to explain 'first-born' as ultimately referring to the Incarnation, that is, to the human nature:

> Then he adds 'first-born from the dead'. For he was the first to destroy the pangs of death. And the expression hints at the resurrection of us all. 'That he might be the first in all things.' As God he is before all and is with the Father; as human he is the first-born from the dead and the head of the body.[40]

Finally, he turns to reconcilation through the passion of the cross:

> 'And through him to reconcile all things unto him'—he speaks of the manner of the reconciliation: '. . . making peace through the blood of his cross, through him whether things on earth or in the heavens.' He undertook our reconciliation, enduring the saving passion and pouring out the blood, having offered the sacrifice for us, and united heavenly things to earthly.[41]

But how does the Word undertake our reconciliation by pouring out his blood? Does the Word suffer the passion of the cross himself? Does the Word in himself offer the sacrifice of his own personal death? Or does the Word appropriate to himself in some way, by virtue of prosopic union, the death of the man, whether called 'assumed humanity' or 'the assumed man'? Obviously a Cyrillian could read this text and easily find in it his own view of the matter; equally, so could Nestorius or any of the other Antiochenes. This seems to be the nature of the presentation of Christology in these commentaries.

[39] Ibid. 600D. [40] Ibid. 600D–601A. [41] Ibid. 601B.

Exegeting Colossians 2: 9, 'In him dwells all the fullness of God bodily', Theodoret notes that many thought the reference was to the Holy Spirit indwelling in the Church, but he does not find this adequate. Rather 'in him' refers to 'the Christ': 'I think that since he nominates the Christ head of the Church, and manifestly he is head of the Church according to our humanity *(to anthropeion)*, these things are said as concerning a human being bearing in himself all deity (*theotes*).'[42] The fullness of deity indwells 'in his own proper body' (*en idio somati*), and this is no partial grace, as was given Moses, 'for God is a human being, and this visible thing has united to it all the divinity of the Only-Begotten'.[43] But how is God *anthropos*, a human being? How does the 'visible thing' have the Word's divine *ousia-physis* united to it? This is not really serious Christology, since he is obviously speaking in very general terms and is not trying to be careful about distinguishing his position from that of his recent opponents. Clearly, he insists that there are two *ousiai* and *physeis*, divine and human, that are not confused, thus protecting the impassibility of the Word and his divine status and the complete reality of the humanity, and he also insists that these are united in one *prosopon*, 'the Lord Christ'. But more than this he does not say. We have less information here about his Christology than in his earlier works. This is in reality a kind of popular commentary theology or Christology, not serious dogmatic debate about the nature of the union. It is not very helpful, consequently, to us, and I do not think that we should try to prove too much one way or the other from it.

When we turn our investigation to Theodoret's commentary on Romans, we find that he opens his discussion of Romans 1: 3 in a characteristic and expected way.[44] The good news of God which he has promised through his prophets concerns his Son 'who has become from the seed of David according to the flesh'. Theodoret explains that the addition of 'according to the flesh' (*kata sarka*) is meant by Paul to show that the Son is not merely human by nature and God by grace. He is 'not only human but also God the Word before the ages who has become incarnate (*enanthropesas*)'. Then we encounter his customary way of explaining the Incarnation as the assumption of the human nature by the Word who 'truly' or ontologically is the divine nature: he is 'the Son of God the Father truly according to divinity', and also 'begotten from him [God] in nature (*physei*) before the ages, he bears the title Son of David as having taken up the human nature (*ten anthropeian physin*) from the seed of David'. The argument remains the same: the Word is God by nature; the Incarnation is the Word's 'taking up' or 'assuming' the human nature, and

42 Theodoret's exegesis is in *PG*, 608D.

43 Ibid. 608D–609A.

44 Ibid. 49C. Theodoret's commentary on Romans runs through cols. 43–226.

therefore he receives by virtue of the union names which are proper to that human nature, such as 'Son of David' or 'seed of David'. The emphasis is on maintaining the impassible divinity of the Word, not on explaining how the union is to be understood.

Theodoret exegetes Romans 1: 4 ('designated Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by his resurrection from the dead') with a bent that sounds pleasantly contemporary to us. He writes that it is only in the power of the Resurrection and the Spirit indwelling the post-Resurrection Church that the divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ is manifest, for in this verse the divine Apostle, who had nominated him Son of David according to the flesh, teaches that he 'had been defined and shown forth the Son of God by the indwelling power of the all-holy Spirit after his resurrection from the dead.'[45]

In a phrase that doubtless would have delighted Luther, Theodoret exegetes Romans 3: 24 to say that we receive forgiveness of sins *sola fide*: 'For adducing only faith, we received the forgiveness of sins, since the Lord Christ has offered his own body as such a great ransom for us.'[46] He continues the same theme at Romans 5: 1–2. Here faith procures us forgiveness of sins and shows us forth 'blameless and justified through the rebirth of the baptismal bath'. Having been hostile and alienated from him, the Only-Begotten, having become incarnate (*enanthropesas*), has reconciled us to himself. Righteousness (*dikaiosune*) guards the peace thus established by the incarnate Only-Begotten, but sin introduces enmity. It is seemly, then, to follow peace, recognizing the hopes we have in the future glory proclaimed to us. It is, we should note, a glory that we are promised, much more than a mere wage earned by good works or suffering for the name of Christ.[47]

Since, however, the first published text of Theodoret's works appeared in Rome in 1556,[48] it is doubtful that Luther would have known anything of his theology of justification, or that Theodoret might have been in Melanchthon's mind when he speaks of 'other holy Fathers' in addition to the Latin Fathers he cites in his lengthy article on justification in his Apology of the Augsburg Confession. Nonetheless, we must still question whether Theodoret is working with a Christology of hypostatic union or prosopic union, for in his exegesis of Romans 5: 10 he once again emphatically attributes experience of the passion of the cross exclusively to the human nature: 'Again Paul certainly calls the Lord Christ Son, who is both God and a human being,

[45] Ibid. 52B. [46] Ibid. 81C. [47] Ibid. 95–6.

[48] E. Venables, 'Theodoretus', in *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iv (1887), 919: the earliest edition of Theodoret's works was published by Paulus Manutius in Rome in 1556, in Latin translation only. The first edition of Theodoret's works to include the Greek text was Sirmond's 4 vols. published in Paris in 1642.

the same one. And it is manifest, as I think, even to the heretics, as to which nature (*physis*) the passion refers.'[49]

Discussing Romans 5: 12, Theodoret turns to the human predicament, or what Western theologians called 'original sin':

Having created Adam and ornamented him with reason, the Lord God gave him a commandment for the exercise of his rational faculty. For it was not as though he could live in society without law, though a partaker in reason and having the ability to distinguish between goods and the opposite. But Adam was deceived and transgressed the commandment. Yet from the beginning the lawgiver had yoked to the commandment a threat of retribution. Therefore, having come within the limits of death, Adam thus begat Cain, Seth, and all the others. All, then, growing from this one, have the mortal nature (*physis*). Now this nature is in need of many things: meat, drink, covering, housing, and different arts; and the need of these often incites the passions to excess, and thus excess generates sin. Therefore the divine Apostle says that Adam having sinned and death having occurred on account of sin, both came into the race, for death has penetrated into all human beings because all have sinned. Not, therefore, on account of the sin of the first father, but through each person's own sin does he receive the limitation of death.

For Theodoret sin is the result of the passions being aroused to excess and thus overcoming reason's God-given ability to distinguish between good and evil. Death is the result of sin, since it alienates human beings from God, who is the life-giver and lawgiver. Adam became mortal because of his disobedience, and in this state of mortality—that is, a condition in which wilful disobedience of the commandment from God leads to enslavement to the passions, to alienation from life in God, and thus to death—Adam begat his offspring. Yet his sons and daughters—to the present day—are not mortal because of Adam's original sin, but because sin, being let loose in the world through Adam's disobedience, draws each person likewise into its mortal snare and enslavement to excess of passions. Theodoret insists that all do in fact sin, and so death 'penetrates into all', but not that any is deserving of eternal death because of Adam's own sin except Adam himself. And yet, of ourselves we cannot get free of this predicament of enslavement to our passions.

This is the function of Christ in the Atonement, which is essentially effected in his free, wilful obedience to God's righteousness, to the point of the cross. His righteousness leads to death's defeat in his resurrection, and thus the re-establishing of the nature of humankind in the status of life:

Just as the first sinned and came under the sway of death, and the entire race followed the forefather, so the Lord Christ fulfilled the highest righteousness and thus dissolved

[49] *PG*, 82: 97–8.

the power of death, being the first to rise from the dead, leading the whole nature of human beings back to life.

How we participate in this redemption is worked out in the exegesis of Romans 6: 4, where Theodoret says that we are made participants (*kekoinonekas*) with Christ in his death and resurrection through the mystery of baptism, the type of the Lord's death. Consequently, he says, we are to lead a new life in him, eschewing sin, since we have been raised to the glory of the Father, that is, in the divinity of Christ. That is to say, Christ (the common *prosopon*) is raised from the dead by the deity working in him, for Paul 'calls the divinity of Christ "the glory of the Father"'. As we have seen before, for Theodoret 'glory' is synonymous with deity (*theotes*). The interesting thing is that this leads directly to Theodoret's returning to his favourite expression to delineate the relationship between the two natures in the 'Lord Christ', or common *prosopon*:

For he says in another epistle, 'That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of the glory....' And the Lord says in the Gospels, 'Destroy this temple and in three days I shall raise it up.' If the heretics will not accept this interpretation, they do not thus draw down the glory of the Only-Begotten. And if the Father raised him, he raised him as a man, for as a man he accepted the passion.[50]

But what exactly does it mean to Theodoret to say that the Only-Begotten is raised by the Father from the dead 'as a man', or that he accepted the passion 'as a man'? Does it mean a genuine *communicatio idiomatum* of the passibility—indeed, mortality—of the human *physis* to the *hypostasis* of the Word, the Only-Begotten? But the context of the argument is one in which the Arians are the target for denying the deity of the Word precisely for attributing passion, passibility, and mortality to the Word. Theodoret's introduction of the text about destroying the temple and its raising up in three days—given the regular use of this text in his earlier writings to illustrate prosopic union—strongly suggests that this is not really *communicatio idiomatum*, but nothing more than a very skilful use of terms and words so as not to offend Cyril's victorious party, but to say things in such a way that the Antiochenes could still read their prosopic union into the text of Theodoret's words. That is to say, not that he is being an opportunist, but that he accepts the value of Cyril's stress on unitive terminology as a way towards a Christological terminology that safeguards the unity of Christ and the distinguishing of the two natures in Christ. At the same time, however, it would yet be a prosopic union that he has in mind. He is still not prepared to say that the Word himself has suffered and died in his humanity, a humanity as much his ontologically as his divine

[50] *PG*, 82: 105B.

nature, but only that the Word can be said to have appropriated the saving passion by virtue of a prosopic union in which it can be *said* that the word does this or that 'as a man'.

Working through Romans 6: 12–14, Theodoret stresses that the question of sin is a question of willing choice.[51] 'The movement of sin . . . is born according to our nature, and the doing of forbidden things hangs on from knowledge.' Yet the body is not evil, but the creation of God, so that under the direction of the soul it can do God proper service. It is a question of conscious choice by the *nous*, willing to serve God or to sin. Further, human nature does not wrestle alone with sin, but has working with it the grace of the Spirit. Grace gives the necessary assistance and is thus better than the Law, which before grace could only instruct in what had to be done.

As the exegesis of Romans 7: 22–4 shows, Theodoret misses the point of Paul's cry of agony over being enslaved to the law of sin in his members and so unable to obey the spiritual law in his soul. To Theodoret, 'sin works in us, the passions of the body bounding up, the soul being unable to contain them due to a laziness there from the beginning. Giving up its own freedom, it is constrained to serve them.'[52] But this is the condition of humankind prior to grace. For Theodoret, enslavement to the passions characterizes the human state, both as a race and as individuals now, before grace, before Christ's redemption. In Christ, however, we can obey the promptings of *nous* and its law. There is nothing here of Luther's *simul justus et peccator* in the post-baptismal person.

He says of Romans 8: 9–11 that to have Christ's Spirit of grace is to be dead to the world but alive to God. Not to have that grace is to have no fellowship (*koinonia*) with Christ. The body (*soma*) is dead not because it is flesh (*sarx*) but because without grace sin reigns in its passions. Thus the fruit of justification is life. This is simply an enlargement on the words of Paul in Romans 6: 11 that the same Spirit who raised Jesus from the dead inhabits the Christian and so vivifies his mortal body. Theodoret finds here, however, a justification of the 'evangelical doctrine' that there is 'one *physis* of the deity'. The Spirit is not created from the Father through the Son, but is 'of one being with the Father and the Son, proceeding from the Father'.[53]

Moving on to 8: 29 ('whom he foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the icon of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren'), Theodoret finds that this means conformity to the icon, or *soma*, of the Son—not to the 'invisible divine *physis*, but to the *soma* in which he is worshipped'.[54] The use of 'invisible divine nature' and *soma* is exactly parallel to the way in which Theodoret in his earlier works would talk of the Word as

[51] *PG*, 82: 107–10. [52] Ibid. 125–8. [53] Ibid. 129–32. [54] Ibid. 141–2.

being invisibly seen in the assumed man, and suggests that we might not be far afield to be on the watch for prosopic, not hypostatic, union here. The suspicion is reinforced a few verses later, when in the exegesis of 8: 32 he writes that it is necessary to see that 'though on the one hand there is one *prosopon*, the human nature (*anthropeia physis*) is given on our behalf by the divinity' on the cross.[55] The 'divinity' here stands rather obviously for the Word, the 'human nature' for the assumed man of the earlier works. Theodoret is careful to phrase it in such manner that a Cyrillian could read into it the Christological model of the Twelve Anathemas of Cyril's letter to Nestorius, but that is all the more reason to note the way in which 'divinity' and 'the human nature' function exactly the way he would earlier have preferred 'Word' and 'the assumed man'. There is no distinction between the 'divinity' and the Word as the second *hypostasis* of the Godhead. That is to say, they could be used interchangeably here and in the context, given the way Theodoret characteristically up to this point has related the Word and the humanity in discussing the cross, and this again can only suggest that *physis* and *hypostasis* cannot yet be separated ontologically for Theodoret. To speak of the 'divinity' or the 'divine nature' is to speak of the *hypostasis*; to speak of the Word is to speak of him according to the nature of divinity exclusively. The union of divine and human natures is on the level of one *prosopon*, the outward and visible icon of humanity, proper to the human nature, the human *hypostasis*, and which can be said to belong to the Word through the union which the Word wills to have with the humanity. So Theodoret can conclude that just as he gives his flesh (*sarx*) in the bread of the Last Supper and has the power to lay down his soul and take it up again, so it is his humanity, flesh and soul, which is given by the 'divinity' (*theotes*) on the cross. What more, Theodoret asks, could he give? A Cyrillian might ask whether Theodoret thinks of the Word's giving himself on the cross or the assumed man, for the one is more than the other.

Theodoret's exegesis of 1 Corinthians is more interesting for what it does not give us than for what it does. At 6: 19 ('Do you not know that you are the temple of the Holy Spirit?'), one might reasonably expect to find a discussion of how the indwelling of the Spirit in us is related to the indwelling of the Word in the temple of the assumed humanity, this having been one of Theodoret's favourite analogies heretofore. But such is not the case. The old analogy is simply ignored. He points out how the Apostle describes the human body as the temple of God, then as parts of Christ, and finally as the temple of the all-holy Spirit, to the conclusion that this proves the equality of the Trinity.[56] Similarly the exegesis of 2 Corinthians 8: 6 goes on at length to

[55] Ibid. 143–4. [56] Ibid. 269.

show the functional equivalence in Scripture of the titles 'God' (*theos*) and 'Lord' (*kyrios*).[57]

The interpretation of 1 Corinthians 6: 11 is of some interest for sacramental theology. Theodoret states that 'you are sanctified and justified in the name of Christ and in the Spirit of our God in the ablution', that is, in baptism. For 'the nature of the waters is sanctified in the invocation of the holy Trinity, and the remission of sins is supplied.'[58] At 10: 16–22 Theodoret discusses participation in the body and blood of the Lord as over against participation in sacrifices offered to idols, which is idolatry. One would hope for something here like Cyril's Christological concern with the vivifying flesh of the Word eaten in the Eucharist, but there is nothing of it, not even an attack on 'Arianism', but simply a reiteration of Paul's warnings against the incompatibility of the Christian Eucharist and pagan sacrifices, which are really offered to demons.[59] The same is true of 11: 25–8, where Paul renews his discussion of the Eucharist.[60]

In discussing 1 Corinthians 15: 22–8, Theodoret must refute the Arian claim that the subjection of the Son to the Father in the eschaton, having first subjected all things to the Father, proves the inferiority in *ousia* of the Son to the Father. In doing so he returns to his use of what appear to be the terms of Neoplatonic speculation concerning how an impassible incorporeal soul indwells the corporeal body without forgoing its impassibility, through a presence by intention (*eudokia*) and declination (*neusis*)—that is, what Norris calls 'a concentration of attention on the corporeal' instead of the universal ideas.[61] He begins his refutation with reference to the 'two natures (*physeis*) of the Lord Christ'. Sometimes in Scripture, he says, the reference is to Christ's humanity (*anthropeia*), sometimes to his divinity (*theia*). But when Scripture refers to God, it does not deny the humanity (*anthropoteta*), and when it names the man (*anthropon*), it also confesses the divinity (*theoteta*). The human *physis* is the nature which he has taken up from us, which taking is described as 'the assumption of the flesh (*tes sarkos ten analepsin*)'.[62] Thus when the Lord Christ (Theodoret's customary title for the common *prosopon* in his earlier works) is spoken of in 1 Corinthians as being subjected to the Father in the eschaton, this is with reference to the human nature. In column

[57] *PG*, 82: 289. [58] Ibid. 268.

[59] Ibid. 305. On Cyril's position on the Christological implications of the Eucharist, see Henry Chadwick, 'Eucharist and Christology in the Nestorian Controversy', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 2 (1951), 145–64.

[60] *PG*, 82: 316–17.

[61] Ibid. 353–62. R. A. Norris, *Manhood and Christ: A Study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). pp. 67–78.

[62] *PG*, 82: 357.

360 Theodoret writes, in a phrase that could sound very Cyrillian, that the Lord Christ makes his own what we are: 'For he makes his very own (*oikeioutai*) what we are, since we are named his Body, and he is called our head.' Does he make what could be translated as 'our properties' his very own through the prosopic union, and thus for Theodoret nothing but terminology would have changed? Or does the *hypostasis* of the Word have the properties of the human nature in the same way as he has those of the divine nature? Is this a communication of names again, or a true *communicatio idiomatum*?

What follows suggests the former alternative. Theodoret writes that Christ did not sin, but he 'makes his own (*oikeioutai*) our present disobedience and future subjection'.

> Thus he is said to be subjected just as we are subjected after relief from corruption.... For now he is omnipresent according to his being (*kata ten ousian*), for his nature (*physis*) is not circumscribable.... But according to good will (*eudokian*) he is not in all. He is pleased to dwell with those who fear him and hope in his mercy.... He is pleased to dwell in those who keep straight but not in those who stumble. In the life to come there will be no place for the passions, corruption having been ended and immortality provided. When these have been altogether driven out, finally no form of sin will be functional. Thus, finally, God will be all in all, everything having been freed from stumbling and turned towards him, not accepting declination towards lower things. Whatever the divine Apostle predicates of God here, he elsewhere lays down about Christ.[63]

We have already seen above what Theodoret and the Antiochene tradition mean by indwelling according to good pleasure, or *eudokia*, over against indwelling *kat' ousian*. It means prosopic union, and the language here gives us nothing to suggest that he is redefining his use of the concept or the term. Indeed, 'he indwells by pleasure in those who fear him' suggests the kind of Christology in which the Word indwells 'the Lord Christ' in no way essentially differently, but only in degree, from the way he indwells those who fear him and keep in the straight way. To put it another way, in Neoplatonic speculation the only way an incorporeal (i.e. the soul) could indwell the human body is by a declination of intention, by focusing its attention and concern for a time away from the universals and on to or into the body. The soul cannot have a union in being, or *kat' ousian*, with the body without leaving off being what it is, incorporeal and impassible, and becoming corporeal and passible. Such a conception of union would indicate that for a person thinking this way a union *kat' ousian* is by logical or philosophical necessity not only a matter of the Word's being omnipresent by nature, but also a matter of the ontological unfolding of being. Theodoret is again, we

[63] Ibid. 360–1.

may safely conclude, asserting that the union of the Word and humanity in 'the Lord Christ', the common *prosopon*, is analogous to this conception of the union of soul and body in human beings. This indicates as strongly as anything possibly could that Theodoret has not gone beyond the Arian syllogism, which is so obviously operative in this argument. There are only two alternatives for him. Either the Word's *physis* is changed into human *physis* or some kind of *tertium quid physis*, which is in any case no longer impassible divinity, or 'he is pleased to dwell' in human beings 'who walk straight', most especially the Christ.

Neoplatonic speculation would have been just as known to the Alexandrine party as to Theodoret's, but we have seen how, while they would undoubtedly have agreed that the human soul indwells the human body by a declination of attention and so on, they had found a way to break the Arian syllogism by insisting on the divine and human *ousiai* retaining each its own properties and each being actualized in the one *hypostasis* of the Word, in the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God. Theodoret still does not appear to have recognized what they were doing. If my analysis here is correct, it means that so far we have found only terminological evolution, not Christological evolution.

Theodoret thus concludes that the 'Arians' are in error. Christ's subjection to the Father in the eschaton is not in his *physis* as the Only-Begotten Word, but is a function of the Incarnation, of the assumed human *physis*, which he indwells, not *kat' ousian*, but by *eudokia*: 'being incarnate, he exhibited obedience'.[64]

A hint that this discussion of the Word's indwelling the humanity by *eudokia*, or good pleasure, is indicative of Theodoret's having still in mind a double-subject Christology occurs in his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 15: 45 and 48–9. Paul is discussing how the Second Adam is a life-giving spirit and how we who have borne the terrestrial icon of the first Adam will bear the icon of the heavenly man, the Lord from heaven who is now risen and ascended. Theodoret paraphrases Paul with an interesting turn of words: 'Just as we have shared in the curse of the earthly primal father and so have had a participation in death, so also shall we have a part of the glory of the heavenly Master.'[65]

In other words, we share in death by nature (*kata physin*) because our *schemata*, or properties, are the same as Adam's, but we share in the glory, or *doxa*, of the Word because he indwells us by *eudokia*, so that we become his icons just as Jesus was the first-fruits of many brothers, the first icon of the Word. Theodoret ultimately must say that the union between Word and humanity in 'the Lord Christ' is different from the union between the Word and ourselves only in degree and not in kind. Indeed, he would seem to say

[64] *PG*, 82: 360B. [65] Ibid. 365D–368A.

that in the eschaton we are all to be Christs in the fullest sense. Since 'glory' in the above context is a term referring to divinity (as nearly always when referring to the 'glory of the Word'), clearly we brothers of the Lord Christ participate in the Word's glory or divinity by his indwelling us in the same way as he indwells the Lord Christ—hardly Alexandrine hypostatic union. It is significant that it is Theodoret who introduces this terminology, not Paul, as he explains what he thinks Paul means by 'just as we have borne the icon of the earthly, so shall we bear the icon of the heavenly'.

At 2 Corinthians 4: 6 there appears a kind of classically Theodoret expression of prosopic union. Paul has written, 'God, who with a word caused light to shine in darkness, shines now in our hearts through the glory of God in the face (*prosopon*) of Jesus Christ.' First, it is interesting that Migne translates *prosopon* with *facies*, following the rendering of the Vulgate and other Latin versions. Indeed, for Theodoret the function of *prosopon* is to be that by which a being or individual is sensibly recognized or perceived by human beings. He exegetes Paul's phrase to mean that 'since the divine nature is invisible, it is clearly seen as it is through the assumed humanity shining with the divine light and emitting lightning rays'.[66] The only change here is from 'assumed man' in earlier texts to 'assumed humanity' here. The Word appropriates the countenance of the humanity by virtue of the union to express his presence among human beings to reconcile them to the Father. There is still nothing here that compels us to see any evolution so far beyond that of terminology. Theodoret's earlier prosopic union is also hinted at in his exegesis of 2 Corinthians 5: 21, where he writes that Christ 'being free of sin endured the death of sinners that he might dissolve the sin of human beings, and having been called what we are, he calls us what he was'.[67] Is this anything more than the earlier communication of names which we found characteristic of Theodoret's prosopic union?

Theodoret opens his exegesis of Galatians with an attack on Manichaeanism which would locate human sinfulness in the corruptibility of the present age. The Law of Moses cannot liberate us from sin; only the Lord Christ can do that. Yet it is not the elements (*stoicheia*) or first principles of creation which are evil in themselves, as the Manichaeans assert, but 'this present life', that is, the transitory life process of humankind ('this present age's process of human beings') in which sin has its place. Clothed still in mortal *physis*, we admit sins in greater or lesser degrees. But placed in that immortal life, we are set free from the present corruptibility and endued with incorruptibility (*aphtharsia*), and so shall be beyond committing sin. It is a hope that has

[66] Ibid. 401A. Theodoret's commentary on 2 Corinthians runs through cols. 375–460.
[67] Ibid. 412C.

been given us in the Lord Christ, who accepted death for us and was the first risen from the dead, supplying us with the Resurrection. Thus 'he snatches us from the present way of life' in which evil has its place.[68] The old tension between locating the source of human sin in the human will and mind, on the one hand, or in earthly passions derived from the flesh, on the other, is still here, and is resolved in the same way as in the earlier works: creation is good, but the conditions of this life are the occasion or opportunity for the rebellious human will to function. It is the victory of the Lord Christ over temptation through the free exercise of his own human will that leads to his resurrection and to our freedom from the trap of 'this current life' in our own participation in his resurrection.

As was the case in his earlier works, Theodoret does not see the same problem over justification as did a Luther or an Augustine. In exegeting Galatians 2: 16 ('No one is justified by works of the law'), he just does not face squarely the issue which Paul has raised. Here he sees two sections in the Law. First is what the Law teaches us by nature, by natural law, as it were; that is, not to murder, commit adultery, steal, and so on. The second section of the Law contains cultic prescriptions about keeping the Sabbath, circumcision, sacrifices, and so on. To transgress these was sinful, but their observation did not lead to perfect justice. According to Theodoret, the works of the Law which do not justify a person fall into this second category.[69]

Commenting on Galatians 4: 4, 'But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons,' he makes an interesting play on the Greek verbs of his slightly variant text, ἀποστέλλω, γεννάω, and γίγνομαι, to reinforce his constant complaint against the Arians to the effect that the Only-Begotten always *is* and does not *become*; it is the humanity that *becomes*. He writes that God has done this to fulfil the mystery of the Incarnation, with the Son having taken up (*analabon*) our nature and thus having been born of the Virgin. He carefully notes that Paul does *not* say that God 'sent him forth to *become* of a woman, that we might understand the sending out of divinity, but that he was *born* from a woman'. It is in taking up our human *physis* that the Word can be said to have been born of a woman; he does not *become* in this process. That is to say, once again, as we have seen heretofore continually repeated, that the Word *is* and never *becomes* is to continue to fail to break the Arian syllogism. It still does not occur

[68] *PG*, 82: 461–4. Theodoret's commentary on Galatians runs through cols. 459–504.

[69] Ibid. 472–3. See also cols. 523–4, where he exegetes Eph. 3: 14–16 to the point that the 'law of commandments' which Paul says is dissolved in the cross is *not* the Decalogue, since Christ told the man seeking eternal life to keep them.

to Theodoret that attribution can be made to the Word as Word but not necessarily *kata physin*, in his divine nature, as the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity. Consequently, he can be said only to take up our nature by virtue of the union of indwelling by good pleasure, and this is what it means to say that he is born of a woman. He concludes the exegesis by stating explicitly that Paul's phrase 'born of a woman' is proper to the economy; that is, it pertains to the human nature. The truly interesting thing is that Theodoret is so intent on proving his point on the eternal impassible divinity of the Word that he literally reads his verbs into Paul's text of Galatians, for Nestlé's text of Galatians 4: 4 reads *γενόμενον ἐκ γυναίκος, γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον*, with no indication in the critical apparatus that *γεννώμενον* appears in any manuscripts in the former place at all. Of course, it would make no difference in Theodoret's argument in either case.[70]

Theodoret's language is considerably more cautious than that of Theodore of Mopsuestia in commenting on this same verse. Theodore writes of the phrase 'God sent forth his own Son, born of a woman':

> It is indeed clear that he is speaking about the man, who came into existence from a woman and lived under the law. And he calls him Son by right, since beyond all men he has participated in a son's adoption on account of that union by which God the Word, who was begotten of the Father, deemed worthy to unite him to himself.[71]

Clearly Theodoret does not talk about 'the man' but about human nature. He also clearly speaks of the Word as initiator and ultimate agent who is the Son whom God sent forth. But when the question is raised as to just how the Word is sent forth, and we see Theodoret emphatically denying that divinity is what is sent forth, but rather that the Word is still understood as assuming human nature and so can be said to 'be born', what is there here that we have not seen in the earlier, pre-433 works? He does omit the concrete terms he used earlier to refer to humanity, but nothing seems really to have changed in his basic Christological model. It is not the *hypostasis* of the Word who is said to be born of a woman—at least, so far as we can see in the texts themselves—but the human nature. Both Theodore and Theodoret ultimately say exactly the same thing. The Word is God by nature and cannot experience the passibility of birth of a woman in his nature as God. Thus the Word does not *become*, but always *is* what he is eternally from before time. The Arians are refuted. It is the humanity, or the man, who is born of the Virgin, who is

[70] Ibid. 485C.

[71] Quoted from Parvis, p. 137: Evidens quidem est, quoniam de homine dicit, qui et ex muliere factus est et sub lege conversatus est. Filium autem eum iure vocat, utpote praeter omnes homines participatum filii adoptionem, propter copulationem illam qua Deus Verbum qui ex Patre est genitus eum sibi copulare dignatus est.

assumed by the Word in the economy of the Incarnation. The title 'Son' properly applies to the Word, but the humanity may be called 'Son of God' by virtue of the unity by which the Word deemed it right to unite the humanity to himself. The later theologian does not say it as boldly, due to the political and ecclesiastical situation, but he seems to say the same thing for the same reasons: 'that we are [not] to understand a sending forth of divinity, but rather "begotten of a woman" is idiomatic of the economy'. How does this really differ from what Theodoret said and wrote at the Council of Ephesus and immediately afterward, save in his dropping the use of concrete terminology for the humanity?

Theodoret makes this even clearer in exegeting Ephesians 1: 19–23. When Paul speaks of the 'Christ' as ascending and reigning at the right hand of him who raised him from the dead, Theodoret says that the Apostle puts the attribution of reigning above all powers and dominions 'as concerning the human being' (*peri anthropou*),

> for it is not wondrous that God should sit with God, or that the Son should reign with the Father, for in the identity of nature the community of power is yoked. Rather the nature assumed from us shares in the same honour as the One who assumed it, so that no distinction of worship appears, but rather the invisible divinity is worshipped through the visible nature.[72]

According to Theodore of Mopsuestia, Christ's sitting at the Father's right hand is said 'concerning the assumed man . . . for it is on account of the inhabiting nature of God the Word in him that he has it to be adored by all'.[73] They say exactly the same thing. Indeed, Theodoret uses the term *peri anthropou*, coming close to abandoning his abandonment of concrete terminology. Theodoret's 'nature assumed for us' is thus the equivalent of 'the man', even 'the assumed man' of Theodore. This one shares the honour of the One who assumed it or him, so that no distinction of worship is to be seen. But it is not the assumed man, the man, or the assumed nature which is properly or ontologically worshipped, but the Only-Begotten who is worshipped invisibly through the visible nature's *prosopon*. This is simply the prosopic union of his pre-433 period. Certainly, taken by itself and without reference to his earlier works, this passage could be read as Cyrillian, but there is nothing here that compels us to interpret this language in any other way than we have seen Theodoret use identical expressions earlier.

Theodoret's exegesis of Ephesians 3: 14–16 and 5: 2 emphasizes that the sacrifice which 'the Christ' offered on the cross is the Lord's body, his *soma*.[74]

[72] *PG*, 82: 516–17. Theodoret's commentary on Ephesians runs through cols. 505–58.

[73] 'de suscepto homine . . . , eo quod propter inhabitantem in eum naturam Dei Verbi ab omnibus habet adorari.' Quoted in Parvis, p. 135.

[74] *PG*, 82: 524.

At 5: 2 Paul writes that the Christian is to walk in love, 'as Christ loved us and gave himself for us, an offering and sacrifice to God'. Theodoret comments that the offering and sacrifice are 'clearly said concerning the body' of Christ.[75] It is not the Word who suffers and experiences death who is the sacrifice, the 'himself' offered as the ransom for the humanity's sins. Rather, the human body dies and is separated from the human soul. Is this human death conceived of by Theodoret as a death hypostatically or personally experienced by the Word? An Alexandrine who, like Cyril in his third letter to Nestorius, insists on the full rational soul and body hypostatically united to the Word, will say that the death of the Word on the cross is a death in his humanity. That is, the Word's human soul is separated from his human body as the body dies on the cross. This is only to say that both parties held the same anthropology common to their time. But whereas the Cyrillian emphasizes that in this death it is 'the Word of God (who) suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh and tasted death in the flesh',[76] this is precisely what Theodoret will not say. Again, it would seem that there is no evidence of Theodoret's actually moving toward Cyril's model of Christ.

In his commentary on Ephesians 4: 9–10, Theodoret once again, as he had in exegeting Isaiah 49: 3,[77] denies the validity of describing the Son as *allos* . . . *kai allos*. Paul had written, 'And what is "he ascended", save that he also descended to the lower parts of the earth? The one who descended is the same as the one who also ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things.' For Theodore of Mopsuestia these verses refer to the assumed man:

> [Paul the Apostle] means to say that he would not have ascended unless first of all the divine nature, which was actually above the heavens, had in some way entered into him. And it was pleasing to that nature to indwell him who was upon the earth and who remained on the earth. . . . He who descended is not the same one who ascended; for how was it possible that that one who is the assumed man be also he who descended from heaven? Besides, this statement is like that other: 'No one has ascended into heaven except the one who came down from heaven.' For this signifies that he into whom the divine nature came down has been given a place above all the heavens, rising up by the latter's agency. The result is that he appears in all respects the same, since everyone looks upon him on the indwelling nature's account.[78]

[75] Ibid. 541.

[76] From the Twelfth Anathema: C. Hardy and C. Richardson, *Christology of the Later Fathers*, Library of Christian Classics, 3, ed. J. Baillie, J. McNeil, and H. van Dusen (Philadelphia: Westmintster Press, 1954), p. 354.

[77] See above, pp. 177–8.

[78] Quoted by Parvis, pp. 139: . . . vult autem dicere quoniam non ascenderat, nisi primum in illum divina aliqua extitisset natura, quae etiam et super caelos erat; cui et complacuit in illum habitare, qui super terram erat, et super terram morabatur. . . . Non qui descendit ipse est et qui ascendit; quemadmodum enim fieri poterat, ut ille qui adsumptus est homo ipse sit et qui de

The situation has changed when Theodoret writes, and he uses a terminology cast so as not to offend and which could certainly be read from a Cyrillian point of view:

> The ascent is indicative of the descent. For having first come down and having worked our salvation, he thus ascended again, for he calls death 'the inferior parts of the earth . . .'. For one (*allos*) has not descended and another one (*kai allos*) ascended, but that I may speak concisely, he descended in one way and ascended in another way, for having descended without a body, he ascended with a body.[79]

This is remarkably different from Mopsuestia's exegesis, but does it in fact represent a different Christological model? Mopsuestia looks at Paul's verses from the point of view of dealing with the assumed man. The one into whom the divine nature descended has been lifted above all the heavens by that divine One, all things in heaven and on earth looking to him (the assumed man) to worship the indwelling Word. Mopsuestia explicitly says that the one who ascended is other than the One who descended into him (non qui descendit ipse est et qui ascendit). This kind of expression will obviously not do at all after the 433 formula of union. But does the Christological model have to be different in what Theodoret writes? Must we understand a Christology of hypostatic union in Theodoret's exegesis? Theodoret writes, not from the point of view of considering primarily the assumed man's relationship to the Word who has descended into him, but rather from the point of view of how the one Son, the Only-Begotten Word, can be said both to have descended and ascended. In this sense Theodoret can rightly say that the same One, the Word, descends and ascends, though differently. It is not that One (*allos*), the Word, descends, and another one (*allos*), the assumed man or the humanity, ascends, but that the Word descends without 'a body', that is to say, with just his divine *physis*, and then the same Word, the same one Son, ascends in union with 'the body', that is, as we have seen throughout his works, with the humanity. Theodoret has indeed altered Mopsuestia's 'he who descended is not the same one as he who ascended' into an adverbial expression: 'he descended in one way and ascended in another'. But has he in fact altered the two-subject Christology that lies behind Mopsuestia's exegesis? A Cyrillian could certainly read hypostatic union into Theodoret's

caelo descendit? Simile est autem hoc dictum illi dicto: 'Nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui de caelo descendit'; vult enim dicere quoniam is in quem divina descendit natura super omnes effectus est caelos, illo ascendens; ita ut et in omnibus idem esse videatur, omnibus ad eum intuentibus propter inhabitantem naturam. I am grateful to the Revd Dr Richard Norris, Union Theological Seminary, New York, and the Revd Dr J. Robert Wright, of the General Theological Seminary, New York, for their assistance in translating this passage.

[79] *PG*, 82: 533D–536A.

commentary, and that is precisely the point. It would be just as easy to continue to find Theodore's *and* Theodoret's earlier two-subject Christological model here, for we have repeatedly found that 'the body' with which Theodoret says the Word ascends differently from the way the same Word descended earlier can mean virtually 'assumed man' as well as 'the man' or 'the humanity' or 'the human nature'. This is exactly what Theodoret did in his commentary on Isaiah 49: 3, where he also denied the appropriateness of describing the Christ as *allos hyios . . . kai allos*.[80] Certainly, it is the same Word who descends in the Incarnation and who with his humanity ascends above all the heavens. The humanity is not 'another Son'. But this does not mean that the humanity is not another psychological subject from the Word. If Theodoret no longers uses the expression found in his *De Incarnatione*, chapter 18, 'There is one (*heteros*) who indwells by reason of the nature (*physis*), but another (*kai heteros*) is the temple', all the other factors in the earlier discussion in *De Incarnatione* appear to be still at work: the understanding of 'flesh' or 'body' in a way consonant with what Theodore of Mopsuestia earlier meant by 'assumed man', and a picture of the death of Christ as a separation of human soul and *nous* from the human body that does not involve the Word himself in passibility or death.[81]

Theodoret appears to be working with the categories that Grillmeier calls the Stoic doctrine of being in his exegesis of 1 Timothy 1: 17.[82] He comments on Paul's hymn of praise to 'the King of all, to the invisible, incorruptible God only wise' to the effect that here 'God' refers to the one divine nature (*physis*), not simply to the one *prosopon* of the Father, for the terms 'king', 'eternal', 'incorruptible', and 'invisible' are applied to the Only-Begotten Son and to the Spirit (except for 'king') in other places by Paul and are thus ontologically proper (*idia*) to the Son and the Spirit. Thus 'God' is a term referring to the common nature, or *koine physis*), and he is careful to say that it really should be predicated only of the name of the Trinity. Since the other divine names or attributes are used as proper or idiomatic (*idia*) of the Son and the Spirit, these are shown to be *prosopa* of the one nature (*physis*) which is God.

At 1 Timothy 2: 5–7 we find a classical example of Antiochene Christology, ostensibly directed against the Arians. God is one, as Paul has written, 'for there is not one maker of the faithful and another of the unfaithful, but there is one creator'. Theodoret goes on, citing Paul:

> 'And there is one mediator between God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus.' There is one Lord of peace, who unites in himself the separated realities. And he names the Christ 'man', since he calls him a mediator, for having become incarnate, he acts as

[80] See above, pp. 177–8. [81] See above, pp. 119–24.

[82] *PG*, 82: 793D–796A. Theodoret's commentary on 1 Timothy runs through cols. 787–830.

mediator. And just as one who wills to reconcile two who are quarrelling with each other sets himself between them, having the one on his right hand and the other on his left, and links them into friendship, thus he, having united (*henosas*) the human nature (*anthropeian physin*) to the divine nature (*theia physei*), has worked an inviolate and indissoluble peace. And if, as Arius and Eunomius say, he does not partake of the being of the Father, how is he mediator? For on the one hand he has been united to us, since according to the humanity he is of the same being (*homoousios*) with us, but he is not so with the Father since—according to these men—he is distinct from that nature (*physeos*). But the holy Apostle has called him 'mediator'. Therefore, he is united (*henōtai*) to the Father according to the divinity, and likewise to us according to the humanity. Thus he shows the Master's passion to have occurred for all.[83]

Who is the 'Lord of peace' who 'unites to himself the separated realities'? 'The Christ' is the answer, the Ephesine Theodoret's typical and technical term for the common *prosopon.* Note also that the Christ is 'called' man (*anthropos*) by virtue of a union verbally described by that other Antiochene term for the union of Word and man in 'the Christ': *synapto.* This 'synaptic' *henosis* has always heretofore in Theodoret indicated prosopic union. By analogy from his analogy of the mediator between two quarrelling men, the two natures, the divine and the human, are reconciled though opposed into a 'friendship' by *synapheia*, precisely the term for union anathematized by Cyril in the third of the Twelve Anathemas appended to his third dogmatic letter to Nestorius.[84] For Theodoret, the Word's Incarnation is here in this text still a matter of union, not by *hypostasis*, or at the level of *hypostasis*, as Cyril insisted in the third anathema, but of *synapheia.* Quite clearly the Theodoret of the Pauline commentaries is still the Theodoret who considered Cyril as having abandoned the Twelve Anathemas in the 433 formula of union and having come over to the Antiochene understanding of the Incarnation, rather than the other way round. For Theodoret the human *physis* is united to the divine *physis* in an unconfusing and indissoluble manner, and the human *physis* is 'of one being' with us, even as the divine *physis* is one being with the Father. The passion is attributed to 'the Master', another of his terms earlier for the common *prosopon.* So far as I can see, virtually all that has changed here from his earlier position is the use of the so-called concrete terms for the humanity, though it needs to be noted again that *anthropos* could be considered one of those concrete terms.

Theodoret's exegesis of the epistle to the Hebrews (which he took to be by Paul) summarizes the situation well for the whole of the Pauline corpus. Essentially, what we find is Theodoret's 'classical' Christology. He begins with the observation that the Arians deny the authenticity of Pauline authorship,

[83] *PG*, 82: 797D–800C. [84] *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 6, p. 116.

since the epistle so clearly attributes divinity to the Word. He replies that the whole Church uses it as a work by Paul, anonymous though it may be, because Paul was writing, not to his authorized Gentile jurisdiction, but to Jews. Hence he could hardly write in his own name.[85]

The exegesis of Hebrews 1: 1–2 sets the boundaries of discussion in a thoroughly Antiochene fashion. The Son is divine in himself, in his own *physis*, and of that divinity Paul predicates certain attributes of 'the Christ'. On the other hand, after the Incarnation, 'the Christ' is humanly spoken of. For example, when called inheritor of the promises, 'the Master Christ' is so called (i.e. 'Christ' or 'the Anointed') 'not as God, but as man'. Once again, we return to the old theme that divinity obviously cannot be anointed, only flesh can be anointed. Thus the name 'Christ' appropriately belongs to the human nature. On the other side, the Christ is as creator 'Master of all' in his divine *physis*. In so many words, we have here the classical Antiochene assignment to each nature of the varied attributes of the common *prosopon*, divine activities and utterances pertain to the divine nature, human to the human nature.[86]

The exegesis of 1: 3 is opposed to the Arians, Sabellians, and Photinians: even as shining and fire are one *ousia*, so the Father and the Only-Begotten Son, the Word, are one *ousia*. This one, having become incarnate (*enanthropesas*) worked our salvation. Yet the author's referring to the Christ's sitting at the Father's right hand is a reference to his humanity.

Exegeting 2: 5–10, the passage on Christ's being lower than the angels for a time and becoming perfected through suffering, Theodoret attributes suffering and death and subordination to the angels to 'the Lord Christ' 'as man', to 'the assumed nature'.[87] In other words, 'the Lord Christ' is Theodoret's term for the common *prosopon*. There is a communication of names to it, but the Word 'conquers the power of death', not by undergoing the experience of death himself, but by having assumed 'the nature' or the 'man' who dies. We are still dealing with the Arian syllogism and Grillmeier's doctrine of being: Theodoret says that Paul's expression, 'What are human beings . . . ?' (Hebrews 2: 6, citing Psalm 8: 4) 'is said concerning the common nature (*tes koines physeos*) . . . as appropriating the things of the entire nature'. *Koine physis* is, of course, the technical expression for a nature, such as humanity or animal nature, built up out of the *ousia* or *hypokeimenon* by the addition of specifying quality of *koine poiotes*.[88] Theodoret's point is that what has been assumed, as the act of the Word's Incarnation, is a real and full human nature.

[85] *PG*, 82: 673–8. The exegesis of Hebrews covers cols. 673–786.

[86] Ibid. 677–80.

[87] Ibid. 693B. The exegesis for Heb. 2: 5–10 covers cols. 689–94.

[88] See above, pp. 84–7. and pp. 108–12; A. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i: *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, trans. J. Bowden 2nd edn., rev. (Atlanta: John Knox Press; London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., 1975), pp. 124–31, 366–7, 372–4.

In his comments on Hebrews 2: 17–18, it is clear, as it always has been, that when Theodoret says that Christ is made like us in every regard, suffering hunger, labouring, being sad, weeping, experiencing death, these are all specifying qualities or *koinai poiotetes* of the human nature. It all sounds very much like *De Incarnatione*:

Like us he partook of nurturing and endured hard labour; he was disheartened, wept, and experienced death. [Paul writes,] 'That he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God, to make expiation for the sins of the people. For because he himself has suffered and been tempted, he is able to help those who are tempted.' He shows that his offering has become the saving death. For he has offered the body which he assumed for the whole creation. And he adds another point for their persuasion. For, he says, having learned through temptation the weakness of the human nature (*tes anthropeias physeos*), having lived according to law and according to grace, he extends aid to those being warred on. And this is said in reference to the humanity (*to anthropeion*). For he is not our high priest as God, but as a human being (*anthropos*); he suffered not as God, but as a human being (*anthropos*); he did not learn the things of us through temptation as God, but as God and creator he knows all things wisely.[89]

Taken by itself and out of the context of Theodoret's thought and style up to this point, this text could easily be read by a Cyrillian as representing Alexandria's Christology. Yet there is no reason to see here anything beyond the way in which the 433 formula of union can have read into it either classical Antiochene Christology, as represented by Theodoret's *De Incarnatione*, or Cyril's position. The antecedent of the 'he' throughout the passage is 'the Christ'. The common *prosopon* does not suffer or endure temptation or hunger, thirst, have to learn, or offer the passion of the cross as God the Word. It is the humanity that learns through temptation the weakness of human nature, that offers its body on the cross, that wins salvation by living according to the Law and grace, and is our high priest. We have seen all this in *De Incarnatione*. The last sentence is particularly telling. I do not see how it can be read in the context of the Theodoret tradition without coming to the conclusion that Theodoret is still ultimately thinking in terms of a two-subject Christology: the one subject, the human subject, 'learns the things of us through temptation'; the other, the Word as divine *physis* and *hypostasis*, as God and creator, knows all things wisely. This is not the Word who learns humanly through temptation by means of a true *communicatio idiomatum* of each nature to the one *hypostasis* of the Word. It is, rather, nothing more or less than Theodoret's classical double-subject Christology by the term 'the assumed man' replaced by 'assumed nature' or 'humanity', or simply 'the man'.

[89] *PG*, 82: 696C–697A.

The exegesis of Hebrews 3: 4 contains a remark that could be lifted directly out of the pre-Ephesine Theodoret, with its emphasis on two *physeis* in one *prosopon* and the distribution of the properties of the natures, not to the *hypostasis* of the Word, but to each nature: 'For since the Lord Christ is God and man, and both are seen in the one *prosopon*, with necessarily the exalted properties and humble properties, it is necessary to speak about him in such a way as makes clear the two *physeis*.'[90]

At Hebrews 4: 15 he returns to the theme that Christ as our high priest not only knows our human weaknesses as God, but as man 'he assumes the testing of our passions, only of sin remaining uninitiated'.[91] Always, throughout the commentary on this epistle, it is the common *prosopon*, the Lord Christ, which is said to 'receive the passions of the human nature'.[92] Nowhere have I found a reference to passion being attributed to the Word. It is the assumed humanity that suffers. There is nothing here of the Word suffering impassibly.

For example at Hebrews 5: 7–10,[93] Theodoret interprets the statement that Christ cried out with many tears to God who could save him from death as meaning that Christ had a true humanity, for 'God the Word, the creator of the ages . . . who is free of passion' cannot fear death. The purpose of the suffering is to confound every kind of Docetist, 'for the divinity united to himself the humanity to suffer this, that we might learn how he has truly been incarnate and assumed a human nature and not a phantasia'. Quite clearly the Word, who cannot experience passion, learning, temptation, fear, and death in himself, is said to be incarnate by his assuming into prosopic union with himself a humanity or human *physis* that functions in this commentary exactly the way the 'assumed man' functioned in *De Incarnatione* and Theodoret's Ephesine Christology.

There is an interesting discussion in the exegesis of Hebrews 6: 4–6 on what the author meant when he wrote that those who have fallen away into apostasy cannot be restored again to repentance. Theodoret writes that to give the Spirit again to someone who has lapsed would involve re-baptism and a consequent re-crucifixion of the Son of God. Re-baptism means to crucify the Son of God anew. It is baptism by which we are united to Christ, and to seek a second baptism is to say that Christ must still be subject to death, since we would not yet be free of death in our first union into his passion and death through our immersion. It is not in the Eucharist that the question of re-crucifying the Son of God appears as a problem to Theodoret—as in the discussions of the eucharistic sacrifice at the Reformation—but in regard to baptism, which for Theodoret is our participation in the sacrifice of Christ.[94]

[90] Ibid. 697D. [91] Ibid. 708D. [92] Ibid. 712B.
[93] Ibid. 711–14. [94] Ibid. 715–18.

In Theodoret's discussion of Hebrews 7: 28 we once again encounter the remark about how there is not 'another Son'. He quotes the text:

'The law established men who have weakness as high priests,' for this is the nature of human beings. 'But the word of the oath, which came later than the law, appoints a Son who has been made perfect for ever.' The Only-Begotten Son has perfection from the time he was begotten, for the Father begot him perfect. And therefore this must be considered as a reference to the humanity (*to anthropinon*). For 'perfect' here bespeaks immortality. But we are not to think of another (*allon*) son beyond the Son by nature (*physei*), but the same one is Son in nature (*physei*) as God, and receives the same name as a human being (*anthropos*).[95]

Obviously—as we have seen several times in this chapter—Theodoret cannot admit that there are two Sons. There is only one Son, the Only-Begotten Word, who is God in *physis*, and so perfect from the Father's begetting him. The question is what Theodoret means by this one's 'receiving the same name as a human being'. The contextual concern with the Word's natural perfection and how the Hebrews text must thus be referred to the assumed humanity indicates prosopic union as the functional Christology in the exegete's mind.

Essentially the same argument appears at Hebrews 13: 8, 'Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and for ever.' The same one—*autos*—is nailed to the cross by the Jews is also eternal, 'yesterday and today' being referred to the human nature, but *aionion* to the divinity. One and the same is both, since 'he says the same one and this thing to be that, for the Only-Begotten Son is one and the same, and first-born'.[96] But is this hypostatic union? The careful attribution of the temporal expressions ('yesterday and today') in 13: 8 to the humanity and the eternity to the divinity is a clear indication that to say that the Only-Begotten is first-born is to say he is called first-born by virtue of the prosopic union with the assumed humanity, not that the *hypostasis* of the Word suffered death in himself and was the first to rise from the dead, as Cyril would have it.

In so many words, while a Cyrillian could read Theodoret's commentaries on the Pauline epistles and find in them his own Christology, a careful reading of them in the light of the Christology and terminology of the pre-433 works shows that those authors are correct who find here merely the dropping of the 'concrete terms' for the assumed humanity and their replacement with more or less impersonal terms such as the 'assumed humanity', the human *physis*, or simply 'the man'. The antecedent of 'he' when the stress is on the union of both natures in one *prosopon* is consistently Theodoret's old term for

95 *PG*, 82: 733C. 96 Ibid. 781B.

the common *prosopon*, 'the Lord Christ', or one of its alternatives such as the 'the Master Christ'. So far as I can see, the Word is never simply equivalent to the common *prosopon*, but refers to the divine *physis*, to the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God. I find no genuine evolution in Christological thought here.

DEFENCE OF DIODORE OF TARSUS AND THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA

Within a year of the deposition of Nestorius, Cyril had turned his attention to attacking Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia with passion, on the ground 'that Christ Jesus is not to be thought of and spoken of by us as a man by himself in the ordinary way and apart, but rather the Word of God incarnate'.[97] In 438, most likely,[98] he published a work of three books entitled *Contra Diodorum et Theodorum*, of which considerable fragments remain in Greek and Syriac.[99] Early in 449, anticipating the Latrocinium later in the year, Theodoret mentions in Epistle 16 to Irenaeus the defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia which he wrote in rapid reply to Cyril's attack. Thus the dating of Theodoret's defence of Diodore and Theodore must be sometime in 438 or shortly thereafter; unfortunately, only fragments remain from quotations used against Theodoret at Ephesus in 449 and at the Fifth Ecumenical Council a century later.[100]

[97] Cf. P. M. Parvis, 'The Commentary on Hebrews and the Contra Theodorum of Cyril of Alexandria', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 26, part 2 (Oct. 1975), 415–19. The quotation from Cyril is from Cyril of Alexandria, *Sancti Patris Nostri Cyrillis Archepiscopi Alexandrini in S. Joannis Evangelium*, ed. P. E. Pusey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1872; repub. Brussels: Culture et Civilisation, 1965), iii. 387.

[98] Quasten, iii, 128. Cyril was reluctant to renew the conflict with the Antiochenes. On this point, see his letters to Proclus of Constantinople (Schwartz's critical edition in *Codex Vaticanus Grecus 1431* (Munich: 1927), p. 17), and those to his zealous supporter the Antiochene archimandrite Maximinus, who was refusing to communicate with John (ibid. 20 f.). He was finally stung into protest by the letter of the Council of Antioch of Aug. 438 which contended that Theodore had taught the same doctrine as Athanasius, Theophilus, the Cappadocians, and Cyril himself (*ACO*, Tom. I, Vol. V, pp. 310 ff.), an assertion Cyril hotly denies. Cf. his reply to John in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 4, pp. 37 ff.) and in *Collectio Casinensis*, nos. 288 and 296 (*ACO*, Tom. I, Vol. IV, pp. 210, 226).

[99] *PG*, 76: 1437–52; Pusey, iii, 492–537.

[100] Johannes Flemming (ed.), *Akten der Ephesinischen Synode vom Jahre 449 Syrisch*, trans. into German by George Hoffmann (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1917), pp. 105–7; G. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio* ..., ix (Florence, 1763), cols. 252–4 (material from the Fifth Ecumenical Council of 553, in Latin); L. Abramowski, 'Reste von Theodorets Apologie für Diodore und Theodor bei Facundus', *Studia Patristica*, Part I (1957: Texte und Untersuchungen, 63), pp. 61–9. On the dating of the *Defense of Diodore and Theodore*,

The fragments of direct use to us in this study are few, and most come from Flemming's *acta* of the Latrocinium. My English text in what follows is thus my translation of a German translation of a Syriac translation of the original Greek. Not the best source, surely, but a few observations may be made. The preface to the fragments indicates that Theodoret's case was heard at Ephesus with a singular lack of objectivity:

Johannes, presbyter and first of the notaries, said, 'The text handed over by the presbyter Pelagios has such a title: "Apologia of Bishop Theodoret defending Diodore and Theodore, soldiers of piety".' The holy synod said, 'This alone suffices for him to be deposed. So has the great king already commanded, so that if anything is said for Theodoret against his proper deposition, it is possible that even Nestorius is being supported.' Johannes, presbyter and first of the notaries, read, 'From the writing of Theodoret. . . .'[101]

One can hardly expect much support for a man already virtually condemned as a Nestorian. The second fragment cites Theodoret's apology to the effect that the Word does not experience death on the cross. Theodoret is accusing an unnamed writer—possibly Cyril—of having converted the divinity of the Word into passible nature: 'Then he has filled the whole bill of accusation with such words: "He has not assumed the man, nor become a human being; he, the Only-Begotten himself, has endured death and tasted death." ' The third fragment seems very confused, but in it Theodoret justifies the use of the word 'temple' to describe the humanity, a term that I did not find so used in any of the commentaries, and certainly one of those terms, so frequent in his earlier works, which was offensive to the Alexandrine party. The fourth fragment presents us with a classic example of Theodoret's communication of names. Obviously his opponent had alleged that the Word himself is, after the Incarnation, a true human being because Scripture calls him a man. Theodoret replies, 'Neither, therefore, is God the Word a lamb. On the contrary as if a lamb he has sacrificed the nature which he assumed. But he is called a lamb on account of the union.' This makes sense only in the context of Theodoret's earlier double-subject Christology.

The fifth fragment uses nature, or *physis* (presumably the original Greek term here) in a way entirely consonant with the Christology we found characteristic of Mopsuestia in Chapter 2 above and of Cyrus in his works before 433. 'Nature' here seems to refer to the Word in himself, that is to say, to the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God, and also to what we have seen was meant before 433 by 'the assumed man'. Theodoret is again attacking his opponent:

cf. M. Richard, 'Proclus de Constantinople et le théopaschisme', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 38 (1942), 303–31.

[101] Flemming, p. 105. The fragments all follow and are numbered.

How would this not now be evident, that just as soon as you indict Diodore for having named the assumed nature 'Son of Grace', or adoptive son, you indict you yourself with the selfsame accusation? You censure him, namely, because he has not named the one who is from David's seed true Son of the Father. For how is that nature which was taken from David in truth the Son of the God of all? The one who was begotten of the Father before time has indeed this name.

The post-433 Theodoret has changed his terminology, but not his Christology. What else can 'assumed nature' mean here but what would earlier have been rendered 'assumed man'? It means 'the one who is from David's seed', the expression used earlier for the one who learns, who suffers temptation but wins our salvation by conquering it through the exercise of his own proper free will with God's grace, the one who fears death, the one who experiences death on the cross by the separation of his soul from his dying body, the one who the Theodoret of *De Incarnatione* was at great pains to emphasize was not the Word himself, but the man assumed by the Word into a union of *synapheia*. Though we must be careful about using fragments from a prejudiced source to prove too much, and through such a stairstep of languages at that, yet the use of the term 'assumed nature' is so characteristic of the Theodoret of the late 430s and 440s that its use here can justly be considered highly likely to be authentic. It is exactly the term we should expect, and equally, its use here to defend the Antiochene Christology of Diodore and Theodore is highly indicative that my general conclusion throughout this chapter that a change only of terminology is really found in this period is probably correct.

That the 'assumed nature' of the fifth fragment does indeed mean what Theodoret earlier would have titled 'the assumed man' is clear in the sixth fragment, where he refers to the 'seed of David', the subject of the 'assumed nature' in the fifth fragment, as the 'assumed perfect man'. He is in this sixth fragment accusing his yet unnamed opponent of twisting the meaning of what Diodore or Theodore has written, in the same way that many twist the meaning of Holy Scripture. He writes, for example, that Paul's words, 'God was in Christ reconciling the world with himself' mean

God the Word has, according to the proclamation of the godly scriptures, assumed a perfect man who is from Abraham's and David's seed, who in nature was that which they were from whose seed he was: in nature a perfect man consisting of a rational and human flesh.

The fragment is written in such a way as to imply that these words are a quotation from Diodore or Theodore that Theodoret is citing approvingly. Be that as it may, it does not alter my conclusion above.

The ninth fragment runs: 'For one is the Only-Begotten Son according to his nature, who has put on our nature.' In the context of a defence of the Antiochene Fathers, given what we have learned so far of Theodoret's Christology, what can this indicate but that in fact during this period of terminological evolution away from the concrete terms of pre-433 Theodoret is using terms such as 'assumed nature' or 'human nature' or 'humanity' to mean precisely what he meant by 'the assumed man'? Can this fragment mean other than that for Theodoret's mention of 'the divine nature' is the same thing as mention of the Word himself, that no distinction can be made between speaking of the Word's *physis* and speaking of the Word as *hypostasis*? In other words, to speak of the divine *physis* is to speak of the Word himself, the second *hypostasis* of God. The Incarnation is his assuming into prosopic union with himself ('putting on') the temple, the assumed man, the human *physis*, the humanity, the man.

In the eleventh fragment, Theodoret returns to his old theme that the assumed *physis* is worshipped because of the union with the Word, and this time he uses the old term, abandoned in the commentaries, of 'the temple' for the human nature:

Would he himself want to say whether the worship of the assumed nature pertains to every human being of nature and whether it has not been evaluated as worthy of this of God the Word on account of the unity? But if it is worshipped of the whole creation on account of this, because it is joined to God the Word, it was named his temple and became flesh of the Only-Begotten. So your refutation is superfluous and very heterodox.

This and the twelfth fragment are vintage Theodoret. Indeed, the twelfth, if it be authentic, stresses the double-subject Christology to an extent which must have removed all scruple from the minds of the Alexandrines at Ephesus in 449:

Though now the God of all has through God the Word suffered the flesh to rise again, and the word of the Lord which went out to the Jews has proved itself true, and he has suffered the temple to rise which had been loosed from this one; the one resurrected from the dead, however, is the Lord Jesus. So name therefore the Lord Jesus flesh.

Fragment 14 makes a distinction between referring to the Word as himself with such terms as 'in nature' or 'in truth' and referring to him as 'man' on the ground that the names appropriate to one nature can be transferred to the other because of the common *prosopon*:

For in reference to the term 'God' here there applies directly the modifiers 'by nature' and 'in truth'. In reference to 'man' the term 'in truth' applies because we are considering the form of the servant. On the other hand, with the expression 'according to the economy' the term 'man' may apply to God the Word. For the

assumed nature is a human being in truth, but he who has assumed this nature is on the one hand God in truth, and on the other in respect of the 'economy' also human, not in that he has been transformed into this, but in that he has assumed the human nature.

This reads so much like the Theodoret of the commentaries period, the later 430s and 440s, and so much like the earlier Theodoret, that it is highly unlikely to be inauthentic. And if it be genuine, then it certainly would support the observation that Theodoret has not to date solved the problem of the Arian syllogism: he cannot attribute passible properties to the Word himself without falling into Arianism. That is to say, Theodoret cannot distinguish between speaking of the Word in himself and speaking of the Word in his divine *physis*. He is still caught in the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism. Also it becomes clear that 'the assumed nature' of the commentaries is simply an equivalent expression for the human nature fully hypostasized over against the *hypostasis* of the Word; which is to say that 'assumed nature' simply replaces the term 'the assumed man', but not the idea.

The last of the fragments found in the Syriac version of the *acta* of the Latrocinium, fragment 15, reads like something right out of Ephesus in 431. Theodoret all but accuses Cyril of having betrayed the formula of 433 and returned to his Apollinarian blasphemy of transforming the divine *physis* into a creature generated in time. He is appalled to find the patriarch resuming use of Apollinaris' infamous dictum of the unity of the Incarnation being in the Word's *physis* made flesh:

But after he [Cyril] has forgotten these words and given vent to the other teaching, he has returned again to his wickedness, and cloaking the blasphemy of Apollinaris he has said and exclaimed: 'We say there is one Son, as the Fathers have said, and one incarnate nature of the Word (*eine fleischgewordene Natur des Logos*).' Take note of the twisting of the orthodox teaching. To wit: while he certainly has first put forward such words as are known by the righteous —'one Son'—he has then produced 'one nature', which springs up from the blasphemies of Apollinaris, and then has added 'incarnate' because he was afraid blasphemy would be detected. Which Fathers has he cited who have made any such statement? But altogether the opposite to that is found in the holy Fathers, for they have continuously proclaimed two natures. Or do you name Apollinaris, Eunomius, Asterius, and Aetius Fathers? It is indeed they who have begotten this blasphemy.

One may rightly question whether this is indeed a man who has been converted from his Antiochene double-subject Christology to Cyril's Christological model through reading the Patriarch's works after the 431 Council of Ephesus, as Bertram thought. The more reasonable solution is that, as I suggested above, Theodoret read his own Christology into the formula

of union, slightly altered his terminology by abandoning the use of the more concrete terms for the humanity in Christ, and is genuinely shocked to see the 'old' Cyril revived in 438. This does not read as though it were written by a theologian who has really perceived what Cyril was saying and has come to agree with it.

The old Theodoret double-subject Christology, prosopic union, clearly appears in another fragment attributed to Theodoret's *Defence of Diodore and Theodore* in Mansi's *acta* from the Fifth Ecumenical Council (see n. 100 above). Theodoret is defending Theodore against the accusations made against him by Cyril, and he asks which of the two, Cyril or Theodore, misuses the Fathers and Scripture, the one who says it was the Word himself who was visited with the Spirit and made worthy of honour, or the latter who simply quotes Paul in Philippians 2, and so distinguishes between the Lord himself who visits and assumes and the man who merits visitation and is assumed, the seed of Abraham:

What has he said beyond those ancient doctors? For each and every one of them openly and clearly taught that the human nature was visited and assumed and anointed by the Holy Spirit, and crucified, died, and rose again, and was received into the heavens, and merited the seat at the right hand. You indeed, when you hear the ineffable words (as it would seem) which Paul heard, hear rather something else and more divine here. In fact you introduce to us doctrines other than Paul's, and you thus interpret Paul and you say, 'But it was God the Father's Word himself who was surely made a human being, and not any other, but he himself whom you dignify with visitation and memory.' What could be more ridiculous than these words? For of what visitation does God the Word stand in need? 'Who though he was in the form of God did not consider it robbery to be equal to God, but emptied himself and accepted the form of a servant; he did not assume the nature of angels but assumed the seed of Abraham.' Rightly, therefore, Theodore said that he who assumed visited him who was assumed. And thus also the prophet teaches, calling him who visited 'Lord', but 'the man' him who merited the visitation.[102]

[102] 'Quid autem novum praeter veteres illos doctores dixerit? Illorum enim unusquisque humanam naturam et visitatam et assumptam, et unctam esse a Sancto Spiritu et crucifixam, et mortuam esse, et resurrexisse, et in caelos receptam esse, et sedem mereri quae ad dexteram est, aperte et dilucide docuerunt [sic]. Tu vero cum ineffabilia, ut videtur, verba audisses, quae Paulus audivit, magis hic alia quaedam et divinora, (alias vero nobis introducis praeter Pauli doctrinas) sic Paulum interpretaris, et dicis: "Sed erat ipsum ex Deo, Patre Verbum, factus certe secundum hominem, et non alium quemdam, sed seipsum visitatione et memoria dignas." Quid his verbis magis ridiculum? Cuius enim Deus Verbum visitationis indigeret? "At qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est aequalis esse Deo, sed semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens: et angelicam quidem naturam non assumpsit, semen autem Abraham assumpsit." Merito igitur Theodorus dixit, eum qui accepit, visitare, assumptum esse. Ita autem et propheta docens, dominum quidem eum qui visitavit, vocat; hominem vero eum qui visitationem meruit.' In the last statement in quotation marks, Theodoret seems to be referring to Phil. 2: 6 and Heb. 1 and 2: 16.

The fragments attributed to Theodoret's *Defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia* certainly agree in style and concern with the undoubted work of Theodoret in the period between the formula of union and the outbreak of the Eutychian controversy in the waning years of the next decade. There seems little reason to doubt their authenticity from the point of view of content. If they be genuine, they without doubt encourage the interpretation that Theodoret did not alter his fundamental Christology in any way after the formula of union, but rather merely dropped from ordinary use his earlier concrete terms for the humanity of Christ.

HISTORIA RELIGIOSA

Theodoret's *History of the Monks*, written *c.* 444, was the first of his historical works, relating the lives of twenty-eight men and three women ascetics in thirty chapters.[103] Most of them lived in the vicinity of Antioch, chapters 14–25 dealing with the hermits of his own diocese of Cyrus, and chapter 26 with the famous Simeon Stylites. Most of them were known personally to Theodoret. He has added an appendix, the *Oratio de Divina et Sancta Caritate*, to show that it is only by the love of God that these ascetics were able to withstand the temptations of Satan and the world. It would seem that for Theodoret asceticism in the monastic tradition was the highest form of Christian spirituality possible. Aside from a few typical denunciations of Arius and Apollinaris,[104] there is nothing here of interest to our study. At the conclusion, he is at some pains to stress that there is complete equality between men and women in Christian asceticism.[105]

[103] *PG*, 82: 1283–1496; Théodoret de Cyr, *Histoire des moines de Syrie*, ed. Pierre Canivet and Alice Leroy-Molinghen, 2 vols., *SC*, 234 and 257 (Paris: Les Éditions de Cerf, 1977 and 1979); Theodoret of Cyrrhus, *A History of the Monks of Syria*, trans. into English with an introduction and notes by R. M. Price (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1985); Theodoret von Cyrus, *Monchsgeschichte*, trans. into German by Konstantin Gutberlet, Bibliothek der Kirchenvater, 50, ed. O. Bardenhewer, C. Weyman, and J. Zellinger (Munich: Verlag Josef Kosel & Friedrich Pustet, 1926). Cf. the studies listed in Quasten, iii. 550, and in addition Pierre Canivet, *Le Monachisme syrien selon Théodoret de Cyr* (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1977), and Theresa Urbainczyk, *Theodoret of Cyrrhus: The Bishop and the Holy Man* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

[104] *PG*, 82: 1300C, 1320C, 1336B.

[105] Ibid. 1493D.

CONCLUSION

The period between the formula of union in 433 and the outbreak of the Eutychian controversy in the late 440s was a time of productive writing for Theodoret. It was the time of his great biblical commentaries and of slightly more than a decade of relative peace from dogmatic controversy, save for the *Defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia* in the middle of it. It is clear that his Christological terminology underwent some evolution in that the more concrete terms for the humanity in Christ are largely avoided. This is probably due to his concern to avoid offending the politically dominant Cyrillian party for the sake of peace and unity in the Church. On the other hand, this does not appear to reflect, as some have thought, an evolution in his Christological model, from the classical two-subject Christology of the Antiochene party at Ephesus in 431 and prior to that council to the single-subject Christology of Cyril, who identified that single subject with the Word, the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God. At least, this study so far has not uncovered anything more in the documents of the period than what appear to be expressions of Theodoret's pre-433 Christology reworked to avoid the concrete formulae.

7

The Eutychian Crisis

Cyril of Alexandria died in 444 and was succeeded by his nephew Dioscorus. His intrigues with Eutyches and Chrysaphius in Constantinople soon led to the outbreak of the Eutychian crisis, Eutyches' deposition by the synod of Constantinople in 448, the so-called Latrocinium at Ephesus the next year, and finally the Council of Chalcedon in 451. This has been covered in some detail in Chapter 1. Here we must consider the Christology in Theodoret's literary works of the crisis period. First will be the *Eranistes*, published originally in 447 or 448, then *There is One Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ* of 448, and a fairly large collection of letters that Theodoret wrote to defend himself against the charges of the opposing party. Finally, there are a few fragments of a letter written to John of Aegae after Chalcedon and the *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium. The Historia Ecclesiastica* dates from 448–9 also, but completely avoids any mention of the Nestorian crisis. It is devoted to the Arian controversy entirely, but the very few Christological references in it reflect exactly the terminology and concerns I have uncovered in Chapter 6 above.

THE ERANISTES

Theodoret's largest and best-known work on Christology, the *Eranistes*, was written *c.*447, though it could have been begun the year before and possibly not completed until 448.[1] The extant edition incorporates quotations of the

[1] Cf. J. Quasten, *Patrology*, iii: *The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon* (Utrecht and Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers; Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1963, 547; R. Devreesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*, Studi e Testi, 141 (Rome: Pubblicazioni della Biblioteca Vaticana, 1948), p. 166; L. Saltet, 'Les Sources de l' '*Ερανιστης* de Théodoret', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 6 (1905), 290; Theodoret de Cyr, *Thérapeutique des Maladies Helléniques*, ed. and trans. P. Canivet, *SC*, 57, pp. 22–3; M. Richard, 'Notes sur l'évolution doctrinale de Théodoret de Cyr', *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 25 (1936), 470; G. Bardy, 'Théodoret', in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, xv. (1946), 306; E. Venables, 'Theodoretus', in *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iv (1887), 913; B. J. Kidd, *A History of the Church to A.D. 461*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), iii. 287.

Fathers from the Tome of Leo, sent to Flavian of Constantinople on 13 June 449. On the other hand, the Council of Chalcedon itself excerpted some sixteen texts from the florilegia in the *Eranistes*, though without citing any of those taken from Leo's Tome. The conclusion is that the *Eranistes* was written shortly before Chalcedon, and that eighteen citations from the Tome of Leo were interpolated into the florilegia of the *Eranistes* sometime after 451, either by Theodoret or by some other individual.[2] Aside from these interpolations, there appear to have been no changes made from the original 447 version of the *Eranistes* after Chalcedon.

The name *Eranistes* was chosen by Theodoret to indicate that he considered his opponents' Christology a collection of ideas gathered from many heresies.[3] In classical Greek *eranistes* signifies a contributor to the feast of a supper club. Its verb form, *eranizo*, means to contribute or to beg for contributions. Hence in these dialogues Eranistes is a beggar or collector of tidbits of heresy from every quarter, easily refuted by Orthodoxos with an endless display of *reductiones ad absurdum*, all drawn—as always with Theodoret—from the logic of the Arian syllogism, buttressed by liberal quotations from Scripture and the Fathers.

The work consists of a short introduction in which Theodoret says that he intends to refute those, such as Marcion, who would call Christ 'God only', or those who would deny the reality of his humanity, such as Valentinus and Bardesanes, or those who would attribute passibility to the Only-Begotten, such as the Arians, or those who would 'call the Godhead and the manhood of the Lord Christ one nature', such as Apollinaris. It may be questioned whether Theodoret achieved the goal stated in this introduction of writing these dialogues between his champion Orthodoxos and Eranistes, or 'the Beggar', so that the reading of them might be 'an easy task, even to the illiterate'.

He states in his introduction that he is dividing the work into three dialogues, each of which is to be buttressed at its end with a collection, or florilegium, of quotations from Patristic authors who would be beyond challenge by his opponents. The first dialogue opens with an explanation, as

[2] The text of the *Eranistes* is in *PG*, 83: 27–336. A new critical Greek text with introduction is in Theodoret of Cyrus, *Eranistes*, ed. Gerard H. Ettlinger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). In 1998, Ettlinger published an English translation of his Greek text in *Theodoret of Cyrus: Eranistes*, The Fathers of the Church, 106 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2003). Another English translation is available in *NPNF*, iii. 160–244. The English translations in this chapter are taken from this version in *NPNF* unless otherwise noted. I have, however, usually changed 'man' to 'human being' when used in a generic sense to refer to both men and women. The interpolations from Leo's Tome are found in the florilegium at the end of Dialogue II, numbered 32–5, 44–5, 72–4, 79–84, 93–5 in Ettlinger's text (cf. pp. 15–18 for exact textual references).

[3] Cf. Theodoret's short introduction, Ettlinger, pp. 61–2; *PG*, 83: 28–9.

a prologue, of how the Word became flesh (John 1: 14). This introduces the main theme of the first dialogue, the immutability (*atreptos*) of the divinity of the Only-Begotten Son. The second deals with the theme that the union of divinity and humanity in 'the Lord Christ' (once again) is without confusion (*asygchyton*). The third dialogue contends for the impassibility (*apatheia*) of the deity (*theotes*) of 'our Saviour'.[4] Quite clearly it is the metaphysic of the Arian syllogism that remains Theodoret's basic concern. Finally, Theodoret summarizes his major points from each of the dialogues in a concluding section of forty syllogisms at the end of the work entitled *Demonstrationes per Syllogismos*.

The entire dialogue takes place between two debaters, Orthodoxos, who represents Theodoret's Christology, and Eranistes, who probably does not represent any particular historical individual but rather, in a general way, the Alexandrine Christology of Cyril, Dioscorus, and Eutyches—as Theodoret perceives it.[5] As would be expected, Orthodoxos dominates the discussion. One or other of the two disputants will put a question, and the other replies, but the mutual questions and answers are always designed to give Orthodoxos full opportunity to present his views. Usually the discussion begins with a commonly agreed-upon theological statement, with Orthodoxos then initiating a more careful analysis of the implications of that statement. That inevitably leads to disagreement, and for the rest of the dialogue Orthodoxos works to convince Eranistes of the logical necessity of adopting Orthodoxos' point of view. We are not surprised to find Orthodoxos liberally quoting from Scripture to support his position, and the scriptural passages chosen are no surprise to anyone who has read Theodoret's earlier works. Finally, each dialogue concludes with Eranistes persuaded of the correctness of Orthodoxos' points, whereupon an appeal to clinch the argument is made to the authority of Fathers whose orthodoxy is beyond challenge by either party.

Gerald Ettlinger's critical text of the *Eranistes* includes in his introduction an index of these Patristic citations.[6] There are sixty-eight in the florilegium of the first dialogue, seven of which occur as part of the conversation between Orthodoxos and Eranistes in the prologue discussion of the interpretation of John 1: 14. Dialogue II's florilegium contains 112 citations; the florilegium to the third dialogue, some seventy-five. As we have seen above, eighteen citations from Leo's Tome were interpolated after 451 into the second florilegium.[7] Aside from these eighteen, Theodoret has amassed 237 citations

[4] Ettlinger, p. 62, l. 25–9; *PG*, 83: 29.

[5] Ettlinger, pp. 3–4; Jerry L. Stewardson, 'The Christology of Theodoret of Cyrus according to His Eranistes' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1972), pp. 232–43.

[6] Ettlinger, pp. 9–23.

[7] Florilegium II, nos. 32–5, 44–5, 72–4, 79–84, 93–5 in Ettlinger's text, pp. 15–18.

from twenty-three authors. Ettlinger, after a careful study of the sources of each, concludes:

Analysis of the errors and inaccuracies in the *Eranistes* shows that many can be explained without assuming that Theodoret deliberately falsified. . . . Apart from the spurious writings, Theodoret makes one incorrect attribution and five positive errors in titles; in view of the large number of citations in the *Eranistes* and the research Theodoret would have faced, this small number of errors seems to indicate a reasonable level of accuracy. . . . This brief study of the citations in the *Eranistes* does seem to show that Theodoret is generally trustworthy, and that one may consider his information accurate, unless there is positive proof to the contrary.[8]

The sources of these three florilegia provide insight into the structure and purpose of the *Eranistes.* In the autumn of 431 the Antiochene delegates at Constantinople—the group sent from Ephesus to represent the Antiochene party's views to the Emperor—sent a letter to Archbishop Rufus of Thessalonica in which they mentioned a collection of 'proofs' from the Fathers to show that their position was in harmony with the received faith. The letter is Epistle 170 in Theodoret's letters, and he may well have been the author of it. The Emperor has met, the letter says, with the Antiochene and Alexandrine delegations on five separate occasions and ordered the Cyrillians

either to reject the [twelve] chapters of Cyril as contrary to the faith, or to be willing to do battle in their behalf, and to show in what way they are in agreement with the confession of the Fathers. We have our proofs at hand, whereby we should have shown that they are totally opposed to the teaching of orthodoxy, and for the most part in agreement with heresy.

The letter goes on to point out what it was in the Twelve Chapters that offended the Antiochenes: that the divinity of the Only-Begotten Son suffered and was passible; that there is made one nature of both divinity and humanity, for so Cyril explains 'the Word was made flesh'; and that this involves the divinity in passibility, which leads straightway to Arianism. It will be noted that the *Eranistes*' prologue on John 1: 14, dialogue's III's theme on the impassibility of the Word's divinity, and dialogue II's theme of a union which does not confuse both natures into one are all represented in this Antiochene florilegium of 431.

L. Saltet has compared the florilegia in the *Eranistes* and the florilegium at the end of the *De Duabus Naturis in Christo* of Gelasius, bishop of Rome from 492 to 496, with this description of the Antiochene florilegium of 431 in Epistle 170.[9] He comes to the conclusion that both Theodoret in the *Eranistes*

[8] Ettlinger, pp. 33–5.

[9] Saltet, pp. 289–303, 513–36, 741–54. His conclusions are summarized briefly by Ettlinger, p. 27, and at more length by Stewardson, pp. 223–32.

(omitting from consideration the citations from Leo's Tome interpolated after 451) and Gelasius used the Antiochene florilegium of 431 as a primary source, and that though Theodoret was part of the Antiochene delegation to the court from Ephesus in 431, it was not he, but another member of the delegation, Helladius of Ptolemais, who compiled the 'dossier patristique' of 431. He comes to the further conclusion that the Antiochene florilegium furnished Theodoret with the plan for the *Eranistes*: he had the argument from tradition in the form of texts from Fathers whom no one could accuse of heterodoxy, to which he had merely to add a theological exposition in the form of a philosophical dialogue between two representatives of the schools at issue. He took the section of citations on 'the Word became flesh' and used them in his prologue; dialogue II's theme of an unconfused union and dialogue III's theme of impassibility in the divinity of the Word are also taken straight from the 431 collection. The only original contribution by Theodoret in 447 is dialogue I's theme of immutability, but it certainly also fits the basic train of thought.

In so many words, in the *Eranistes* Theodoret is still fighting the battle of 431 against the Twelve Anathemas. Saltet says of Theodoret's greatest work on Christology, 'Il cesse de constituer une oeuvre originale; il devient une adaptation d'une idée anterieure.'[10] Indeed, Saltet concludes that the section of the 431 Antiochene collection dealing with the unconfused union is in direct response to the fourth anathema concerning *communicatio idiomatum*, the section on John 1:14 is in reaction to the question of *Theotokos*, and the section on impassibility responds to the twelfth anathema's insistence that the Word suffered, was crucified, and suffered death in the flesh. These are, of course, the fundamental themes and concerns we have continually found throughout Theodoret's works.[11]

J. L. Stewardson, in a 1972 study of the *Eranistes*, leans in the direction of considering Theodoret himself the author or collector of the 431 Antiochene florilegia.[12] In his 1975 critical edition of the Greek text of the *Eranistes*, Gerard Ettlinger attributes much more originality to Theodoret's 447 work than does Saltet. He agrees that the florilegia in the *Eranistes* and in Gelasius have a common source, but that it is not the Antiochene collection of 431 (indeed, he wonders whether it ever existed in 'a fully developed form') but rather the florilegium of Theodoret's lost work the *Pentalogos*, which was itself written right after the 431 Council of Ephesus against Cyril and the Twelve Anathemas. This was, he argues, 'a fully developed and published work', and as such would have been far more likely the source that Theodoret would have used. Even if the 'obscure' 431 Antiochene document was Theodoret's source

[10] Saltet, p. 527. [11] Ibid. 744–5. [12] Stewardson, pp. 230–1.

for the *Eranistes*, 'Theodoret would have played a major part in its composition'. For Ettlinger, then, far from lacking in originality, Theodoret reworked material gleaned from his own personal research in the florilegia of the *Eranistes* and based his greatest Christological work solely on it.[13] Further, Ettlinger follows Bolotov's late nineteenth-century thesis that the Greek text of the citations from John Chrysostom and Gregory of Nazianzus in the second florilegium from Leo's Tome are definitely not from the original Greek texts of John Chrysostom and Gregory of Nazianzus, but are retranslations into Greek from a Latin translation apparently in the hands of the interpolator. It is unlikely that this would have been necessary for Theodoret in the first place, and, further, the interpolations from Leo's Tome are crudely done in relationship to the structure and form of the work. These lead to the conclusion that the interpolator was not Theodoret himself, but some unknown Greek copyist sometime after 451.[14] In other words, Theodoret never issued a revision of the 447 version of the *Eranistes*, and the text we possess is that of 447 with some eighteen citations from Leo's florilegium interpolated into the second florilegium of the original text of the work.

In any case, it is clear from the structure of the work itself that Theodoret is still attacking Cyril's Twelve Anathemas, that his basic concern is to refute any notion of a union which arises out of confusing (as he saw it) the divine and human natures into one nature, for this leads to the predication of passibility and thus creaturely status to the Only-Begotten Son, the Word of God. It should not come as any surprise that we do not find any particular advance over Theodoret's position in 431 or in the period of his writing his commentaries on such questions as what it means for the Word to be 'made flesh', *communicatio idiomatum*, or whether it is the Word himself who suffers and dies on the cross.

Dialogue I, entitled *ἌΤΡΕΠΤΟΣ*, opens with a statement defining God as one being and nature in three *hypostaseis* and *prosopa*. Since all three are *homoousios* each to the other, all share in divine immutability. If the Word, the second *hypostasis* of the one divine *ousia*, be not immutable, Orthodoxos argues, we fall into Arianism. The debate moves to the difference between 'being' and 'becoming', leading us to a consideration of how John 1: 14 is to be interpreted. This is the topic of the rest of the dialogue. The question is how the Only-Begotten Word can be said to have become flesh and remain immutable. As we have heretofore seen endlessly, for Theodoret it is logical nonsense to say that immutable, unchangeable divinity can change by

[13] Ettlinger, pp. 27–9.

[14] V. Bolotov, 'Theodoretiana', *Christjanskoje Tschtenie*, 2 (1892), 142–7; summarized in Ettlinger, pp. 29–30.

becoming what it is not. Various kinds of physical unions are examined until Orthodoxos postulates that the Word did not 'become' but rather 'took' human nature and wore it in the economy of the Incarnation. Eranistes replies that this is actually teaching two Sons, which leads Orthodoxos to a consideration of the attributes of divinity and humanity. He appeals to certain implications of the doctrine of the Eucharist (concerning the relationship of *ousia* and outward appearance and the way in which one thing may be changed into another), then to Old Testament prophecies that are said to distinguish between divine and human natures, and, finally, to the florilegium of Patristic citations considered to support Orthodoxos' position.

The dialogue opens with an analysis of *ousia*, *hypostasis*, and *prosopon* in God.[15] Orthodoxos points out that both he and Eranistes 'acknowledge one *ousia* of God, alike of Father and of the Only-Begotten Son, and of the Holy Spirit'. Not to do so is to 'follow the blasphemy of Arius', which is, of course, the key to the whole of Theodoret's concern. Having procured Eranistes' agreement, Orthdoxos then asks the question 'And do we reckon *hypostasis* to signify anything else than *ousia*, or do we take it for another name for *ousia*?' He answers his own question by asserting that extra-Christian philosophy knows no fundamental difference in meaning between the two words, other than that *ousia* signifies what is (τὸ ὄν), while *hypostasis* indicates what subsists (τὸ ὑφεστός). But then he goes on to explain that according to the Fathers, in Christian thought a distinction is made between *ousia* and *hypostasis*, for the purpose of stating how God can be one in three, that corresponds to the difference between 'the common (*to koinon*) and the particular (*to idion*), the species (*to genos*) and the individual (*to eidos*)'. *Physis*, or nature, is not part of the vocabulary here, but obviously it functions as the ontological equivalent of *ousia*. *Ousia* and *physis* represent what is common to all those individuals who share the same species or specifying quality (*koine poiotes*). God, being utterly simple and completed being, is one *ousia* and one *physis*. But add the particularizing characteristics or properties—the *idia*—of unbegottenness, begottenness, and proceeding, and we have the way in which God is three: the three *hypostaseis*. All this is simply part of what Grillmeier has described as the Stoic doctrine of being. Each *hypostasis* or 'individual' has its own *prosopon*, which in the case of the divine *hypostaseis*, being of incorporeal *ousia*, is not visible or perceptible to human senses (thus the necessity of the Only-Begotten's 'taking' or 'assuming' a human *physis* and *prosopon*, so that the invisible may become visible).

Orthodoxos goes on to explain how 'species' (*genos*) refers to various kinds of living things: rational and irrational, creatures that fly or are amphibious,

[15] Ettlinger, pp. 63–5; *PG*, 83: 32–6.

others that go on foot, and some that swim. Of each of these kinds, there are many subdivisions: for example, of the creatures that go on foot there are lions, bulls, etc. Similarly the name human being (*anthropos*) is the common name (*koinon onoma*) of the human *physis*. The names Roman, Athenian, Persian, Egyptian, refer to groups of classes of human beings; but particular names, such as Peter or Paul, refer not to what is common to the *physis* but to a specific individual human individual.

As we have seen heretofore, *hypostasis* is not really a functional theological term for Theodoret. He normatively prefers to write of the three *prosopa* in one *ousia* in the Trinity.[16] Here, however, he is dealing specifically with a Christology that refers to the one *physis* or *hypostasis* of the Word of God incarnate. From the beginning of his discussion refuting this Christology, therefore, he is compelled to show why he objects to using either *physis* or *hypostasis* in this way—to 'one enfleshed *physis* (or *hypostasis*) of God the Word'. Even if *prosopon* is his preferred term for indicating individuation, the now traditional Trinitarian terminology refers to the three *hypostaseis* as individuations of God's *ousia*; and while *hypostasis* is going to be used here to indicate that which is individual and proper to the Word, it will do so as a function of *ousia-physis*.

He goes on, therefore, to say

As the name human being is common to human nature, so we understand the divine *ousia* to indicate the Holy Trinity; but the *hypostasis* denotes any *prosopon*, as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For following the definitions of the holy Fathers, we say that *hypostasis* and individuality (*ten idioteta*) signify this same thing.

And thus the discussion of the doctrine of being leads directly to Orthodoxos' main point in this dialogue (and indeed in all Theodoret's works):

Whatever then is predicated of the divine *physis* is common both to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, as for instance, 'God', 'Lord', 'Creator', 'Almighty', and so forth.... Since then we assert that some terms are common to the Holy Trinity, and some peculiar to each *hypostasis*, do we assert the term 'immutable' (*atrepton*) to be common (*koinon*) to the *ousia* or peculiar (*idion*) to any *hypostasis*?[17]

Eranistes concedes that 'immutable' is a term common to the *ousia-physis* of God the Trinity ('for it is impossible for part of the *ousia* to be mutable and part immutable'[18]). This leads Orthodoxos to his first and most basic triumph: 'So the Only-Begotten Son is immutable, as both are the Father that begat him and the Holy Spirit.'[19]

[16] See the discussion in Chapter 3 above of the *Graecarum Affectionum Curatio*, pp. 81–2, 84–9; and also of *Expositio Rectae Fidei*, pp. 91–3.

[17] Ettlinger, pp. 65–6; *PG*, 83: 36. [18] Ibid. [19] Ibid.

Immediately Orthodoxos continues his offensive, asking how Eranistes can possibly then assert that the Word became flesh in a literal sense, thus predicating mutability of him. Obviously, Theodoret can understand predication of an attribute to the Word strictly and only in the sense of attributing it to him as a *hypostasis* arising out of the one divine *ousia-physis*. It is not possible to speak even of the Word's *hypostasis*, which is proper to him alone, without also referring to all that is common to the *physis* out of which his *hypostasis* is begotten. In other words, Theodoret's absolute inability to refer to the Word's *hypostasis* apart from his divine *physis* is the fundamental assumption of the entire *Eranistes*. He has not broken the minor premiss of Sullivan's Arian syllogism.

Theodoret is now ready to introduce a fundamental point in his debate with the Alexandrines. Orthodoxos brings up John 1: 14. If the term 'immutable' applies to the *ousia* of the Holy Trinity, the Only-Begotten Son is also immutable. Eranistes agrees, and Orthodoxos asks, 'How then do you advance the statement in the Gospel "the Word became flesh", and predicated mutation of the immutable *physis*?'[20] Orthodoxos will not allow Eranistes to take refuge in saying that the Word is made flesh, 'not by mutation, but as he himself knows'. Theodoret takes seriously, that is, the Alexandrine claim that the Word became flesh not by a change into flesh but by a mystery apparently transcending human reason. But he answers that it simply will not do. Given Theodoret's conviction that to speak of the Word is to speak of him in his divine nature, such a statement is simply philosophical, rational nonsense. He has Orthodoxos reply that there are only three logical possibilities: either the Word 'took' flesh (Theodoret's customary way of explaining the prosopic union), or his nature was mutated into that of flesh, or he only seemed to appear as flesh (i.e. Docetism).[21] In so many words, it would seem that nothing at all has changed in the way Theodoret sees the Christological problem. There are only the possibilities of Antiochene prosopic union, predicating the Word's becoming flesh in a way that requires an ontological change of status in the divine *ousia-physis*, or Docetism. He knows and recognizes that the Alexandrines deny that their doctrine involves a change in nature in God, for he puts the claim directly into the mouth of Eranistes. But the Alexandrine claim remains an utter enigma to him. It is utter nonsense, and he concludes that it is actually double-talk, asserting that in reality they are predicating mutability of the Word.

Orthodoxos then suggests several analogies for mutation, such as sand becoming glass when heated, or grapes becoming wine when pressed, or the change of wine into vinegar with time, or the change of stone into lime when

[20] Ettlinger, p. 66; *PG*, 83: 36.

[21] Ettlinger, pp. 66–7; *PG*, 83: 37.

burned, concluding, 'If therefore you assert that the divine Word underwent change into flesh, why do you call him God and not flesh, for change of name fits in with the alteration of *physis*?'[22]

Orthodoxos then sets out to show that the New Testament speaks of the Word becoming flesh by taking on 'the seed of Abraham', that is, a human nature of body and reasonable soul, citing Hebrews 2: 11. Eranistes replies that what is proper to Abraham is proper to the seed of Abraham (i.e. Christ) except for sin, for 'Christ did not sin'.[23] Orthodoxos agrees: 'On that very account, therefore, I did not say indefinitely what Abraham had, but what he had according to nature (*kata physin*), that is to say, body and reasonable soul.'[24] When Orthodoxos then presses Eranistes to agree that Christ possessed body and rational soul, or a full human *physis*, Eranistes responds that to predicate a human *physis* of the Christ is to put 'forward two sons'.[25] Theodoret appears to be following some sort of Alexandrine argument here, in which *physis* would refer to the individualized person of a human being, to *hypostasis* in other words. Clearly, the Alexandrines understood that a real humanity had to be predicated of Christ. Cyril's third dogmatic letter to Nestorius makes that clear, as we have seen. The only reason why Eranistes would object, then, to Orthodoxos' conclusion is that it would mean to the Alexandrine a distinct human being set over against the Word.

Orthodoxos, however, in a way rather typical of Theodoret, skirts the issue, responding:

> But he who says that the divine Word is changed into the flesh does not even acknowledge one Son, for mere flesh by itself is not a son; but we confess one Son who took upon him the seed of Abraham, according to the divine apostle, and wrought the salvation of humankind.[26]

For Theodoret, the 'one Son' is the Word. To teach two Sons is to teach that another is the Son of God properly in addition to the Word. But this does not mean that he has refuted or even taken seriously Eranistes' claim that to predicate a genuine human *physis* of the incarnate Word is to predicate a distinct human being over against the Word but united to him by obedience, which is the same thing in Alexandrine terminology (and that of Ephesus) as to assert two Sons. The question remains whether this genuine humanity of body and rational soul is united to the Word in his own proper *hypostasis* (the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity) or whether the union is prosopic, as we have defined it heretofore. Theodoret has never claimed that the assumed humanity or human being is properly referred to as 'Son of God'. That title belongs to

[22] Ettlinger, p. 68; *PG*, 83: 40.
[23] Ettlinger, p. 69; *PG*, 83: 40.
[24] Ettlinger, p. 69; *PG*, 83: 41.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.

the Word. But the assumed humanity may be *called* Son of God by virtue of the prosopic union. Apparently, then, the charge of 'two Sons' means to Theodoret the elevation of the assumed humanity to divine status—more mutation, of a type he will spend much effort refuting later in the *Eranistes.* In other words, the assumed humanity or human being of Theodoret's prosopic union is not a son of God in his own right and certainly not the Son of God, who is the Word. To teach two Sons is to teach either that there are two Words of God or that the humanity is transformed into divine *ousia.* Theodoret is quite right to keep denying that anyone teaches this. That this is not what the Council of Ephesus and the Alexandrine party meant by the charge that Antioch taught two Sons passes him by.

Orthodoxos concludes, then, that the Word became flesh by assuming or taking up human nature—Theodoret's constant theme. Several proof texts from both testaments follow before Orthodoxos turns to another consequence of the immutability of the divine *physis.* Since the divine nature is not perceptible to human senses and is invisible to the human eye, part of the reason for the Word's assuming a human *physis* into union with himself is that the invisible might become visible through the body made his by the prosopic union. Neither may the Word in himself—that is to say, in his divine *physis*—perform healing miracles by making and applying spittle to the eyes of the blind or display the almighty powers over nature by walking on water, unless there be fleshly hands and feet with which to do these mighty works. The visions of God in the Old Testament, such as on Sinai, were just that, visions, but the *ousia* of God is not seen by human eyes.[27] After the Incarnation, the flesh of the assumed humanity functions as a 'kind of screen' through which 'God was made manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels'.[28] All of this we have seen before.

However, in his efforts to demonstrate the reality of the human *physis* assumed by the Word—as over against what he seems to consider a doctrine which, by its insistence on mutability in the Word's *physis*, denies both the divine *physis* and a real human *physis*—Theodoret turns next to a theme we have not yet encountered. He insists that just as the symbols in the Eucharist are not changed in their *physis* but are *called* the Body and Blood of Christ, so too the divine *physis*, being immutable, is not changed into flesh, into something which it is not, but that each of the two *physeis*, in effect, receives the names of the properties of the other (again a communication of names, not a true *communicatio idiomatum*). Orthodoxos says:

To them that are initiated in divine things the intention is plain. For he wished the partakers in the divine mysteries not to give heed to the *physis* of the visible objects,

[27] Ettlinger, pp. 75–6; *PG*, 83: 51–2.

[28] Ettlinger, p. 76; *PG*, 83: 52; quoting i Tim. 3: 16.

but, by means of the variation of the names, to believe the change (*metabole*) wrought of grace. For he, we know, who spoke of his natural body as grain and bread, and again called himself a vine, dignified the visible symbols by the appellation of the body and blood, not because he had changed their *physis*, but because to their *physis* he had added grace.[29]

Driving home his point, Orthodoxos asks Eranistes of what he understood the 'holy food to be symbol and type? Of the deity of the Lord Christ, or of his body and his blood?'[30] Note that once again the title 'Lord Christ' is used, Theodoret's usual term for the common *prosopon*. Eranistes answers that it is a symbol of the Christ's Body and Blood, but when Orthodoxos comes to the conclusion that Christ had a true body, Eranistes confounds him with apparent obtuseness by refusing to confess it, insisting simply that the Word became flesh. Orthodoxos replies that the dialogue between them is like 'drawing water in a pail with a hole in it'. There follows a somewhat lengthy citing of biblical texts to underscore Orthodoxos' point of view before we reach the conclusion of the first dialogue in which Orthodoxos asserts that John 1: 14 means that the Word did not change his divine *physis* into flesh, but took up human nature and indwells it as a kind of temple—all of which we have seen long before now:

The evangelist himself interprets himself. For after saying 'the Word was made flesh', he goes on 'and dwelt among us'. That is to say, by dwelling in us, and using the flesh taken from us as a kind of temple, he is said to have been made flesh, and, teaching that he remained unchanged, the evangelist adds 'and we beheld his glory—the glory as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth'. For though clad with flesh he exhibited his Father's nobility, shot forth the beams of the Godhead, and emitted the radiance of the power of the Lord, revealing by his works of wonder his hidden nature (*physin*).[31]

He immediately cites Philippians 2: 5–8, arguing that the form of God and the form of humanity there referred to mean real and full divine and human *physeis* in the Lord Christ. Orthodoxos' confession with which he thus concludes the first dialogue reads very much like the confessions of the period of the commentaries and also of that prior to 435:

To put the matter briefly both [John and Paul] teach that being God and Son of God, and clad with his Father's glory, and having the same *physis* and power with him that begat him, he that was in the beginning and was with God, and was God, and was creator of the world, took upon him the form of a servant, and it seemed that this was all which was seen; but it was God clad in human *physis*, and working out the salvation

[29] Ettlinger, pp. 78–9; *PG*, 83: 56. [30] Ibid. [31] Ettlinger, p. 89; *PG*, 83: 72.

of human beings. This is what was meant by 'the Word was made flesh' and 'was made in the likeness of human beings and being found in fashion as a man'.[32]

Surprisingly, at this point Eranistes seems to give up, saying that Orthodoxos has given a 'plausible interpretation'. But he wants to know what the 'old teachers of the Church' have taken John 1: 14 to mean, and the florilegium to the first dialogue follows. Theodoret is able to cite various Patristic sources that use terminology remarkably like his. For one example, his very first citation is from Athanasius' letter to Epictetus: 'it is not because he was turned into flesh, but because he took flesh on our behalf, that he is said to have been made flesh.'[33] Or again in the fourth citation Theodoret quotes Flavianus of Antioch:

The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us; he is not turned into flesh, nor yet did he cease from being God, for this he was from all eternity and became flesh in the dispensation of the Incarnation after himself building his own temple, and taking up his abode in the passible offspring (*gennemati*).[34]

Or from an Epiphany sermon preached by Gelasius of Caesarea:

'And the Word was made flesh', not having himself undergone change, but having taken up his abode with us. The dwelling is one thing (*heteron*); the Word is another (*heteron*); the temple is one thing (*heteron*), and God who dwells (*enoikon*) in it, another (*heteron*).[35]

Orthodoxos says that he would have cited the 'interpretations of the victorious champions of piety Diodore and Theodore', but perceiving that Eranistes 'was ill disposed towards them and had inherited the hostility of Apollinaris', he decided 'to pass them by, for you have declared truceless war against them'.[36]

A citation from Hippolytus is particularly interesting:

Tell me, O blessed Mary, what it was that was conceived by you in the womb; what it was that was borne by you in a virgin's womb. It was the Word of God, first-born from heaven, descending on you, and a firstborn human being being formed in the womb, that the firstborn Word of God might be shown united to a firstborn human being.[37]

The citation is of interest because, on the one hand, the concrete term 'firstborn human being' appears, the kind of term that Theodoret is reluctant

[32] Ettlinger, p. 90; *PG*, 83: 73, quoting John 1: 1.

[33] Florilegium I: 1; Ettlinger, p. 91; *PG*, 83: 76. Full reference to all citations in all three florilegia in the *Eranistes* is found in Ettlinger's introduction, pp. 9–23.

[34] Florilegium I: 4; Ettlinger, p. 93; *PG*, 83: 77.

[35] Florilegium I: 5; Ettlinger, p. 93; *PG*, 83: 77.

[36] Ettlinger, p. 95; *PG*, 83: 80.

[37] Florilegium I: 24; Ettlinger, p. 99; *PG*, 83: 88.

to use by this date in his own works, but it is in a sentence in which the Word himself is described as 'a firstborn human being being formed in the womb'. Theodoret himself would never have composed such an expression—that the Word himself was being formed a man in the Virgin's womb. He would have felt thoroughly comfortable with the idea of a man being formed in the womb and there united to the Word (and note that one of his favourite words for that union is used here, *synapto*), and he could have spoken of the *Lord Christ* as being both first-born Word of God and a first-born human being being formed in the Virgin's womb, but he would *not* have said that the Word himself is being formed a human being in her womb. His use of Hippolytus' expression here throws his own Christological terminology into sharp relief.

He cites Gregory of Nazianzus with approval to the point that the Word had to assume a rational human soul and body because it was the human mind that had sinned and thus required being taken up into the Incarnation: 'that which dared transgression was what had not kept the commandment; and that which specially needed salvation was what had transgressed, and that which was assumed was what needed salvation; so the mind was assumed'.[38]

There is a citation from Amphilochius of Iconium on the text 'my Father is greater than I' in John 14: 28 that sums up very well Theodoret–Orthodoxos' main points in the first dialogue:

> Distinguish me now the natures (*physeis*), that of God and that of the human being. For a human being was not made from a falling away from God, nor was God made from a human being by advancement. I am speaking of God and humanity. When, however, you attribute the passions to the flesh and the miracles to God, of necessity and not voluntarily you assign the lowly titles to the man from Mary and the exalted and divine to the Word who is in the beginning. Therefore, in some cases I utter exalted words, in others lowly, to the end that by the lofty I may show the nobility of the indwelling Word, and by the lowly I may reckon the weakness of the humble flesh. Whence I sometimes call myself equal to the Father and sometimes the Father greater [than I], not contradicting myself, but showing that I am God and human, for God is of the lofty, humanity of the lowly; but if you wish to know how my Father is greater than I, I spoke of the flesh and not of the *prosopon* of the divinity.[39]

Finally, Theodoret has Orthodoxos hurl the *coup de grâce*: not even Apollinaris was willing to say that the Word became flesh by a change of his divine *physis*, but rather that in the 'synthesis' of the Word and (mindless) flesh which is the incarnate Christ, the Word empties himself, 'not by undergoing change, but by investiture'.[40] It is not altogether consistent of Theodoret on

[38] Florilegium I: 47; Ettlinger, pp. 104–5; *PG*, 83: 96.
[39] Florilegium I: 56; Ettlinger, p. 107; *PG*, 83: 100.
[40] Florilegium I: 62–8; Ettlinger, pp. 109–10; *PG*, 83: 104.

the one hand to cite Apollinaris approvingly to the point that the Word becomes flesh by being invested with flesh, even if irrational (a process Orthodoxos calls assuming the flesh[41]), in a way that does not involve the Word in mutation, and then on the other hand throughout his works to assert that the danger of Apollinarianism is precisely that its Christology requires predicating mutability and passibility of the Word.

This discussion leads us into the second dialogue, whose point is that the union of the two *physeis* God and humanity in Christ is an unconfused union. Hence its name: *'ΑΣΥΓΧΥΤΟΣ*. The point of the dialogue is to demonstrate that the Word as divine *hypostasis* remains what he is, immutable God, and that he has assumed to himself in the Incarnation a real, full, actual humanity which remains what humanity is. The dialogue takes the form, consequently, of asserting the genuine humanity of Christ, a humanity which remains human throughout the ministry, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ. Whatever the union is between divinity and humanity in the Lord Christ, Theodoret is at some pains to assert firmly that both natures remain distinct and are not confused into each other.

The second dialogue opens with Eranistes' agreeing that the Word has not been changed into a creaturely *physis* in the economy of the Incarnation, but that John 1: 14 is to be understood as the Word's taking up flesh into a union with himself. This brings us to a consideration of the abiding reality of the other nature in Christ, the flesh. Orthodoxos immediately raises the anthropological question: 'What do we mean by the flesh?'[42] There follows a careful and explicit rejection of Apollinaris' threefold anthropology, and the assertion that 'flesh' means the entire human *physis* of rational soul and body. Again, we have seen this before in Theodoret's works. This is the 'form of a servant'. Eranistes agrees that what was assumed by the Word was complete in body and rational soul. Orthodoxos' reply once again indicates that he shares Gregory of Nazianzus' soteriological concern in predicating of the Lord Christ a 'complete' form of a servant:

> For since the whole first man became subject to sin, and lost the impression of the divine image, and the race followed, it results that the Creator, with the intention of renewing the blurred image, assumed the nature in its entirety, and stamped an imprint far better than the first.[43]

That point established, Theodoret then raises, through Eranistes, the question as to whether the union of both natures in Christ destroys one or the other. In other words, the form of this second dialogue is the question of

[41] Ettlinger, p. 110; *PG*, 83: 104.
[42] Ettlinger, p. 112; *PG*, 83: 108.
[43] Ettlinger, p. 113; *PG*, 83: 108.

whether the human nature is absorbed into the divinity. Theodoret raises this issue by having Eranistes ask whether Jesus the Christ is to be called a human being or God. Orthodoxos responds that he is to be called both:

By neither name alone, but by both. For God the Word, having been incarnated, has been named Jesus Christ.... But before the Incarnation he was named God, Son of God, Only-Begotten, Lord, divine Word, and Creator.... But after the Incarnation he was named Jesus Christ.[44]

Is this a case of Theodoret's getting beyond his communication of names to a genuine *communicatio idiomatum*? Is Jesus Christ the *hypostasis* of the Word with an added name, a name that aptly describes the Word because it is the Word himself who is 'anointed' with the Spirit at his baptism? Or is the Word properly named with the divine names and *called* after the human names by virtue of utilizing the *prosopon* of the man Jesus?

Theodoret has Eranistes take up what Theodoret considers the Alexandrine position of a confused union, in which the humanity has been absorbed into the divinity. Eranistes replies that 'the Lord Jesus is God only.... Since he became human without being changed, but remained just what he was before, we must call him just what he was.'[45] Theodoret now turns to the issue thus raised: what sort of union does Eranistes' vision of the Incarnation involve?

Orthodoxos insists that Jesus Christ is to be called both God and human, arguing from the analogy of the synthetic (*synthetos*) or composite union of rational soul and body in human beings. He points out with his usual examples and citations that the human being is not merely named in Scripture after 'his nobler part'; that is to say, the human being is not merely called 'soul' but also 'flesh', citing Galatians 1: 15–17 where Paul calls the other apostles 'flesh and blood'. Other scriptural examples follow until Orthodoxos draws an interesting conclusion:

In cases, then, where there is a certain natural union (*physike henosis*), and a combination of created things (*ktiston*... *synapheia*) and of beings connected by service and by time, it is not the custom of holy scripture to use a name for this being derived only from the nobler nature; it names it indiscriminately both by the meaner and by the nobler. If so, how can you find fault with us for calling Christ the Lord human after confessing him to be God, when many things compel us to do so?[46]

The human being is, of course, a composite nature and *physis* for Theodoret, as we saw in examining his pre-431 works. Soul is an immortal *physis*, and the body is a mortal *physis*, but when they are united, Theodoret is willing to refer to the one human *physis*. He is obviously doing so here in the *Eranistes*. He is

[44] Ettlinger, p. 114; *PG*, 83: 109. [45] Ibid. [46] Ettlinger, p. 116; *PG*, 83: 112.

not saying that the union of deity and this human *physis* in the Lord Christ is a composite, natural union, or *physike henosis* bringing into being one *physis* after the union. That would be precisely the Christology against which he is writing. And he has argued before, as we have seen, that this is where the analogy of the union of soul and body breaks down when applied to the Incarnation: no new third thing or *physis* is brought about by a confusion of the two natures into one. He means here, rather, that if human beings can be called by the names of the lesser component in their new composite *physis*, why should even Apollinarians, those who predicate the same kind of composite, confused union for Christ, object to calling Christ 'human'?

When Eranistes asks what are the compelling reasons for naming Christ 'human' after the union, Orthodoxos returns to his ever central theme. Only by attributing a real and full human nature to the Lord Christ after the union, signified by naming him 'human' as well as 'God', can Gnosticism, Arianism, and Apollinarianism be adequately refuted.[47] Eranistes agrees that Arianism is wrong in denying the assumption of a human soul in the Incarnation, and that Apollinarianism is in error in denying that the assumed soul is fully rational with its own mind (*nous*).[48] However, while Eranistes is willing to agree with Orthodoxos that these heretics ought to be taught to confess that Christ is to be styled 'human', he adamantly refused to use the title himself. This provokes Orthodoxos to respond that refusal to apply the name 'human' to Christ (note that Theodoret is always careful to apply the human attributes to 'Christ') is to deny the reality of the human *physis* in the Lord Christ, and this in turn forces either the denial of any real suffering or passion in Christ (Docetism) or the attribution of passion and thus mutability to the Word, that is, to deity (Arianism). Thus Orthodoxos' central argument against Eranistes' Alexandrine Christology is once again the problem of the Arian syllogism. Orthodoxos responds to Eranistes' persistence that 'it is right to name the Christ from his nobler qualities', with 'and the name "human" is the name of a nature (*physeos*). Not to pronounce the name is to deny the nature. Denial of the nature is denial of the sufferings (*pathematon*), and denial of the sufferings does away with the salvation.'[49]

Eranistes is willing to assert that Christ is perfect in deity and in humanity, but he is not willing to call Christ a human being, since to him, quite obviously, this is the same thing as confessing two natures and thus two individuals, two Sons. Orthodoxos turns to a discussion of the meaning of 'mediator' as applied to Christ, referring to Moses and Melchizedek as types of the Christ. Eranistes is finally persuaded that the title 'human' may be

[47] Ettlinger, pp. 117–18; *PG*, 83: 115–16.
[48] Ettlinger, p. 119; *PG*, 83: 117.
[49] Ettlinger, p. 120; *PG*, 83: 119–20.

applied to the Christ, but not in the same way as the title 'God', and only during the 'economy' and not after the Resurrection, when the humanity is swallowed up in the glory of the divinity. This leads after further conversation to Eranistes' basic concern, that while there were two natures before the union (*henosis*), after it, from the moment of conception, there is one *physis*.[50]

Orthodoxos states that this is logical nonsense. He asserts that before the union there was only one *physis*, that of the Word, and that the human *physis* came into existence only with the moment of conception. In so many words, his position is exactly opposite to that of Eranistes: one nature before the Incarnation, two afterward. When Eranistes persists in saying, 'I say that Christ was of two natures, but I do not say that there are two natures,'[51] Orthodoxos asks what sort of union it is that Eranistes conceives as being 'of two natures', listing certain kinds of physical unions that Grillmeier's Stoic categories would have listed under *confusio* or *kata sygchysin* (gilded silver, electron—a mixture of silver and gold—and solder made of lead and tin). It is clear that Orthodoxos misses Eranistes' point, or rather, that Theodoret misses the Alexandrine point. What they mean by asserting that Christ is one *physis* is that he is one being, the one *hypostasis* of the Word, who has taken human life and existence and limitation up into his own life. Theodoret simply continues to see the assertion of one *physis* out of two as a confusion, or *sygchysis*, of deity and humanity into a third kind of being, or the swallowing up of the latter in the former. So he goes on to have Orthodoxos ask Eranistes (who has denied that the union is like any of the physical unions Orthodoxos listed, asserting rather that it is ineffable) whether he acknowledges that the properties of each nature continue in the Christ.[52] Theodoret has Eranistes deny that the properties of each nature continue after the Incarnation. Orthodoxos then accuses Eranistes of teaching a union by confusion (*sygchysis*) whereby the human properties and nature are absorbed into the divinity—in short, Docetism. Eranistes reasserts that he recognizes one nature after the union. Orthodoxos' response is again to return to Scripture to show that terms and activities appropriate to divinity and to humanity are both ascribed therein to Jesus Christ, concluding: 'Now, make the former and latter quotation fit one nature. You will find it impossible, for existence from the beginning and descent from Abraham . . . are inconsistent.'[53] Eranistes responds that Orthodoxos teaches two Sons by asserting two *physeis*. Orthodoxos gives us a response that is classically characteristic of Theodoret: 'One Son of God I both know and adore, the Lord Jesus Christ; but I have been taught the difference between his deity and his humanity.'[54]

[50] Ettlinger, p. 132; *PG*, 83: 137.
[51] Ettlinger, p. 134; *PG*, 83: 140.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ettlinger, p. 135; *PG*, 83: 141.
[54] Ibid.

The debate continues in like manner for some time, including Theodoret having Eranistes make the classic Alexandrine confession when Orthodoxos asks whether the one nature of Eranistes' Christ can be creator of all things before time and the same nature be formed of the Virgin in her womb in time: 'I have already said that both these properties are appropriate to him as God made flesh, for I recognize one nature (*mian physin*) made flesh of the Word.'[55] Quite clearly Theodoret of Cyrus understands the Christology represented by Eranistes to teach that God is turned into flesh and flesh is turned into God, for Orthodoxos immediately responds: 'I proclaim quite openly that the divine Incarnation is without change. For if by any variation of change he was made flesh, then after the change all that is divine in his names and his deeds is quite inappropriate to him.'[56]

Orthodoxos follows that up with a neat play on the Apollinarian–Cyrillian phrase 'the one *physis* incarnate of the Word', combined with another of Theodoret's plays on *allos… kai allos*: 'The enfleshed *physis* of God the Word is other than the *physis* of the flesh, by assumption of which the divine *physis* of the Word was made flesh and became a human being.'[57]

Orthodoxos, that is, takes over the Alexandrine phrase and uses it to assert that the Word became flesh, not by a change of his divine *physis* into a creature, but by assuming a complete, real, functional human *physis* (the conclusion of the first dialogue). When Eranistes agrees that in the Incarnation the Word was not changed into flesh, we reach what is the actual conclusion of the second dialogue:

> If then he was made flesh, not by mutation, but by taking flesh, and both the former and the latter qualities are appropriate to him as to God made flesh, as you said a moment ago, then the natures were not confounded, but remain unimpaired. As long as we hold this we shall perceive too the harmony of the Evangelists, for while one proclaims the divine attributes of the one Only-Begotten—the Lord Christ—the other sets forth his human qualities.… You will find the divine scripture full of similar passages, and they all point not to one *physis* but to two.[58]

Eranistes can only assert that what Theodoret seems to mean by two *physeis* is a division of the one Christ into two Sons. And that is really the question, for while Theodoret's language here can obviously be read in a Chalcedonian sense of one *hypostasis* with two *physeis*, has Theodoret really moved beyond his prosopic union?

The second dialogue then gradually comes to a finish with another discussion of the appropriateness of using the analogy of the union of soul and body

[55] Ettlinger, p. 136; *PG*, 83: 144.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ettlinger, p. 137; *PG*, 83: 144.
[58] Ibid.

in human nature to describe the Incarnation, and also another of the analogy of the Eucharist. Eranistes' response that to speak of two *physeis* in Christ is to confess two Sons prompts Orthdoxos' instant reply, 'Yes, and he who says Paul is made up of soul and body makes two Pauls out of one.'[59]

Orthodoxos agrees with Eranistes' complaint that the analogy of the union of soul and body in human beings does not completely apply to the union in Christ,[60] for the human union is a 'natural union' (*physike henosis*) of creaturely parts, both created in time. The properties (*idia*) of each nature, soul and body, even here, remain unmixed. Which is to say, for Orthodoxos it is the body which suffers the passions of hunger, thirst, fatigue, and so on, not the soul, for after the dissolution of the union in death the soul feels none of these. Rather, 'the reasonable, the absolute, the immortal, and the invisible' are the properties of the soul, while the body is complex (*syntheton*), visible, and mortal. The analogy does not hold in so far as the human nature is a composite one that arises out of the 'natural union' into a new single nature, but the union of divinity and this new, single human nature in Christ is one of 'well-pleasing' (*eudokia*), of God's love for humanity and of grace.

The analogy does hold in that since a human being is a composite, we can define that human being as 'a mortal, reasonable being'; that is, we can 'give names to him from both these attributes'. As we can 'call the same human being both reasonable and mortal, so also should we do in the case of the Christ, and apply to him both the divine and the human'. But the 'I' of Christ is not the same thing as the 'I' of the composite new nature of 'Paul'. Christ does not signify a single, composite nature for Orthodoxos and Theodoret. In a human being's composite nature, the soul retains its immortality, rationality, and essential impassibility, though Theodoret has heretofore agreed that in some sense the soul participates in creatureliness and shares involvement in the limitations of human existence. But the soul is still the 'I' of the composite human nature; the soul is what is tempted and falls, and must therefore be assumed in the Incarnation if human nature is to be redeemed. It is, then, clearly, passible at least in the sense of having fallen victim to the bondage of sin's rebellion against the Word of God.

The analogy, then, of two natures in one human person, each retaining its own properties while the one person is called by the properties of each, applies to the Christ insofar as Theodoret wants to call 'the Christ' one and to insist that the divine nature and the human nature each are entire, whole, real, and functional, each retaining its own properties. The names of each nature and of its characteristics are also to be applied to the one Christ. But the analogy does not hold in that the unity of the two natures in Christ is

[59] Ettlinger, p. 137; *PG*, 83: 145. [60] Ettlinger, pp. 137–8; *PG*, 83: 147.

not the same kind of unity as that of the two natures in a human being, for no new third 'nature' results from this 'composition'. Orthodoxos insists that 'the Christ' is one *prosopon*, just as a human being has one *prosopon*, but is this, again, a step beyond his old prosopic union toward a genuine hypostatic union? He writes,

Well, just in this way should we speak of the Lord Christ, and, when arguing about his nature, give to each its own (*idia*) and recognize some properties as belonging to the divinity and some as to the humanity. But when we are discussing the *prosopon*, we must then make what is proper (*idia*) to the natures common (*koina*), and apply both sets of qualities to the Saviour Christ, and call the same one (*auton*) both God and a human being, both Son of God and Son of man, both David's Son and David's Lord, both seed of Abraham and the creator of Abraham, and all others thus.[61]

This certainly could be interpreted as representing a doctrine of hypostatic union, or at least could be read into the text as it stands. But again, it need represent nothing more than Theodoret's classic Antiochene prosopic union with its *communicatio* of names to the *prosopon* of the humanity which is utilized by the Word. Eranistes clearly sees it as the latter, for he responds with the familiar charge of two Sons being taught:

That the *prosopon* of the Christ is one, and that both the divine and the human are attributable to the same you have quite rightly said, and I accept this definition of the faith. But to make it clear, when you insist that it is necessary when discussing the natures to give to each its own properties, it seems to me to dissolve the union. It is for this reason that I object to this and such like reasoning. . . . I am equally anxious to avoid the term confusion, but I shrink from asserting two natures lest I fall into a duality of sons.

Orthodoxos replies:

I am equally anxious to escape either horn of the dilemma, both the impious confusion (*sygchyseos*) and the impious distinction. For to me it is alike an unhallowed thought to split the one Son in two and to deny the duality of natures (*physeon*). But now in truth's name tell: were one of the supporters of Arius or Eunomius, while debating with you, to belittle the Son and describe him as less than and inferior to the Father, by the help of all their familiar arguments and citations from the divine Scripture of the text, 'Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me,' and that other, 'Now is my soul troubled,' and other like passages, how would you dispose of his objections? How could you show that the Son is in no way diminished in dignity by these expressions and is not of another being (*heteroousion*) but begotten of the Father's being (*ousias*).[62]

[61] Ettlinger, p. 139; *PG*, 83: 148.

[62] Ettlinger, p. 140; *PG*, 83: 148–9.

Theodoret's historical position is still at work here. The subject that confesses fear is not the Word, for to attribute fear or a troubled soul to the Word himself is to attribute passibility to the Word's *physis* as Word, the Word's own *physis*, and thus passibility to the divine *physis*, or rather to render the Word's own proper *physis* less than divine. The Arian syllogism continues its grip on Theodoret of Cyrus. Eranistes is not far off when he says that the way in which Orthodoxos uses two *physeis* after the union is tantamount to confessing the two subjects that are what the Alexandrines meant by a Christology that divides the union into two Sons.

The argument then returns to the old terms of the debate. Eranistes insists that Christ is one reality, the Word, even though after the union he has assumed the 'economy' of a human life in which a human soul and human flesh are real (i.e. 'I could bring proofs from the divine scripture showing how God the Word took not only flesh but also a soul'[63]).

Theodoret's Orthodoxos, on the other hand, continues to deny the major premiss of the Arian syllogism since his metaphysics do not allow him to consider the possibility of denying the minor premiss, that whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him *kata physin* in his ontologically proper divinity. Though Theodoret recognizes that the Alexandrines confess a real human soul and body in Christ, as well as repudiate any change of the divine *ousia* in the assumption of this humanity, he continues to insist adamantly that Eranistes' terminology of one nature after the union can require only a *confusio-sygchysis* of divine *physis-ousia* and human *physis-ousia* into a composite *physis* that renders the Word a creature, or which has the Word replace the mind-*nous* of humanity in the flesh and so render the human *physis* inhuman, negating salvation.

Clearly both sides are using the same terminology with different meanings; but it is also clear that Theodoret is still maintaining a two-subject Christology and still misunderstanding the central point of the Alexandrine position. At one point in the discussion Orthodoxos becomes so frustrated with Eranistes' refusal to budge from his one-*physis* terminology while confessing the reality of an unchanged Word united with a real human soul and human body that he accuses Eranistes of teaching not two but three natures in Christ, not two but three Sons.[64]

Eranistes responds that he means that the humanity was absorbed by the divinity. At least, that is what Theodoret interprets the Alexandrine position to mean. This leads to a discussion of types of union by mixture (*krasis*) which are obviously similar to the Neoplatonic attempts to understand the union of incorporeal and impassible soul with corporeal and passible body

[63] Ettlinger, p. 141; *PG*, 83: 149.

[64] Ettlinger, p. 143; *PG*, 83: 153.

that can be found in the work of Nemesius, bishop of Emesa in Syria half a century before Theodoret wrote the *Eranistes*. Theodoret has Eranistes postulate a union of divinity and humanity in Christ which is what H. A. Wolfson would have identified as a union by predominance.[65] When Orthodoxos asks, 'how could a nature absolute and uncompounded, comprehending the universe, unapproachable and infinite have absorbed the nature which it assumed?', Eranistes answers, 'Like the sea receiving a drop of honey, for straightway the drop, as it mingles with the ocean's water, disappears.'[66]

Theodoret has Orthodoxos immediately reject this union by predominance as inapplicable to the union of divinity and humanity in Christ, and then turns to explain what sort of union, or *krasis*, he does mean to assert. He rejects a union of predominance because it can be applied only, he says, to created realities which can be so intermixed that the one is inseparably absorbed into the other. The *ousia* of creator and that of Creature simply cannot be combined this way:

> The sea and the drop are different in quantity, though alike in quality (*poioteti*); the one is greatest, the other is least; the one is sweet and the other is bitter; but in all other respects you will find a very close relationship. The nature (*physis*) of both is moist, liquid, and fluid. Both are created. Both are lifeless yet each alike is called a body. There is nothing then absurd in these cognate natures undergoing commixture (*krasin*), and in the one being made to disappear by the other. In the case before us, on the contrary, the difference is infinite, and so great that no figure of the reality can be found. I will, however, endeavour to point out to you several instances of substances which are mixed without being confounded, and remain unimpaired.[67]

Eranistes asks, 'Who in the world ever heard of an unmixed mixture (*krasin akraton*)?' Theodoret has introduced a discussion here that will base his distinction between the unacceptable union by *sygchysis* and the acceptable union by *krasis* solidly in the Neoplatonic speculation on the soul–body union which R. A. Norris referred to as the background for the doctrine of the Incarnation in Theodore of Mopsuestia. Essentially his answer is that *sygchysis* involves a mixture of two natures in such a way that they become inseparably a new, third reality, thus involving the divine *physis* in mutability. What sort of *krasis*, then, is acceptable to Theodoret? One example he gives of an 'unmixed mixture' is the often used light diffused through the atmosphere,

[65] H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, i: *Faith, Trinity, Incarnation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 372–463, esp. pp. 405 ff. For a discussion of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the union of soul and body and its applicability to the Patristic evolution of the discussion of the Incarnation, cf. R. A. Norris, *Manhood and Christ: A Study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 67–78. Norris's conclusions are supported by Theodoret's discussion here, Ettlinger, pp. 143–50; *PG*, 83: 153–67.

[66] Ettlinger, p. 143; *PG*, 83: 153.

[67] Ettlinger, pp. 143–4; *PG*, 83: 156.

asking, 'And is not the mixture diffused through all that is subject to it?' Theodoret's Greek text here introduces the technical expression *krasis di' holon*, which was used by the Stoics for one of their concepts of the union of differing things.[68]

The background to the doctrine of *krasis di' holon* can be traced back to Aristotle.[69] For him the union of soul and body in human beings was like the relationship between form and matter, the soul being the form of the body. He also set out two kinds of relationship by mixture: *synthesis* and *krasis*, or *mixis*. The first is a mixture in which very small parts of the material forming it are juxtaposed, such as when two sorts of grain are poured together. The two materials remain each what it was; the mixture is inert. In *krasis*, however, the two substances being mixed together interact with and on each other, and are changed so that a *tertium quid* is the result of the mixture. When one of the two constituent elements predominates over the other, the relationship is like that between form and matter, and the weaker or lesser substance is in effect absorbed into the stronger. He makes the analogy that Eranistes does above, only it is one drop of wine being put into 10,000 gallons of water.

Aristotle's *synthesis* was called *parathesis* by the Stoics, denoting or emphasizing that it signified a mere juxtaposition of the two elements in the union, side by side as it were. It was, consequently, not acceptable to them as a description of the union of soul, or *pneuma*, with the body. Likewise, Aristotle's doctrine of *krasis*, if applied to the union of soul and body, would suggest genuine and substantial change in the soul. The stoics therefore postulated two forms of mixture. The first, *sygchysis*, refers to the kind of mixture in which the constituent substances are altered into each other or into a third new entity, which cannot be dissolved or analysed into its original two elements again (unlike Aristotle's *krasis*, which could be). Their second kind of mixture was called *krasis di' holon*. In it there was a thorough interpenetration of the two constituent substances through each other, though each retained its own properties unimpaired. This kind of mixture of two physical substances was the analogy which the Stoics used for the union of soul and body.

Norris has shown that Plotinus criticized the application of the Stoic doctrine of *krasis di' holon* to the union of soul and body because the Stoics, of course, were dealing with categories of two material substances, whereas Plotinus insisted on the incorporeality of the soul. Nonetheless, Norris

[68] Ettlinger, p. 144, l.19; *PG*, 83: 156. Cf. Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i: *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, trans. J. Bauden, 2nd edn. rev. (Atlanta: John Knox Press; London: A. R. Marbray & Co. Ltd., 1975), 129–30.

[69] Cf. Norris, *Manhood and Christ*, pp. 67–78.

concludes, Plotinus did value the basic concept of *krasis di' holon*, 'because it asserts the total interpenetration of body by soul and thus genuinely accounts for the animation of the body, and because it seeks to maintain a distinction between soul and body, and thus to safeguard the integrity of the soul'.[70] Norris shows how in one of the last essays of the *Enneads*, Plotinus states that the soul is in some sense mixed with the body until it liberates itself through philosophy. He rejects the Aristotelian doctrine of *krasis* as an explanation of this mixture on the ground that it would involve the impassible soul in change. He turns to the language of Plato's *Timaeus* to find that the soul and the body could be described as 'interwoven', since such interwoven things do not have to be similarly passible. Then he illustrates what he means by the same analogy of the mixture of light present in air which Orthodoxos raises to Eranistes to illustrate what he means by *krasis di' holon*.[71] In an earlier passage in the *Enneads*, as Norris points out, Plotinus used the analogy of light in air in regard to the union of soul and body: light is present in air throughout it, and yet is not mixed with it—that is, mixed with it in the *krasis* or *mixis* in the strict Aristotelian sense.[72] Or to put it another way, the air is in the light, just as the body is totally penetrated by soul, but not the soul by the body. For Plotinus the soul remains transcendent of the body just as light and its source are transcendent of air and remain unchanged by their contact with it.

Norris goes on to make two further significant points. First, for Plotinus the soul is not form to the body in the Aristotelian sense. It is not the body's *entelecheia* in the way a plant's form, say, gives form to the matter in it to hypostasize a given, specific plant. That would render soul inseparable from its body and the body's fate in mortality. On the other hand, the 'soul may be described as a formal principle, inasmuch as it is the separate, active substance which begets form within a body'.[73] The soul is present in the body as a kind of light which shines throughout it, and so enlivens it as the body of that particular soul. Yet, further, the analogy of light to air pertains only in so far as it shows how the soul can transcend the body while being in a sense present to it but not dependent on the body for its own being.

Secondly, the soul's presence in a body comes about because the soul intends to make itself present to a body, a kind of

presence brought about by the soul's focusing, to one degree or another, its attention on the body which it animates. Thus the soul's descent is explained as its becoming 'absorbed in the partial' (πρὸς μέρος βλέπειν): as a bending of its consciousness upon

[70] Ibid. 70. [71] Ibid. 70–1; Ettlinger, p. 144; *PG*, 83: 156.

[72] Plotinus, *The Enneads*, in *Opera*, ed. Paul Henry and *Plotini* Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., 1951–9), iv. 3, 22; Norris, p. 71.

[73] Norris, p. 72.

the particular as opposed to the universal. Similarly, Plotinus observes that the difference between the World-Soul and individual souls in their relation to body is constituted by the fact that the individual souls are governed by a νεῦσις towards the inferior, or by an ἐπιστροφή towards the body which has need of their attention. Moreover, it is precisely this νεῦσις, this inclination which is in fact a concentration of attention on the corporeal, that Plotinus explains as ἔλλαμψις πρὸς τὸ κάτω: the illumination by which the soul penetrates and animates the body.[74]

Neoplatonic speculation, thus, could use a modified concept of *krasis di' holon* as the best analogy of mixture available to discuss the union of body and soul. Soul interpenetrates the body totally, enlivening it with its rational presence, enlightening it with life and mind, but the soul itself is not changed or altered or rendered passible or mortal through this union, in which its presence is intentional by a kind of declination of interest toward the body. Nemesius, bishop of Emesa of Syria at the time of Theodoret's birth, takes over this general Neoplatonic scheme, in which the soul is present to the body by *schesis* (relation) or *neusis* (inclination).

In his treatise *On Human Nature* he rejects several possible types of mixture as apt descriptions of the union of soul and body.[75] He rejects one form of union that seems clearly the Aristotelian *krasis*: things which come together 'into an *hypostasis* of one *ousia*' are changed into something new.[76] As for Plotinus, this doctrine of union is unacceptable to Nemesius since it would involve the incorporeal soul in mutation. Nemesius also rejects *parathesis*, or Aristotle's *synthesis*, as an inadequate union to describe that of soul and body. He also rejects the kind of *krasis* that is illustrated in the example of a small amount of wine mixed into much water on the ground that the constituent elements in the mixture do not remain themselves even though the mixture may in theory be analysed, for in the mixture in actuality the two elements can no longer be distinguished from each other. Strangely enough, he goes on to argue that this sort of *krasis* is really only another example of *parathesis*, or mixture by juxtaposition. Juxtaposition of soul to the body does not provide an adequate explanation of how the union is close enough to allow soul to enliven and illuminate the body. On the other hand, a real *krasis*, as related above, simply changes the one into the other.

Nemesius then propounds a doctrine of the union of soul and body which he claims to take from Ammonius, Plotinus' teacher. The rational soul is united to the body in such a way that it is as close as if it were the Aristotelian

74 Norris, p. 73.

75 *PG*, 40: 504–817. There is an English translation by William Telfer in The Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), iv. 201–466. I continue to follow Norris here, pp. 74–7.

76 *PG*, 40: 592; quoted by Norris, p. 74.

krasis but each remains as unaltered as if the union were a *parathesis*. Yet, as Norris points out, this is not a mixture by predominance which would involve the soul's being the form of the body, since that would render the soul inseparable from the body and the body's eventual death. Nemesius and the other Neoplatonists insist that the soul, being incorporeal and impassible and immortal, is not an 'inseparable form'.[77] Thus, once again we are returned to the comparison of the union of soul and body to the relationship of light to air,

> penetrating it totally, transforming its character, the while remaining distinct from it and unaffected by it. The soul dominates and contains the body; it is in fact the active, governing element in the human composition, conferring life, but receiving from the body nothing in return.[78]

In conclusion, for the Neoplatonists the only one of the types of mixture or union currently discussed which could approximate their concept of the union of body and soul in human beings was the Stoic *krasis di' holon*. But they used this Stoic terminology to insist that they were referring to a union of an impassible, incorporeal, immutable, indivisible soul with a corporeal substance without in any way being altered, changed, or corrupted by that union. Ultimately, the soul remains transcendent of the body, as the sun, the source of light, remains unaltered and transcendent of the air through which its light passes.

Returning to the *Eranistes*, when Theodoret raises the issue of 'an unmixed mixture' (*krasin akraton*) which he describes as a *krasis di' holon*,[79] illustrating his point with the analogy of the atmosphere illuminated by light in which neither light nor air are changed but their union is obviously more than mere juxtaposition of two elements side by side, and goes on to another similar and equally classic analogy of iron heated red hot by fire, though neither the heat nor the fire be altered in *physis* as the heat 'is diffused through the iron's whole *ousia*',[80] it is clear that Theodoret is making use of the Neoplatonic reinterpretation of the Stoic doctrine of *krasis di' holon* to expound his concept of the union of soul and body in human beings and, by analogy, the union of divinity and humanity in the Christ. Quite clearly as well, when he here in the second dialogue of the *Eranistes* can use the term *krasis* as an acceptable term to describe this union, he is *not* turning away from his earlier vehement and consistent rejection of describing the union of God and humanity in Christ as a *krasis* or *sygchysis*, which he has rejected in all his works to this point, and which latter term is, after all, the title of this second dialogue. Rather, he means *sygchysis*, and his earlier instances of the rejected *krasis* in

[77] Norris, p. 76. [78] Ibid. 75. [79] Ettlinger, p. 144, l. 7 and 19; *PG*, 83: 156.
[80] Ettlinger, p. 144, l.33; *PG*, 83: 156.

terms of the Stoic doctrine of a mixture by *sygchysis* in which both elements of the mixture are altered and cannot be again analysed or resolved back from the new *tertium quid* which arises out of their mixture. He would read the Alexandrine insistence on the *mia physis* of the Word after the Incarnation as exactly equivalent to that union 'into an *hypostasis* of one *ousia*' which Nemesius rejected as a description of the union of soul and body because each has become something other than it was. In addition, though I have not uncovered so far in Theodoret's works any use of the terms *schesis* (the soul being bound to the body by 'relation') or *neusis* (the soul's becoming present to the body by the soul's own decision or declination of interest downward toward the body), the idea expressed by these terms in Neoplatonic speculation is clearly present in Theodoret's constant use of the classic Antiochene insistence that the Word is present in the Christ not *kat' ousian*, but by *willing* to be incarnate in the *synapheia* or *henosis* of divine and human natures in Christ.

Theodoret's anthropology is thoroughly Neoplatonic in so many words, which is consistent with the way in which he has applied the union of soul and body as an analogy of the union in Christ in his earlier works. However, Theodoret's Eranistes remains just as thoroughly unconvinced. Theodoret has him continue to insist that there is one *physis* in the Christ with a statement that is absolutely unintelligible to one with the metaphysical principles of the bishop of Cyrus: 'What I assert is not the destruction of the assumed nature, but its change into the *ousia* of divinity.'[81] At first he wants to assign the moment of this non-destructive change to the moment of conception. But Orthodoxos has no trouble demonstrating that flesh turned into divinity could hardly be circumcised, forcing Eranistes to reconsider and to state his position (as he puts it) more clearly: the change of the human nature into divinity took place after the resurrection of Christ. Orthodoxos in turn asks what sort of hands and wounded side the risen Lord showed to doubting Thomas, using his question to make one of his typical remarks about the nature which takes up, assumes, or possesses, as distinct from the assumed nature.

The disciples thought they saw a spirit, but the Lord dispelled this idea, and showed the *physis* of the flesh, for he said, '. . . behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself. Handle me and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see me have.' And observe the exactness of the language. He does not say, '. . . is not flesh and bones,' but '. . . has not flesh and bones,' in order to point out that there is one thing that has by nature and another thing that is had. For just so that which has taken is one reality, and that which has been assumed is another (. . . *allo men esti to labon, allo de to*

[81] Ettlinger, p. 145; *PG*, 83: 157.

lephthen...), but one Christ is seen from both. Thus that which has assumed is entirely different from that which is assumed, and yet does not divide the one considered in them into two *prosopa*.[82]

This is typical prosopic union terminology. That Theodoret uses impersonal, neuter forms to differentiate the *hypostasis* of the Word from the composite human *physis* of rational soul and body which the Word has assumed does not prove that he has abandoned his double-subject prosopic union Christology to move toward a genuine doctrine of hypostatic union, for we have seen the earlier Theodoret use impersonal terms like this in the same works with highly personal ones, such as was the case in *De Incarnatione*. In so many words, the clarification of his anthropology in terms of a Neoplatonic understanding of *krasis di' holon* does not require us to understand that Theodoret is asserting anything more about the applicability of the analogy of the union of rational, incorporeal soul and passible body to the Incarnation than we have seen before. He has always used this analogy, and he has used it to stress the way in which divinity can be united to passible human nature without undergoing mutability by confusion, or *sygchysis*. This, as we have seen several times, is not necessarily the same thing as saying that the Word is the subject of the human experiences of Jesus of Nazareth in the same way that the soul of Paul the Apostle is the subject of the experiences of the man Paul of Tarsus.

Orthodoxos goes on to insist that even after the Resurrection the human *physis* remains in the Christ. Jesus' body, however, is now become immortal, incorruptible, and impassible.[83] Even though he took real, material food after the Resurrection in the presence of the apostles, this was not to satisfy any needs of actual hunger in a body that could still be threatened with starvation, but through 'a certain economy' to demonstrate that his body was real and not a ghostly phfantasma. That the human nature of the risen Lord is still a genuine human nature, unchanged in its *ousia*, is proved for Orthodoxos by Jesus' pointing out his crucifixion wounds and by eating food. It follows that the same will be true of the resurrection bodies of Christians in general. It also follows that mortality, corruption (both in terms of the decay of a dead body and in terms of the corruptibility of the human nature by temptation and sin), and passibility are not of the substance (*ousia*) of human nature, but are accidents of pre-Resurrection human nature.[84] Thus it follows that the transformation of human nature in the Resurrection—both of Jesus and the Christian—involves a change of the accidents of mortality, corruption, and passibility into a state of that nature which is immortal, incorrupt, and impassible, but does not

[82] Ettlinger, pp. 146–7; *PG*, 83: 160.
[83] Ettlinger, pp. 147–8; *PG*, 83: 160–3.
[84] Ettlinger, p. 149, ll.3–4; *PG*, 83: 161D.

change human nature into another nature, or *ousia*. When a modern analyst of the *Eranistes* wonders whether Theodoret does not in fact contradict himself in postulating immortality and impassibility to the humanity of Jesus after the Resurrection while still describing it as a true humanity,[85] or when another modern writer insists that Jesus had to be guilty of actual sin because it is through the experience of sin and forgiveness that we become able to grow into genuine humanity,[86] they appear to me to be taking issue with Theodoret's anthropology—indeed, with the anthropology generally taken for granted in the fifth century. That is to say, the debate between Antiochenes and Alexandrines, on the one hand, could be understood in terms of a debate over anthropology: just what is human nature, and how can it be united to the divine Word so as to become the Word's own nature without ceasing to be that human nature? On the other hand, when modern theologians say that to ascribe sinlessness to Jesus, or to ascribe immortality, incorruptibility, or impassibility to Christ's human nature after the Resurrection (and to every Christian's after his or her resurrection), is to succumb to Docetism, Apollinarianism, or Eutychianism, is this not actually also a debate over anthropology, over what attributes can be attributed to the essential nature of being human? Theodoret would have been astounded to have found himself accused of Eutychianism or Apollinarianism for having attributed immortality, incorruptibility, and impassibility to the resurrected human *physis*. Though modern theologians would probably want to give a different account of how human nature both continues and is transformed in the Resurrection (and with a great deal of agnosticism about that state of being), none the less Theodoret would want to insist just as strongly as they that the humanity in Christ is a real human life however we might define humanity. That is his fundamental point in this second dialogue of the *Eranistes*. He therefore concludes of the Lord's resurrection body:

> It was not changed into another *physis*, but remained a body, full however of divine glory, and sending forth beams of light. The bodies of the saints shall be fashioned like unto it. But if it was changed into another *physis*, their bodies will be likewise changed, for they shall be fashioned like unto it. But if the bodies of the saints preserve the character of their *physis*, then also the body of the Lord in like manner keeps its own *physis* unchanged.[87]

The bodies of the risen saints are of the same *physis* as that of the Lord, but there is a difference in the quantity (*posotes*) of glory between them, as in the quantity of light coming from the sun and the stars.

[85] Stewardson, pp. 323–5.

[86] This is my reading of John Knox, *The Humanity and Divinity of Christ: A Study of Pattern in Christology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).

[87] Ettlinger, p. 150; *PG*. 83: 165.

The second dialogue naturally ends, with its discussion of the continuity of *physis* between the pre- and post-resurrection body, accompanied with a change in accidents, by returning once again to the question of the relation of the 'mystical symbols which are offered (*prospheromena*) to God by those who perform priestly (*hieromenon*) rites' to what they symbolize.[88] Orthodoxos argues that if the divine mysteries are types of the true body of the Lord, then even now the body of the Lord 'is a body, not changed into the *physis* of divinity, but filled with the divine glory'.[89] Eranistes counters with an argument that if Orthodoxos believes that he truly partakes in the mysteries of the Body and Blood of Christ, then bread and wine have been substantially changed, pointing to a like change of the risen human *physis* into divinity:

> As, then, the symbols of the Lord's body and blood are one thing before the priestly invocation, and after the invocation are changed and become another thing, so the Lord's body after being taken up is changed into the divine being (*eis ten theian metablethe ousian*).[90]

Orthodoxos' reply is interesting, for he explicitly denies that there is a change of substance in the eucharistic elements, but says that after the consecration they are what they are said to be, and are 'worshipped' as such because they are *called* the Body and Blood of Christ:

> Even after the consecration (*hagiasmon*) the mystical symbols are not deprived of their own *physis*; they remain in their former *ousia*, appearance, and form, visible and tangible as they were before. But they are thought of as what they are become, and so believed and worshipped as being those things that they are believed to be. Compare then the image to the archetype, and you will see the likeness, for the type must be like the reality. For that body preserves its former form, figure, and limitation, and in a word the *ousia* of the body. After the resurrection it has become immortal and superior to corruption, and made worthy of a throne at the right hand, and is adored by every creature since it bears the title of the *physis* of the Master.[91]

This is simply Theodoret's normal communication of names. He can still see only the two alternative possibilities: either the Word's divinity and the assumed humanity are united in a way that confuses them into each other and into a *tertium quid* (*sygchysis*), or the union is Theodoret's prosopic union. Thus he concludes this second dialogue with its insistence that the divinity and the humanity remain unconfused (*asygchytos*) by having Eranistes insist that a change in appellation of bread and wine to body and blood means that in the Incarnation the 'reality must be called God and not body'.[92]

[88] Ettlinger, pp. 151–2; *PG*, 83: 165, 168. [89] Ibid.
[90] Ettlinger, p. 152; *PG*, 83: 168. [91] Ibid. [92] Ibid.

To which Orthodoxos responds with a classic example of Theodoret's terminology of prosopic union and communication of names:

You seem to me very ignorant, for he is called not only body but also even bread of life. So the Lord himself used this name, and we name that very same body the divine body, the life-giving body, the body of the Master and of the Lord, teaching that it is not that of any ordinary man, but is that of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is God and human, eternal and recent in time. 'For Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever.'[93]

Theodoret then turns to the second set of citations from earlier and universally acknowledged Patristic sources to buttress his argument. Item 29 is a long citation from Ambrose, given here in Greek of course, which reads as though it were a quotation from Theodoret, so close is the agreement in terminology. It concludes with a statement that Theodoret would have taken as supporting his thesis in this second dialogue:

Those therefore that assert . . . that the two *physeis* of the Christ become one *physis* by confusion and commixture, those that deny that our Lord Jesus Christ is two unconfounded (*asygchytous*) *physeis*, but one *prosopon*, as he is one Christ and one Son, all these the Catholic and Apostolic Church condemns.[94]

Theodoret then adds another citation from Ambrose, this time from *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento*, which clearly equates *physis* and *hypostasis*:

If, then, the flesh of all was in Christ subjected to wrongs, how can it be considered to be of one *hypostasis* with the divinity? For if the Word and the flesh which has its *physis* from earth are of one *hypostasis*, then the Word and the soul which he assumed in its fullness are of one *hypostasis*. For the Word is of one *physis* with God according to the confession of the Father and of the Son himself which says, 'I and the Father are one.' Therefore the Father would have to be considered of the same *ousia* with the body. Then why be angry with the Arians who say that the Son of God is a creature while you yourselves say that the Father is of one *ousia* with the creatures?[95]

The Latin text that lies behind this translation is not really relevant to our discussion. What is relevant is the fact that Theodoret renders it in this way so

[93] Ettlinger, pp. 152–3; *PG*, 83: 168–9. On the question of the relationship between Christology and eucharistic theology, see Henry Chadwick, 'Eucharist and Christology in the Nestorian Controversy', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 2 (1951), 145–64. Chadwick argues that Cyril's concerns in the Nestorian controversy lay not in the question of the unity of Christ's person but in questions of the presence of the Word's life-giving power in the Eucharist.

[94] Ettlinger, p. 163; *PG*, 83: 184.

[95] Ettlinger, p. 163; *PG*, 83: 184–5. The quotation is from Ambrose, *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento*, 6: 57; Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 79, 253: 106–254: 121.

that *hypostasis* is thought of here as a function of nature and being, *physis* and *ousia*. To say that the Word and the assumed humanity can be one *hypostasis* is, for Theodoret, to say they are one *ousia*, that the human and assumed *physis* and the divine *physis* have been changed into each other, into a *tertium quid*, and that the proponent of such a confession has fallen into Arianism. This is quite compatible with his metaphysics and Christology to this point, but it does make it difficult to interpret the *Eranistes*, at least in the first two dialogues, as a document in which Theodoret has come to a confession of a genuine Christology of hypostatic union. To suggest that there is one *hypostasis* of the Word, in whom there are two *physeis*, is, for the Theodoret who cites Ambrose with this translation, the same thing as to say that the *ousia* of the Word is confounded, *sygchytos*.

Citation 70, from John Chrysostom's commentary on the Fourth Gospel, is filled with the kind of tabernacling terminology that characterized the Christology of Theodoret's earlier works. He cites it to show that his terminology, to which the Alexandrines had taken exception, had solid roots in recent Patristic literature and was not new to him:

Why does he add 'and dwelt among us'? It is as though he said, 'Imagine nothing absurd from the phrase "was made".' For I have not mentioned any change in that unchangeable *physis*, but of tabernacling and of inhabiting. Now that which tabernacles is not identical with the tabernacle, but one thing tabernacles in another (*all' heteron en hetero skenoi*); otherwise there would be no tabernacling. Nothing inhabits itself. I spoke of a distinction of *ousia*. For by the union and the conjunction (*henosei kai te synapheia*) God the Word and the flesh are one without confusion or destruction of the *ousiai*, but by an ineffable and indescribable union.[96]

In citation 84 from the second florilegium Theodoret renders the Latin of Augustine so as to deny again that the union of two *physeis* is in one *hypostasis*, for that would involve a confusion (*sygchysis*) of the two so that God would be no longer God:

It is ours to believe, but his to know, and so let God the Word himself, having received all that is proper to a human being, be a human being; and let the assumed human being, having received all that is proper to God, be no other than God. It must not be supposed because he is said to have been incarnate and mixed (*miktos*) that his being (*ousia*) must be considered lessened. God knows that he mixes himself without corrupting himself and he is mixed in reality. . . . Let us not then, in accordance with our weak intelligence, and forming conjectures on the teaching of experience and senses suppose that God and humanity are mixed after the manner of things created and equal mixed together, and that from such a confusion (*sygchysis*) as this of the

[96] Ettlinger, p. 175; *PG*, 83: 201.

Word and flesh a body, as it were, was made. If we believe this, how should we not suppose that after the manner of things which are confounded (*sygchynomenon*) together two natures (*duo physeis*) were brought into one *hypostasis*? Such a mixture (*mixis*) is the destruction of both parts. But God himself, containing but not contained, who examines us but is himself beyond examination, making full but not made full, everywhere at one and the same time being himself whole and pervading the universe, through his pouring out his own power, as being moved with mercy, was mingled (*emige*) with the human *physis*, but the *physis* of humanity was not mingled with the divine.[97]

Quite clearly for Theodoret a one-*hypostasis* Christology is what he prefers to mean by a single-*physis* Christology, one, that is, in which the divine and human *physeis* are confused by *sygchysis* into a new *ousia*. The *krasis* which Theodoret has all along been concerned to repudiate is, therefore, not a *krasis di' holon* but a *sygchysis*.

In citation 88 Theodoret takes an apparent delight in quoting for his opponents no less an authority than Cyril of Alexandria when he finds him using Theodoret's own favourite language to explain the title *Theotokos*:

There is a union of two *physeis* and therefore we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord. According to this conception of the unconfused union (*tes asygchytou henoseos*) we confess the holy Virgin as Mother of God because the Word of God has been made flesh and made human, and from the conception itself united to himself the temple assumed from her.[98]

The phrase is from Cyril's letter to John of Antioch approving the 433 formula of union. Since it was Theodoret who most likely prepared the formula in the first place, he is simply citing himself here, but at the same time he forcefully reminds his opponents that Cyril himself had formally approved the very terminology which his successors are now attacking. In citation 92 Theodoret again quotes Cyril of Alexandria, this time from his commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews:

Yet though the Only-Begotten Word of God is said to be united in *hypostasis* to flesh (*henosthai sarki kath' hypostasin*), we deny there was any confusion (*anachysin*) of the *physeis* with one another, and declare each to remain what it is.[99]

Quite clearly Theodoret does not approve of the use of *kath' hypostasin* to describe the union in Christ. He does want to show Eranistes, however, that

[97] Ettlinger, pp. 180–1; *PG*, 83: 209. The citation is from Leporius' *Libellus Emendationis Leporii, PL*, 31: 1224.

[98] Ettlinger, p. 182; *PG*, 83: 212. Theodoret is citing Cyril's letter to John of Antioch, *PG*, 77: 177.

[99] Ettlinger, p. 183; *PG*, 83: 212; 74: 1004.

Cyril insisted that there was no confusion of deity and humanity into each other, which is Theodoret's fundamental assertion. As we know, Theodoret sees no sense in the claim that there is a union *kath' hypostasin*, that is in one *hypostasis*, which is not also a confusion, or *sygchysis*—again, this is one of his fundamental points against Alexandrine Christology—but he does find it extremely useful in this dialogue entitled *ἈΣΥΓΧΥΤΟΣ* to be able to cite the Alexandrine hero exactly to that effect. A quotation from Cyril's *Scholia on the Incarnation* in citation 94 is even more explicit: the Word remains what he is, but after the Incarnation Christ cannot be separated into a man apart (*idikos*) or God apart, but 'recognizing the difference (*diaphoran*) of the *physeis* and preserving them unconfused (*asygchytous*) with one another, we assert there is one and the same Christ Jesus'.[100] A final citation from Cyril (number 95), again taken from the *Scholia*, makes the same point. The Incarnation is described as one reality indwelling another (*heteron en hetero to katoikoun*), the divine *physis* in the humanity, without there having been any confusion or change (*anachysin... metastasin*) into what it was not. Rather, from both one Christ is known, and the Word is said to have tabernacled among us without confusion (*asygchyton*).[101] Ignoring the complications that could arise from the phrase 'from both', Theodoret concludes the second florilegium with the assertion that these citations all show that the Fathers confessed the 'union of deity and the humanity to have been without confusion (*asygchyton*).'[102] The second florilegium then closes with seventeen citations from Apollinaris by which Orthodoxos tries to convince Eranistes that even the arch-heretic himself admitted a distinction between the two *physeis* in Christ.

The third dialogue then turns to the subject of the impassibility of the Word in the Incarnation, and it is entitled appropriately *ΑΠΑΘΗΣ*, 'Impassible'. Eranistes asks the question which raises the issue of who is the subject of the experiences of the Christ, of whether there be one subject who is the Word or whether there be two subjects, the Word and the assumed human being. 'Who', he asks Orthodoxos, 'according to your view, suffered the passion?'[103] Orthodoxos replies, 'Our Lord Jesus Christ.' When Orthodoxos responds to further questions to the effect that Christ is God, of the same *ousia* as the one who begot him, as well as a human being, Eranistes, of course, responds,

[100] Ettlinger, p. 183; *PG*, 83: 213; 75: 1385.

[101] Ettlinger, p. 183; *PG*, 83: 213; 75: 1397–8. It should be noted that citations 94 and 95 are among those interpolated after Chalcedon in 451, so they may not be from Theodoret himself (cf. n. 2 and 7 above). However, they only amplify terms and concepts already introduced in citation 92, which was in the original version of the *Eranistes*.

[102] Ettlinger, p. 184; *PG*, 83: 213.

[103] Ettlinger, p. 189; *PG*, 83: 221.

'Then God underwent the passion.'[104] This Orthodoxos denies, asserting that it was the body of the assumed human nature which experienced death, since the Word does not have a nature which is capable of passion: 'If he had a *physis* capable of the passion, he would have suffered without flesh; so the flesh becomes superfluous.'[105]

Now this is a very interesting expression. Both Eranistes and Orthodoxos would agree that the Word cannot suffer in his own proper *physis* as of the divine *ousia*, and that he assumes human nature as the medium through which in some way or other the passion is to be 'owned' by the divine one, as we might say in our idiom (Eranistes: 'I said that he took flesh to suffer'[106]). But at the same time it is clearly implied by the expression above that for Orthodoxos-Theodoret the point is that even in the Incarnation the Word in himself does not suffer; that is to say, that Orthodoxos-Theodoret does not distinguish between what can be attributed to the Word and what can be attributed to the Word's divine *physis*. He cannot suffer in his divine *physis*, and therefore he simply cannot suffer in himself at all in any way. The expression also makes it clear, at least in this context, that the Word 'has' his own proper *physis* differently from the way he 'has' the human assumed *physis* after the union. For Orthodoxos-Theodoret the Word *is* the divine *physis*, but is *united to* the assumed *physis*, so that the suffering of the human body may be *called* his own, though it is clearly not his in the sense that the *idiomata* of the divine *physis* are his. On the other hand, the Alexandrines—at least such as Cyril—are trying with all the limitations of their terminology to find a way to say that though the Word does not suffer in his divinity, the assumed human *physis* is as properly his as the divine *ousia*, and that in some sense the death of that assumed humanity is his own death. On the other hand, the Antiochene position of Theodoret is still locked into the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism, that whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him in his divine *physis*. And therefore, for Orthodoxos, the Word simply cannot be said to experience death in himself in any way whatsoever.

Eranistes responds with the classical Alexandrine position, asserting that though the divine Word is indeed immortal in his divinity, yet he tastes death through his human nature; that is to say, the passions of human experience are just as much his as they are ours, just as much his as the properties of the divine nature: 'The divine *physis* is immortal, and the *physis* of the flesh is mortal, so that the immortal was united to the mortal in order that he might taste death through that *physis*.'[107] Looking at this statement through the spectacles of the Arian syllogism, Orthodoxos can make no sense of it. It is

[104] Ettlinger, p. 189; *PG*, 83: 221. [105] Ettlinger, p. 190; *PG*, 83: 221.
[106] Ibid. [107] Ibid.

nonsense to him, since for him the only experiences that can be attributed to the subject of the Word are those idiomatic to the divine *physis-ousia*: 'That which is immortal in *physis* does not experience (*hypomenei*) death even though conjoined (*synaptomenon*) to something that is mortal.'[108] Note the use of Antioch's favourite word for describing the union: *synaptomai-synapheia*. Theodoret's prosopic union clearly is not the same thing as hypostatic union. It is equally clear that he is tenaciously holding on to prosopic union as it has been understood up to this point. For Theodoret, the one who died on the cross is not the immortal Word, but the human subject. For him, to assert that the Word experienced the death of the cross is the ultimate and final expression of Arianism. It would be to attribute mortality to the *physis* of the Word, and so deprive him of his divine status, making him a creature. Thus, when Orthodoxos answers Eranistes' question of who suffered the passion with the reply, 'Our Lord Jesus Christ,' the sufferer is not the Only-Begotten Word, but the common *prosōpon*, the Christ, who is by the necessity of Theodoret's metaphysic a different subject from the Word. Theodoret remains concerned to preserve the metaphysical integrity of the properties of each *physis*; the Christology represented by Eranistes is concerned to attribute the experiences of the incarnate Lord to the single subject of the Word. Theodoret's consistent reference to 'the same one' or the 'one Son of God' notwithstanding, his prosopic union remains in the *Eranistes* what it was in *De Incarnatione*.

The main point of the third dialogue has been made. The remainder of the dialogue is taken up with a discussion of analogies and scriptural texts by which Orthodoxos attempts to convince Eranistes of the absurdity of his position.

The first of these returns to the analogy of the union of soul and body. If, as Eranistes agrees, the human soul is immortal and it is the body which dies, even though death be the just punishment for the sin which the soul has committed, how can Eranistes not see that the Word in union with the flesh cannot be said to suffer death? If the human soul does not suffer death when a human being dies, that is to say, how can we say that the Word, who creates that immortal soul, suffers what the soul cannot?[109] The argument, of course, has logical power only so long as both sides are arguing from the same perspective. Here they are not, for Orthodoxos is developing his anthropology with a view to demonstrating the continuity of two natures in one human being. On the other hand, Eranistes' Christology is concerned to assert that the Word is the subject of the activities and experiences of the Incarnation.

[108] Ibid. [109] Ettlinger, pp. 190–7; *PG*, 83: 221–33.

For him the function of the analogy between a human being's death and Christ's death is to say that as a human being suffers death as the subject of it—regardless of how one's anthropology defines the relationship and natures of soul and body—so as the subject of the Incarnation the Only-Begotten Word is the experiencer of the passion. As a man of his time, he says he accepts the immortality of both the Word as God and the *physis* of the human soul. But he insists that in a way beyond human understanding, the Word himself suffers the experience of death just as the human subject experiences human death. To put it in his terminology, the Word suffers impassibly, a phrase which is totally incomprehensible to Orthodoxos, since to accept it would mean abandoning the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism.

For Orthodoxos the Word simply cannot suffer death because his *physis* is immortal and impassible. Even Satan, having a rational, and so immortal, *physis* cannot experience death. Consequently, 'if even the very inventor and teacher of iniquity did not incur death on account of the immortality of his *physis*, do you not shudder at the thought of saying that the font of immortality and righteousness shared death?'[110] Eranistes' reply is probably meant by Theodoret to be evasive, but in stressing the voluntary assumption by the Word of all the experiences of the humanity as the subject of them, Eranistes is actually closer to the spirit of our own contemporary theology than Theodoret's rigid faithfulness to the results of his philosophical categories. Eranistes answers:

> Had we said that he underwent the passion involuntarily, there would have been some just ground for the accusation which you bring against us. But if the passion which is preached by us was spontaneous and the death voluntary, it becomes you, instead of accusing us, to praise the immensity of his love to humankind. For he suffered because he willed to suffer, and shared death because he wished it.[111]

It is interesting that the Theodoret who argued in the *Expositio Rectae Fidei* that the Word is present in the Incarnation voluntarily and not *kat' ousian*, since that would involve God involuntarily in the Incarnation, is here finding an assertion that the Word voluntarily assumes being the subject of the passion an absurdity on the grounds of the necessity of the attributes of his divine *physis*.

Orthodoxos' response to Eranistes' assertion is simply that the Word can no more suffer the passion than commit sin or become visible, comprehensible, non-existent, darkness, or the Father.[112] These things are simply impossible for the Word's *physis*, and so to him. The Arian syllogism's minor premiss has

[110] Ettlinger, p. 194; *PG*, 83: 228. [111] Ibid.
[112] Ettlinger, pp. 194–6; *PG*, 83: 229–32.

a lock-tight hold on Theodoret's reasoning. When Orthodoxos concludes, 'Therefore our Lord Jesus Christ is truly God and truly human, for of these two *physeis* he has had the one eternally and the other he truly assumed,' and 'Therefore as human he suffered the passion but as God he remained beyond passion,'[113] this is still no more than Theodoret's persistent prosopic union, no matter how much these phrases read in isolation could be, and have been, taken to represent a Christology of hypostatic union, for the subject of the discussion is the prosopic union's common *prosopon* 'Jesus Christ', not the Only-Begotten Word, who is—according to Theodoret immediately before the two expressions just quoted—'*called* Son of Man because he took a body and a human soul'.[114] When Eranistes asks, 'How, then, does the divine scripture say that the Son of God suffered?', Orthodoxos answers, 'Because the body which suffered was his body.'[115] It is an answer that actually answers nothing, since any of the combatants in the controversy could have given it, from Apollinaris to Nestorius. The question is how the body is the Word's.

The debate continues with lengthy examples from Scripture, in all of which Orthodoxos is at some pains to stress that his party is simply 'regarding the peculiar properties of the natures', attributing impassibility to the Godhead and the passions in the economy of the Incarnation to the body. Yet the properties of both natures are said to apply to the common *prosopon*:

> I think that even a barbarian might easily make this distinction. The union of unlike *physeis* being conceded, the *prosopon* of Christ on account of the union receives both (*tauta kakeina*). To each nature its own properties are attributed: to the uncircumscribed immunity from weariness, to that which is capable of transition and travel weariness, for travel is idiomatic of feet.[116]

The common *prosopon*, the outward, sensible appearance of the humanity which can rightly be called 'Christ' because flesh can receive anointing, is said to 'receive' (*dechetai*) the attributes of both, though each *physis* actually retains its own properties to itself ontologically. But for this to be more than Theodoret's customary prosopic, two-subject union, it would be necessary to attribute the properties of the human *physis* not merely to its own *prosopon*, but to the second *hypostasis* of the one *ousia* of God, to the Word himself, which Orthodoxos plainly and persistently absolutely refuses to do. This is not, consequently, in my judgement, an example of true *communicatio idiomatum*. Indeed, shortly after making this statement, Orthodoxos returns to his theme of how, if the soul of a human being does not suffer and die when the human being is said to suffer and die, the Word can be said to suffer death,

[113] Ettlinger, p. 198; *PG*, 83: 233.
[114] Ettlinger, p. 197; *PG*, 83: 233.
[115] Ettlinger, p. 198; *PG*, 83: 233.
[116] Ettlinger, p. 202; *PG*, 83: 240.

since the *physis* of the Word is not capable of suffering, and 'the divine apostle interprets the passion and shows what *physis* suffered'?[117]

There follows a succinct definition of Theodoret's doctrine of the Atonement:

So with reason the Creator, with the intention of destroying [sin], assumed the *physis* against which war was being waged, and by keeping it clear of all sin, both set it free from the sovereignty of the devil, and by its means destroyed the devil's dominion. For since death is the punishment of sinners, and death unrighteously and against the divine law seized the sinless body of the Lord, he first raised up that which was unlawfully detained, and then promised release to them that were with justice imprisoned.[118]

A righteous human life has at last been lived, and the injustice of the devil's attempt to seize the Lord's body by death cancels the debt to death justly owed by the rest of sinful humanity, thus allowing them to go free of death, to be raised with the Lord's body from death. Adam's sin introduced human mortality, for death justly followed as punishment for his sin. The rest of humanity has followed Adam in his choice, for as Eranistes is given to say, 'Although the race had not participated in the famous transgression, yet it committed other sins, and for this cause incurred death.'[119] Even if Theodoret does not have an Augustinian doctrine of original sin, the result is the same: Adam having become mortal through his sin begts a mortal race, and 'reasonably, then, all who have received mortal nature follow their forefather'.[120] It is not clear whether Theodoret means to imply that Adam's race falls into sin because they inherit his mortality, or that they suffer death as the just reward for their choosing to follow his example in sin. In any case the unjust death of Christ and the seizure of his body by death are the source of the freedom of those justly in bondage to death:

When the head of the race was doomed, all the race was doomed with him, and so when the Saviour destroyed the curse, human nature won freedom; and just as they that shared Adam's nature followed him in his going down into Hades, so all the nature of humankind will share in newness of life with the Lord Christ in his resurrection.[121]

As in *De Incarnatione*, God raises the body from the grave, but it is the humanity that conducts and wins the struggle with temptation:

And yet the Lord Christ is not only human but eternal God, but the divine Apostle names him from the *physis* which he assumed, because it is in this nature that he compares him with Adam. The justification, the struggle, the victory, the death, the resurrection are all of this human *physis*. It is this *physis* which we share with him. In

[117] Ettlinger, pp. 203–4; *PG*, 83: 244. [118] Ettlinger, pp. 205–6; *PG*, 83: 245.
[119] Ibid. [120] Ettlinger, p. 206; *PG*, 83: 248. [121] Ibid.

this *physis* they who have exercised themselves beforehand in the citizenship of the kingdom shall reign with him. Of this *physis* I spoke, not dividing the Godhead, but referring what is proper to the humanity.[122]

It is not the Word that struggles with temptation, for his *physis* is immutable and impassible and immortal, but rather it is the humanity that resists temptation. The common *prosopon* is 'the Lord Christ', not the Word experiencing human life, the subject of the struggle to be obedient in and through a human *physis* as much his as ours is ours. Though it is set out in a terminology much more cautious than Theodoret used in *De Incarnatione*, I can find no substantial change in the Christological model here in the *Eranistes*. Only attributes proper to the divine *physis* are really those of the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God. Those proper to the humanity may at best be said to be his in so far as the perfect human life of the Lord Christ most fully and absolutely manifests visibly in human history the Word's word of 'Yes' to the human desire to be reconciled to God and life. But the human attributes are in no way proper to the Word in himself; he is not the subject of the human experiences of the Lord Christ.

This brings us to an analogy in which Marcel Richard thought Theodoret's Orthodoxos uses *hypostasis* in such a way as to suggest he might have come to understand it as the equivalent of *prosopon*, which would imply Theodoret's having reached a confession of one *hypostasis* in Christ.[123] Orthodoxos and Eranistes have been continuing their central debate of this third dialogue concerning how a human being such as Isaac could be said to suffer death or be about to suffer death while in reality it was not his soul but his body which dies. Orthodoxos' purpose is, as we have seen, to involve only the humanity in the death of Christ so as to be able to demonstrate the continuing distinction in Christ of the divine and human natures. He turns, then, to a consideration of the sacrifice of Isaac as a type of the death of Christ. The question of how he understands *hypostasis* at this point requires quoting most of the passage.

Now compare the type with the reality and you will see the impassibility of the divinity even in the type. Both in the former and the latter there is a father; both in the former and the latter a well beloved son, each bearing the material for the sacrifice. The one bore the wood, the other the cross upon his shoulders. It is said that the top of the hill was dignified by the sacrifice of both. There is a correspondence moreover between the number of days and nights and the resurrection which followed, for after Isaac had been slain by his father's willing heart, on the third day after the bountiful God had ordered the deed to be done, he rose to new life at the voice of him who loves

[122] Ettlinger, p. 207; *PG*, 83: 249.

[123] Marcel Richard, 'L'Introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la théologie de l'incarnation', *Mélanges de Science Religieuse*, 2 (1945), 249.

humankind. A lamb was seen caught in a thicket, furnishing an image of the cross, and slain instead of the lad. Now if this is a type of the reality, and in the type the only-begotten son did not undergo sacrifice, but a lamb was substituted and laid upon the altar and completed the mystery of the oblation, why then in the reality do you hesitate to assign the passion to the flesh and to proclaim the impassibility of the divinity.[124]

Eranistes asks if Orthodoxos can say even in metaphor that Isaac died and lived again, why it is wrong for him to say that the Word of God suffered and came to life again. From Eranistes' point of view the Word is the *hypostasis* who did experience death on the cross through his human *physis*'s mortality. Orthodoxos replies,

I have said again and again that it is quite impossible for the type to match the archetype in every respect. This may be easily understood in the present instance. Isaac and the lamb, as touching the distinction of their *physeis* suit the image, but as touching the separation of their *hypostaseis* they do so no longer. We preach so close a union of deity and humanity as to understand one *prosopon* which is undivided, and to acknowledge the same one to be God and a human being, visible and invisible, circumscribed and uncircumscribed, and we apply to the one *prosopon* all the attributes which pertain to the deity and the humanity. Now since the lamb, an unreasoning being and not gifted with the divine image, could not possibly prefigure the restoration to life, the two divide between them the type of the mystery of the economy, and while one furnishes the image of death, the other supplies that of the resurrection.[125]

At first glance it does appear that Orthodoxos may be using *hypostasis* here as the functional equivalent of *prosōpon*. Even if that is so, it does not mean that Theodoret has arrived at a doctrine of hypostatic union in the later sense of that expression; for we have seen that he clearly does not attribute the passions of the humanity to the Word, the Only-Begotten. It need mean only that he is using the term to indicate what he normally signifies by *prosopon*: that the man and the Word share a common outward manifestation, that the Word is manifest to the world through the assumed man/humanity, but is not the subject of the human experiences of the man/humanity. That in fact is what Theodoret appears to do after the Council of Chalcedon when he remarks in his letter to John of Aegae that when the Council confesses one *hypostasis* and one *prosopon* in Christ, he takes it to mean what he had always meant by one *prosopon*. But Theodoret has always avoided using *hypostasis* this way himself, preferring to link it with *physis* in his own writings—really preferring to avoid using it at all. What he actually has Orthodoxos say here is that the analogy of Isaac as the only-begotten son of his father and the lamb as

[124] Ettlinger, p. 209; *PG*, 83: 252.

[125] Ettlinger, pp. 209–10; *PG*, 83: 252.

substitutionary sacrifice applies to the union of the Only-Begotten Word and humanity only as far as the distinction of *physeis*. But they do not only represent two distinct natures; the boy and the lamb also do *not* share a common *prosopon*, and in this the analogy does not apply to the Incarnation. And, incidentally, since there is no common *prosopon*, there is no question either of there being anything but distinct individuals here, distinct *hypostaseis*. The two different natures apply to the analogy; but there is not a like unity between boy and lamb as between Word and assumed humanity. The two *hypostaseis* are so different in the case of Isaac and the lamb that there can be no question of a common *prosopon*. Theodoret need not be interpreted here to mean anything more than that whereas the two *physeis* and two ontologically consequent *hypostaseis* are united in Christ to share one *prosopon*, in the case of Isaac and the lamb the two *physeis* and their *hypostaseis* are so separated that they do not form a like prosopic union. Whether Theodoret means this, or that the lamb and Isaac do not share a common *prosopon* and he uses *hypostaseis* in the preceding sentence as a synonym of *prosopon*, as in the letter to John of Aegae, we still need not be dealing with anything more than Theodoret's customary prosopic union. In the light of the rest of the evidence from the *Eranistes*, we are still not dealing with a Christology of a human *physis* being taken up into the one *hypostasis* which is the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God.

A little further into the dialogue we come to an almost classic example of Theodoret's prosopic union. Discussing the Resurrection, Orthodoxos cites 1 Corinthians 15: 21–2 to the effect that Paul 'calls Christ human that he may prove the remedy to be appropriate to the disease'.[126] Note the typical Theodoret terms 'calls' and 'Christ' as the subject of attribution. When Eranistes immediately concludes that Orthodoxos teaches that Christ is only a man, Orthodoxos replies, 'On the contrary, we have again and again confessed that he is not only a man but eternal God. But he suffered as a man, not as God.'[127] This is one of those passages where Theodoret could obviously be interpreted in a Chalcedonian-leaning sense, with his emphasis that 'he suffered as a man, not as God'. But the antecedent of 'he' is not God the Word, but the Christ, the common *prosopon* which may be *called* God or a man depending upon which *physis* it is to which one is referring.

That this is Theodoret's customary prosopic union, and not hypostatic union, is abundantly clear from the repartee that follows. Eranistes answers that it is God the Word who has died in the flesh. Orthodoxos responds with his basic argument in this third dialogue that the Word cannot experience passion or death because his *physis* is immortal and impassible. From the

[126] Ettlinger, p. 215; *PG*, 83: 261. [127] Ibid.

discussion it is clear that Theodoret is still obviously locked into the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism: 'We have frequently shown that what is immortal in *physis* can in no way die. If then he died, he was not immortal.'[128] Eranistes answers with one of Alexandria's terminologically imprecise statements that drove the Antiochenes to such frustration: 'He is by nature immortal, but he became a man and suffered.'[129] Quite clearly to Eranistes, 'he' refers to the Word, whereas for Theodoret it sometimes refers to the Word and sometimes to the Christ as two distinct subjects of experience. For Orthodoxos, to speak of the Word as suffering the passion is to attribute change to his divine *physis*: 'Therefore he underwent change, for how otherwise could he being immortal submit to death? But we have agreed that the *ousia* of the Trinity is immutable. Having then a *physis* superior to change, he by no means shared death.'[130]

This prompts the obvious question from Eranistes as to whether Orthodoxos 'regards the Lord Christ as God the Word'. Orthodoxos quite clearly makes the distinction between God the Word in himself as subject of the divine experiences and the Christ as the common *prosōpon* to which the predicates of the Word and the humanity may be said to be attributed: 'The term Christ in the case of our Lord and Saviour signifies the incarnate Word, the Immanuel, God with us, both God and human, but the term "God the Word" so said signifies the simple *physis*, before the world, superior to time and incorporeal.'[131] God the Word is simply not the subject of the human experiences of Jesus of Nazareth. It could not possibly be said more clearly in the terminology and with the philosophical concepts of the fifth-century debate. To attribute the properties of the divine Word's *physis* to the *prosopon* ontologically proper to the humanity by stating, as Theodoret persistently and carefully does, that because of the union they may be *said* to pertain to the common *prosopon*, is not the same thing at all as classical *communicatio idiomatum*, the attribution of the properties of the humanity to the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God, who for Theodoret emphatically does not experience death on the cross when the body of Jesus dies. All of Theodoret's expressions about 'the same one' and 'he is both God and human' must be read in this light. They refer to the *prosopon* of the humanity, not to the Word as such. Rather, the common *prosopon*—that is, the human *prosopon*—may be said to be God and may be said to share in the divine glory and attributes by virtue of the way in which the Word uses the human *prosopon*'s human perfection to manifest himself. But these attributes are not that *prosopon*'s ontologically but honorifically.

[128] Ettlinger, p. 216; *PG*, 83: 261. [129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid. [131] Ettlinger, p. 216; *PG*, 83: 264.

Consequently, Eranistes' subsequent remark that the Word 'underwent the passion impassibly'[132] is simply a 'ridiculous riddle' to Orthodoxos, who is willing to admit that perhaps the human soul can share the passion of the body, but even so the soul cannot die, being immortal in *physis*, and likewise the Word cannot experience death.[133] The concluding 'credal' statements made by Orthodoxos, which could be read from a purely Chalcedonian viewpoint, must also be seen in the light of a subsequent remark that identifies attributing the experience of the passion to the Word with Arianism.

Thus, at the end of the third dialogue we find Theodoret's version of *communicatio idiomatum*. Eranistes insists on referring to the crucified as the Lord of glory, in the context a reference to divine being. Orthodoxos responds:

I follow [the Apostle] too, and believe that he was Lord of glory. For the body which was nailed to the wood was not that of any common man but of the Lord of glory. But we must acknowledge that the union makes the names common.[134]

Then Orthodoxos agrees with Eranistes when Theodoret has the latter say:

The peculiar properties (*ta idia*) of the *physeis* are shared (*koina*) by the *prosopon*, for on account of the union (*henosis*) the same one (*autos*) is both Son of Man and Son of God, everlasting and of time, Son of David and Lord of David, and so on with the rest.[135]

And then from Orthodoxos himself:

You say that the divine *physis* came down from heaven and that in consequence of the union it was called the Son of Man. Thus it behooves us to say that the flesh was nailed to the tree, but to hold that the divine *physis* even on the cross and in the tomb was inseparable from this flesh, though from it it derived no sense of suffering, since the divine *physis* is by nature incapable of undergoing both suffering and death, and its *ousia* is immortal and impassible. It is in this sense that the crucified is styled Lord of glory, by attribution of the title of the impassible *physis* to the passible.[136]

Finally, Orthodoxos concludes:

I mean that after the union the holy scripture applies to one *prosōpon* exalted and humble terms. But possibly you are also ignorant that the illustrious Fathers first mentioned his taking flesh and being made human, and then afterwards added that he suffered and was crucified, and thus spoke of the passion after they had set forth the *physis* capable of passion.... I have observed more than once that both the divine and the human are received by the one *prosopon*. It is in accordance with this position that

[132] Ettlinger, p. 218; *PG*, 83: 268.
[133] Ettlinger, p. 220; *PG*, 83: 268–9. [134] Ettlinger, p. 226; *PG*, 83: 277.
[135] Ibid. [136] Ettlinger, pp. 226–7; *PG*, 83: 280.

the thrice blessed Fathers, after teaching how we should believe in the Father, and then passing on to the *prosopon* of the Son, did not immediately add 'and in the Son of God', although it would have very naturally followed that after defining what touches God the Father they should straightway have introduced the name of Son. But their object was to give us at one and the same time instruction on the theology and on the economy, lest there should be supposed to be any distinction between the *prosopon* of the deity and the other *prosopon* of the humanity. On this account they added to their statement concerning the Father that we must believe also in our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God. Now after the Incarnation, God the Word is called Christ, for this name includes alike all that is proper to the deity and to the humanity. We recognize nevertheless that some properties belong to the one *physis* and some to the other, and this may at once be understood from the actual terms of the creed. For tell me, to what do you apply the phrase 'of the being of the Father', to the deity or to the *physis* fashioned from the seed of David?[137]

In the second of these four quotations concluding the third dialogue Theodoret says that the properties (*ta idia*) of the two natures become the common (*koina*) properties of the one *prosopon*. Likewise, in the fourth quotation he writes that the one *prosopon* receives divine and human terms. In this same fourth quotation he goes on to speak of the second paragraph of the Nicene Creed as referring to the '*prosopon* of the Son'. We have seen throughout his works how Theodoret prefers to use this term *prosopon* to refer to the threeness in the one being of God, instead of *hypostasis*. Does this mean that Theodoret is here using *prosopon* as the exact equivalent of *hypostasis*? That is to say, does he mean to refer to the Word in himself when he says that the properties of both human and divine natures are attributed to the one *prosopon*? If so, then this would also be a true *communicatio idiomatum*, but it would also mean that the common *prosopon*, which we have repeatedly seen is for Theodoret ontologically proper to the human *physis*, is the second *prosopon* or *hypostasis* of the Trinity, the Word himself. But we have seen how in this dialogue, as well as elsewhere, Theodoret quite consistently insists that the Word himself, considered in himself as the Word or what we would refer to as the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity, is equivalent to the divine *physis*. He insisted above that the title 'Word of God' is applied strictly only to the divine *physis*, and that 'Christ' is the appropriate title to apply to the Word in union with the humanity—that is, the common *prosopon*. Strictly speaking, therefore, the properties of the human *physis* apply for Theodoret to that *physis* (see the penultimate sentence in the fourth quotation above) and to the common *prosopon*, but not, at least ontologically, to the second *hypostasis* (Theodoret's *prosopon*) of the Trinity.

[137] Ettlinger, pp. 227–8; *PG*, 83: 280–1.

These four quotations can obviously be read from the point of view of a Christology of hypostatic union. The question is, as always, whether Theodoret meant them that way. I do not believe that is correct. I do not believe that the evidence which has been amassed here can lead to any other conclusion but that we are still where we were at the very beginning. When each *physis* is considered in itself, there are two *prosopa*: the second of the three *prosopa* of the three *hypostaseis* of the Triune God and the *prosopon* of the human *physis*. The Word remains impassible and immortal in himself and does not experience the human passions and death of Christ as the subject of them. Theodoret consistently denies that the Word is capable of doing this. To acknowledge that would have necessitated either a lapse into Arianism or his breaking the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism which stated that whatever is attributed to the Word must be attributed to him *kata physin*, or to him in his divine nature. We have not found the slightest evidence that Theodoret ever did either. The only other possible alternative is a consistent prosopic union Christology. Thus terms appropriate ontologically to one *physis* may be applied to the common *prosopon*, so that the human *physis*'s proper outward countenance, or *prosopon*, may be said to be the Word's in so far as the perfect human life of Jesus of Nazareth shows forth to the world the divine life and love of the Word as fully as that can ever be done through the limitations of human personality, through the human one's total union with the Word in the Word's love of him. The humanity may be called by the titles appropriate to the Word's *physis*, but the subject of the passion and death is a human subject and experiencer, one who can will to be obedient and to die in that obedience to the will of God, for those attributes simply cannot be applied to the Word in himself. Theodoret is desperately trying to find some way to speak of the Christ of the New Testament with all his real and functional humanity as one with the Word who was with the Father in the beginning and who became flesh. He is driven by this need and the need to placate the political fury of the Alexandrine party to avoid the concrete terms for the humanity of the pre-Ephesine period and to use such expressions as 'the same one' and so on. That, in consequence, his language in this period can so easily have a Christology of hypostatic union read into it must not be allowed to overrule his basic and principal point. The Word cannot in himself suffer and die. He has stated explicitly above that to speak of the Word is to speak of his divine *physis*. The *prosopon* that receives the names of the properties of both *physeis* is the common *prosopon*, not the second *hypostasis* (the generally preferred term) or *prosopon* (Theodoret's preferred term) of the Trinity. At the end of the *Eranistes* Theodoret remains trapped in the metaphysical consequences of the Arian syllogism, compelling us to conclude that his Christology at this point remains the two-subject prosopic union Christology

of the period of the Council of Ephesus. So it is that the *Eranistes* concludes with a statement of faith asserting that any who confess that the Word suffered the passion have fallen into Arianism. To say that the Word is the divine *physis*, as we have seen above, and to deny the experience of the passion to that *physis* is in effect to say that the two *physeis* of his confession really do require our thinking of two *hypostaseis*, each of which is its own subject, which is precisely, I believe, what the bishops at Ephesus and Chalcedon meant by rejecting a confession of two Sons. So Theodoret's Orthodoxos concludes:

> When we are told of the passion and of the cross, we must recognize the *physis* which submitted to the passion; we must avoid attributing it to the impassible, and must attribute it to that *physis* which was assumed for the distinct purpose of suffering. The acknowledgment on the part of the most excellent Fathers that the divine *physis* was impassible and their attribution of the passion to the flesh is proved by the conclusion to the creed, which runs, 'But they who state there was a time when he was not, and before he was begotten he was not, and he was made out of the non-existent, or who allege that the Son of God was of another *hypostasis* or *ousia*, mutable or variable, these the holy catholic and apostolic Church anathematizes.' See then what penalties are denounced against those who attribute the passion to the divine *physis*.[138]

Theodoret sums up his arguments in the *Eranistes* by concluding the work with three sets of 'Demonstrations by Syllogisms', each of which corresponds to one of the dialogues and is named the same. Someone reading these summary syllogisms without insight into Theodoret's code terminology just might be able to find a theology of hypostatic union in them. A close reading of them, however, brings out their Christology clearly, and in a few instances gives us a little added information. In the second set of demonstrations, for example, Theodoret clearly states that sin is not a function of *physis*, but of evil will (paragraph 5), leading to the conclusion that it is not the divine *physis* (which is what Theodoret identifies with the Word, as we have seen in the body of the work) which sleeps, hungers, is afraid of death in the garden, or experiences the various infirmities of being a human being, presumably including temptation, although that is not explicitly mentioned. He uses the tradition that all humankind shall see the Son of Man coming on the clouds in judgement as proof that the visible, human *physis* has not been transformed into divinity after the Resurrection and the Ascension, but that the union of two distinct but inseparable *physeis* continues in the risen Christ. In the third set of demonstrations, he returns to his constant attack on Arianism and Apollinarianism:

> They who maintain that God the Word suffered in the flesh should be asked the meaning of what they say, and should they have the hardihood to reply that when the

[138] Ettlinger, p. 228; *PG*, 83: 281.

body was pierced with nails the divine *physis* was sensible of pain, let them learn that the divine *physis* did not fill the part of the soul.[139]

In Theodoret's Neoplatonist anthropology, in some way or other the immortal human soul still to some degree participates in the passion of the human body. But for Theodoret, of course, the Word is totally impassible. Theodoret insists that it is a human soul in Christ who was 'sensible of pain', the nails, the cross, and not the Word. These experiences are not proper to the Word as they are to a human being—to the composite human *physis*. This issue lies at the very heart of his Christology: to say that the Word experienced a human death on the cross the way human beings suffer death, that he is the subject of these human experiences, is logically to predicate of Christ either a mutable divine *physis* or to deny a real human soul to Christ, which in replacing the human soul with the Word is the same thing as predicating mutability and passibility of the Word's *physis*.

The final word Theodoret has to say on the subject in the last paragraph of the last demonstration (III, 16) sums up his Christology admirably. All the old 'concrete terms' for the humanity are gone, but the Christology is the same:

When we say that the body or the flesh or the humanity suffered, we do not separate the divine *physis*, for as it was united to a *physis* that was hungry, thirsty, weary, even asleep and undergoing the passion, the divine *physis* itself is affected in its own way, so it was conjoined to it even when crucified, and permitted the completion of the passion, that by the passion it might destroy death; not indeed receiving pain from the passion, but making the passion its own, as of its own temple.[140]

We have seen above in the main body of the *Eranistes* how Theodoret identified the Word with the Word's divine *physis*. Nothing can be attributed ontologically to the Word that cannot be attributed to his divine *physis*. To speak of the Word is to speak of the divine *physis*, to use his expression. When he says, as he does throughout the *Eranistes* and here in the summary demonstrations, that it is not the Word who fears death in the garden, or the Word who is tempted, or the Word who experiences the passion of the cross, but rather the human *physis*, is this *physis* functionally anything other than the assumed man of *De Incarnatione*, who was there defined exactly in the same way?

I conclude that for all his careful expressions, all his careful avoiding those 'concrete terms' such as 'assumed man', Theodoret's Christology in the *Eranistes* is still exactly the same as in his pre-432 works. He has not broken free of the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism.

[139] Ettlinger, p. 263; *PG*, 83: 332.

[140] Ettlinger, pp. 264–5; *PG*, 83: 336.

THAT THERE IS ONE SON, OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST

In Epistle 16 to Irenaeus of Tyre, Theodoret is defending himself in the strife of 448 to 449 against a charge brought against him by Irenaeus' more Nestorian Antiochene party that he had in some recently written but unnamed treatise been guilty of naming the Virgin *Theotokos* without simultaneously qualifying what that term means by adding to it in customary Antiochene fashion the term 'mother of the human being' (*kai anthropotokos*), and of not quoting Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia to support his position. Garnier and Tillemont suggested that the treatise faulted by Irenaeus would be the *Eranistes*, but Marcel Richard has shown that it must be a short treatise which is published in Migne's text of Schulze's edition of Theodoret's letters appended to Epistle 151, under the title *Proof that after the Incarnation our Lord Jesus Christ was one Son*.[141] It was first published in 1759 from a manuscript in Vienna in which it appears right after our present Epistle 151 (from the year 432), and so was not known to Garnier and Tillemont. It is true that the *Eranistes* does not cite Diodore or Theodore of Mopsuestia; nor does it use the term *anthropotokos*. But it does not use *Theotokos* over against that term in any way that could arouse the extreme Antiochene party's wrath. Indeed, the Virgin is hardly mentioned at all in the *Eranistes*. On the other hand, the anonymous treatise now appended to Epistle 151 in Migne is in fact guilty of both these accusations brought against Theodoret, and Richard has shown how its ideas and terminology exactly fit Theodoret's correspondence of 448–9, when he was restricted by imperial edict to Cyrus and forbidden to participate in the approaching Council at Ephesus.

In Epistle 16 Theodoret writes that 'the conveners of the Council have arrived and delivered the letters of summons to several of the Metropolitans including our own', which means that it dates from early 449. Richard has also noted that the way in which supporting Fathers are quoted in this treatise and the *Ecclesiastical History* suggests that Theodoret wrote it while editing the *Ecclesiastical History* during his detention in Cyrus, which ended at the latest at the beginning of 450. Widely enough known to have come to the attention of Ireaneus' party and to elicit Theodoret's apology for it in Epistle 16 in early 449, the most likely date, therefore, for the treatise *That There is One Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ*, would be 448, shortly after the *Eranistes*. Theodoret seems to

[141] Marcel Richard, 'Un Écrit de Théodoret sur l'unité du Christ après l'incarnation', *Revue de Sciences Religieuses*, 14 (1934), 34–61. *PG*, 83: 1433–40.

refer to it in Epistle 109 as well, which Azéma dates to November 448.[142] As Richard points out, during the winter of 448–9, Domnus of Antioch sent several bishops to Constantinople to ascertain the situation there since the condemnation of Eutyches and to defend Theodoret against the accusations of Dioscorus.[143] Richard believes that *That There is One Son* was prepared as a brief statement of his orthodoxy to aid his episcopal colleagues' defence of him, particularly against the charge by Dioscorus that Theodoret taught a doctrine of two Sons. The letter to Eusebius of Ancyra, Epistle 109, becomes clearer in this case, for the bishops would be passing right through that city on their way to the capital, and Eusebius would be useful for Theodoret's defence, having earlier professed friendship for him as well as being an important figure in ecclesiastical politics. As matters turned out, Eusebius sided with Dioscorus at the Latrocinium, though he once again accepted Theodoret at Chalcedon. Thus our treatise was provoked by the summons of the bishops to the 449 Council and was designed as a short defence against the charge that Theodoret taught two Sons. The work survives in only three manuscripts, because it failed in its purpose. It would not be prized by the defeated or the victors of 449, and shortly thereafter Theodoret found in Leo's Tome to Flavian a much more useful defence, with his apparent vindication at Chalcedon making our treatise all the more superfluous. We are lucky that it survived at all, as Richard points out.

It is a brief statement and admirably sets forward as close a position to Cyril's as the Antiochene Theodoret could possibly get:

The authors of slanders against me allege that I divide the one Lord Jesus Christ into two sons. But so far am I from this opinion that I charge with impiety all who dare to say so. For I have been taught by the divine scriptures to worship one Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the Only-Begotten Son of God, God the Word enmanned. For we confess the same to be both God eternal and made a human being in the last days for the sake of humanity's salvation, but made human not by the change of divinity but by the assumption of the humanity. For the *physis* of the divinity is immutable and unchangeable, just as is the Father who begat the same before all eternity. Whatever anyone would think of the *ousia* of the Father, he shall find it entirely so of that of the Only-Begotten. . . . He did not become God; he was God. . . . He was not human; he became human, and he so became by taking up that which is ours. So says the blessed Paul: 'Who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant. . . .' Thus he was both passible and impassible, mortal and immortal; passible on the one hand and mortal as human; impassible on the other and immortal as God. As God he raised his

[142] *SC*, 98, p. 198 n. 3.

[143] Tillemont, *Mémoires pour servir a l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1639–1712), xv. 285.

own flesh, which was dead. . . . And as human he was passible and mortal up to the time of the passion, for after the resurrection even as a human being he is impassible, immortal, and incorruptible and he discharges divine lightnings, not that according to the flesh he has been changed into the *physis* of divinity, but still preserving the distinctive marks of humanity. . . .

We therefore worship the Son, but we contemplate in him either nature in its perfection, both that which took, and that which was taken, the one of God and the other of David. For this reason also he is named both Son of the living God and son of David, each *physis* drawing to itself the name which pertains to it. Accordingly the divine scripture calls him both God and human. . . .

Thus [Paul] has stated the Christ to be of the Jews according to the flesh, and God over all as God. . . .

Since we have been thus taught by the divine scripture and have further found that the teachers who have been at different periods illustrious in the Church are of the same opinion, we do our best to keep our heritage inviolate, worshipping one Son of God, one God the Father, and one Holy Spirit, but at the same time recognizing the distinction between flesh and divinity. And as we assert that those who divide our one Lord Jesus Christ into two sons transgress from the road trodden by the holy apostles, so do we declare the maintainers of the doctrine that the divinity of the Only-Begotten and the humanity have been made one *physis* to have fallen into the opposite chasm.

The slander of the libellers that represent me as worshipping two sons is refuted by the plain facts of the case. I teach all persons who come to holy Baptism the faith put forth at Nicaea, and when I celebrate the mystery of new birth I baptize those who believe into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, pronouncing each name by itself. Invariably when we celebrate the liturgy in the Churches, we are accustomed to glorify the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—not 'sons', but Son. If, then, I teach two sons, which is glorified by me and which left unhonored? . . . I worship one Only-Begotten Son, God the Word enmanned. And I call the holy Virgin Mother of God because she has given birth to the Emmanuel, which means 'God with us'. . . . For the mother shares in the honor of her offspring, and the Virgin is both mother of the Lord Christ as human and again is his servant as Lord, Creator, and God. . . .

This is the doctrine delivered to us by the divine prophets . . . , the holy apostles . . . , the great saints of the East and the West. . . . The same was taught by the great luminaries of Alexandria, Alexander and Athanasius.

And he goes on to list Gregory of Nazianzus and John Chrysostom and Atticus, all recent bishops of Constantinople, as supporting his position, together with Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Amphilochius, and several other more ancient worthies.

Certainly, later readers could and did find in this statement the Chalcedonian doctrine of hypostatic union. But a reader of the *Eranistes* and earlier works will recognize all the customary themes and concerns of the Theodoret of those works, particularly the *Eranistes* from the same year, or within a year

of this treatise. It is, as usual, 'our Lord Jesus Christ', the common *prosopon*, which is the antecedent of every statement which involves the properties of both *physeis*, not the Only-Begotten Word. 'Christ' 'is' the Only-Begotten *enanthropesanta*—enmanned, made human—not by change of divinity but by the customary *proslepsis* of the humanity. But we have seen repeatedly heretofore that this does not refer to hypostatic union in which the Word is the subject of the experiences of the humanity, but to Theodoret's Antiochene prosopic union designed specifically to avoid that problem of assigning human experiences to the Word in himself, in his *hypostasis*. 'Christ', the common *prosopon*, is both the eternal God the Word and the humanity assumed for human salvation. The discussion about immutability of the Word's *physis* and the Father's is all typical of the *Eranistes* and the earlier works; so too the various scriptural quotations, particularly that from Philippians. The Christ who is both passible and impassible, mortal and immortal, is quite clearly Theodoret's common *prosopon*, not the Word himself.

The closest Theodoret can come to the Alexandrine position is when he writes, 'We worship the one Son, but contemplate in him either nature in its perfection, both that which took, and that which was taken, the one of God and the other of David.' Heretofore, in the earlier works, we have found Theodoret careful to speak of the Word as properly 'the Son'. Here the term obviously refers to the common *prosopon* of both *physeis*, but this need mean no more than Theodoret's typical communication of the names proper to each *physis* to the common, shared *prosopon*. Indeed, this is clear from the very next sentence: 'For this reason he is named both Son of the living God and son of David, each *physis* drawing to itself the name which pertains to it. Accordingly the divine scripture calls him both God and human.'

He claims to worship one Son, and he does: the Word of God, who is the one Son into whom the faithful are baptized and who is glorified in the liturgy as one of the three *hypostaseis* of the Triune God. It is still this one Word who alone is properly worshipped in Christ the common *prosopon*, the *prosopon* the Word has taken as his own, the *prosopon* of the humanity whose visibility allows believers to see what can be seen of the glory of the invisible One, the humanity who is the subject of the passion, death, and resurrection, the humanity who is still the *homo assumptus*—indeed, the second subject of Theodoret's teaching who is the second Son the Alexandrines find here. We will recall that for Theodoret teaching two Sons is to teach a kind of Paul of Samosata Adoptionism. We have seen earlier on several occasions how Theodoret denies that even Nestorius ever taught such a doctrine, for he is convinced that the Antiochene prosopic union safeguards the unity of Christ from such an Adoptionism in which Christ is a 'mere man' without the Word

prosopically united to him. However, the Alexandrines—and I think Chalcedon too—would still consider this prosopic union a doctrine of two Sons. They were not convinced by Theodoret's treatise of Ephesus in 449 at any rate.

One last point before moving on: Theodoret was also correct in his defence of this treatise in his letter to Irenaeus of Tyre, for in essence there is nothing at all different about his justification of *Theotokos* here and at Ephesus in 431. True, he does not juxtapose the favoured Antiochene word *anthropotokos* to *Theotokos*, but it is certainly present in his explanation of how the Virgin may be called Mother of God, because she has given birth to the Lord Christ *as a human being*, an *anthropos*, to which humanity is united Emmanuel, the 'God with us' who is her Lord, Creator, and God.

In so many words, *That There is One son, Our Lord Jesus Christ* is a shortened, and therefore less comprehensive, version of the *Eranistes*, tailored to meet Theodoret's very serious need to defend himself against the approaching Alexandrine juggernaut at Ephesus in 449. Consequently, it goes just as far as it possibly could in stressing the unity of the prosopic union without surrendering to what he considered the final Arianism of a *mia physis* doctrine. Even so, there is no indication that Theodoret has escaped the philosophical dilemma of the Arian syllogism; nor does he progress beyond his customary doctrine of prosopic union. It is to be noted that although he cannot politically afford the pleasure of a direct attack on Cyril's chapters, he very carefully avoids all mention of the Theopaschite debate over who suffered the passion and death of the cross, or who was afraid in the garden, or who experienced temptation. Nor is there anything here to suggest that he has progressed to a genuine *communicatio idiomatum*.

CORRESPONDENCE, 447–451

We find exactly the same terminology, concerns, and Christology in the correspondence of the period of the Eutychian crisis as in the *Eranistes* and *That There is One Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ*.[144] Most of the letters which we possess from Theodoret date to this period, roughly Epistles 1–147, when they can be dated, obviously too large a group to be examined one by one. Examples from a few will easily suffice for our purposes.

Epistle 83 was written to Dioscorus himself in late 448 or early 449 in a vain attempt to reconcile the patriarch of Alexandria to himself. Theodoret

[144] See Appendix I for references to the various critical texts and translations of Theodoret's correspondence. Epistles 1–147, when they can be dated, fall into the period *c.* 444–51.

defends himself against the charge of teaching two Sons along the lines of the treatise we have just been examining. He writes that he has been charged in a letter from Dioscorus to Domnus of Antioch with preaching in Antioch the division of 'the one Lord Jesus Christ into two sons'. He responds that he has continuously preached before the patriarchs Theodotus, John, and now Domnus for seven years, and 'up to this present day, after the lapse of so long a time, not one of the pious bishops, not one of the devout clergy has ever at any time found any fault with my utterances'. There follows a typical confession of his faith:

I believe that there is one God the Father and one Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father. So also that there is one Lord Jesus Christ, Only-Begotten Son of God, begotten of the Father before all ages, brightness of his glory and express image of the Father's *hypostasis*, on account of humanity's salvation incarnate and made human and born of Mary the Virgin according to the flesh. . . . On this account we also call the holy Virgin *Theotokos*, and deem those who object to this appellation to be alienated from true religion.

In this same manner we call those corrupt and exclude them from the assembly of the Christians who divide our one Lord Jesus Christ into two *prosopa* or two sons or two Lords, for we have heard the very divine Paul saying 'One Lord, one faith, one baptism', and again, 'One Lord Jesus Christ by whom are all things', and again, 'Jesus Christ the same yesterday and today and forever.'

So too the divine Evangelist exclaims, 'And the Word was made flesh.'. . . And when he [John the Baptist] had shown the one *prosopon*, he expressed both the divine realities and the human (*ta theia kai anthropeia*), for the words 'man' (*aner*) and 'comes' are human, but the phrase 'he was before' expresses the divine. But nevertheless, he did not recognize a distinction between him who came after and him was before (*allon . . . allon*), but owned the same one (*ton auton*) to be eternal as God, but born a human being, after himself, of the Virgin.

Thus Thomas . . . through the visible *physis* discerned the invisible. Just so we recognize the distinction between the flesh itself and the divinity, but we own God the Word made human to be one Son.

He goes on to cite various Fathers as is his wont, particularly Cyril, to the point that

we are most anxious by the medicines supplied by very holy men to heal them that deny the distinction between the Lord's flesh and the divinity, and who maintain at one moment that the divine *physis* was changed into flesh and at another that the flesh was transmuted into the *physis* of divinity. For they clearly instruct us in the distinction between the two *physeis* and proclaim the immutability of the divine *physis*, calling the flesh of the Lord divine as being made flesh of God the Word, but the doctrine that it was transmuted into the *physis* of the divinity they repudiate as impious.

Theodoret goes on to relate to Dioscorus how he has read and highly approved Cyril's books against Julian and one he calls 'on the scapegoat', books Cyril had sent to John of Antioch, saying he has a letter from Dioscorus' uncle 'praising my exactitude and kindness' in writing to him of his approval of these works. He goes on to relate that he has twice subscribed to the writings of John of Antioch concerning Nestorius, and he returns to the basic issue once again, the basic points made at Ephesus in 431 and then in the formula of union:

I will in addition write yet a brief word. If anyone refuses to confess the holy Virgin to be *Theotokos*, or calls our Lord Jesus Christ bare man (*psilon anthropon*) or divides into two sons him who is the Only-Begotten and first-born of every creature, I pray that he may fall from hope in Christ.

This is obviously a letter written to placate a mortal and very powerful enemy, and in it Theodoret goes just as far as he can go toward the Alexandrine position. None the less, there is nothing here that we have not seen already. It is thoroughly consistent with his other material from both this period and earlier. There is an interesting turn away from his 430s use of *allos kai allos*, for he has learned that this will only fuel the fire—he wants to stress that it is the Word who is properly the Son of God, and that it is this same One who is 'enmanned' by assuming to himself in prosopic union the human reality. Jesus is not, thus, a 'mere man', but the assumed human *prosopon* manifests the divine light of the Word visibly through union with the Word. That is to say, Theodoret very carefully enunciates his own Christological model in terms he believes are least offensive to his politically powerful opponent, stressing that this is the same Christology which he believes Cyril agreed was orthodox in the formula of union. He does not, it will be noticed, state that the human *prosopon's* passible experiences become those of the Word. That is not what he means by saying that there is no distinction between him who came after and him who was before. For Theodoret, to distinguish between the Word and the 'mere man' would be to deny that there is one *prosopon* commonly between them after the union. The letter also suggests the possibility that Theodoret derived his term for stressing the unity of *prosopon*—the same One—not from philosophical terminology or that of the continuing debate with Alexandria, but from Hebrews 13: 8, which he quotes here in this context: 'Jesus Christ the same (*ho autos*) yesterday and today and forever.' Jesus Christ is for Theodoret the same One who is immutable forever, who is manifested as perfectly as possible under the conditions of human existence to human perceptions through the life, birth, ministry, words, death, resurrection, and ascension of the man Jesus of Nazareth, who is not a human being only, apart from union in *prosopon* with the Word, but whose life of obedience to the Word's will is the

life of Second Adam, the life which redeems all humanity through his passion. This is what Theodoret means by the same One, by inseparable but unconfused union. For him Nestorianism is the denial of prosopic union, making Jesus a prophet, crude Adoptionism, the doctrine he attributes to Paul of Samosata. Note how very carefully he says that he has twice subscribed to the writings of John of Antioch concerning Nestorius, and we will remember how scrupulously he then refused to condemn the person of Nestorius, considering him unjustly condemned, but felt free to condemn those who divided the Christ into two Sons. That this is not the same thing as the Alexandrines meant, again, remains unchanged. He still refuses to state that the *idiomata* of both *physeis* are to be predicated to the *hypostasis* of the Word himself—for he cannot philosophically glimpse the possibility of that—or that the Word experienced the passion. Nothing short of this could possibly satisfy the Alexandrines.

The same themes reappear throughout the correspondence of the period, such as in Epistle 145 to the monks of Constantinople, written in the autumn of 450, a considerably expanded version of Epistle 83, and *That There is One Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ*, but which contains nothing new; it is a condensed version of the *Eranistes*' main points. On the one hand, to preach two Sons (to deny the title *Theotokos* to the Virgin and to divide the Only-Begotten into two) is to make Jesus a human being apart from the prosopic union with the Word; on the other, to teach one *physis* of the Word of God incarnate is to confound the divinity into a creature, and also to deny a functioning, rational soul to the humanity, which soul is the very aspect of human existence that needs healing, since 'the soul not only shared in sin, but was first in sin, for first the thought forms an image of the sin and then carries it out by means of the body'.

Epistle 146 was written either in Lent of 451 or perhaps during Theodoret's retirement after Chalcedon.[145] In it Theodoret faults a presbyter who wanted to alter the doxological expression 'for to thee belongs glory and to thy Christ and to the Holy Spirit' by substituting 'Only-Begotten' for 'thy Christ'. Theodoret says that if this be true,

> it were impossible to exceed the impiety. For he either divides the one Lord Jesus Christ into two sons and regards the Only-Begotten Son as lawful and natural, but the Christ as adopted and spurious, and consequently unmeet for being honoured in doxology, or else he is endeavouring to support the heresy which has now burst in on us with the riot of wild revelry.

For Theodoret this substitution implies that the Christ would no longer be conceived of as the prosopic union, but simply as the pre-incarnate Word,

[145] Azéma dates it to Lent of 451, Garnerius to Theodoret's retirement; cf. *NPNF*, 2nd ser., iii, 316 n. 3.

presumably the humanity taken up into the divinity and changed into divinity—his old foe Apollinarianism, as he understands it. If not that, then the humanity—which is properly, ontologically 'Christ' by virtue of the anointing of the Holy Spirit at Jesus' baptism—is 'adopted', not in prosopic union, what Theodoret means by a teaching of two Sons, or Nestorianism. For Theodoret, it is quite clear, a doctrine of two Sons means Adoptionism; for the Alexandrines a doctrine of two Sons means precisely what Theodoret teaches: the Word is not the subject or experiencer of the human passions in the Incarnation, but rather the humanity, the man Jesus, is. For them prosopic union as he defines it is no more a doctrine of personal unity of the incarnate Word than Adoptionism.

And yet the language here in these last letters of Theodoret does reflect an attempt to express more clearly and emphasize more emphatically the unity of the Incarnation over his pre-435 works. Thus in Epistle 146, he writes:

> Copious additional evidence may be found whereby it may be learned without difficulty that our Lord Jesus Christ is no other *prosopon* than the Son which completes the Trinity. For the same One before the ages was Only-Begotten Son and God the Word, and after the resurrection he was called Jesus and Christ, receiving the names from the facts.... He is named Christ from being as a human being anointed with the Holy Spirit and called our high priest, apostle, prophet, and king.... Let no one then foolishly suppose that the Christ is any other than the Only-Begotten Son.... When writing to the Corinthians, Paul does not say we preach 'the Son', but 'Christ crucified,' herein doing no violence to his commission, but recognizing the same to be Jesus, Christ, Lord, Only-Begotten, and God the Word.... He calls the same both Jesus Christ, and Son of David, and Son of God, as God and Lord of all....

And in Epistle 145:

> I believe in one Father, one Son, and one Holy Spirit; and I confess one divinity, one Lordship, one *ousia* and three *hypostaseis*. For the Incarnation of the Only-Begotten did not add to the number of the Trinity, and make the Trinity a quaternity. And while confessing that the Only-Begotten Son of God was made human (*enanthropesai*), I do not deny the *physis* which he took, but confess, as I have said, both the *physis* which took and the *physis* which was taken. The union did not confound the properties of the *physeis*.... In this manner also the Lord's body is a body, but impassible, incorruptible, immortal, of the Lord, divine and glorified with the divine glory. It is not separated from the divinity, nor yet is of anyone else save the Only-Begotten Son of God himself. For it does not show us another *prosopon*, but the Only-Begotten himself clad in our *physis*.

A similar passage also appears in Epistle 145 as Theodoret's interpretation of Leo's Tome, or at least of the letters which he says Leo wrote to him.[146]

[146] See also Epistle 181 Ad Abundium, which Azéma considers authentic, and in which Theodoret again claims that Leo's Tome to Flavian supports his position.

Nonetheless, though this terminology is clearly a major improvement over that of the earlier works in treating more maturely the problem of the unity in Christ, nothing of Theodoret's philosophical need to distinguish the *physeis* and presumably the *hypostaseis* of the Word and the humanity has been lessened, and that distinction is clearly and emphatically brought out throughout this late correspondence. The problems remain the same, and the solution remains the same, even if the exigencies of political reality and the genuine desire for unity in the Church compel him to be exceedingly careful in enunciating the terminology of the unity of *prosopon*.

Thus Epistle 85, written in 448 to Basil, who may have been the bishop of Seleucia in Isauria who was at both the Latrocinium and Chalcedon, provides a convenient summary of what Theodoret was writing throughout this period. It is a summary, actually, of the Christology of the *Eranistes*:

Be well assured, most godly sir, that we were much delighted to hear the intelligence of our common friend, and in proportion to our previous distress at hearing that he described the *physis* of the flesh and of divinity as one, and openly attributed the passion of salvation to the impassible divinity, so were all rejoiced to read the letters of your holiness, and to learn that he maintains in their integrity the properties of the *physeis* and denies both the change of God the Word into flesh, and the mutation of the flesh into one *physis* of divinity, maintaining on the contrary that in the one Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, God the Word made human, the properties of either *physis* abide unconfounded. We praise the God of all for the harmony of divine faith. We however have written to either Cilicia, although our intelligence is imperfect, as to whether there are really any opponents of the truth, and have charged the godly bishops to search and examine if there are any who divide the one Lord Jesus Christ into two sons, and either to bring them to their sense by admonition or cut them off from the roll of the brethren. For in fact we equally repudiate both those who dare to assert one *physis* of flesh and divinity, and those who divide the one Lord Jesus Christ into two sons and strive to go beyond the definitions of the apostles.

My conclusion is that throughout the correspondence of the period of the Eutychian crisis Theodoret's terminology is designed to defend himself against the charge that he taught two Sons. There is nothing in the material to suggest that he has come to an understanding of hypostatic union. There is still no example of any use of a genuine *communicatio idiomatum* or even the slightest sufferance of the idea that the Word himself, in his own *hypostasis* as the Word, could have been the subject of the passion of the humanity. His Christology, therefore, remains that of a two-subject prosopic union, and though he pushes the terminology of that prosopic union as far as possible to placate his powerful opponents and to stress the reality of the union which he sees in Christ, it still remains 'the Christ' which is the common *prosopon*, which is the reality to which the *idiomata* of both 'distinguished' *physeis* are

persistently attributed. Though here too what he writes could certainly be interpreted from the point of view of a doctrine of hypostatic union if one were not informed of the way he uses this terminology in his theological development, there is nothing here that is inconsistent with his customary understanding of prosopic union. When Theodoret condemns Nestorianism or teaching that there are two Sons, what he means by that is a separation between the Word and the assumed man in which the man is conceived of as a 'mere man'—that is, a prophet whose union with the Word is not intimate enough to be described as prosopic. For Theodoret, then, Nestorianism can only be a crude Adoptionism, what he points to by calling it the teaching of Paul of Somasata. He has never held that doctrine, he claims repeatedly, nor have any of the Antiochenes, and so far as he is concerned to this date, neither did Nestorius himself.

In Epistle 125, written during the first half of 450 after his deposition at Ephesus in 449 and during his exile in his old monastery in Apamea, Theodoret defines his prosopic union very carefully, basing in his rejection of the possibility of the Word experiencing the passion the necessity of predicating a human subject, a human *hypokeimenon*, a word sometimes used in other Patristic sources for *hypostasis*, of the Christ:[147]

You do not suffer the number of the blessed Trinity to be diminished or increased. For it is diminished by those who ascribe the passion of the Only-Begotten to the divinity, and it is increased by those who have the audacity to introduce another Son. You believe in one Only-Begotten, as you do in one Father and in one Holy Spirit. In the Only-Begotten made flesh you behold the assumed *physis* which he assumed from us and offered on our behalf. The denial of this *physis* puts our salvation far from us, for if the divinity of the Only-Begotten is impassible, as the *physis* of the Trinity is impassible, and we refuse to acknowledge that which by nature is passible, then the preaching of a passion which never happened is idle and vain. For if he who [or that which] suffers (*tou gar paschontos*) does not exist, how could there be a passion? We declare that the divine *physis* is impassible—a doctrine confessed by our opponents as well as by ourselves. How then could there be a passion when there is no subject capable of suffering (*hypokeimenou tou paschontos*)? This is the fable started by Valentinus, Bardesanes, Marcion, and Manes. But the teaching handed down to the Churches from the beginning recognizes even after the Incarnation one Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, and confesses the same (*ton auton*) to be everlasting God and made human at the end of days, made human not by the mutation of the divinity but by the assumption of the humanity. For suppose the divine *physis* to have undergone mutation into the human *physis*, then it did not remain what it was. And if it was not what it was, they who have objects of worship are false in calling him God.

[147] For the date, see Azéma, *SC*, 111, p. 99 n. 2. On ὑποκείμενον, see G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 1449.

The letter thereupon continues with the usual confession of the immutability of the Word and how we learn from Scripture that the Word assumed the form of a servant, the seed of Abraham, of flesh, blood, and immortal soul. The point is that Theodoret in 450 can combine his careful, unity-stressing terminology, which can appear to reflect so firmly a doctrine of hypostatic union, with an explicit insistence that the Word cannot experience the passion of the cross because his *physis* is immutable and that this requires postulating a human subject, a human (*hypokeimenon*), as the experiencer of that passion—precisely what the Alexandrines meant by a doctrine of two Sons. Theodoret's two-subject prosopic union is still with him. He is still locked in the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism.

THE EPISTLE TO JOHN OF AEGAE

Of Theodoret's correspondence after the Council of Chalcedon we possess only four short fragments of a letter to the Nestorian John of Aegae. This worthy had written to Theodoret to take him to task for having signed the Chalcedonian formula with its insistence on two *physeis* in one *hypostasis* and *prosopon*. The fragments of Theodoret's reply are preserved in Syriac Monophysite texts, the *Liber contra Impium Grammaticum* of Severus of Antioch (*c.* 465–538), his *Philalethes*, and an anonymous Monophysite work published by F. Nau.[148] Marcel Richard has made a careful study of the evidence, reconstituting the discussion between Theodoret and John as far as the fragmentary evidence allows.[149] He concludes that John of Aegae is pointing out that it is philosophically impossible to speak of two *physeis* having or being in one *hypostasis*, for *hypostasis* is a function of *physis*: each *physis* would have its own proper *hypostasis* by the very nature of the doctrine of being. If one *hypostasis* is to be postulated for Christ, John goes on, then there must have been formed in the union a composite or confused *physis*, composed out of *physeis* which are not similar to one another. Then John concludes:

[148] F. Nau, 'Textes monophysites', *Patrologia Orientalis*, 13 (1919), 188–91; Severus of Antioch, *Liber contra Impium Grammaticum*, ed. J. Lebon, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Scriptores Syrici, (Louvain, 1929), 194, p. 18; repr. as vol. 58 (Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste L. Durbecq, 1952), p. 218; vol. 102 (Louvain, 1933), p. 29; repr. as vol. 59 (Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste L. Durbecg, 1952), 174–5; A. Sandra, *Severi Philalethes* (Beyrouth, 1928), pp. 30 and 43.

[149] Marcel Richard, 'La Lettre de Théodoret à Jean d'Égées', *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 30 (1941–2), 415–23. Richard here also considers the authenticity of these Syriac fragments.

But perhaps we draw back before the duality of *hypostaseis* so as not to be obliged to say two *prosopa* and two sons. That fear is superfluous, only a facetiousness. For if one admits that the confession of two *hypostaseis* introduces the duality of sons, when we preach two *physeis*, they engender necessarily the same number of sons.

In other words, John of Aegae is taking the classical Antiochene line which Theodoret has always defended.

Theodoret responds first by pointing out that the formula he signed at Chalcedon does not say the one *hypostasis* of Christ is composed of two *physeis*, for the council did not say that the single *hypostasis* of the union is 'out of two' *physeis* (*ek duo physeon*), or that one should confess one *physis* of the Word incarnate. On the contrary, he points out, the council anathematized 'out of two', which implies composition, and confessed 'in two' *physeis*. Thus for Theodoret the council did not teach one composite *hypostasis*—that is to say, *physis*—but one *hypostasis* in the sense in which Theodoret and his fellow Antiochenes had always used *prosopon*. Thus Theodoret's reply to John runs:

Those then, who make mention of two *physeis* and the union without confusion, yet recognize them in one *hypostasis* which is neither *ousia* nor *physis*, but *prosopon*. . . . The holy council set one *hypostasis*, not—as I have said—that by *hypostasis* it understood *physis* but *prosopon*. [And indeed it is this which the symbol itself teaches,] for the *hypostasis* [there] follows *prosopon*.[150]

Both Nau's anonymous Monophysite and Severus claim that Theodoret went on to cite Nestorius to show that disciples of his could certainly understand *hypostasis* in a way other than *ousia* or *physis*, indeed in the sense of *prosopon*, and that he further goes on to make a study of the use of *hypostasis* in Scripture to show that it could be used this way.[151]

Neither in any of Theodoret's other post-Chalcedonian works nor in any of his earlier works do we have another example of his using *hypostasis* in this way. Heretofore—with the single possible exception of the way he uses the word in the third dialogue of the *Eranistes*, and even there we have seen that it is by no means clear that *hypostasis* was to be equated with *prosopon*—Theodoret always understood *hypostasis* as a function of *ousia* and *physis*: a *hypostasis* is a concrete example, an actual existent, of a *physis*, particularizing properties, or *idia*, being added, at least in conception or thought, to the generic properties, or *idia*, of the *physis*, so that we are dealing with a concrete

[150] I am quoting from Richard's article. The portion in brackets does not appear in Nau's text, but is recovered from Severus of Antioch, who cites the same two passages of Theodoret's letter which appear here.

[151] The scriptural citations are referred to by John Philopon in *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, trans. from Syriac by Chalot (Paris, 1901), pp. 92–121.

existent of, say, humanity or human *physis*: a specific individual human being. Using it this way, when considering Antiochene prosopic union, the Word's divine *ousia* and *physis* have added to the generic *idia* of divinity (immutability, impassibility, being from before time, etc.) the specifying characteristic of begottenness (as we saw in the earlier works) to be the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity. John of Aegae would insist that the human *physis* is not confused into the divine *physis*, but that the specifying characteristics added to that human *physis* in Christ result in the specific human being Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, and consequently a human *hypostasis* which cannot be identified ontologically or properly with the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity. For John of Aegae, speaking of one *hypostasis* in Christ requires one *physis*, a composite, confused one that is precisely what Theodoret had always said was Apollinarianism. This is, of course, simply the Christology that Theodoret has represented all along—classical Antiochene Christology.

Theodoret responds to John's letter by simply stating that when he signed the Chalcedonian formula at the council, he interpreted it to mean that the formula uses *hypostasis* not in this classical Antiochene fashion, but as the terminological equivalent of *prosopon*. At least, that is all we can say for certain from the brevity of these fragments, and it certainly makes the most sense of them. For him in these fragments, *hypostasis* (a word Theodoret consistently avoided in any case) means either *physis* or *prosopon*. The fragment can only mean that a one-*hypostasis* formula could have only two possibilities for Theodoret. Either one *hypostasis* means 'one *physis* of the Word of God incarnate', a composite *physis*, Apollinarianism; or it means simply prosopic union, that *hypostasis* is to be taken in the sense that Theodoret, John of Aegae, Nestorius, and the other Antiochenes have always taken *prosopon* to mean. Clearly it is the latter that Theodoret means here: 'The holy council set one *hypostasis*, not—as I have said—that by *hypostasis* it understood *physis* but *prosopon*.' This *hypostasis* of the Christ is not the *hypostasis* ontologically proper to the divine *physis*; it is not the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity, the Word himself. Rather, it is the common *prosopon* of Theodoret's persistent Christology. Richard is correct: just as the efforts of sixth-century Chalcedonian theologians show that it took much time and effort for the doctrine of the one *hypostasis* to be integrated into the theology of the Incarnation, so it is easiest to conclude that the old bishop, worn out by decades of intense debate, forced to repudiate his friend Nestorius after standing fast for so long, simply drew back from so formidable a theological task and fell back on his old formula, his old Christology, as, on the whole, equivalent. He says to John of Aegae that at Chalcedon Antioch had to make a terminological compromise, but that the Antiochenes need not find in the Chalcedonian formula anything more than the Christology they have always

believed in. But, as we saw in Chapter 1, the bishops at Chalcedon saw their formula as Leo's Tome interpreted in the light of Cyril, what came to be called 'hypostatic union', a fundamentally different way of perceiving the Incarnation in which the Word is the subject of the human experiences of the Incarnation, not a second subject over against the Word. Clearly, Theodoret cannot make this break through the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism.

HAERETICARUM FABULARUM COMPENDIUM

This is the last extant witness to Theodoret's theology, written after Chalcedon, probably *c.* 453.[152] The work is really a history of heresies in five books, the first four describing heresies from Simon Magus to Nestorius and Eutyches (though there is no mention of Pelagianism, which was a Western conflict, or the Origenist controversies). The fourth book is of most interest to us, with its accounts of Arius and other Arians, Apollinaris, Nestorius, and Eutyches. The fifth book consists of twenty-nine articles of orthodox faith, including one on the Incarnation.

His account of the various heresies is of some interest to our purpose. For example, he faults Sabellius on the ground that he taught one *hypostasis* of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in one *prosopon* with three names. The same One, he says, is called at one time Father, at another Son, and at another Holy Spirit.[153] Arius is said to have been motivated by envy of Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, calling the Son a creature, created *ex nihilo* within time, with a mutable *physis*. He is said to have mutilated the Word in the Incarnation by teaching that the Word assumed a soulless body, for the divinity took the place of the soul in order to be able to attribute to this 'the source of sympathy'.[154] It is interesting that Theodoret uses the Arian syllogism so precisely in this short exposition of Arianism; or rather, perhaps the syllogism stands out so obviously because of the brevity of the article. His argument is that the Word's divinity replaces the soul in the assumed body in Arius' doctrine, a statement which combines both the major and minor premisses of the syllogism, the first stating that the Word is the subject of the human operations and passions of Christ, the second that whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him *kata physin*. The conclusion of the syllogism follows: Arius denies the immutability and eternity of the Word.

[152] It is dated in 453 by Pierre Canivet in his critical edition of the *Curatio Graecarum Affectionum*, *SC*, 57, part 1, p. 25 n. 1 and 4. The text of *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium* is in *PG*, 83: 335–556. The English translations here are mine.

[153] *PG*, 83: 395–6.

[154] Ibid. 411–16.

When Theodoret says that Arius has the Word's divinity replacing the human soul in the body, he shows that he does not mentally distinguish between the Word in himself and his divinity, or divine *physis*. For Theodoret—as we have seen repeatedly—for the Word to take the place of the human *nous* or *hypokeimenon* is the same as saying that the Word's *theotes* as divine mind replaces the human mind and so becomes involved in passibility. In other words, this is the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism from which Theodoret cannot escape even here at the very end of his works: whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him *kata physin*. It is this minor premiss that must be denied in order to appreciate the basic point that the Alexandrines were making and to come to an understanding of a genuine doctrine of hypostatic union.

Theodoret recounts of Apollinaris that he agreed with the orthodox in predicating one divine *ousia* and three *hypostaseis*, but that he errs in postulating a tripartite anthropology of soul, mind, and body, in which the soul is the principle of vitality and life but not of rationality, which is the function of the mind. It is this human mind that Apollinaris replaces with the Word as divine mind, thus both involving the Word's divinity in passibility and making impossible the redemption of the human soul by its freely willed obedience to God in Christ's life and passion. Though Apollinaris accepted a human soul in Christ, insofar as it is not a rational soul, he still falls into the same error as the Arians.[155]

The one truly new aspect in Theodoret's thinking to appear in the *Compendium* comes in his discussion of Nestorius, his old friend, who is a friend no longer.[156] This is a very strange article, rather longer than the others, and most uncharacteristic of Theodoret. It is given over mostly to a very disparaging estimation of Nestorius' person, and sounds rather like the typical character assassination awarded heresiarchs to defuse their doctrine's power. Theodoret says that the devil need not war against the Church from the outside, for he is the sower of weeds within the Body, Nestorius being a chief example of weediness. He is said to be full of opportunistic ambition and arrogance, training his oratorical voice to be a crowd-pleaser by popular preaching. He sought and won the *cathedra* of Constantinople in order to gain tyrannical power over the whole world.

There he blasphemed the Only-Begotten and made war on apostolic doctrine. His heresy lay in an innovation: denying the Virgin was *Theotokos*:

It is not fitting to confess as *Theotokos* the bearer of God the Word taking flesh from her; rather she should be called *Christotokos*. But anciently and even before anciently

[155] Ibid. 425–8. [156] Ibid. 431–6.

those who proclaimed the orthodox faith according to apostolic tradition taught that she should be named *Theotokos*.

Nestorius' heresy is said to have been carefully and systematically worked out, even though it was unknown before him. He is said to have taught that the appellation 'Christ' is indicative of the two *physeis*, the divinity of the Only-Begotten and the humanity:

> The freely stated testimony of God establishes the simple and incorporeal *ousia* of God. But that of the man shows only the human *physis*. Therefore it is not necessary to confess the Virgin as *Theotokos*, but rather as *Christotokos*, lest we forgetfully say that God the Word assumed a beginning to be and thus make the mother antecedent to what is born from her.... Mary did not bear God, but she bore a man, the organ of deity.

But God is not mocked, according to Theodoret, and Nestorius was deposed by the assembled saints with a divine vote at Ephesus.

As I said, this is quite strange, and one wonders if this is really Theodoret talking, even a post-Chalcedonian Theodoret, who, once having been forced at the council to renounce his old friend, may now feel it necessary to go all the way in renouncing him, separating himself once and for all from the twice conciliarly damned heresiarch. Is this really Theodoret, attributing the usual heresiarchal vices to his friend whom he had so resolutely defended over the decades, making the use of *Theotokos* and *Christotokos* the essence of Nestorius' heresy, with no mention of the question of two Sons? Is this really Theodoret calling the Ephesine Cyrillian caucus 'an assembly of saints', and their deposition of Nestorius as 'by divine vote'? If so, it is Theodoret at the worst we have found him.

It is to be noted that Nestorianism is here defined solely in terms of whether *Theotokos* can be legitimately given as a title to the Virgin. And the problem is defined in a way that any Antiochene could have accepted after 432. Theodoret certainly had no difficulty combining the use of the term with his own Christology right through the *Eranistes* and up to the eve of Chalcedon. In so many words, the article on Nestorius tells us nothing new about Theodoret's Christology. He does not define Nestorianism in the way the Alexandrines did. For them, as for the Twelve Chapters of Cyril, much more was at stake, and the title served only as a pointer to that. Even here, after Chalcedon, Theodoret simply avoids the question of whether Antiochene Christology divides Christ into two Sons, into two subjects. For him Nestorius' problem was solely in what title he would give the Virgin.

Without doubt the real Theodoret reappears in the article on Eutyches.[157] Here he is in hand-to-hand combat with *the* enemy. The sorcerer and

[157] *PG*, 83: 435–8.

bewitching demon has found in Eutyches the organ and instrument able to receive his evil. In him Satan makes bloom again the long-withered heresy of Valentinus. Arius confessed the assumption of a real body, as did Apollinaris of the soul, but Eutyches denies the body, asserting that the Word took nothing human from the Virgin. Rather, he himself is immutably changed into and becomes flesh. And there are still other absurdities. The Word made only a track through the Virgin. Nailed to the cross and hanged suspended was the uncircumscribable, infinite, and incomprehensible divinity of the Only-Begotten, who was then given over to the grave and attained to resurrection. Then Theodoret turns around Paul's argument in 1 Corinthians 15: 12–13 about our rising from death because Christ has risen to prove that since he and we rise, he must have the same *physis* as us. If only God rises from the dead, what has that to do with us?

In the fifth book are twenty-four chapters or brief articles on the orthodox faith, in which Theodoret moves from the doctrine of creation, through the Trinity, Christology, anthropology, to the Resurrection, the goodness and justice of God over against the Gnostics, baptism, the Antichrist, virginity, marriage, second marriages of widows, fornication, and repentance, and a closing article on abstinence from wine and flesh in which he faults the Encratites for forbidding both. His advice on marriage, for example, is quite sensible, talking in Pauline terms of the distractions that married folk find in the way of their service to the Lord, but admitting that marriage is blessed by God, no sin, and there is no evidence here of any ascetic distaste for sexuality. His discussion of baptism is interesting in encapsulating quite neatly the fifth-century doctrine of the sacrament:

> In place of Old Testament aspersions, baptism suffices the Christian. Not only does it provide forgiveness of old sins, but also the hope of promised goods, and it establishes participants in the Lord's death and resurrection, and gives the grace of the gift of the Spirit. It produces sons of God, and not only sons, but inheritors of God and fellow heirs with Christ. For baptism does not only imitate the razor, taking off old sins, as the crazy Messalians think. It does provide grace superabundantly, but if that were the only function of baptism, why do we baptize the new-born who have not yet tasted sin? Thus the mystery promises not only this, but things greater and more perfect. For it is the down payment of good things to come, the type of the resurrection which is to be, a participation in the Lord's passions and in the Lord's resurrection, the pallium of salvation, the tunic of good cheer, and the luminous stole brighter than life itself.[158]

On the other hand, this fifth book of *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium*, though it dwells at length on the various concerns of Christology and is

[158] Ibid. 511–12.

an excellent summary of Theodoret's faith, gives us nothing new whatsoever. Its discussion of Christology is nothing more or less than a summary of exactly what we found in the *Eranistes, That There is One Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ*, and the correspondence of 444–51. The concerns, the terminology, the philosophy, and the Christological model remain exactly the same, as if Chalcedon had never happened. There is no mention whatever of two *physeis* in one *prosopon* and *hypostasis*, as if the Chalcedonian formula had never been brought to his attention or that he had signed it himself, further evidence for the supposition above that he simply interpreted it as the equivalent of his own two-subject Christology.

In the section on the Incarnation, for example,[159] while it is true that 'God the Word is not one and the Christ another (*ouk allos ho theos Logos kai allos ho Christos*), for God the Word having been incarnate is named Christ', yet it is still the assumed rational humanity that in Luke 2: 52 increased in wisdom (since the Word is perfect and cannot participate in progress), that experienced the fear of the Garden of Gethsemane, that freely willed to accept and experience the passion of the cross. All of this we have seen before. Theodoret's Christology after Chalcedon, at least as far as we know it from this last of his works, remains exactly what it was in the late 440s.

[159] *PG*, 83: 487–96.

8

Conclusions

In his book *The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia*, Francis Sullivan showed that the clash between Alexandrine and Antiochene Christologies could be traced to their separate reactions to what he called the Arian syllogism, whose major premiss was that the Word is the subject even of the human operations and sufferings of Christ, and whose minor premiss was that whatever is predicated of the Word must be predicated of him according to his divine nature, *kata physin*. The Arian conclusion was that the Word's *physis* is limited and affected by the human operations and sufferings of Christ. Sullivan argues that Athanasius and the Alexandrine theologians rejected the minor premiss, the Antiochenes the major premiss.

The Alexandrine tradition, with its Christology of one *physis* or *hypostasis* of the Word incarnate, its *henosis kath' hypostasin*, or union at the level of *hypostasis*, emphasized the personal unity of Christ. For them the subject, the 'I' in so far as such an expression is appropriate, of the incarnate One is none other than the Word. He is not a *homo assumptus* over against the Word; nor is he any sort of *tertium quid* self-consciousness arising out of a mixture of divinity and humanity, nor the *hypostasis* of some kind of *ousia* resulting from a 'confusion' of the two *ousiai* into one. For them, the subject of the Incarnation, of the Christ, is simply the Word. It was the Word who was born of the Virgin. To deny her the title of *Theotokos* is to deny that reality. It was, for them, the Word who was the subject of human fear, temptation, the decision to accept the passion of the cross, and who died and was raised again on the third day. Despite a genuine progress in terminology up to and beyond Chalcedon in finding more appropriate ways to express their Christology, this Christological model of the Word as the one subject of Christ remained constant. What Sullivan means when he says that the Alexandrines rejected the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism is that though they insisted on predicating the human operations or sufferings of the Christ of the Word as their subject, they did not attribute them to him *kata physin theotetos* or in the Word's divine *physis*, using *physis* in this case not to refer to the person of the Word but to his divine nature or *ousia*.

The Antiochene tradition, on the other hand, solved the problem of Arianism by rejecting the major premiss, refusing to predicate of the Word the human limitations, passion, and death of Christ. They seem never to have been able to conceive of the possibility of denying the minor premiss. For them, to speak of the Word was by that fact to speak of his divine *physis*. At least, I have not been able to find a single example in Theodoret's lengthy works of his even hinting at this possibility. It follows that the Antiochene theologians were philosophically unable ever to predicate human passibility of the Word. That was a function of their philosophical assumptions about what could be said of God. God is immutable and impassible. Therefore the subject, the 'I', of Christ is subject other than the divine Word—for all Theodoret's later careful use of *οὐκ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*. The Antiochene Christological model results from its fundamental philosophical assumptions about what God can and cannot be, and it is firmly a Christological model of two subjects. Antiochene Christology is a function, in other words, of the metaphysics of its doctrine of God.

We have seen how Theodoret's Christology is such a two-subject Christology up through the Nestorian crisis. We have seen how it was rooted in both the Arian syllogism's philosophical assumptions and the other Antiochene concern to assert firmly that for genuine human redemption to have occurred it was necessary that there be in the life of Jesus the Christ a genuinely free human soul which could experience temptation just as do the rest of us and resist. We saw in *De Incarnatione* in particular how Theodoret stresses that the *homo assumptus* was not the Word replacing the human soul in the desert temptation, but a human agent who could be tempted. The Word cannot be tempted, according to the pre-433 Theodoret; nor can the Word progress in wisdom, or what we would call human psychological growth, experience the fear of death, or suffer death or resurrection. The result is clearly a two-subject Christology in which the two subjects, Word and *homo assumptus*, are united in a prosopic union, a union in which the *prosopon* ontologically proper to the *homo assumptus*' *physis* is used by the Word (through the *homo assumptus*' perfect obedience to the Word, an obedience enabled by a grace prevenient even to the conception of the *homo assumptus* in the Virgin's womb) to be the personal manner in which the Word bespeaks himself and gives himself as fully as possible to interpersonal relationships with the rest of humanity. Thus the names proper to the Word's *physis* and to the *homo assumptus*' *physis* and activities are applicable to the human *prosopon*, the common *prosopon*, which is now *said* to be both the Word incarnate and human. But the common *prosopon* is both of these realities differently: it is the *prosopon* of the *homo assumptus* ontologically, properly, or *kata physin*; it may be *said* to be the *prosopon* of the Word, not ontologically or properly, but by virtue of the

unique union between the *homo assumptus* and the Word, who before the conception of the *homo assumptus* had determined to unite the same to himself by grace, so enabling the obedient human response which is the *homo assumptus*' own free response. Thus the full and perfect human life lived by this grace-filled *homo assumptus*, so united to the Word, becomes the fullest possible manifestation not only of what God wills human life to be, but of God's image. The life of the *homo assumptus* thus makes God the Word, the invisible One, visible.

After 435, when he himself finally accepted reconciliation with Cyril, Theodoret's terminology undergoes a significant change. Stress falls upon the unity in Christ, upon unity in one *prosopon*, while at the same time Theodoret continues to insist on there being two *physeis* in Christ to uphold the immutability and impassibility of the Word and the genuine human response of 'what is assumed'. This new stress on the unity of *prosopon* resulted from two factors: the political strength of the Alexandrines, victorious at Ephesus in 431 and having the Emperor's full support, and a genuine concern for the unity of the Church. On the other hand, a careful examination of all the major texts up to and after Chalcedon has shown that Theodoret's fundamental Christological model remained exactly the same. There is no instance in any of his works of a genuine use of *communicatio idiomatum*, or the attribution of the properties and activities of the human *physis* to the Word himself. There is what I have called a communication of names, wherein the titles of both God the Word and of humanity are attributed to the common *prosopon*, but never to the Word himself, for Theodoret never seems to have grasped the idea that the Word's *hypostasis*, the Word as second *hypostasis* of the Trinity, might be thought of not altogether and exclusively as the function of the divine *physis-ousia*. He was never able to conceive of breaking the minor premiss of the Arian syllogism. Thus, despite the new insistence in the later works that the Christ, the common *prosopon*, is the Word who has become flesh by assuming into prosopic union with himself a fully rational humanity, a full human *physis*, we find the same themes that the Word cannot experience human growth in wisdom, human fear in the Garden of Gethsemane, experience death on the cross the way you and I as the 'I' of our humanity experience such things, or be raised from the dead, for the Word is immutable, immortal, impassible; nor can the Word experience temptation, and so on. 'Christ' cannot be equated with the Word. Rather, throughout his later works, as in the earlier ones, 'Christ' always refers to the common *prosopon*, and can therefore be both mortal and immortal, the Word incarnate and the assumed humanity, what I would call both subjects. Theodoret could never have agreed that one of the divine Trinity died on the cross. Since he could not break the Arian syllogism's minor premiss, that

statement would always have meant that whoever said it was confusing the Word's divine *physis* into something that it was not, was attributing mutability and mortality to the Word's divinity.

I conclude, therefore, that Theodoret's Christology remains a two-subject one to the end. Chalcedon, whose formula of two *physeis* in one *prosopon* and *hypostasis* he signed, meant to him only the justification of his own prosopic union Christology. He was apparently unable to understand what Cyril and the Alexandrines were getting at, and he simply ignored the reality that the bishops at Chalcedon plainly and repeatedly stated that they understood Leo's Tome in Cyril's sense, in the sense of a one-subject Christological model, that subject being the Word, and that they accepted Theodoret as orthodox, not by accepting his own theological definitions, to which they refused to listen, but because he confessed the Virgin as *Theotokos* and renounced his old friend Nestorius. Furthermore, Theodoret's Christological model with its emphasis on two subjects, the Word and the human, is precisely what the Cyrillians condemned as a Christology of two Sons, and I cannot see what else Ephesus meant in 431 as Nestorianism. To me, Theodoret was perfectly consistent in refusing to condemn Nestorius, and when he did condemn Nestorianism, it was always a straw man that he had set up. For him, the Nestorianism condemned at Ephesus and then Chalcedon meant refusing to attribute the title *Theotokos* to the Virgin, and it meant a simple kind of Adoptionism which he preferred to attribute to the likes of Paul of Samosata or the Ebionites.

The Church, on the other hand, owes an eternal debt to Theodoret of Cyrus. Though his two-subject Christology is exactly what Ephesus and Chalcedon rejected as Nestorianism, yet he was *the* champion of the Antiochene side of the debate. His works represent that Christology worked out to its limit and perfection, which is why it seems to me more important for an understanding of Antiochene Christology to study the works of Theodoret than those fragments which remain of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius. The debt owed is due to his insistence on teaching a real and genuine humanity in the Incarnation. Without his witness and defence, it may well have been that Eutyches' type of Christology would have won the day. Most of 'in two *physeis* in one *prosopon* and *hypostasis*' comes straight from his pen.

It is that 'one *hypostasis*', however, that makes the difference. Here is upheld the basic point of Cyril and the Alexandrines: the subject of the Incarnation, the subject of the human experience, of human fear, temptation, obedience to the will of God, of human passion, death, and resurrection, is not just a human being in prosopic union with the Word's *physis*, but the Word himself, the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity. That is what Chalcedonian and post-Chalcedonian Christology affirm, and that is precisely what Theodoret could

not affirm. It is historically the fact that the Chalcedonian formula itself does not explicitly articulate the equation of its one *hypostasis* with the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God. This specific equation had to await the Christology of Leontius of Jerusalem, Justinian, and the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553.[1] On the other hand, if asked directly the question of whether their one *hypostasis* was to be identified with the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God, would the overwhelmingly Cyrillian majority of bishops at Chalcedon have answered negatively? The entire point of their Christology was that the one subject of the Incarnation was the Word.

In recent decades much has been made of the contribution from the Antiochene school in insisting on a real and full humanity in the Christ. That is as it should be. But it should be recognized—as I hope this study has shown—that the Antiochene two-subject Christology is thoroughly rooted in a doctrine of God that insists on God's absolute immutability and impassibility. It is true that the Antiochenes stressed that for a real redemption of humanity to have occurred in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, there had to be a free human response, a real human temptation. But they went from that point to join it to a doctrine of God's being, God's immutability and impassibility, that necessitates two subjects and, if we dare use such terms these days, two Sons. Is it really necessary or desirable to do that? Need modern Christology remain mired in the concrete hardness of the Arian syllogism's minor premiss? Is it not possible that the Cyrillianism of both Ephesus and Chalcedon might not be just as interesting to us? Must we limit

[1] Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, ii: *From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590–604)*, Part II: *The Church of Constantinople in the Sixth Century*, in collaboration with Theresia Hainthaler, trans. into English by John Cawte and Pauline Allen (London: Mowbray & Co.; Louisville, K.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), argues that Leontius of Jerusalem introduced the specific concept of the *henosis* of the two *physeis* in the one *hypostasis* of the Word, pp. 271–312 (esp. pp. 276–82); then that in the work of the emperor Justinian during the Three Chapters controversy we find for the first time a complete interpretation of the union of divine and human *physeis* in the one divine *hypostasis* of the Word, pp. 419–38; and finally that the Fifth Ecumenical Council of 553 appropriates Justinian's identification of the one *hypostasis* of Chalcedon with the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God, pp. 438–62. Grillmeier concludes that 'Because of this purified use of formulas the Fifth Ecumenical Council was not a weakening of Chalcedonian terminology, but its logical continuation. With regard to the basic formula "one *hypostasis* or person in two natures", the canons of 553 belonged to the history of strict Chalcedonianism, because they were not set in competition with the *mia-physis* formula. Nevertheless the use and application of the main concepts were clearer and more unambiguous than at Chalcedon. The one *hypostasis* or *substantia* as such was anchored in the pre-existent Logos; to him, as the ultimate subject, Christ's human nature was united *sub ratione subsistentiae*; the assumption into this one *hypostasis* of the human nature which did not exist in itself was formally the event of the incarnation or, seen from above, the self-communication of this Logos hypostatically to the ensouled flesh, by the Logos creating this flesh for himself', pp. 456–7. Grillmeier provides a summary conclusion of sixth-century Christology on pp. 503–13.

the Word to an impassibility and immutability that are consistent with Neoplatonic convictions, but which are distant from us, distant from the biblical God who cares, who enters into human pain and suffering. The God who can remain who he is, who can remain God, whose eternalness and being are not threatened by anything seen or unseen, but who can take into his own life all that it is to be truly human, who can enter into living humanly, enter himself into our history—Cyril's Word—is to me infinitely more appealing than the God who can enter only into prosopic union with one of us because otherwise he would stop being God. There is something about Eranistes' Word who can suffer impassibly, who is the subject and experiencer of the pain and death on the cross, that is infinitely more appealing than Theodoret's God. There is a great debt of gratitude that we owe to Theodoret of Cyrus for his insistence that Jesus Christ is an actual human being, a real human life, lived with genuinely human growth, psychology, temptation, fear, death, and dependence upon God for the life of resurrection and transformation. On the other hand, his picture of God is sterile. The second *hypostasis* of the Triune God, the Only-Begotten of the Father, who shares the same *ousia* and *physis*, is, in the Christology that follows Chalcedon, able to assume into his *hypostasis*, into his life, into his person, all that is truly human, the human life of Jesus of Nazareth, because he is not only using that life but *is* that life, to have in himself, in that one person-*hypostasis*, all that it is to be God and to have lived humanly in our own history, or, to use the terms of that time, all the *idiōmata* of both *physeis*. The debate with Cyril drove Theodoret to develop Antiochene Christology as far as it would go. The difficulty is that it could not move beyond its own philosophical limitations.

APPENDIX I

Published Sources for the Letters of Theodoret

There are several sources for the letters of Theodoret which are conveniently available to us. One is found in the collected works of Theodoret published in J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus ... Series Graeca* (Paris, 1859–64), vols. 80–4, wherein the correspondence is in vol. 83, cols. 1173 ff. These five volumes (*PG*, 80–4) basically republish in vols. 80–3 the *Opera Omnia Theodoreti Cyrensis Episcopi Post Recensionem Jacobi Sirmondi*, originally published in Paris in 1642. Vol. 84 consists of additional attributions to Theodoret, sometimes inaccurately, and dissertations on aspects of his life, works, faith, etc. by the Jesuit Jean Garnier. He republished Sirmond's 4 vols. and his fifth under his own name and Sirmond's as editors in *Theodoreti Episcopi Cyri Opera Omnia*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1684). These in turn were republished by J. Schulze in the eighteenth century: Jean Garnier (ed.), *B. Theodoreti Episcopi Cyri Opera ex Recensione Iacobi Sirmondi denuo edidit ... Ioann. Ludov. Schulze*, 5 vols. (Halae, 1769–74). It is this text which reappears in Migne.

Thus in *PG*, 83, we have the epistles in the *Collectio Sirmondiana*, or Epistles 1–147, plus more immediately following from the so-called *Auctarium* of Garnier, numbered 147–81. Sirmond had removed Epistle 147 in the MSS to an appendix because he doubted its authenticity, causing thereby a discrepancy between his enumeration and that of the MSS which has remained in all the editions until that of Y. Azéma (cf. below), and so the double accounting for Epistle 147 above. It is customary in recent literature on Theodoret to enumerate these epistles from Migne with Arabic numberals.

The most recent critical edition of the correspondence of Theodoret is Theodoret de Cyr, *Correspondance*, trans. into French by Yvan Azéma, in vols. 40 (Collection Sakkélion), 98 and 111 (Collection Sirmond), and 429 (Collections conciliaires) of *Sources Chrétiennes* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1955 (2nd edn. 1982), 1964, 1965, 1998). In vols. 98 and 111, Azéma provides a critical Greek text, with French translation on the facing pages, of the *Collectio Sirmondiana*, or Epistles 1–147. He further demonstrates the authenticity of Epistles 150, 151, 171, and 169 from *acta* of the Ecumenical Councils. The first three appear in Garnier's *Auctarium* in Greek, but Epistle 169 is given there only in Latin. The Greek text is now available in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. i, part 7, pp. 79–80. In *SC*, 40 Azéma published the letters of Theodoret discovered in *Codex Patmensis* 706 by J. Sakkélion in 1885 at Patmos. Of the fifty-two letters, five appear in *Collectio Sirmondiana*, leaving forty-seven new letters, which Azéma enumerates as Epistles I–LII. Then there are thirty-three letters in the Latin *Collectio Casinensis*, now available in *ACO*, Tom. I, vol. iv. One of these corresponds to Epistle 171, leaving us thirty-two otherwise unknown letters in Latin. In vol. *SC*, 429 Azéma republishes the letters of Theodoret gleaned from conciliar collections, viz.

Epistles 150, 151, 171, and 169, together with the letters in *Collectio Casinensis*, with Greek or Latin texts on the left pages and a French translation on the right.

To avoid unnecessarily complicated footnotes, I follow the now common practice of citing simply the epistle number. Epistles 1–147 may be found either in *SC*, 98 and 111, or in *PG*, 83: 1173 ff. Epistles 148–81 are found in Garnier's *Auctarium*, following directly upon Epistle 147 in *PG*, 83. When I need to refer to the *ACO* text of these, I cite the proper reference to it. Epistles I–LII are in *SC*, 40. Reference to the epistles in *Collectio Casinenesis* are cited by their *ACO* source. An English translation of Epistles 1–181, made from the texts of Sirmond and Garnier, is published in *NPNF*, iii. 250–348. Citations in English of the epistles in this work are normally taken from this *NPNF* translation, although sometimes I make some changes in the translation, particularly where there are differences between the Greek text in Migne and Azéma.

APPENDIX II

Some Brief Remarks on the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria

Those interested in Cyril's use of the *mia physis* (or *mia hypostasis*) formula should see J. van den Dries, *The Formula of St Cyril of Alexandria μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγου σεσ αρκωμένη* (Rome, 1939). For the relationship and use of *hypostasis* and *physis* in Cyril's Christology, see Aloys Grillmeier and Heinrich Bacht (eds.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart*, i (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1951), 170 n. 15; and M. Richard, 'L'Introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la théologie de l'incarnation', *Mélanges de Science Religieuse*, 2 (1945), 243–52. To justify in any sort of thorough manner my interpretation of Cyril's Christology, especially in Ch. 5, would require a monograph or more in itself. I refer the reader to Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, i: *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, 2nd ed. rev. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975), pp. 472–83, and Richard A. Norris, 'Christological Models in Cyril of Alexandria', *Studia Patristica*, 13, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, 116 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1975), pp. 255–68, articles which substantially agree with the conclusions and model of Cyril's Christology which I sketch out in Ch. 5 and use to interpret Cyril's second and third dogmatic letters and anathemas. Other recent works that in general confirm my interpretation of Cyril's Christology are M.-O. Boulnois, *Le Paradoxe trinitaire chez Cyrille d'Alexandrie*, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Serie Antiquité, 143 (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1994); John A. McGuckin, *St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy, Its History, Theology, and Texts*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 23; (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1994); Norman Russell (ed. and trans.), *Cyril of Alexandria* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); Steven A. McKinion, *Words, Imagery, and the Mystery of Christ: A Reconstruction of Cyril of Alexandria's Christology*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 55 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000); and Donald Fairbairn, *Grace and Christology in the Early Church*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Richard pointed out that Cyril was the first to use the expression *kath' hypostasin* to attempt to describe the character of the union of divinity and humanity in Christ and to defend this admitted innovation when Theodoret pointed out that it was unknown in either Scripture or the Fathers, on the grounds that it is often necessary to introduce new terms to confute new heresies. Richard concluded that Cyril uses *physis* and *hypostasis* more or less interchangeably, and that he uses either term, when considering the *union* of Word and humanity in Christ, to refer strictly not to essence or nature in the narrow sense of the Stoic doctrine of being, but to the concrete existent reality of the Word as a living being in himself. In other words, the union *kath'*

hypostasin is not one of changing or confusing God or the human assumed *ousia* or nature into each other or some new *tertium quid*, but rather signifies that the Word himself, the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God, took to himself kenotically all the properties of living a true and full human life, whatever that would require, without any ontological change in his divine nature.

Norris works this out in greater detail and with greater substantiation in his paper (cf. above: 'Christological Models in Cyril of Alexandria') which was first presented at the Oxford International Patristics Conference of 1971. He shows that in his *Quod Unus Sit Christus* (*PG*, 75), Cyril means by the *kenosis* of the Word in the Incarnation that (quoting Cyril) the Word 'abased himself by submitting ... to the limitations of the human condition', a conception Cyril uses regularly to explain what he means by 'the Word became flesh'. The Word does not cease being what he is in his divine *physis* when he is united to the human *physis* in the womb of the *Theotokos* (in this context using *physis* in the sense of 'nature'), but actually 'enters upon conditions of existence and action different from, and inferior to, those which belong to him as he is in himself' (Norris). Whatever is said in Scripture about the Christ is for Cyril predicated of the single reality or person of the Word, the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity, 'and it is this fact which establishes the unity of Christ' (Norris). His *mia physis* or *mia hypostasis* 'is based quite simply on his apprehension that the orthodox tradition as he knows it always speaks of the Incarnation as the entrance of the divine Word upon a new condition of existence, through birth as a man'. On the other hand, Norris shows how Cyril can quite easily talk of Christ as composed out of or of two elements, that is, to understand that in some way it is necessary to continue to speak of a divine *physis qua* nature and a human *physis qua* nature after the union, for Cyril insists that the divine nature of the Word does not endure change by being united to his humanity and that 'the completeness and reality of the human nature' must be maintained—i.e. body and rational soul. Thus for Cyril there is one subject, the divine Word, not the two we have found in the Antiochenes, for, to quote Norris:

> Cyril means to intimate that the unity of Christ has its principle in the nature or hypostasis of the divine Son. The one Person of Christ is not constituted by the union—that is, by a process of composition; rather, the personal unity of the divine Son is as it were extended to embrace the manhood of which he makes himself the subject. This notion is then made even more explicit by the introduction of the phrase ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν, which, as Cyril later tried to explain in reply to Theodoret, meant 'nothing else ... than only that the nature of the Logos—that is, the hypostasis, which is the Logos himself—was truly united to the human nature, without any change or confusion' (p. 263).

Norris's analysis of Cyril's Christological model is confirmed by Cyril's work *On the Incarnation of the Only-Begotten* (*PG*, 75: 1189–1254)—if the work is Cyril's. Quasten does not mention it in his article on Cyril, J. Quasten, *Patrology*, iii: *The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon* (Utrecht and Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers; Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1969), pp. 126–9, but it is listed as Cyril's in G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. xxi. Here it is quite clear that the Word is the subject of the completely and perfectly human activity and experiences of Christ. The one *hypostasis* of the Word takes to himself without in any way altering his divine being all the *idiomata* of a perfect humanity. At the same time Cyril can here also use the model of a composite Christ, but to the same effect:

Co-eternal with God the Father, God the Word, having taken the form of a servant, just as he is perfect in divinity, is himself also perfect in humanity, not compounded into one Christ and Lord and Son from divinity alone and flesh, but from two perfects—I mean humanity and divinity. (*PG*, 75: 1219–20)

Here in this work (e.g. *PG*, 75: 1236) *physis* can mean 'nature', and in this case Cyril confesses a fully perfect human *physis* of rational *psyche* and *soma* united to the perfect divine *physis* of the Word. This is no Apollinarian compound *physis* of Word substituting for the rational *psychē*, Word plus *sarx*.

Cyril's fundamental point is against the Arians: 'No one can truly understand God as Father unless he receives the Son as hypostasized and begotten' (*PG*, 75: 1204). At the Incarnation the second *hypostasis* of the Triune God takes into his life, into himself, human natural existence through that which is generated in the Virgin's womb—he experiences human birth, but in no way is he as divine *hypostasis* originated of the Virgin or transformed into what he is not (*PG*, 75: 1197–1201). The divine *physis* is as nature immutable just as that which is creature cannot participate as creature in the *idia* of the divine *physis*. Finally, Cyril carefully and thoroughly renounces the Arian–Apollinarian Word–sarx model of Christ, for that which is assumed to the Word is perfect humanity:

There are those who assert that the flesh united to the Logos is in want of a rational soul. They clothe the Logos in flesh alone, though it has received living and sensitive movement. They attribute to the Only-Begotten the function of mind and soul. They abhor predicating of that united to the Logos perfect man, perfect humanity of body and soul. They reject the ancient faith for human private opinion. (*PG*, 75: 1207)

As Norris found in *Quod Unus Sit Christus*, here when emphasizing the reality of unchanged divinity and fully rational and fleshly humanity, Cyril will say that the *henosis* is effected by a composition (*sygkeisthai*), which is ineffable, 'of unequal and unlike *physeis* into *henosis*' (*PG*, 75: 1207), which is inseparable. Interestingly, Cyril can also use the same kind of 'concrete' terms for the humanity which Theodoret used. For example (*PG*, 75: 1208), the temple united to the Word is an *anthropos teleios*, that is to say, 'flesh with a human and rational soul' (*sarx psyches tes anthropines kai logikes*). The union is a 'coming together (*syndrome*) from a perfect *anthropos* and from God the Word into union (*eis henoteta*)', leading Cyril to conclude:

Let us say that the Word of God has been brought in with and united to, in an ineffable and beyond-the-mind way, a perfect man, obviously as if of soul and body. We shall not have in mind two Sons but one and the same, being God in *physis*, appearing from the *ousia* of the Father, and in the last times of this age become man, begotten through

the Holy Virgin and worshipped by us ourselves and the holy angels according to the scriptures. (*PG*, 75: 1209–12)

To get to Grillmeier's point about Cyril, this is exactly what Grillmeier would call a Logos–Anthropos Christology, for the Word

used just as an organ his own flesh for the works of the flesh and the infirmities of that *physis*, though far from anything of blemish, and his own soul for human and blameless passions, for he is said to have hungered, to have submitted ... to frights and fears, grief and agony, and death on the cross. (*PG*, 75: 1213–18).

APPENDIX III

Glossary of Greek Terms with English Transliterations

Aionion, αἰώνιος, -α, -ον, eternal; from αἰών, an age, aeon, eternity.

Allos, ἄλλος, another one besides; ἄλλος ... καὶ ἄλλος appears frequently in the Alexandrine–Antiochene Christological debates over the question of whether there are two Sons (the Word and the assumed man Jesus) in Christ. See, e.g., Theodoret's exegesis of Isa. 49: 3 and Eph. 4: 9–10 in Ch. 6.

Analambano, ἀναλαμβάνω, to take up, assume. In the Incarnation the Word, the Son of God, took up human flesh (σάρκα ἀνέλαβε). The 'assumed man', or *homo assumptus*, of the Antiochene party is ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀναληφθείς.

Analepsis, ἀνάληψις, ἡ, taking up, assumption.

Anthropeia, ἀνθρωπεία, ἡ, human nature.

Anthropos, ἄνθρωπος, ὁ, a human being, humankind.

Anthropotes, ἀνθρωπότης, ἡ, humanity, human nature, the *physis* human nature.

Anthropotokos, ἀνθρωποτόκος, Mother of the human being, an Antiochene title for the Virgin Mary, in opposition to *Theotokos*.

Apathes, ἀπαθής, -ες, impassible; the name of the third dialogue of the *Eranistes*.

Aphtharsia, ἀφθαρσία, ἡ, incorruptibility.

Asygchytos, ἀσύγχυτος, -η, -ον, without confusion, unfused; the name Theodoret gives to the second dialogue in his *Eranistes*, the point of which is to demonstrate that the Word as divine *hypostasis* remains what he is, immutable God, and that he has assumed to himself in the Incarnation a real, full, actual humanity which remains what humanity is. The adverbial form of the word appears in the Chalcedonian Definition.

Atreptos, ἄτρεπτος, -η, -ον, immutable; this is the key word for the first dialogue of the *Eranistes*; it also appears in the Chalcdonian Definition.

Autos, αὐτός, the same one, the very one, the one himself.

Character, χαρακτήρ, ὁ, impress, stamp, features, appearance, figure; a 'particularizing characteristic' or *idion* which identifies a particular *hypostasis* from other *hypostaseis* of the same *physis*.

Christotokos, Χριστοτόκος, Christ-bearing, the Mother of Christ; a title for the Virgin Mary preferred by the Antiochenes in opposition to *Theotokos*.

Dikaiosune, δικαιοσύνη, ἡ, righteousness, justification.

Doxa, δόξα, ἡ, derived from δοκέω, to think, have an opinion, estimate, repute. Thus *doxa* can mean doctrine, system of belief, and also honour, distinction, glory, especially of the *Shechinah* (Septuagint of Exod. 16: 10) or the glory and dazzling splendour which in the Old and New Testaments is peculiar to God.

Eidos, εἶδος, τό, the individual.

Enanthropeo, ἐνανθρωπέω, to become human, to become incarnate; for Theodoret, God the Word is incarnate by assuming, or taking up, human nature, or the man: τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν λαβὼν ἐνανθρώπησε.

Enanthropesis, ἑνανθρώπησις, incarnation.

Energeia, ἐνέργεια, ἡ, activity, operation, working.

Eudokia, εὐδοκία, ἡ, good will, wilful intention.

Genos, γένος, τὸ, the species to which a *hypostasis* or individual subsistent belongs.

Hegemonikon, ἡγεμονικόν, τό, the governing, rational, decision-making part of the human being, the subject of consciousness; in *Graecarum Affectionum Curatio*, Book V, section 22, Theodoret uses *hegemonikon* to indicate the rational part of the psyche.

Henoo, ἑνόω to unite.

Henosis kath' hypostasin, ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν, hypostatic union, union at the level of *hypostasis* or within a *hypostasis*.

Heteros, ἕτερος, -α, -ον, other. The phrase *heteros* ... *kai heteros* is often employed by Theodoret to distinguish the Word from the assumed man, or humanity: ἕτερος ὁ ναός, καὶ ἕτερος ὁ ἐνοικῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θεὸς.

Homoousios, ὁμοούσιος, -α, -ον, of the same *ousia* or being.

Ho on, ὁ ὤν, he who is, I AM (the Name of God).

Hyios, υἱός, ὁ, son.

Hyle, ὕλη, ἡ, material, matter, the material sphere.

Hyparxis, ὕπαρξις, ἡ, existence, subsisting, being. Theodoret describes the three *hypostaseis* of the one *ousia* of God as 'modes of God's being': οἱ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόποι.

Hypokeimenon, ὑποκείμενον, τό, the subject of the experiences of an *hypostasis*, sometimes used by various Patristic authors as an equivalent of *hypostasis*. In Epistle 125 (from the first half of 450), Theodoret insists that the Word, being impassible, could not have experienced the passion on the cross, and that this necessitates predicating a passible, mortal *hypokeimenon*, or human subject, to experience the passion and death of the cross. On the other hand, *hypokeimenon* can be used as an equivalent of *ousia* to signify 'substrate', or substantial, indeterminate, and undefined matter.

Hypostasis, ὑπόστασις, ἡ, a particular, individual existent of a nature or *physis*.

Icon, εἰκών, ἡ, image; a 'particularizing characteristic', or *idion*, which identifies a particular *hypostasis* from other *hypostaseis* of the same *physis*.

Idion, idia, idioma, ἴδιον (or ἰδίαζον), ἴδια, τὸ ἰδίωμα, the particularizing characteristics, qualities, or properties which distinguish or differentiate the *hypostaseis*, subsistences, or individuals of a common nature or *physis* in the Stoic doctrine of being; these *idiomata* constitute the universal or *physis* into an *hypostasis* or particular existent of an *ousia-physis*.

Idiotes, ἰδιότης, ἡ, individuality.

Kata physin, κατὰ φύσιν, in regard to the nature; in our context used to attribute characteristics or activities of God the Word to him in his divine nature.

Kath' ousian, καθ' οὐσίαν, on the level of *ousia*, by nature.

Koine physis, κοινὴ φύσις, or sometimes κοινότης τῆς φύσεως, the universal or common nature in the Stoic doctrine of being.

Koine poiotes, κοινὴ ποιότης, the specifying quality or what is common to all those individuals who share the same *physis*, or nature, or species in the Stoic doctrine of being. All three *hypostaseis* of the triune God share the *koine poiotes* of divinity-*theotes*.

koinonia, κοινωνία, ἡ, fellowship, communion, partnership, joint ownership, participation in.

Koinos, κοινός, -ή, -όν, that which is common to all the members of a species or *physis*. For example, *theotes*, or divinity, is common or *koinon* to the *ousia-physis* of God and thus common to all of the three *hypostaseis* of the triune God.

Krasis, κρᾶσις, ἡ, union by mixture, such as a union by predominance as when a single drop of wine is mixed with an ocean of water, the two substances being mixed together interact with and on each other and are changed so that a *tertium quid* is the result of the mixture. When one of the two constituent elements predominates over the other, the relationship is like that between form and matter, and the weaker or lesser substance is in effect absorbed into the stronger. An alternative word for *krasis* is *mixis* (μίξις).

Krasis di' holon, κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων, used in the Stoic doctrine of being to denote a thorough interpenetration of the two constituent substances through each other, though each retained its own properties unimpaired. This kind of mixture of two physical substances was the analogy the Stoics used for the union of soul and body in the human *physis* and *hypostasis* to protect the immortal, rational soul from the mutability, corruptibility, and mortality of the body. Neoplatonic speculation used a modified concept of *krasis di' holon* as the best analogy of mixture available to discuss the union of body and soul: soul interpenetrates the body totally, enlivening it with its rational presence, enlightening it with life and mind, but the soul itself is not changed or altered or rendered passible or mortal through this union, in which its presence is intentional by a kind of declination of interest towards the body. In the second dialogue of the *Eranistes*, Theodoret makes use of the Neoplatonic reinterpretation of the Stoic doctrine of *krasis di' holon* to expound his concept of the union of soul and body in human beings and, by analogy, the union of divinity and humanity in the Christ.

Logikos, λογικός, -ή, -όν, rational.

Logos, Λόγος, ὁ, the Word.

Metabole, μεταβολή, ἡ, change, alteration.

Mia physis, μία φύσις; Cyril's key phrase μία φύσις [or ὑπόστασις] τοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη is often misleadingly translated as 'one *physis* [or *hypostasis*] of the Word incarnate', but the phrase is more accurately translated 'one enfleshed *physis* [or *hypostasis*] of the Word'. Cf. Ch. i, n. 65.

Morphe, μορφή, ἡ, form.

Neusis, νεῦσις, ἡ, inclination or declination; in Neoplatonism the rational soul is present to the body by *schesis*-relation or *neusis*-inclination of the soul toward the body.

Nous, νοῦς, ὁ, mind.

Oikeioo, ὀικειόω, to claim as a friend, make someone a kinsman. In the middle voice, ὀικειοῦμαι, to make one's own, identify oneself with, take upon oneself.

Ousia, ὀυσία, ἡ, being, the basic substrate to which qualifying form is added.

Parathesis, παράθεσις, ἡ, juxtaposition, Aristotle's *synthesis*; used by the Stoics, to denote a union of mere juxtaposition of the two elements in the union, side by side as it were, without any confusion.

Pathos, pathemata, πάθος, τό; παθήμα, -ατα, τό, suffering(s), passion(s).

Physike henosis, φυσικὴ ἕνωσις, a natural or composite union bringing into being one *physis* after the union: for example, the union of rational soul and body, two distinct *physeis* before the union, but one new *physis*, the human *physis*, after the union in one concrete existent or subsistent human being, or *hypostasis*.

Physikos, φυσικῶς, naturally.

Physis, φύσις, ἡ, a nature common to all the individual existents of a species.

Prosopon, πρόσωπον, τό face, countenance, mask, legal person; preferred by Theodoret to *hypostasis* to denote the three distinctions in the Triune God and the centre of unity between the divinity and humanity of Christ.

Psyche, ψυχή, ἡ the soul, or vitalizing part of a living being.

Sarx, σάρξ, ἡ, flesh. *Sesarkomene*, σεσαρκωμένη, is the perfect passive participle of *sarkoo*, σαρκόω to make flesh, and is used more or less interchangeably by Theodoret with *enanthropeo*, ἐνανθρωπέω, become a human being, or the noun form *enathropesis*, ἐνανθρώπησις, for 'incarnation'.

Schema, σχῆμα, τό, shape, form; a 'particularizing characteristic' or *idion* which identifies a particular *hypostasis* from other *hypostaseis* of the same *physis*.

Schesis, σχέσις, ἡ, relation; in Neoplatonism the rational soul is present to the body by *schesis* or *neusis*, νεῦσις (inclination).

Skene, σκηνή, ἡ, tent.

Soma, σῶμα, τό, the body.

Sygchysis, σύγχυσις, ἡ, the kind of mixture in the Stoic doctrine of being in which the constituent substances are altered into each other or into a third new entity, which cannot be dissolved or analysed into its original two elements again (unlike Aristotle's *krasis*, which could be); a *confusio*, or mixture, that confuses two things into something new in which the two previous realities cannot be distinguished. Theodoret uses the term to accuse Cyril of uniting the Word with the assumed humanity in Christ by confusing or mixing the divine nature of the Word and the the human nature into a *tertium quid* which is neither divine nor human. The word is derived from συγχέω, to confound. This is not a confusion in the sense of misunderstanding, but of mixing two or more realities to form a new reality.

Synapheia, συνάφεια, ἡ, a union by conjunction, a setting alongside each other of two *physeis* in such a way that the two natures are not changed or confused into each other or into a new third nature, or *tertium quid*. It is Theodoret's preferred term for the union of the divine *physis* and *hypostasis* of God the Word with the human *physis* of the assumed human being, or *hypostasis*, in the one *prosopon* of the 'Christ'.

Synthesis, σύνθεσις, ἡ, a union in which very small parts of the material forming it are juxtaposed, such as when two sorts of grain are poured together. The two materials remain each what it was; the mixture is inert.

Theia, θεία, ἡ, divinity.

Theotes, θεότης, ἡ, deity, divinity, the *physis* of God.

Theotokos, θεοτόκος, God-bearing, Mother of God, the one who gives birth to the one who is God the Word, an Alexandrine title for the Virgin Mary which was given dogmatic standing by the Council of Ephesus in 431.

Zoon, ζῷον, τό, that which is alive, the living thing.

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Index